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Abstract
Humanity’s greatest challenge is to improve the living standards of billions of people
across the world without surpassing the planetary boundaries, and especially within the
carbon space compatible with a 2°C future. Mitigation actions are thus required to
create synergies and address climate and development goals simultaneously. It has
been recognised that technology-led mitigation measures can accomplish this task, as
long as they are also complemented with demand-side measures. Several bodies of
literature have emphasised, for example, the urgent need to reduce consumption
levels, particularly in industrialised economies. However, in the context of an ever more
globalised world, the climate benefits delivered by demand-side mitigation policies can
be offset by the existence of potential negative consequences in developing nations via
international trade. This thesis assesses the compatibility between climate change
mitigation actions taken in industrialised nations and improving development prospects
in the developing world from a demand-side approach. The study contributes to the
existing knowledge base by providing answers to four separate but related research
questions that were proposed to examine relevant aspects associated with this issue.
The results reveal that CO2 emissions have increased monotonically with income
without showing signs of having decoupled over time. The findings also show that while
curbing final demand for imports in developed countries can contribute to reduce their
consumption-based emissions and free carbon space, they can also curtail the
development opportunities available to the global South. Moreover, specific policy
instruments, like border carbon adjustments, can potentially distort trade flows and
jeopardise development in developing nations. Finally, the analysis unveils that the
available carbon space compatible with a 2°C target is insufficient to deliver significant
improvements in living standards in less developed countries given the continuity of the
status quo. The sharing of the development and carbon spaces should be done in an
equitable manner. The longer it takes developed countries to significantly cut their
emissions, the smaller is the carbon space available particularly to the poorest nations
who need it the most. The conclusions from this work evidence the necessity to
formulate alternative development pathways capable of facilitating a transition towards
an equitable, low-carbon, high-developed, and sustainable global economy.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
As its title indicates, this thesis offers an assessment of the compatibility between
climate change mitigation and global development. Studies of this nature have been
seldom conducted from a consumption perspective and the academic literature in the
area is still scarce. This research thus constitutes an initial effort to understand the
trade-offs that exist between undertaking mitigation actions in industrialised countries
to avoid dangerous climate change and improving development prospects across
developing nations from a demand-side approach. This introductory chapter provides
the rationale for the study in section 1.1. It also highlights the importance of carrying
out this investigation and offers a brief background on the subject. Section 1.2 presents
the overarching aim and research questions. Finally, section 1.3 explains the general
chapter structure and the organisation of the thesis.
1.1. Rationale of the study
1.1.1. The nexus between climate and development
The evidence gathered in the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC, 2013) reveals that most of the observed increase in global
average temperature since pre-industrial times is extremely likely (i.e. >95%
probability) due to the growing atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases
(GHGs) derived from human activities (see: Cook et al., 2013). Throughout the last
century, global GHG emissions increased significantly, particularly in the last decades.
These grew around 70% between 1970 and 2004, whereas carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions, the most important anthropogenic GHG, rose by about 80% during the
same period, mainly associated with energy supply, transport and industry (IPCC,
2007b). Since the year 2000, total CO2 emissions increased on average 3.1% on an
annual basis, and recent estimations suggest they were 58% greater in 2012 than in
1990 (Le Quéré et al., 2012). If these trends were to persist, it is likely (>66%
probability) that future global warming would augment more than 2°C above the pre-
industrial level (see: Friedlingstein et al., 2011; IPCC, 2013; Peters et al., 2013).
Notwithstanding uncertainties about potential effects, there is high agreement among
the scientific community (IPCC, 2007a) that this would greatly increase the risk of
climate-related impacts on human and natural systems, in some of which irreversible
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changes could take place (e.g. melting of ice sheets, extinction of species, alteration of
ocean water circulation, etc.). Thus, in order to keep global warming below a 2°C
threshold in the long-run and mitigate these effects, immediate and considerable
actions are required to keep the average atmospheric CO2 concentration below 450
parts per million (ppm). The amount of cumulative emissions that is compatible with
such a target, what in this thesis is defined as the available carbon space, is
diminishing at a fast rate.
The impacts of long-term climate variability will differ across geographical regions and
economic sectors. It has been recognised that the most adverse effects will occur in
the developing world. Specifically, the poorest, underdeveloped societies will be most
at risk due to their high exposure to climate events and their low adaptive capacities,
mainly in Africa and also in Asia and Latin America (see: Huq et al., 2004). Regarding
sectors, agricultural activities, for example, are expected to experience declines in crop
productivity at lower latitudes due to changes in temperature and precipitation. Other
sectors closely linked with climate-sensitive resources (e.g. water, forests, fish, etc.),
including industrial, are equally threatened (IPCC, 2007a).
Climate change thus exerts an important influence on sustainable development.
Approximately 85% of the world’s population are situated in the developing world and
about 40% live with less than $2 dollars a day. Improvements in development,
however, have been achieved during the last two decades, reflecting what the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2013) calls the rise of the South. The first
Millennium Development Goal (MDG), for instance, has been accomplished (UN,
2012a). The proportion of people living in extreme poverty on less than $1.25 dollars a
day was halved since 1990 from 47% to 24%. In addition, more people around the
world have access to health and education services. Nonetheless, the extent to which
human development opportunities can still be improved across the planet, what is
defined in this thesis as the necessary development space, is considerable. Large
efforts need to be undertaken especially in the 49 poorest countries, classified by the
UN as least developed (LDCs) (see: Guillaumont, 2009)1. As these nations enhance
their development levels, they will exert more pressure on the environment. Larger
populations and higher rates of economic growth per capita will be associated with
more GHG emissions, accelerating climate change which, in turn, can threaten their
development.
1 A list of the countries that comprise the group of LDCs can be found in Appendix A.1.1.
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There is, in this sense, a two-way relationship between climate change and sustainable
development (Beg et al., 2002; Robinson et al., 2006). Climate variability influences the
basis for economic and human development, while economic and social decisions
determine the generation of GHG emissions and the adaptability of societies to
different climate regimes. Hence, the IPCC (2007b) has suggested that policies
pursuing sustainable development and climate change mitigation and adaptation are to
be mutually reinforcing. In other words, sustainable development involves realising the
necessary development space within the limits of the available carbon space (Kartha et
al., 2010).
1.1.2. The role of technology in climate change mitigation
The IPCC (2007b, p. 818) defines the term mitigation as those policies aimed at
reducing GHG emissions and enhancing sinks, placing an important emphasis on
“technological change and substitution that reduce resource inputs and emissions per
unit of output”. In national and international policy agendas, mitigation actions have
mainly focused on technological solutions, considering the use of low carbon energy
sources and less carbon-intensive materials and techniques as key factors. However,
as recognised by the IPCC (2007b, p. 701), “mitigation options should not be limited to
technology” and cover a broader spectrum of economic and social policies. Such
policies can address factors like population (P) and affluence (A) which, recalling the
IPAT equation (Ehrlich and Holdren, 1971; Commoner, 1972), jointly determine the
degree of an environmental impact (I) in conjunction with technology (T).
Technological change exerts an influential role on both the environment and
development (Huesemann and Huesemann, 2008). Combustion technologies based on
fossil fuels, for instance, have allowed societies to become more productive, to change
the structure of their economies from agrarian to industrial, and to improve their
standards of living since the pre-industrial era. However, these same technologies
have significantly contributed to global climate change. In the face of this phenomenon,
the paradigm of sustainable development requires technological improvements and
substitution of inputs to preserve the integrity of the environment, while enhancing
economic and social assets (Beder, 1994). In other words, there is the need for
technology-led mitigation policies that have the dual ability to address climate and
development aims, particularly in developing countries. In this respect, the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) constitutes an example of a mitigation scheme that
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generates these synergies (see: Olsen, 2007). Developing nations receive
development support from industrialised economies (i.e. Annex I2) in the form of
cleaner technology options, while the latter gain by meeting part of their reduction
targets.
Despite the relevance of technology as a mitigation solution and the optimism
displayed by some policymakers and academics (e.g. Pacala and Socolow, 2004;
Vollebergh and Kemfert, 2005), there is a growing uncertainty regarding the pace of
future technological change required to deliver on time the deep emissions reductions
compatible with a 2°C pathway (Beder, 1994; Schor, 2005; Flavin and Engelman,
2009). Jackson (2009) offers some estimates based on the IPAT equation, assuming a
global contraction and convergence towards equal per capita emissions. He suggests
that the global average carbon intensity (i.e. emissions per unit of output) would need
to register a 21-fold improvement by 2050 given that population and income per capita
grew annually at rates of 0.7% and 1.5%, respectively. The necessary improvements
could even be 130 times larger if developed and developing countries possessed the
current average European Union’s (EU) per capita income growing at 2% per annum.
This implies a pace of technological change at least ten times faster than the one
present today to offset the current trends of population and economic growth.
Moreover, it implies overcoming lock-in effects and diffusion barriers (e.g. market,
regulatory, trade, etc.) that affect the rapid and effective deployment of technological
solutions (see: Arthur, 1989; Unruh, 2000; Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006).
Regarding geo-engineering options to remove CO2 from the atmosphere and blocking
solar radiation, the IPCC (2007b, p. 15) has recognised that these technologies
“remain largely speculative and unproven, and with the risk of unknown side-effects”
(also see: Bengtsson, 2006; Boyd, 2008; Fox and Chapman, 2011). Authors such as
Huesemann (2006, p. 539) thus believe that mitigation technologies have the potential
to deliver the required emission cuts “only if population and economic growth are halted
without delay” (also see: Anderson and Bows, 2011). Technology, in this sense, is
deemed as a necessary, but not sufficient condition for combating climate change, as
well as other environmental problems, and achieving sustainability.
2 These are the parties to the UNFCCC listed in the Annex I, formed by industrialised
economies and economies in transition, including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States,
and several Central and Eastern European States. See complete list in Appendix A.1.4.
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1.1.3. The need to address consumption
Population and affluence are significant drivers of emissions (Rosa and Dietz, 2012).
The former is particularly relevant in developing countries, where population growth
rates are still far from reaching stabilisation (Jiang and Hardee, 2011). An expansion of
income per capita, on the other hand, has mostly driven the increase of emissions in
industrialised nations (Hamilton and Turton, 2002), and has become increasingly
relevant in emerging economies (e.g. China, India, Brazil, etc.) as the purchasing
power of their societies has improved during the last decades (Hubacek et al., 2007).
However, both population and affluence are seldom addressed in policy debates on
climate change mitigation, due to political sensitivities and the associated social and
economic costs. Reducing fertility rates, for instance, can contribute to sustainable
development by alleviating poverty and diminishing pressure on natural resources
(Petroni, 2009; Das Gupta et al., 2011), but this action can generate negative social
effects when the policies are too stringent, as in the case of China (Feng et al., 2013).
Nevertheless, none of the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMA) plans
reported by developing countries to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) consider the use of population controls. Moreover, none of
them address the issue of affluence, since developing countries generally argue in
climate negotiations that they have the right to develop and continue rising their
incomes and consuming more in per capita terms (see: Jotzo, 2005). On the other
hand, in Annex I nations, whose populations have stabilised but whose income per
capita levels have led their economies to surpass sustainable scales (Wackernagel et
al., 2002), national mitigation strategies do not include measures related to capping
affluence and consumption.
Neoclassical economics has traditionally dealt with the relationship between affluence
and environmental quality through the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis
(e.g. Grossman and Krueger, 1991). The EKC basically states that environmental
degradation improves after income per capita reaches a certain level during the
process of economic development. Said differently, becoming rich can be a potential
solution to environmental problems (Beckerman, 1992), which represents a more
attractive option for policymakers. However, there is no conclusive empirical evidence
indicating that CO2 emissions per capita have declined with rising affluence (Galeotti et
al., 2006).
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Consumption is a function of affluence. A higher disposable income is usually
associated with a higher amount of consumer spending, and this can be observed on a
global scale. The more affluent nations house around 15% of the world’s population
and account for approximately 75% of total consumption expenditure (Assadourian,
2010). Their high levels of consumption per capita constitute the main driver for
increasing emissions (Sanwal, 2009). It is estimated that industrialised countries are
accountable for about 7.5 out of every 10 tonnes of CO2 that have been emitted since
the start of the industrial era (Raupach et al., 2007; Wei et al., 2012). Consumption in
developing countries, on the other hand, has been growing significantly by almost a
factor of 2.5 since 1990, generating a considerable amount of emissions.
Acknowledging this situation, a call was made in Rio’s Agenda 21 (UN, 1992) to
encourage changes in unsustainable consumption patterns, particularly in wealthy
nations, and take action against the global imbalances of consumption in order to
reverse environmental degradation. This call was taken into account by the IPCC
(2007b, p. 12), recognising that changes in lifestyle and consumption patterns “can
contribute to climate change mitigation across all sectors”.
Demand-side climate change mitigation is defined in this thesis as those measures that
pursue cuts in consumption-induced emissions by modifying consumption patterns
and/or reducing consumption of goods and services. The label demand-side is used so
as to distinguish these actions from technology-led mitigation, which usually focus on
the production process or supply-side, as well as purely technological geo-engineering
options. Demand-side policy tools can take the form of market-based (e.g. carbon
consumption taxes and subsidies), regulatory (e.g. bans) and information instruments
(e.g. carbon-labelling, awareness campaigns). It is important to recognise, however,
that production and consumption are opposite sides of the same coin. In this sense,
some demand-side instruments can produce indirect effects in supply, just as supply-
side measures can cause indirect effects in demand when the costs are transferred to
the final consumer. For instance, a carbon consumption tax applied directly to
consumers may dissuade them from acquiring a certain product. Consequently, it may
also represent an incentive for the producers to manufacture it in a less carbon-
intensive manner. Some demand-side schemes are already in operation. For example,
the UK and France have initiated carbon-labelling programmes that are currently
voluntary, but can become mandatory in the future. Such initiatives seek to inform
consumers about the carbon content of products (i.e. the amount of CO2 generated
during all stages of production and distribution) and are thus motivated or discouraged
to buy them. This is particularly significant in industrialised nations, where many of the
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basic consumer goods are of foreign origin, often produced in carbon-intensive regions
not subject to costs derived from carbon abatement regulations.
The dependence of industrialised nations on foreign goods has increased during the
last decades, making them net-importers of emissions through international trade.
Conversely, the developing world has become on average a net exporter (Peters and
Hertwich, 2008a; Davis and Caldeira, 2010). Following a consumption-based
approach, Peters et al. (2011b) estimate that net emission transfers from developing to
wealthy nations grew by a factor of 4 from 1990 to 2008, which exceeds the reductions
stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol, and are expected to continue growing. Allocating
emissions to countries where the products are consumed (i.e. consumption-based
carbon accounting), rather than where they are produced (i.e. territorial or production
perspective), thus stresses the responsibility of carbon-importing nations for adopting
demand-side mitigation actions along with technological solutions with the aim of
achieving a 2°C future.
Reductions in consumption and changes in consumption patterns (e.g. preference for
locally-produced rather than for foreign products) in industrialised nations, however,
can generate negative effects in developing countries via international trade. Since
1990, the volume of trade (i.e. imports and exports) has grown three times faster than
global gross domestic product (GDP), which reflects the increasing globalisation of
markets and the interdependence of nations. The international division of labour and
the geographical fragmentation of production have intensified (Lanz et al., 2011).
Different regions and countries are linked by an intricate network of trade interrelations.
It is common that products are manufactured with a range of raw materials extracted
from diverse regions. These products are then assembled in some other nations, and
then redistributed to yet other countries for consumption. The separation of extraction,
production and consumption, often by great distances, is a standard trait of the world’s
economy (Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001). The rise of global production chains and the
profound interdependency imply that changes in demand in one country may induce
effects in several other economies.
1.1.4. The need for further research
The need for making consumption more sustainable is well documented in various
bodies of academic literature. The evidence indicates that humanity has surpassed the
planet’s carrying capacity (Wackernagel et al., 2002) and transgressed the balance of
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the Earth’s ecosystems (Rockström et al., 2009). Global warming is just one of the
symptoms of unsustainable consumption, along with the depletion of natural resources,
biodiversity loss (Lenzen et al., 2012) and other environmental problems. As was
explained, numerous academics and international organisations have recognised the
need to address consumption. Steady-state economics (e.g. Daly, 1974) and the
degrowth movement (e.g. Latouche, 2006), for example, advocate for the necessity of
tackling overconsumption, especially in wealthy nations, either by stabilising it or
applying overall reductions. However, the economic consequences of reducing
consumption levels and changing consumption patterns have not been sufficiently
analysed. In particular, the potential impacts on the developing world have been
scarcely explored. This gap in the knowledge has thus motivated the undertaking of the
present research.
Humanity’s greatest challenge is to keep generating the development that the world
needs (i.e. necessary development space) within the planetary boundaries, and
especially within the carbon budget compatible with a 2°C future (i.e. available carbon
space) to prevent dangerous climate change. The sharing of the development and
carbon spaces should be done in an equitable manner. Instigating mitigation-induced
changes in consumption in industrialised nations can produce developmental costs in
poorer regions, but it can also deliver potential climate and environmental benefits, and
leave more carbon space to the developing world. In this respect, it is uncertain to what
extent the available carbon space, which is to be shared between both groups of
countries, will be large enough to fulfil higher levels of development in developing
economies. This would primarily depend on the scale and pace of the emission
reductions undertaken by industrialised nations. The longer it takes the latter countries
to significantly cut their emissions, the smaller is the carbon space available particularly
to the poorest nations who need it the most. Steinberger and Roberts (2010) argue that
human development has been gradually decoupling from per capita emissions, and
that low levels of energy and carbon can satisfy human development needs. However,
this would require substantive efforts to restructure the global economy. Even if wealthy
nations achieved emissions cuts of 80% by 2050 relative to 1990 (see: Elzen et al.,
2013) by reducing their per capita consumption-based emissions by about 2% per
annum, the amount of development that developing nations could attain with their
remaining share of carbon space could be limited given their current economic
structures. This aspect has also not been explored in the climate change and economic
literature and requires further study.
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Understanding the trade-offs between implementing mitigation actions in industrialised
nations and achieving improvements in development in the rest of the world is thus
important, as unilateral policy decisions can undermine the potential synergies created
between climate and development goals. Moreover, analysing the trade-offs is relevant
to inform the future direction and design of alternative low-carbon development
pathways.
1.2. Aim and research questions
This thesis was inspired by a question formulated by Hans Opschoor (2010, p. 7) as a
topic that requires further examination: “How will mitigative actions by developed
countries affect development in developing and emerging economies?” This question
allows a range of possible answers depending on the nature of the mitigation options
and the different aspects of development. Generally, existing responses have focused
on addressing the beneficial features of creating synergies between climate change
mitigation and economic development priorities, often referring to schemes like the
CDM and the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD)
programme. However, as was explained in the previous section, the climate benefits
delivered by demand-side mitigation policies can be offset by the probable existence of
negative consequences in the developing world. These effects have been seldom
considered and there is a lack of studies centred on the subject. In this sense, the
overarching aim of this study is to assess the compatibility between climate
change mitigation actions in industrialised nations and improving development
prospects in the developing world from a demand-side approach.
Due to the complexity involved and the scope of the overarching aim, four separate but
related aspects associated with it were chosen to be explored, each guided by a
specific research question. Examining these aspects provides useful insights into the
problem and helps to fulfil the overarching aim.
Research question 1: Is the Environmental Kuznets Curve for carbon valid from a
consumption-based approach?
Exploring this question serves a starting point for this research since, as was explained
in section 1.1.3, if the EKC for carbon were valid, then there would be no trade-offs
between achieving emission cuts and attaining economic development. A potential
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policy would then be to promote throughout the world rises in income per capita. As will
be explained in Chapter 2, there are no conclusive findings about the applicability of
the EKC to CO2 emissions. By using cross-country panel data for consumption-based
emissions and econometric methods, more robust evidence is sought in order to
accept or reject the EKC. The results derived from the analysis, apart from validating
the hypothesis, also show the extent to which the income-emissions relationship has
evolved over time in industrialised and developing nations from a consumption-based
perspective.
Research question 2: How much value added and wages paid to skilled and unskilled
labour in developing countries are associated with every unit of CO2 that is mitigated in
different sectors through reductions in consumption in industrialised nations?
Demand-side mitigation measures designed to change/reduce consumption are
deemed as essential to complement technology-led mitigation actions in order to
achieve a 2°C target. However, in the context of a globalised planet, changes in
demand for imports registered in industrialised nations can bring negative
developmental consequences in the global South. This research question addresses
the trade-offs between achieving cuts in consumption-based emissions in wealthy
countries and attaining economic benefits through international trade in developing
economies. Variables relevant for promoting economic growth and improving welfare,
such as value added and wages to skilled and unskilled labour, are used here as
proxies for development indicators. In this sense, the amount of value added and
wages that are associated with every unit of consumption-based emissions are
quantified. This examination allows identifying which countries and sectors are more
vulnerable to changes in the flow of traded goods. Moreover, the findings can inform
future demand-side mitigation policies regarding ways in which to avoid affecting
vulnerable nations.
Research question 3: How much value added and wages paid to skilled and unskilled
labour in developing countries are associated with CO2 emissions that would be
captured in different sectors through the implementation of border carbon adjustments
in industrialised nations?
This question refers to the analysis of a specific market-based mitigation policy
instrument, which in basic terms constitutes an import tariff. Border carbon adjustment
(BCA) schemes are designed to address carbon-leakage effects and competitiveness
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issues, concepts that will be extensively explained in the next chapter. Although some
economists believe that in theory BCAs are not likely to distort trade (Whalley, 1979),
other authors suggest that they can lead to losses in efficiency and welfare among
exporting nations (e.g. Atkinson et al., 2011). Some developing countries have
opposed to their implementation, asserting that they represent trade barriers and shift
the mitigation costs onto the developing world (Davidson Ladly, 2012). Discussions are
happening in some Annex I nations, regarding the adoption of this policy instrument.
The US has stated that it will not implement an emissions trading scheme without a
provision for BCAs to compensate for differences in production costs with respect to
countries with no abatement schemes. Thus, it is relevant to quantify the trade-offs
between the amount of emissions that a BCA scheme can capture from the developing
world and its effects on the creation of value added and skilled and unskilled wages.
Research question 4: To what extent can human development be improved in the
developing world within the limits of the available carbon space as defined by the RCP
pathways given the continuity of the status quo?
This question addresses the challenge of the equitable sharing of the development and
carbon spaces explained in the first section of this chapter. As said, considerable
efforts still need to be undertaken to fulfil the necessary development space within the
constraints imposed by the available carbon space. The longer it takes industrialised
countries to undertake significant and sustained emissions reductions, the less carbon
space will be left for the poorest regions. It is uncertain, however, to what extent human
development could be improved with the remaining carbon budget in different areas of
the planet given the continuity of the current model of economic development. By using
territorial and consumption emissions and historical carbon elasticities of human
development, potential improvements in the human development index (HDI) by 2050
are calculated for various groups of developing countries according to the new
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) included in the Fifth Assessment
Report (IPCC, 2013). The so-called RCP3-PD, also known as RCP2.6, is of special
interest, since it describes an emissions pathway that is compatible with a 2°C target
(van Vuuren et al., 2007). This analysis does not attempt to make a forecast, explore
alternative pathways or examine different allocation schemes. Rather, it seeks to obtain
insights about the historical relationship between human development and CO2
emissions and stress the importance of focusing on the dual climate-development
challenge in an integrated and more equitable manner. The findings, moreover, can
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help to build more comprehensive future emission pathways, as well as to inform global
and regional climate negotiations.
1.3. Organisation of the thesis
Chapter 2 links diverse bodies of literature necessary to achieve the objective of the
thesis. It offers a critical review of the existing literature revolving around the topics of
climate change, consumption, trade and development, and explores the gaps in
knowledge related to the research questions presented in the previous section.
Chapter 3 then concentrates on the methods and data, explaining the suitability of the
selected techniques to address the research queries presented in the previous section.
In addition, the data used in the study is described in detail. The next four chapters
present the results derived from each of the research questions. The results pertaining
to the carbon EKC analysis appear in Chapter 4. This is followed in Chapter 5 by an
examination of the effects that take place in developing economies via international
trade caused by implementing cuts in consumption-based emissions in wealthy
countries. Chapter 6 then focuses on the impacts produced by BCAs in the developing
world. Chapter 7 analyses the extent to which human development can be improved in
the South given the available carbon space. All these results are then discussed in
Chapter 8 in the light of the existing literature, while focusing on their academic and
policy implications. Finally, Chapter 9 offers the main conclusions, details the
contributions of this thesis, discusses the limitations of the study and highlights future
research needs.
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Chapter 2
Climate change mitigation and global development: a
consumption perspective
This chapter offers a critical review of the literature and identifies the gaps in the
knowledge base that this study aims to address. The nature of this research requires
engaging with several bodies of literature. As will be explained, the links between
climate and development are shaped to a large extent by consumption and
international trade. These topics are deeply interrelated and a proper understanding of
their linkages is thus vital to understand the problem at hand. A background of these
topics is presented here, covering those studies that are more relevant for this thesis.
The chapter starts by discussing the nexus between the carbon and the development
spaces in section 2.1. It provides definitions for both concepts and offers information
about their magnitude according to existing analyses. Section 2.2 talks about the role
of consumption in the fields of development and climate change. The problem of
overconsumption is examined, stressing the need to modify consumption patterns
and/or reduce the overall level of economic throughput. It also offers a literature review
about the carbon EKC from a consumption-based approach. This is followed in section
2.3 by a presentation of the different demand-side mitigation policy options,
emphasising the case of border carbon adjustments. Section 2.4 deals with
international trade and its influence on development and the environment. Next, section
2.5 reviews the literature regarding the potential impacts experienced in the developing
world caused by demand-side changes via international trade. Finally, section 2.6
presents a brief summary and highlights the main research gaps that are addressed in
this thesis.
2.1. The carbon and development spaces
2.1.1. The carbon space
Since the Industrial Revolution, the planet has experienced an era of significant
environmental change. This era has been labelled the Anthropocene, as a way to mark
the transition from a geological epoch characterised by relative environmental stability
(i.e. the Holocene) to an age in which human activities have exerted a profound
influence on the Earth’s ecosystems (Crutzen, 2002). During this period, population
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registered a rapid expansion, which grew more than five-fold since 1850 (Maddison,
2003) (see Figure 1), and an associated eight-fold increase in the use of renewable
and non-renewable resources since the start of the twentieth century (Krausmann et
al., 2009). The deep reliance on fossil fuels, as the basis for industrialisation, has
produced billions of tonnes of GHGs that have been emitted into the atmosphere on an
annual basis. The pressure on the environment has thus reached historical levels,
threatening the planet’s carrying capacity. Rockström et al. (2009) indicate that some
planetary boundaries or tipping points (see: Lenton et al., 2008) have been
transgressed. These boundaries represent the limits below which human societies can
function safely without altering biophysical systems and processes. Specifically, the
thresholds related to climate and biodiversity, as well as the nitrogen cycle, have been
surpassed. The potential effects caused by these transgressions are still surrounded by
large uncertainties, but they may lead to catastrophic consequences for human
civilisation (Scheffer et al., 2001).
Figure 1 - Population and atmospheric CO2
concentration (ppm), 1850-2012
Sources: Own figure based on data by Manning et al. (1996);
Maddison (2003); Keeling et al. (2005)
In relation to climate, the mean global surface temperature has increased about 0.85°C
since the pre-industrial era, mainly caused by the atmospheric accumulation of
anthropogenic GHGs (IPCC, 2013). CO2 is the gas that accounts for approximately
75% of total GHGs and is mostly generated by the combustion of fossil fuels and land-
use change (IPCC, 2007b). Its global atmospheric concentration showed a sharp
growth of more than 35% since the mid-nineteenth century, ranging from 287 ppm in
1850 to 392 ppm in 2012 (Keeling et al., 2005; NOAA, 2012) (see Figure 1). In terms of
annual emissions, these grew on average 2.8% from 1950 to 2000, but in the last
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decade the pace has slightly accelerated, registering a mean annual rate of 3.1%.
Recent estimations suggest that emissions were 58% greater in 2012 than in 1990 (Le
Quéré et al., 2012). If this trend persisted throughout the present century, annual
emissions could augment by a factor of 4.5 by 2100, which could likely (i.e. >66%
probability) lead to a rise in mean global temperature of about 3.8° to 5.7°C with
respect to the pre-industrial level (Rogelj et al., 2012; IPCC, 2013). The impacts on
natural and human systems associated with such an average temperature are
uncertain, but the IPCC (2007a) has estimated that it could cause irreversible
biophysical changes, such as sea level rise, a weakening of the meridional overturning
(i.e. thermohaline) circulation3, melting of polar ice sheets, major extinction of species,
loss of wetlands, among others. With regards to human systems, many societies would
suffer from increased water and food stress, lower crop productivity at lower latitudes,
increases in the severity and frequency of tropical storms and coastal flooding, a
greater proliferation of infectious diseases, etc.
The impacts from climate variability will differ across geographical regions, but it is
highly agreed that the most adverse effects will be felt in the developing world,
particularly in the poorest, underdeveloped and most climate-exposed areas (see:
Mendelsohn and Dinar, 1999; Huq et al., 2004; Mertz et al., 2009). Many people in
these regions rely heavily on agriculture and are sensitive to changes in climate.
Moreover, these variations may aggravate their ongoing social and economic
situations, thus increasing their vulnerability and exacerbating their already limited
economic and technological capacities to adapt (Yohe and Tol, 2002; Adger et al.,
2003; Reid et al., 2010). The IPCC (2007a) has identified regions that are likely to be
especially threatened. Millions of people located in Africa could be at risk of
experiencing water stress and declines in yields from rain-fed agriculture. Small Island
Developing States (SIDS), on the other hand, which are already facing problems
related to sea level rise, are expected to be affected by even higher sea levels and
more frequent and intense coastal hazards, such as flooding, storm surges and
erosion. Adverse effects could also take place in the heavily populated megadelta
regions in South, East and South-East Asia, where people could be at risk of increased
flooding and larger propagation rates of water- and food-borne diseases.
3 The meridional overturning or thermohaline circulation refers to the flows of ocean water
from high to low density areas caused by differences in temperature and salinity (see:
IPCC, 2001).
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Changes in climate can equally affect the comparative advantage of different regions in
terms of producing goods and services. As said, it is anticipated that agricultural
activities will be negatively affected in lower latitudes, but yields could show slight
increases at middle to high latitudes depending on the type of crop (IPCC, 2007a).
Other economic sectors, such as industrial activities, can also be vulnerable to
temperature and precipitation changes. Industries dependent on climate-sensitive
inputs, like those related to food processing and manufacturing of paper, natural
textiles and others, can be affected by scarcity and higher costs of raw materials (see:
Ruth et al., 2004). Climate variations are also likely to affect both energy use and
energy production in many parts of the world (see: Schaeffer et al., 2012). Demand for
heating and cooling is prone to vary in different regions (see: Xu et al., 2012).
Moreover, water reservoirs for hydroelectric generation can dwindle in some areas,
while extreme weather events can affect energy production and distribution (see:
Mimikou and Baltas, 1997). In relation to the service sector, retail and commercial
services, such as those that deal with perishable commodities and agricultural produce,
could experience disruptions in their supply chains (see: Sussman and Freed, 2008).
Regarding tourism, changes in tourist flows could take place depending on the location,
due to variations in temperature and the frequency and intensity of extreme climate
events (see: Wall, 2005). Shifts in passenger flows could, in turn, affect the transport
sector, which could also face variations in freight prices and alterations of shipping
routes (see: Koetse and Rietveld, 2009).
Avoiding dangerous effects from climate change requires urgent, substantial and
sustained emission cuts in order to stabilise global mean temperature below a 2°C
threshold and not exceed an atmospheric CO2 concentration of 450 ppm (IPCC, 2007c;
Arnell et al., 2013). However, there is a gap between an emissions pathway with a
likely chance of meeting the 2°C target and the current trajectory. UNEP (2012) has
estimated that this gap could amount to approximately 14 gigatonnes (Gt) of CO2
equivalent (CO2e) in 2020 under a business as usual (BAU) scenario. The existence of
this gap was recognized by the UNFCCC member countries (i.e. parties to the
convention) at the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17), held in Durban, South
Africa (UNFCCC, 2011b). The reduction pledges submitted by the parties are still far
from the cuts required to achieve the 2°C goal. According to UNEP (2012), the gap
could be reduced down to 13 or even 8 gigatonnes of CO2e in 2020 with the current
pledges, depending on the level of ambition and the severity of the accounting rules
agreed in future climate negotiations. Completely eradicating the gap, however,
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requires the willingness of member countries to undertake much greater abatement
efforts.
Estimating the potential pathways that emissions will follow in the coming decades has
been at the centre of the process led by the IPCC. Since the First Assessment Report
(IPCC, 1990) was published, four generations of emissions scenarios have been
developed (see: Moss et al., 2010). These scenarios do not represent forecasts, but
probable depictions of the future in relation to socio-economic, technological and
climate assumptions. Moreover, they represent baseline or reference projections, as
they do not consider the implementation of additional climate policies other than the
existing ones. They reflect the judgment of expert scientists in diverse areas and are
useful for guiding research and decision-making. The first series of IPCC scenarios are
known as SA90 (scientific assessment) (IPCC, 1990), which were updated two years
later to produce the so-called IS92 IPCC scenarios (Leggett et al., 1992). In the year
2000, the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) (Nakicenovic and Swart,
2000) was released. It included a new set of 40 reference projections, which were then
used in the IPCC Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2007c, a, b). These scenarios are
grouped into four categories (A1, A2, B1 and B2), depending on their associated
storylines or narratives of the future. Each storyline comprises different key
assumptions about the demographic, social, economic, technological and
environmental forces that drive emissions (see: Rosa and Dietz, 2012). Scenarios in
the “A” family place a stronger focus on economic aspects, while the “B” group gives
more importance to environmental issues. On the other hand, scenarios labelled with
the number 1 consider a more homogenous world in terms of economic development,
with fast economic growth, population peaking around mid-century and the introduction
of more efficient technologies. Conversely, scenarios with a number 2 attached indicate
heterogeneity in development levels across countries, with lower rates of economic
growth and increasing population. These scenarios, along with three variations of A1,
are described in Table 1.
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Table 1 - Narratives of SRES illustrative scenarios
Scenario
Storyline
Economic
growth
Economic
development Population Technology
A1 Fast Convergence Peaks in mid-century
Rapid introduction
of new and more
efficient technologies
A1F1: Fossil-fuel intensive
A1T: No use of fossil-fuel energy resources
A1B: Balance across all energy sources
A2 Slow
Heterogeneous
(regionally
oriented)
Increasing
global
population
Slow introduction of
new and more efficient
technologies
B1 Fast Convergence Peaks in mid-century
Introduction of clean
and resource-efficient
technologies
B2 Intermediate
Intermediate
levels of
economic
development
Increasing
global
population
(lower than A2)
Less rapid and more
diverse technological
change than A1 and
B1
Source: Own table based on Nakicenovic and Swart (2000)
A fourth set of scenarios has been put together, as more detailed and updated
information has become available during the last decade. These are called the
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), and are intended to be used in the
IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (Moss et al., 2010; van Vuuren et al., 2011). Different
groups of climate modellers were in charge of their development with the purpose of
addressing the needs of distinct research communities (i.e. climate modelling,
mitigation and adaptation), as well as to stimulate the coordination between them. The
term representative indicates that each pathway does not constitute a completely new
scenario, but represents a larger set of existing scenarios already available in the
scientific literature; whereas the word concentration is used to stress their primary
focus on producing atmospheric concentrations as their main outputs, rather than
annual emissions. In contrast to the SRES scenarios, the RCPs do not have explicit
socio-economic storylines attached, as these were developed separately. Each RCP
essentially represents a potential radiative-forcing trajectory4. The four pathways, in this
sense, correspond to radiative-forcing levels of 8.5, 6.0, 4.5 and 2.6 watts per square
meter (Wm-2), which are associated with a range of likely values for an increase in
global average surface temperature (Meinshausen et al., 2011).
4 Radiative forcing is defined as the net amount of energy irradiated from the planet (i.e. the
difference between the energy flowing into the atmosphere and that reflected back to
space) due to changes in atmospheric composition, land use change and solar activity. It is
measured in watts per square meter (IPCC, 2007c).
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Figure 2 - Fossil fuel CO2 RCP and SRES
annual emissions scenarios (observed 1980-
2011 and projected 2012-2100)
Source: Own figure based on data by Nakicenovic and Swart
(2000); Fujino et al. (2006); Smith and Wigley (2006); Clarke
et al. (2007); Riahi et al. (2007); van Vuuren et al. (2007);
Wise et al. (2009); Rogelj et al. (2012); IPCC (2013)
Note: Range of temperatures refer to likely (>66% probability)
increases by the end of the century above pre-industrial
levels.
Peters et al. (2013) indicate that observed emissions have exceeded the trajectories
described by the majority of the highest IPCC scenarios included in all four
generations. The expected pathway thus seems to be currently more in line with the
RCP8.5 projection (Riahi et al., 2007), according to which the given radiative forcing
could likely lead to an average rise of 3.8° to 5.7°C in global temperature by the end of
the century with respect to pre-industrial levels (see Figure 2). This coincides with the
A1F1 and A2 SRES scenarios, which are mainly characterised by fossil fuel-intensive
economies, an increasing global population, heterogeneous levels of development and
a slow introduction of more efficient technologies. Alternative trends are given by the
RCP6.0 (Fujino et al., 2006) and RCP4.5 (Smith and Wigley, 2006; Clarke et al., 2007;
Wise et al., 2009) pathways. The former is compatible with the A1B and B2 SRES
scenarios, and foresees that emissions will peak until 2080, causing a likely expansion
in mean temperature of 2.5° to 3.6°C. The latter, in turn, considers moderate rises in
emissions until 2040, and increasing reductions from then on until flattening from the
2080s, leading to a climb in temperature of between 2.0° to 2.9°C. This trajectory is
similar to the most ambitious SRES scenarios (i.e. A1T and B1), which reflect a world
dominated by fast economic growth, with convergence in development levels across
nations, decreasing population rates from mid-century and the complete substitution of
fossil fuels by cleaner energy sources. Finally, the RCPs include a novel scenario that
illustrates an emissions trajectory which is likely to keep the world below the 2°C
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threshold (Rogelj et al., 2012). It corresponds to a level of radiative forcing of between
2.6 and 3 Wm-2, and is known as RCP3-PD (i.e. peak and decline), or RCP2.6 (van
Vuuren et al., 2007). It considers that emissions will peak in 2020 and then will show a
sustained decline until becoming negative from the 2070s onwards, which means that
carbon would be absorbed from the atmosphere rather than emitted into it. The
possibility of achieving negative emissions by means of the deployment of emerging
technologies, such as carbon capture and storage (CCS), is still surrounded by large
uncertainties in terms of their future feasibility and potential effects on natural and
human systems (see: Szulczewski et al., 2012; UNEP, 2012). There are, nonetheless,
other existing scenarios in the literature which suggest that it is possible to attain the
same goal without negative emissions, but they basically consider either earlier
peaking dates or more abrupt reduction rates (e.g. UNEP, 2012; van Vliet et al., 2012;
Arnell et al., 2013). Attaining a 2°C future, moreover, depends strongly on
implementing timely actions. Delaying mitigation measures implies achieving higher
abatement rates in the future (Friedlingstein et al., 2011) and facing higher costs
(Jakob et al., 2012).
Table 2 - Narratives of Shared Socioeconomic Pathways
Scenario
Storyline
Economic
growth
Economic
development Population Technology
SSP1
Sustainability Fast
Achievement of
development goals
Peaks in
mid-
century
Rapid
introduction of
new
technologies.
SSP2
Middle of the
road
Intermediate
Development of low-
income countries
proceeds unevenly
Peaks
around
2070s
Dependency on
fossil fuels
slowly
decreases
SSP3
Fragmentation Slow
Large number of
countries struggle to
maintain living
standards
Increasing
population
Slow
introduction of
more efficient
technologies
SSP4
Inequality Intermediate
Small, rich global elite
and a large poor
population
Peaks
around
2070s
Mitigation
efforts are low
SSP5
Conventional
Development
Fast
Economic growth as
the solution to social
and economic
problems
Peaks in
mid-
century
Energy system
dominated by
fossil fuels
Source: Own table based on O’Neill et al. (2012)
As has been said, the RCPs do not have socio-economic and technological storylines
attached. The baseline storylines or narratives are known as Shared Socioeconomic
Pathways (SSPs), and were developed in parallel by separate groups of researchers
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based on the RCPs (Kriegler et al., 2012; Rozenberg et al., 2012). They represent
possible paths that human societies could follow over the next century. They are
termed shared, as they are intended to be mutually useful to climate and integrated
assessment modellers, as well as to the impacts, adaptation and vulnerability (IAV)
community (van Vuuren et al., 2012). Furthermore, SSPs can be shared across
multiple RCPs (Moss et al., 2010). In other words, each radiative-forcing trajectory is
not associated with a unique SSP, but instead each can result from different
combinations of social, economic and technological assumptions depicted in the SSPs.
The characteristics of the five SSPs, as have been presented by O’Neill et al. (2012),
are shown in Table 2. SSP1 describes a sustainable world that carries out ongoing
efforts to achieve development goals, with population peaking at mid-century and the
introduction of more efficient technologies, including the replacement of fossil fuels by
cleaner energy options. SSP2 is labelled as a BAU scenario, portraying a world that
continues along the existing trends, with some progress towards achieving
development goals, with a slowly decline in the use of fossil fuels and uneven
development, especially in low-income countries. SSP3 illustrates a fragmented world
with increasing population and a large number of nations struggling to improve their
development levels. SSP4 shows a similar world than SSP2, but more unequal, as the
current wealth distribution among countries (i.e. small global elite against a large
proportion of poor people) does not improve during the rest of the century. Finally,
SSP5 presents a world that follows the existing development paradigm, in which
economic growth is deemed as the solution to all social and economic problems and
with an energy system largely predominated by fossil fuels. In addition, each SSP
represents different challenges in terms of mitigation and adaptation efforts, as can be
seen in Figure 3. The sustainable world of SSP1 involves the lower challenges in these
areas, while the fragmented planet of SSP3 entails the greatest efforts.
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Figure 3 - SSPs according to mitigation and
adaptation challenges
Source: Own figure based on Kriegler et al. (2012);
Rozenberg et al. (2012)
The amount of available carbon space, understood as the global cumulative emissions
consistent with the achievement of the 2°C target, is given by the RCP3-PD pathway.
Its magnitude corresponds to the difference between the atmospheric CO2
concentration present today of approximately 392 ppm (NOAA, 2012) and the 450 ppm
mark, which according to this scenario would be met around 2050. The carbon space
measured in per capita terms would depend on future population trends. If population
figures from the most ambitious SSP are used (i.e. SSP1, with population peaking
around mid-century), the largest amount of carbon space would proportionally
correspond to the developed member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), who are also the ones that need to undertake
most urgently the deepest cuts (see Figure 4). Transition economies, which mostly
include countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, get the
second biggest per capita shares. Smaller proportions correspond to the rest of the
developing world. The Middle East and Africa would need to generate almost zero
emissions by the end of the century, while Asian nations, mainly China and India,
would require achieving negative per capita emissions from the 2080s. Obviously, the
carbon space would increase in size for all country groups if different radiative-forcing
pathways were chosen (i.e. 4.5, 6.0 or 8.5), but this could put the world at risk of
suffering dangerous and uncertain climate impacts. The literature on climate scenarios,
in this sense, is not explicit regarding the improvements in development that
developing countries, and especially the poorest ones, could achieve with their shares
of carbon space compatible with a 2°C future. This represents a gap in the knowledge
base, which will be further discussed in section 2.1.3, where the specific literature
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focused on emissions and development will be reviewed. On the other hand, many of
the most ambitious SRES scenarios and SSPs consider high rates of economic growth
(i.e. A1T and SSP1) across the majority of countries as a driver of welfare and
technological change. This would imply attaining an absolute decoupling between the
growth rates of both emissions and income per capita. As will be explained in section
2.2.3, this decoupling has not been yet achieved and significant efforts are required to
make it happen.
Figure 4 - RCP3-PD annual per capita
emissions pathway according to country
group using SSP1 population projections
(2000-2100)
Source: Own figure based on data by van Vuuren et al.
(2007); IIASA (2012)
2.1.2. The development space
Despite its widespread use, defining the concept of development from a socio-
economic viewpoint is a contentious issue (Chang, 2011). Its meaning has transformed
over the years and there is not a unanimous definition for it. If the word development is
understood as “a specified state of growth or advancement”, according to the Oxford
English Dictionary (Stevenson and Waite, 2011), then in basic terms socio-economic
development refers to a state of expansion or betterment of an economy and its
society. The term economic development as such, implicitly encompassing a social
dimension, started to be utilised in the beginning of the twentieth century. Since then, it
has been strongly associated with the notions of progress, wealth, growth and well-
being.
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In his Theory of Economic Development, Schumpeter (1934) viewed the concept as a
dynamic and cyclic process, in which innovations play a fundamental role. In the
absence of innovative activities, economies tend to stagnate. However, thanks to
entrepreneurs, who bring fresh ideas, old practices are destroyed and replaced by new
and more efficient ones. This process, known as creative destruction, leads to
improvements in productivity and an expansion of the economy. During the 1950s, this
conception was transformed and economic development started to be more associated
with the notion of structural change. This is reflected in the linear-stages-of-growth and
structural-change theories that appeared in that decade. In basic terms, these theories
state that all economies must pass through several stages in a linear progression.
Rostow (1959) developed one of the most characteristic models among the linear-
stages theory. It describes the transformation of an economy from being a traditional
society to then take-off and drive to maturity, finally entering into an age of mass
consumption. Structural-change theorists (e.g. Lewis, 1954; Chenery, 1960) similarly
argued that economies must progress from being primarily agricultural and focused on
resource extraction to later become industrialised and then to develop a tertiary sector
(i.e. services). In this sense, when an agrarian economy generates a large economic
surplus, it can shift labour and capital to spur the creation of more productive industrial
activities. The production frontier of the economy thus expands, increasing the value of
production which, in turn, leads to employment generation and higher income per
capita levels. Industries start demanding a wide array of services, which stimulates the
formation of a tertiary sector. The production possibilities of the economy expand even
further, generating more value added per capita, replacing low-productivity activities by
a process of creative destruction, and leading to an efficient rearrangement of the
factors of production (i.e. land, labour, and physical capital). Simon Kuznets argued
that structural change constitutes a central feature of the process of development (see:
Syrquin, 2010), which is reflected in his original formulation of the inverted-U income-
inequality hypothesis (Kuznets, 1955). He stated that while societies increase their
income per capita along the industrialisation process, income inequality tends to
improve. However, this hypothesis has been refuted (see: Deininger and Squire, 1998;
Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010; Palma, 2011).
As can be seen, not only the meaning of economic development has suffered several
transformations over the years, but also the ways in which nations could successfully
attain it (see: Lin and Rosenblatt, 2012). Currently, several definitions of the concept
can be found, but the idea of structural transformation is still embedded in many of
them. Black et al. (2009) define the concept as “an economic transformation of a
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country or a region that leads to the improvement of the well-being and economic
capabilities of its residents”. According to Park (2007), it is “the process of raising the
level of prosperity and material wealth in a society through increasing the productivity
and efficiency of its economy, particularly through an increase in industrial production”.
The World Bank has defined it as the “qualitative change and restructuring in a
country's economy in connection with technological and social progress..., reflecting an
increase in the economic productivity and average material well-being of a country's
population” (Soubbotina, 2004, p.133).
The World Bank proposes that the main indicator of economic development is GDP per
capita (ibid.). However, it has been recognised that the concept envelops much more
than just an acceleration of economic growth (see: Todaro and Smith, 2011). For
Amartya Sen (1987), development is a multi-dimensional process that involves major
economic and social changes oriented towards the enhancement of human
capabilities. According to this perspective, the quality of a person’s life or his/her well-
being is subject to a combination of what he/she can do or be, which Sen calls
functionings, and the freedom to choose among these options, which the author labels
as capabilities. In this sense, income and wealth should not be treated as ends in
themselves, but rather as means to obtain other goals. People should enjoy access to
some minimum requirements, such as acceptable material living standards, health
services, education, decent work, a clean environment, among other factors, in order to
have the capability to function adequately. Development, consequently, is not only a
matter of transforming the material structure of an economy, but it also possesses an
important humanistic dimension.
Influenced by Sen’s ideas, the concept of human development started gaining
prominence in the late 1980s. This was reflected in the launch of the Human
Development Report in 1990 by the UNDP. In that report, it was acknowledged that
while economic growth is necessary to meet essential human needs, it is equally vital
to translate this material expansion into increasing human capabilities. The UNDP thus
defines human development as “a process of enlarging people’s choices..., [of which]
the three essential ones are for people to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire
knowledge and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living”
(UNDP, 1990, p. 10). The report was accompanied by series of key indicators,
summarised in the so-called Human Development Index (HDI), to measure and monitor
the progress across different nations (Anand and Sen, 1994a). Income per capita
represents a component of the index, along with life expectancy and the observed and
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expected years of schooling (Klugman et al., 2011)5. Since then, the index has been
published annually, enjoying an increasing and widespread use. It has also received a
number of criticisms, among which are, for example, its narrow focus (i.e. limited
amount of variables), not including environmental matters, the component’s weightings,
and not considering the problem of inequality (see: McGillivray, 1991; Trabold-Nübler,
1991; Lind, 1992; Nübler, 1995; Sagar and Najam, 1998; Chakravarty, 2011; Ravallion,
2012). Some of these issues have been taken into account, and the methodology has
thus suffered slight changes over the years. An inequality-adjusted index and a gender
inequality index, for instance, have been made available by the UNDP.
The notion of human development complemented the appearance of another concept
that attracted attention in policy and academic circles (Anand and Sen, 1994b). In
1987, the UN’s World Commission on Environment and Development, known as the
Brundtland Commission in honour of its chairman, coined the term sustainable
development. Its significance, expressed by the famous Brundtland definition, lies in
the necessity of meeting “the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987). In this sense, it places a
special emphasis on inter-generational equity. The concept additionally highlights the
economic and social dimensions, as well as the natural environment, as the main
pillars of development. Improving development in the present should not be done at the
expense of the well-being of future generations. Since its creation, sustainable
development has represented another much contested term, not only in relation to
formulating a more precise definition for it, but also in the ways of achieving it (see:
Barbier, 1987; Lélé, 1991; Pezzey, 1997; Fergus and Rowney, 2005; Kates et al.,
2005; Sneddon et al., 2006).
The human and environmental dimensions of development were acknowledged in the
establishment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), following the adoption of
the United Nations Millennium Declaration in the year 2000. All the member states
agreed to achieve eight essential goals by 2015, each including individual targets (see
Table 3). The UN (2012a) has reported that the progress in achieving the goals has
been uneven. Whereas important improvements have been made towards some of
them, other targets are still lagging behind. The same occurs in geographical terms,
where some regions are advancing more rapidly than others. In relation to extreme-
5 See Appendix B.1.2 for a more detailed explanation about the methodology to calculate
the HDI.
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poverty reduction, the UN has announced that the first goal has been met. The
proportion of the total people living on less than $1.25 dollars a day fell from 47% in
1990 to 24% in 2008 (ibid.). However, the target has still not been reached in Sub-
Saharan Africa and Southern Asia, where reductions amounted to approximately 9%
and 17%, respectively. There is, moreover, a lack of progress in combating hunger.
The fraction of people who are undernourished has just decreased by about 4.5%. In
contrast, the proportion of people with access to improved water sources almost
doubled between 1990 and 2010. On the other hand, primary school enrolment
registered an important rise from 82% to 90% between 1999 and 2010, but
improvements have slowed down since 2004. Furthermore, gender parity has been
achieved in access to primary education, even though some regions are still falling
behind, such as Western Asia and Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa. Reducing child
mortality has been slow, although considerable declines have been attained in several
regions. Similar improvements have been achieved in maternal mortality, which has
nearly halved. The spread of HIV is slowly decreasing, but access to treatment has
expanded significantly. In relation to the environment, deforestation rates have shown
small drops and are far from being reversed. Moreover, almost half of the world’s most
important areas for species conservation are unprotected. Regarding the last goal,
which considers establishing an international development framework, indicators show
that official development assistance (ODA) has fallen in real terms, since donor
countries have still not recovered from the 2008/09 financial crisis. However, developed
nations have continued giving preferential treatment in trade to LDCs by granting duty-
free treatment to a considerable proportion of their imports (see: McQueen, 2002;
McDonald et al., 2010).
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Table 3 - The Millennium Development Goals
Goal Description
1
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.
Illustrative target: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose
income is less than $1.25 a day.
2
Achieve universal primary education.
Illustrative target: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will
be able to complete a full course of primary schooling.
3
Promote gender equality and empower women.
Illustrative target: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education,
preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015.
4
Reduce child mortality.
Illustrative target: Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five
mortality rate.
5
Improve maternal health
Illustrative target: Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal
mortality ratio.
6
Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
Illustrative target: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS,
malaria and other diseases.
7
Ensure environmental sustainability
Illustrative target: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country
policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources.
8
Develop a global partnership for development
Illustrative target: Develop an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory
trading and financial system, and dealing comprehensively with developing countries’
debt.
Source: Own table based on UN (2012a)
The MDGs have received several criticisms since their implementation. Some of the
most relevant ones relate to the choices made in setting them, as they draw the
spotlight on the selected topics, while shifting the development agenda away from
other no less significant issues and thus reducing their support (e.g. civil and political
rights, income disparity within countries, global environmental problems, etc.).
Furthermore, the MDGs understate the importance of addressing the root causes of the
problems (e.g. institutional, political, cultural, etc.) (see: Harcourt, 2005; Saith, 2006;
Nelson, 2007). Other critiques are centred on their top-down approach and the heavy
influence wealthy nations and international organisations had on setting the goals,
while the most afflicted states played a limited role in determining their own priorities
(see: Bissio, 2003; Amin, 2006; Bond, 2006). In addition, the difficulty to measure the
progress of some targets, due to inadequate methodologies and indicators (see:
Easterly, 2009; Fukuda-Parr et al., 2013) and data reliability and availability (e.g.
Satterthwaite, 2003; Attaran, 2006), has been highlighted as a serious drawback. In
relation to the last goal, authors like Gore (2003) and Khor (2003) state that the
proposed development framework will be insufficient to pull many nations out of their
poverty traps. They argue that more aid and debt relief is required, as well as resolving
the asymmetries in international trade policies. Moreover, there is a widespread
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concern that many targets will not be achieved and that they must be replaced by a set
of revised and more complete goals (see: Manning, 2010; Chibba, 2011; Clarke and
Feeny, 2011; Webster, 2012). For example, Clemens et al. (2007) have suggested that
beyond 2015 the targets should be country-specific and take into account the historical
performance of each nation. This would be analogous to the way in which emissions
targets are established. Sachs (2012) and Griggs et al. (2013), on the other hand,
favour the implementation of a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which
constitute an important outcome of the UN Rio+20 Conference (UN, 2012b). Griggs
and colleagues argue that the protection of the planet’s life-support systems and
poverty reduction must be the two leading priorities.
Despite the criticisms made to the MDGs and the uneven progress that has been
attained so far, they embody an unprecedented global consensus to reduce poverty. In
addition, they have contributed to enhancing advocacy and aid flows, as well as
promoting the design of adequate indicators to monitor development projects (Waage
et al., 2010). Moreover, noteworthy improvements in development have been achieved
in the developing world. These advances have been highlighted by the UNDP (2013, p.
iv). Its latest report asserts that over the last decade, all developing countries
“accelerated their achievements in the education, health, and income dimensions as
measured in the HDI”. For example, the expected years of schooling in nations with the
lowest levels of human development rose on average by 70% between 1990 and 2012,
going from 5 to 8.5 years. Moreover, the mean number of years of education received
by people aged 25 and older grew by 75%, increasing from 2.4 years in 1990 to 4.2
years in 2012. However, the gap with respect to the highest human-developed
countries is still large, as an average student in this latter group was expected to
complete 16.3 years of education in 2012, while an adult had received on average 11.5
years of schooling in that same year. In terms of life expectancy at birth, it went up from
52.4 years in 1990 to 59.1 in 2012 in low-developed nations, whereas a person in
industrialised countries was expected to live on average 80.1 years in 2012 (UNDP,
2013). Regarding gross national income (GNI) per capita, significant growth rates were
registered especially in the big emerging economies, like China, India and Indonesia. In
China, for instance, where income per capita grew approximately 9.5% on an annual
basis from 1980 to 2012, there are 600 million fewer people living under $1.25 per day
(Chen and Ravallion, 2012). GNI per capita has also grown in other regions, like in
Sub-Saharan Africa, where it expanded by about 5% a year from 2003 to 2008, more
than twice the rate of the 1990s (UNDP, 2013).
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The UNDP classifies nations according to the HDI quartile they belong to. The quartiles
are thus labelled as very-high-, high-, medium-, and low-human-development
countries6. The very-high-human-development nations include all the wealthiest
industrialised nations, whereas the low-development group encompasses the majority
of the LDCs. The World Bank, on the other hand, groups nations according to GNI per
capita, resulting in low-income ($1,025 dollars or less per annum), lower-middle-
income ($1,026 to $4,035), upper-middle-income ($4,036 to $12,475) and high-income
economies ($12,476 or more)7. There are still significant disparities in development
levels across these groups. The average HDI score for the low-human-development
nations in 2012 (i.e. 0.46) was almost half than that of the topmost group (0.90), while
that of the medium-development countries (i.e. 0.64) was almost one third smaller
(UNDP, 2013). In terms of geo-political regions, the average HDI score in Middle East
and Africa was approximately half than that of the industrialised OECD economies in
2012 (see Figure 5, which shows the same country groupings as those used in SSPs).
Asian developing countries, including China, registered a mean annual growth rate of
1.1% in their HDI scores from 1980 to 2012, but are still behind Latin America.
Transition economies, on the other hand, possess the second largest scores. These
country rankings are similar to those of annual per capita emissions (see Figure 4),
which reflects the close relationship between emissions and development. This issue
will be discussed more extensively in the following section.
6 A list of the countries that comprise each of the UNDP and World Bank classifications can
be found in Appendices A.1.2 and A.1.3.
7 The World Bank uses the Atlas method. It entails applying a conversion factor to reduce
the impact of exchange rate fluctuations in the cross-country comparison of national
incomes, which have all been converted to US dollars (see:
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/world-bank-atlas-method).
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Figure 5 - Human development pathways by
country group according to BAU scenario,
observed (1980-2012) and projected (2013-
2050)
Source: Own figure based on data by the PCIF (2013) and
UNDP (2013)
Disparities are not only present between countries, but also within them. Growing
inequality rates have been registered in the last decade among both developed and
developing nations. The latest Human Development Report (UNDP, 2013) argues that
inequality is negatively correlated with human development, threatening further
improvements. The report states that almost a quarter of the HDI is lost to income
inequality. Low-human-development countries are affected the most, since they tend to
possess greater inequality across all dimensions (i.e. income, education and health).
Latin America is overall the most unequal region, followed by Africa, with the highest
inequality in health, and South Asia, with the highest inequality in education.
From what has been presented, it is clear that humanity faces the enormous challenge
of improving the well-being of the people in the planet. The amount of development that
still needs to be fulfilled, or the necessary development space, is still considerable. Two
future human development pathways were developed for the UNDP (2013) report by
the Pardee Centre for International Futures (PCIF, 2013), based on an integrated
global model. One is a BAU scenario in which historical trends continue into the future,
pursuing current development policies. The second one is an accelerated progress
scenario, which assumes aggressive policy interventions to reduce poverty, enhance
infrastructure, and improve governance. Some of the selected measures are increasing
foreign aid, escalating renewable energy production by 50%, and expanding health
spending. Figure 5 shows the BAU pathways. The regions that achieve the greater
improvements are the Middle East and Africa, whose HDI scores grow by
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approximately 35% from 2012 to 2050, attaining a level similar to that of the current
medium-human-development group. The regions that follow are Asia (28%), Latin
America (14%) and the economies in transition (13.7%) (PCIF, 2013). Under the
accelerated progress scenario (not shown in the figure), the improvements are larger.
Middle East and Africa accomplish a 54% increase, including a rise of 52% in Sub-
Saharan Africa and 36% in South Asia (UNDP, 2013). HDI in Latin America expands
22%, enjoying a level of development comparable with today’s very-high-development
group. Regarding wealthy nations, their HDI improves as well, increasing around 8% in
the BAU case and almost 12% in the accelerated scenario (PCIF, 2013).
It is uncertain, however, if these projections are compatible with a 2°C future.
Understanding if these development levels can be attained with the remaining carbon
budget still requires further study. UNEP (2011) undertook one of the few studies in this
respect by developing a set of scenarios for its Green Economy Report based on the
Threshold 21 (T21) World model created by the Millennium Institute (see: Bassi, 2008).
By assuming annual investments of 1% and 2% of global GDP in green investments,
similar to those suggested by Stern (2007), the model estimated average global
improvements in HDI of about 16% and 19%, respectively, by 2050. These average
HDI-scores are, in turn, associated with CO2 emissions of 3.3 and 2.2 tonnes per
capita, which overly exceed the 2°C pathway as depicted by the RCP3-PD scenario
(see Figure 4). These levels of per capita emissions are more in line with atmospheric
concentrations in the range of 500 to 600 ppm, which are likely to lead to increases in
average global temperature beyond 3°C by the end of the century. UNEP (2011) does
not offer disaggregated data at a national level, but its model projections show that
more ambitious improvements in human development in developing economies might
be difficult to attain given the available carbon space. If it is assumed that the required
increases in income per capita in poor nations will be associated with growing material
consumption and pollution, then it would be necessary to achieve unprecedented levels
of decoupling.
There is the need to develop alternative and more complete development strategies
that can guarantee a transition to a low-material, low carbon and high-development
future. Nevertheless, as argued by Chang (2011), the mechanisms to attain the kind of
development that the world needs have been absent from the development discourse
during the past couple of decades. This author, along with others like Cornwall and
Brock (2005) and Craig and Porter (2006), have asserted that development has come
to be understood more as poverty reduction or provision of basic needs, as reflected in
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the MDGs. However, development is much more than reducing the number of poor
people (Ocampo, 2002). The concerns of the development economists of the pre-
1980s have been displaced to some extent. The notion of transforming the productive
structure, as a way to enhance social, economic and technological capabilities and to
ultimately enhance and sustain the well-being of the societies across the planet, is not
explicit in the global policy agenda. The only reference to a global development
framework is included in the eighth MDG, which makes an emphasis on aid, debt
reduction and international trade. Chang (2011) argues that the first two represent
enabling factors to initiate a process of development, while relying on trade is a
necessary but not sufficient condition to attain sustainable development (more on this
topic will be discussed in later sections). The question is then how to develop strategies
to address the dual climate-development challenge.
2.1.3. Linking the carbon and development spaces
As was explained in the previous sections, there is a reciprocal relationship between
climate change and development (IPCC, 2007b). Climate variability affects the basis
for economic and human development, while economic and social decisions determine
the generation of GHG emissions and the adaptability of societies to a changing
climate. However, the linkages between these two concepts have not been always fully
acknowledged in policy and research circles. During several decades, both were
usually framed as separate discourses (Beg et al., 2002; Michaelis, 2003; Swart et al.,
2003; Robinson et al., 2006; Bizikova et al., 2007; Kok et al., 2008; Melamed et al.,
2012). One of the consequences, as noted by Cohen et al. (1998), is reflected in the
differences between the scenarios developed by climate and development modellers,
who often tend to work independently of each other. The first three generations of
IPCC scenarios rely strongly on physical science and focus mainly on exploring
different variations of the BAU pathway by adopting different assumptions in relation to
the forces that drive emissions, especially concerning technological change, population
and income per capita growth (Rosa and Dietz, 2012). The Fourth Assessment Report
(IPCC, 2007b) made an effort to recognise the mutual reinforcing nature of sustainable
development and climate change policies. However, the trade-offs between emission
reductions and increasing human welfare across its different dimensions or the lock-in
due to existing infrastructure do not appear explicitly in the SA90, IS92, as well as the
SRES scenarios. They are limited to the notion that emissions can be absolutely or
relatively decoupled from higher levels of income per capita which, in turn, are
associated with higher levels of well-being. The creation of RCPs and SSPs seeks to
34 Chapter 2: Climate change mitigation and global development
improve this situation by integrating the views from different research communities (i.e.
climate, integrated assessment modellers and IAV), although the development
community has still not been fully taken into account. On the other hand, human
development scenarios like the T21 projections presented by UNEP (2011) and the
ones made by the PCIF (2013), as described in the previous section, do not explain
clearly if higher levels of human development can be compatible with a low-risk-climate
future. Another consequence of the dissociation between climate and development has
been evident in the global policy arena (Kok et al., 2008). The MDGs, for instance, do
not incorporate explicit measures in relation to climate change. The seventh goal
broadly seeks to integrate the principles of sustainable development into country
policies, but without making a direct reference to mitigation or adaptation actions
(Urban, 2010). This issue, however, has been changing in recent years as there has
been an increasing acknowledgement of the linkages between climate change and
development. The Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), prepared by
developing states in accordance to the UNFCCC agreements, involve the use of
mitigation options in the context of sustainable development. Nonetheless, the climate-
development strategies proposed by countries have been limited to the inclusion of
CDM and REDD projects, making no references to additional climate-development
schemes oriented toward economic restructuring and the enhancement of human well-
being (Olsen et al., 2009; UNFCCC, 2011a). The National Adaptation Programmes of
Action (NAPAs), on the other hand, place a stronger focus on the nexus between
development and adaptation, which has been widely recognised by the scientific
community (e.g. Huq and Reid, 2004; Huq et al., 2004; IPCC, 2007a; Lemos et al.,
2007; Wilby et al., 2009). Reducing the vulnerability and strengthening the adaptive
capacities of developing nations, and particularly of LDCs, is fundamentally linked to
development efforts. However, much work is still required to properly align and
integrate climate change actions into sustainable development policies at a national
level, so as to conceive comprehensive climate compatible development strategies
(Pan, 2004; Bruggink, 2012; Linnér et al., 2012; Román et al., 2012). These are
defined by Mitchell and Maxwell (2010, p. 1) as those that “minimise the harm caused
by climate impacts, while maximising the many human development opportunities
presented by a low emissions, more resilient, future”.
Sustainable development, in this sense, involves realising the necessary development
space within the limits of the available carbon space. Baer et al. (2009), Kartha et al.
(2009), Kartha et al. (2010) and Khor (2010) argue that a solution to climate change
should not be achieved at the expense of reducing the development opportunities of
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developing countries. These authors thus assert that it is vital to ensure an equitable
sharing of both the development and carbon spaces based on a set of rights and
responsibilities. They argue that industrialised nations hold a historical ecological debt,
being responsible for emitting into the atmosphere about 7.5 out of every 10 tonnes of
CO2 since the beginning of the industrial era (Goldemberg, 1995; Raupach et al., 2007;
Wei et al., 2012). In contrast, developing countries have often expressed in
international policy forums that they have contributed the less to global warming and
are the ones who need to increase the most their development levels. Khor (2010) has
calculated in rough terms the carbon debt owed by industrialised economies, which he
estimated in the following way. Total cumulative emissions emitted into the atmosphere
from 1850 to 2008 amount to around 1214 Gt, of which industrialised countries were
responsible for about 72%, corresponding to 874 Gt. Khor argues that if these
emissions were proportionally distributed according to population shares, then rich
nations would have been duly responsible for about 304 Gt of the observed emissions,
since they housed on average 25% of the world population during this period (i.e.
1214*0.25). This means that their carbon debt amounts to approximately 570 Gt of CO2
emissions (i.e. 874 minus 304), almost twice their proportional fair share. On the other
hand, according to Khor, the carbon budget compatible with a 2°C target comprises
around 750 Gt of cumulative CO2 emissions for 2010 to 2050. By allocating this space
again according to population shares, industrialised nations would possess around 120
Gt of available carbon space, given that they will house on average 16% of the world
population during this second period (i.e. 120*0.16). This leaves developing countries
with around 630 Gt. However, by taking into account the carbon debt, the carbon
budget available to rich nations would actually become negative (i.e. 120-570=-450
Gt), increasing the carbon space for the rest of the world (i.e. 630+570=1200 Gt).
Khor’s mechanism for the fair allocation of the available carbon space may be too
simplistic and not realistic in practice, but it illustrates the magnitude of the challenge
and highlights its ethical implications. Moreover, it stresses the historical responsibility
of industrialised nations and the rights of the developing world, and specifically the
poorest countries, to have an equal access to sustainable development opportunities
without having to carry an excessive burden of mitigations costs. This constitutes the
basis of what Baer et al. (2009) and Kartha et al. (2009) have called the Greenhouse
Development Rights Framework. According to this scheme, countries with an average
income per capita below a threshold of approximately $16 to $20 US dollars per day
($5,840 to $7,300 per annum) would not be expected to bear mitigation costs and
should be assigned a larger share of the carbon space. According to the World Bank
classification, this would include all low- and lower-middle-income economies, as well
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as some upper-middle-income. The rest of the nations would thus carry the burden of
absorbing all the mitigation costs and would support the poorest countries by providing
them with financial resources, technology transfer and capacity building. Chakravarty et
al. (2009) propose a similar framework, but instead of using an income threshold, they
put forward a floor of one tonne of CO2 per capita per year. Individuals below this floor,
the lowest one-third of the world’s emitters, would be exempt from taking up mitigation
costs.
It can prove difficult to mainstream the ideas proposed by Khor, Baer, Khartha,
Chakravarty and colleagues into the global climate policy agenda beyond the UN
working principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, which recognises that
climate change is a common problem to all nations, but not all of them should
contribute equally to its solution (see: Stone, 2004). However, their ideas represent the
few examples in the literature that deal with the equitable use and sharing of the
carbon and development spaces. There is thus the need to analyse more profoundly to
what extent human development can be enhanced with the available carbon space.
This constitutes an important gap in the existing knowledge base, which this thesis
seeks to address.
Few studies have focused on the links between indicators of living standards and CO2
emissions or energy consumption. It has been widely acknowledged that energy
requirements increase with economic development. Industrialised economies use more
energy per unit of GDP and also in per capita terms than poorer nations (Schurr, 1984;
Medlock III and Soligo, 2001; Toman and Jemelkova, 2003; Fischer-Kowalski and
Haberl, 2007; Haberl et al., 2011). Some of the first authors to analyse how the quality
of life is affected by changes in energy use were Mazur and Rosa (1974). They noted
that economic indicators show a high correlation with energy consumption, but lifestyle
indicators are not. Hence, they asserted that the US could reduce its energy use
without deteriorating health and education levels in the population. Goldemberg et al.
(1985) suggested that human basic needs can be properly covered with around one
kilowatt per capita of primary energy. Alam et al. (1991) and Alam et al. (1998)
consider that the relationship between electrical energy consumption and quality of life,
which they define as being a function of life expectancy, infant mortality and literacy
rates, follows an asymptotic curve. Quality of life improves rapidly at low levels of
energy consumption, until flattening and showing diminishing returns at high levels.
Suárez (1995) obtained similar findings, showing that energy consumption per capita
helps to elevate the HDI in low-human-developed nations, but it does not contribute to
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improve quality of life, or can even deteriorate it, in industrialised economies. Rosa
(1997) estimates that there have been decoupling patterns between CO2 emissions
and societal well-being since the 1970s in wealthy countries, suggesting that
reductions in fossil-fuel use are not necessarily associated with impacts to quality of
life. Pasternak (2000) found that HDI tends to level out at an average level of electricity
use of 4,000 kilowatt-hour (kWh), which is below the consumption levels of most
developed nations. Dias et al. (2006) show that it would be possible to reduce energy
per capita in OECD countries around 30% with no significant losses in quality of life.
Martínez and Ebenhack (2008) assert that improvements in human development are
attainable for the less developed nations with small incremental access to energy.
Spreng (2005) believes that a threshold of two kilowatts per capita, which is
comparable to Chakravarty’s floor of one tonne of CO2 per capita, is enough to ensure
the sustainable development of the planet. This basically follows the reasoning of the
contraction and convergence approach, put forward by the Global Commons Institute,
which suggests that CO2 emissions per capita across countries should converge over
time to a level below one tonne per capita to achieve the 450 ppm target (Meyer,
1999). More recently, Steinberger and Roberts (2010) have established the existence
of a gradual decoupling between the satisfaction of human needs and energy and
carbon per capita. By conducting a longitudinal analysis from 1975 to 2005, they found
that the energy and carbon thresholds required to satisfy human needs are decreasing
over time. According to their estimations, thresholds of around 0.25 and 0.7 tonnes of
carbon by 2030 can ensure global high human development standards in relation to life
expectancy and HDI, respectively. In a separate study, Steinberger et al. (2012) focus
on the differences between consumption-based and territorial emissions (defined in
section 2.2.2 of this chapter) with respect to human development. They show that
emissions corrected for trade correlate better with human development indicators,
evidencing their appropriateness to be used in this kind of analyses. Moreover, they
affirm that carbon-importing countries (i.e. mostly industrialised economies) receive
more development benefits than their counterparts. Additionally, they elucidate that
high income per capita levels above $12,000 US dollars per annum (i.e. high-income
economies) are not compatible with low carbon emissions, whereas high life
expectancies are possible to attain at those levels. Costa et al. (2011), on the other
hand, propose a framework to maintain global emissions below a safe level. They
suggest that 300 Gt of CO2 are necessary to raise a considerable amount of
developing countries beyond an HDI score of 0.8 in 2050, but developed countries
require curbing their per capita emissions by 17% to 33% every five years.
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The possibility of enhancing human development within the confines of the available
carbon space and achieving some of the proposed thresholds presented in the above
paragraph require the undertaking of significant structural change across industrialised
and developing economies. However, as declared by Chang (2011), new development
strategies are needed to make the transition to a low-carbon, high-developed, global
economy. One of such proposed strategies is China’s Circular Economy, inspired by
the notion of loop-closing emphasised by German and Swedish environmental policies
(Yuan et al., 2006; Mathews and Tan, 2011). Basically, the scheme contemplates a
goal of doubling the country’s efficiency of resource utilisation by 2020 (Zhu and Wu,
2011), and raising the majority of China’s population into a well-being society. This
approach rests upon the 3R principle: reduce the consumption of energy and
resources, as well as pollutants and waste, reuse products and resources, and recycle
used goods and by-products. More recently, Liu et al. (2013) have suggested a similar
approach based on recycling, using more renewable energy sources and reinvigorating
the domestic energy market to reduce China’s carbon intensity around 55% to 60% by
2020 compared to 2005.
Another strategy is embodied in the renowned and closely related notions of the Green
Economy and Green Growth, which have served to mainstream the close relationship
between the environment and economic development into the international policy
discourse. The former was widely advocated in the UN Rio+20 Conference, and has its
origins in the book titled Blueprint for a Green Economy by Pearce et al. (1989).
According to UNEP (2011, p. 16), a green economy is the “one that results in improved
human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks
and ecological scarcities. In its simplest expression, a green economy is low-carbon,
resource efficient, and socially inclusive”. The OECD (2011, p. 9) states that green
growth “means fostering economic growth and development while ensuring that natural
assets continue to provide the resources and environmental services on which our
well-being relies”. UNEP (2011) recognises the twin challenge of preserving the
environment while enhancing human development, which is to be achieved by heavy
investments in resource efficiency, emission and pollution reductions and poverty
eradication. The proposed enabling conditions to attain a green economy consist of
national regulations, policies, subsidies and incentives, market and legal infrastructure,
trade and technical assistance. Apart from these, the OECD (2011) places a significant
emphasis on innovation and technological change as key enablers of green growth.
The proponents of the concepts of green economy and green growth schemes,
however, do not consider them as replacements to sustainable development. UNEP
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(2011, p. 17) believes that the notion of a green economy is valuable as it focus the
attention on “getting the economy right” as a condition to achieve sustainable
development. The OECD (2011, p. 11), on the other hand, perceive green growth as
being narrower in scope than sustainable development, “entailing an operational policy
agenda that can help achieve concrete, measurable progress at the interface between
the economy and the environment”. Nonetheless, there have been some critical views
about these two concepts. Zysman and Huberty (2011) consider that they reflect good
intentions, but that the specifics to attain them have not been sufficiently discussed.
Verzola and Quintos (2011) and Dercon (2012) believe that their objective of offering a
rapid route out of poverty is not very plausible, since they do not properly address the
root causes of poverty and underdevelopment. As expressed by the former authors, by
focusing too narrowly on “getting the economy right, proponents of the green economy
and green growth end up getting development wrong”. Khor (2011) warns about the
risks of not fully considering the development and equity dimensions. He argues that
viewing the concepts in a one-dimensional way and treating them as a one-size-fits-all
approach can lead to negative outcomes. Moreover, Hoffmann (2011) believe that
these concepts are insufficient to deal with the challenge of climate change, as they do
not envelop measures to deal with population expansion, global inequality, as well as
cultural and governance constraints.
More recently, UNCTAD (2012) proposed the concept of sustainable structural
transformation as a development strategy. It is based on the decoupling of resource
use and environmental impact from the growth process, while achieving significant
improvements in human well-being. It emphasises the importance of assuming a
structuralist stance in the development discourse and recognises the role of structural
change as a necessary condition to replace traditional production structures with more
resource-efficient and low-carbon economic activities, as well as to reallocate the
factors of production and improve the distributive mechanisms in the process of growth
(Ocampo, 2011). This strategy is useful to operationalise the concept of the green
economy and applies particularly to developing nations, and more specifically to LDCs,
whose priority is to achieve higher and persistent rates of economic growth that can
deliver greater and more broad-based improvements in human well-being without
pursuing the traditional industrialisation pathways followed by wealthy economies.
Implementing sustainable structural transformation relies mainly on significant
investment rates, technology transfer, a robust framework for international support
including fair trade rules and the role of a strong developmental state. More work is still
required to operationalise the framework of sustainable structural transformation and
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develop the specifics to implement it successfully. Nevertheless, its validity and
usefulness have been recognised in academic circles (see: Swilling, 2013), while the
G77, the largest intergovernmental organisation of developing countries in the UN, has
manifested its interest in fostering research in the area (G77, 2012).
2.2. The role of consumption in development and climate
change
2.2.1. Consumption and development
Despite its everyday use, the term consumption is open to several interpretations
(Princen, 1999). Different schools in economics have defined it in various manners.
According to neoclassical economics, consumption refers to “the final use of goods and
services by economic agents to satisfy their needs” (Black et al., 2009). This
connotation is congruent with the system of national accounts, which considers
consumption as solely constituting final demand (i.e. final expenditure) of domestic and
imported goods and services by households and government. Intermediate purchases
by industries are not included to avoid double counting, while private and public
investment in fixed (i.e. physical) capital is considered as a separate component of
GDP. However, other schools, like ecological economics, question this view as it
ignores the linkages between the economic and biophysical systems. Hence, it adopts
a wider standpoint. Consumption thus not only entails the final use of goods and
services, but also involves the entire stages in their life-cycles, from the extraction of
materials and generation of energy to the waste and by-products derived from their
production and use (Røpke and Reisch, 2004). This conception is related to the idea of
the physical throughput of the economy (Boulding, 1966), rooted in the principles of
thermodynamics (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971). According to these principles, materials
and energy are neither created nor destroyed, but just transformed (i.e. first law of
thermodynamics), while systems constantly evolve from low entropy (i.e. disordered)
states to high entropy states (i.e. second law). Daly and Farley (2004, p. 29) describe
throughput as “the flow of raw materials and energy from the global ecosystem’s
sources of low entropy (mines, wells, fisheries, croplands), through the economy, and
back to the global ecosystem’s sinks for high-entropy wastes (atmosphere, oceans,
dumps)”. Moreover, other even broader notions of consumption additionally take into
account those amenities and non-use values pertaining to the environment that cannot
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be exchanged in markets and that deliver benefits to people (e.g. scenery, wildlife,
clean air) (Myers et al., 1997; Frey et al., 2004).
Consumption plays a key role in the development process, but this role varies
according to how consumption is theoretically conceived. From a neoclassical
perspective, social welfare is a function of the utility that individuals obtain by
consuming goods and services. Utility in this context is understood as a measure of a
society’s or an individual’s sense of benefit, satisfaction or contentment derived from
the use of a certain good or service (Black et al., 2009). In turn, the amount of goods
and services that an individual consumes is a function of affluence or personal income
(see: Flavin, 1981; Campbell and Mankiw, 1991). Following this line of reasoning, if
income is associated with consumption and the latter is closely related to utility and
welfare, income should consequently be maximised. A nation’s level of development, in
this sense, is determined by the level of income per capita of its inhabitants, as is
considered by the World Bank (see section 2.1.2). However, utility yields diminishing
returns. Once basic material needs are satisfied, further marginal increases in
consumption lead to lower increments in utility. It then follows that in wealthy nations
higher levels of consumption do not necessarily lead to overall improvements in welfare
(Lintott, 1998). This constitutes one of the major arguments of ecological economics,
which agrees that consumption contributes to enhancing welfare at low levels of
development, but ever-increasing consumption is not sustainable, as it contravenes the
principle of strong sustainability (Daly, 1990)8. This principle states that natural capital
(i.e. forests, fisheries, minerals) is not a substitute for other types of capital (i.e.
physical, financial, human, social) and that its stock must remain constant over time.
The consumption of goods and services, which require material and energy for their
production extracted from the environment and which produce waste and pollution,
must be maintained within sustainable limits. In other words, the level of throughput
must not exceed the planet’s biophysical carrying capacity (Boulding, 1966).
Surpassing this threshold leads to unsustainable outcomes, since the costs of
overconsumption or misconsumption (e.g. environmental degradation, resource
exhaustion, global warming, health problems) offset the benefits of consuming more
(Lintott, 1998; Daly, 2005). As can be seen in Figure 6, the costs related to the
depletion of natural resources and the damage caused by atmospheric pollution as a
8 The principle of weak sustainability, on the other hand, is aligned to neoclassical theory,
allowing the substitution of natural capital with other types of capital, while the total stock
formed by all forms of capital must be maintained constant over time (Pearce and Atkinson,
1993; Cabeza Gutés, 1996).
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percentage of final consumption expenditure registered an upward trend in high-
income economies during the last two decades, showing a decline during the 2008/09
financial crisis.
Figure 6 - Costs related to the depletion of
natural resources and damage caused by
pollution as a percentage of final
consumption expenditure in high-income
economies (1990-2011)
Note: Includes costs related to energy, mineral and forest
depletion and impacts derived from CO2 and suspended
particulate matter.
Source: Own figure based on data by the World Bank (2013)
The importance of economic throughput is well illustrated in the concept of socio-
ecological metabolism, which has its origins in biological sciences (Fischer-Kowalski
and Haberl, 1998, 2007). Analogous to a living organism, economies also take
materials and energy from the environment, which are then processed, used and
assimilated. Afterwards, what is not required is discarded once more to the
environment in the form of waste and pollutants. The scale of this metabolic process or
throughput, or what Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl (1998) call the metabolic profile,
depend on the mode of production and the lifestyle of a society. The mode of
production refers to the way a society is organised to produce goods and services (i.e.
primitive communism, feudalism, capitalism). However, it can similarly be said that the
metabolic profile in a capitalist system is influenced by the stage of economic
development that an economy is going through. In other words, the metabolism of an
economy is transformed over time along with its structure, from an early agrarian stage
to a later industrialist phase. Agrarian economies consume about 3 to 5 times less
energy and materials on a per capita basis than industrialised ones. As shown in Table
4, LDCs clearly possess an agrarian profile, as they use very low levels of energy and
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material per person, and a significant share of their energy sources comes from
biomass. The rest of the developing world, on average, corresponds more to an
agrarian than an industrial regime. Their levels of energy and material use are larger
than those of LDCs and use much more fossil fuels in their energy mix, but they still
have not reached the levels of developed economies, which clearly present an
industrial profile. The latter consume significantly more energy and materials and
obtain more than two thirds of their energy from fossil fuels (Krausmann et al., 2008).
Table 4 - Metabolic profiles of agrarian and industrial economies
Unit Agrarianeconomy
Industrial
economy LDCs Developing Developed*
Total energy use
per capita
GJ /
person /
year
50-70 150-400 33 64 205
Biomass (share
of energy use) % 95-100 10-30 92 50 23
Fossil fuels
(share of energy
use)
% 0-5 60-80 8 50 77
Use of materials
per capita
Tonnes /
person /
year
2-5 15-25 4.2 6.8 16
Note: * based on EU15; GJ: gigajoules
Source: Own table based on Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl (2007) and Haberl et al. (2011)
The gap between developed and developing economies in terms of materials and
energy use is also evident in relation to final consumption expenditure. In the year
2011, the world’s richest 16% were located in industrialised nations and accounted for
75% of total consumption expenditure (see Figure 7a). Their consumption per capita
was about 16 times greater than that of the rest of the world (UNSD, 2013a). In 2008,
they consumed, for instance, 39% of the world’s grain for food, feed and biofuels and
41% of animal protein (Moomaw et al., 2012), and on average they have been
consuming 58% of the total energy and approximately own 87% of all the vehicles on
the planet (Parikh and Painuly, 1994; Elliott, 1999). The people in the US alone
accounted in 2011 for more than 30% of global expenditures with only 4.5% of the
global population (UNSD, 2013a). In terms of long-term trends, consumption
expenditure in wealthy nations almost tripled from 1970 to 2011. A large part of this
increase cannot be attributed solely to population growth, which rose approximately by
50% on average in these countries during the same period. The considerable
expansion of consumption is attributed mainly to a rise of almost 75% in personal
income (see Figure 7b) (UNSD, 2013a) and other cultural and socio-psychological
reasons (e.g. status-seeking, competition, feelings of success, social hierarchy)
(Røpke, 1999; Jackson, 2002; Jackson and Michaelis, 2003; Assadourian, 2010).
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Consumption has increased significantly in the developing world as well. In 1970, its
final expenditure represented around 14% of the world’s total, but its share increased
to almost 25% in 2011 (see Figure 7a). In absolute terms, this corresponds to a six-fold
increase. This rise has occurred particularly among the so-called big emerging
economies, like China and India, where GDP per capita has expanded on average by
around 8.9% and 4.3% per year, respectively (UNSD, 2013a). In their quest to emulate
the lifestyles enjoyed by their rich counterparts, these nations have experienced rising
consumption trends, also fuelled by an increase in population and an improvement in
quality of life (Hubacek et al., 2007). Kharas (2010) estimates that Asia currently
accounts for around one quarter of the planet’s middle class and that figure could
double by 2020, accounting for over 40% of global middle-class consumption. This
means that more people in these nations are already demanding and will demand a
greater array of consumer goods, from processed food to washing machines, cars and
air travel. It is expected that similar consumption patterns will be present in other
developing nations. Dobbs et al. (2012) and the UNDP (2013) calculate that by 2025,
annual consumption in developing economies will triple with respect to 2010.
Population, on the other hand, is projected to keep growing, and could reach 9 to 10
billion people by 2050, who would be demanding more resources (Godfray et al.,
2010). Even with effective strategies to curb it, it is thought that population will probably
rise by at least another billion before peaking (Assadourian, 2010).
Figure 7 - Final consumption expenditure (a) (1970-2011) and GDP per capita
(1980-2011) (b) according to country group
(a) (b)
Source: Own figures based on data by UNSD (2013a)
In spite of the rise of the South (UNDP, 2013), income inequality will continue to be a
severe problem worldwide. Even in big emerging economies, like the ones mentioned
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above, levels of development will be uneven. It is expected that in large sectors of the
world population will continue to survive with barely an essential amount of goods and
services in the next decades (UNDP, 2005). The gap between rich and poor countries
in most cases is widening (Chen and Ravallion, 2008). For instance, in 1990, an
average person in the US was 38 times richer than the average Tanzanian. After less
than two decades, that same person in the US was 61 times richer (UNDP, 2005).
Growing consumption rates have translated into an enormous pressure on the planet’s
ecosystems on which humanity depends. More land has been converted into cropland
in order to satisfy a bigger demand for food, while minerals and fossil fuels have been
extracted at larger quantities. During the last century, global materials use increased
eight-fold, and developed and developing nations use almost 60 Gt of materials per
year (Krausmann et al., 2009). Humanity has been utilising more resources than the
planet can regenerate, and filling waste sinks more rapidly than the environment can
absorb (Princen, 1999). The consequences for global sustainability are significant, as it
can negatively affect the ability of future generations to satisfy their own needs.
The ecological footprint is an indicator that illustrates the scale of these consumption
patterns (see Figure 8). Broadly defined, it is as an index that measures how much
resources individuals, or nations, consume in terms of the amount of land that is
required not only to produce them, but also to absorb the waste derived from their use
(Rees, 1992). Although it has been criticised for its limited scope, the weight of its
components, and its inability to reflect the nature and severity of the environmental
impacts, among others (Lenzen and Murray, 2003; Fiala, 2008; Wiedmann and Barrett,
2010), the ecological footprint represents a simple method for comparing the
sustainability of human consumption. In this sense, the indicator shows that humanity
surpassed the world’s biocapacity threshold in the early 1970s (Wackernagel et al.,
2002; Kitzes et al., 2008). In 2008, this threshold was 1.8 global hectares per person.
In that same year, a regular person living in the US required around 7.2 global hectares
to support its lifestyle, while another one in the UK needed slightly less than 5. On
average, the footprint per person for high income countries was 5.6 for 2008 (GFN,
2013). This means that if all the people in the planet consumed as much as those who
live in the developed world, humanity would need more than three planets.
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Figure 8 - Global ecological and carbon
footprints and total biocapacity (1961-2008)
Source: Own figure based on data by the GFN (2013)
2.2.2. Consumption as a driver of emissions
The consequences of overconsumption are varied, and range from deforestation, soil
erosion, generation of hazardous waste, to abusive labour practices and health
problems, like obesity and stress (UN, 1992; Assadourian, 2010). Nevertheless, the
greatest symptom of modern consumption patterns may be the continuous increase in
atmospheric levels of GHGs, which has led to global warming. This phenomenon has
usually been associated with production processes, but some researchers suggest that
it should also be analysed from a demand-side or consumption perspective, as this
represents the origin of the problem (Munksgaard et al., 2000; Munksgaard and
Pedersen, 2001; Ferng, 2003; Bastianoni et al., 2004; Peters, 2008; Peters and
Hertwich, 2008b). Larger quantities of fossil fuels have been used in order to generate
the energy that is required to support present-day lifestyles, primarily in industrialised
nations. Emissions derived from the utilisation of energy-related resources account for
the largest part of the CO2 (i.e. >55%) that has been released to the atmosphere
(IPCC, 2001). Likewise, deforestation and land-use change have been the result of an
increasing demand for arable land to produce more food, which has also generated a
considerable amount of GHG emissions (i.e. >17%). Regarding agricultural activities,
these have been held responsible for nearly a fifth of total emissions, where livestock
transport and feed have been identified as major contributors (McMichael et al., 2007).
The extreme inequalities in income and energy/resource use between nations have
been reflected in significant disparities in terms of emissions. Sanwal (2009) asserts
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that the high levels of consumption per capita in industrialised economies constitute the
main driver for increasing emissions. For example, the 19 million people that live in the
US state of New York have a higher carbon footprint than the 766 million persons that
reside in the 50 least developed countries. Moreover, the UK, with a population of
nearly 60 million, emits more GHGs than Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Vietnam
combined, which have a total population of 472 million (UNDP, 2007).
The influence of consumption on the generation of GHG emissions has important
implications in terms of allocation and accounting. Traditionally, countries calculate
their emissions inventories from a territorial perspective; that is, they take into account
all the emissions that are generated within their own political borders. However, an
alternative approach is to allocate emissions according to the consumption that occurs
within a country, which includes not only domestically-produced goods and services,
but also imports. Hence, the difference between territorial and consumption-based
approaches consists in who is to be held responsible for the environmental impact
(Munksgaard and Pedersen, 2001; Ferng, 2003; Bastianoni et al., 2004; Peters, 2008;
Peters and Hertwich, 2008b). Territorial accounting assumes that nations should only
be responsible for the emissions that result from the processes required to fulfil their
own production requirements. Alternatively, consumption-based inventories incorporate
the CO2 generated along the entire supply chain from the production of all goods and
services demanded by a country, regardless of their geographical origin. From this
point of view, nations are thus responsible for the amount of emissions embedded in all
the products and services they consume. On the whole, both approaches ultimately
consider the same data, but differ on an accounting principle. The territorial approach
includes emissions embodied in exports, while the consumption-based subtracts these
exports and incorporates emissions contained in imports (Munksgaard and Pedersen,
2001). It is important to emphasize, however, that consumption-based emissions
should not be confused with the carbon footprint, as they present conceptual and
methodological differences. Although both show the effect of consumption on
emissions, the footprint seeks to reflect the extent to which humanity is exceeding the
planetary boundaries and is expressed in global hectares, as was explained in the
previous section. Consumption-based emissions, in contrast, are the result of an
accounting principle and are expressed in terms of CO2 or carbon per year.
Methodologically, the footprint calculates a nation’s total consumption by adding
imports to and subtracting exports from its national production (Borucke et al., 2013),
whereas consumption-based emissions are estimated using an Input-Output Analysis
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(IOA) framework to capture the emissions embedded in traded goods along the entire
production supply chain (Peters, 2008), as will be explained in the following chapter.
Davis and Caldeira (2010) built a global consumption-based CO2 emissions inventory
using Multi-Regional Input-Output (MRIO) analysis and a database (version 7) created
by the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP). The authors found that in 2004
approximately 23% of all CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel burning were emitted during
the production of goods and services that were consumed in a country different from
that of their origin. Peters et al. (2011b) later constructed consumption-based time
series by extending global emissions estimates for 1997, 2001, and 2004 over the
period 1990-2010 using a combination of GDP, emissions, and trade statistics from
established global datasets (e.g. UN, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Centre) (see
section 3.4). Figure 9 shows these series, which represent historical trends of territorial
and consumption-based CO2 emissions for Annex B and Non-Annex B countries.9 As
has been explained, the former group of countries constitute industrialised nations and
economies in transition that have commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. Non-Annex B
nations, consequently, comprise the rest of the world. Regarding territorial emissions,
Annex B countries achieved a reduction of approximately 5.6% from 1990 to 2010. In
contrast, emissions rose significantly by a factor of 2.4 in the Non-Annex B group,
going from 2.0 Gt of carbon in 1990 to around 5 in 2010. In fact, their emissions
surpassed those of the wealthiest nations by almost 1.3 Gt in 2010. This increase was
mostly caused by highly carbon-intensive activities in Brazil, Russia, India and China
(i.e. BRIC countries), as well as other emerging economies, such as South Africa,
Mexico, Indonesia, etc. Consumption-based emissions, on the other hand, grew almost
3.2% in Annex B nations, exceeding the Kyoto Protocol emission reductions. On the
other hand, the same type of emissions grew about 130% in the rest of the world,
reflecting their rising rates of consumption. An important fact is that Annex B
consumption-based emissions were a little less than 1% larger than their territorial
ones in 1990, and this proportion grew to 9.3% in 2010. In absolute terms, emission
transfers via international trade from one group to the other thus increased 10.2%
during the period. This reflects the increasing propensity of Annex B countries to rely
on imported goods, which have made them net importers of emissions. On the other
9 These are the parties to the Kyoto Protocol listed in the Annex B with quantified reduction
commitments, which are the same as those in the Annex I of the UNFCCC (see footnote 2),
with the exception of Kazakhstan, who only belongs to Annex B, and Turkey and the US,
who are only included in Annex I. Moreover, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the Russian
Federation have not pledged reduction commitments under the Kyoto protocol for the
period 2013-2020 (UNFCCC, 2012).
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hand, the rest of the world presented the opposite pattern. Their consumption-based
emissions were 1.6% smaller than their territorial ones in 1990, but this figure grew to
8.1% in 2010. Non-Annex B economies have consequently become net exporters of
emissions. Moreover, it is important to highlight that consumption-based emissions
from the rest of the world surpassed those of their counterparts in 2009 (Peters et al.,
2012).
Figure 9 - Territorial and consumption-based
emissions according to country groups
(1990-2010)
Source: Own figure based on data by Peters et al. (2011b)
Bows and Barrett (2010) used a consumption-based approach to build scenarios based
on cumulative emissions. Considering the amount of emissions accumulated in the
atmosphere instead of yearly emissions is deemed as an appropriate strategy for
developing emissions pathways and examining future climate policies (e.g. Anderson
and Bows, 2008; Allen et al., 2009; Meinshausen et al., 2009; Zickfeld et al., 2009;
Anderson and Bows, 2011). Bows and Barrett recognise the challenge of sharing the
carbon space between Annex I and Non-Annex I nations, and state that by redirecting
responsibility for emissions transfers from the latter to the former group, can be useful
to send signals to decarbonise the supply chain and trigger more timely and radical
mitigation actions.
2.2.3. The Consumption-Based Carbon Kuznets Curve
As was explained in section 2.2.1, the neoclassical theory argues in favour of the
maximisation of social welfare, which is a function of the utility that individuals obtain by
consuming goods and services. The ability of these individuals to consume, in turn,
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depends on their affluence. The relationship between affluence and environmental
quality or, in other words, the consequences of affluence in the environment, have
been usually dealt by neoclassical economics through the Environmental Kuznets
Curve (EKC). Inspired by the hypothesised inverted-U or bell-shaped relationship
between economic development and income inequality found by Simon Kuznets
(1955), some authors have suggested that a similar pattern exists between
environmental degradation, including the emission of certain types of pollutants, and
income per capita levels (Grossman and Krueger, 1991; Shafik and Bandyopadhyay,
1992; Panayotou, 1993; Selden and Song, 1994; Shafik, 1994).
Traditionally, the EKC relationship has been explained following similar arguments than
those originally expressed by Kuznets. In this sense, it reflects the different stages of
economic development economies must pass through, suggesting that structural and
technological changes in an economy are determinants of environmental quality. When
an economy is primarily agricultural, the environment deteriorates at a slow pace.
Meanwhile, the average level of income among the population remains low.
Afterwards, during the industrialisation phases, rising rates of degradation appear as a
result of increasing physical capital intensive activities, rather than human capital
intensive. Mass production, income per capita and consumer expenditure grow
gradually. At this point, societies are unwilling to exchange consumption for investment
on abatement efforts. But once the population achieves a certain level of income per
capita, environmental deterioration arrives at a threshold. After this turning point,
environmental indicators would start to display improvements, as increasing
investments in cleaner production technologies and stricter controls on emissions begin
to be publicly demanded by a wealthier society. The environment, in this fashion,
becomes a luxury good, and the existence of an income elasticity effect becomes
evident. Society’s willingness to pay for a better environment depends on the income
levels of its members. At low levels, environmental quality is inelastic with respect to
income, propensity to pollute is high, and only a minority is willing to pay. Meanwhile, at
higher levels, the elasticity is larger, the propensity to pollute is lower, and more
individuals are willing to invest to improve their environment.
The main argument is thus based on the assumption that a decoupling of
environmental pressure from economic growth is possible (World Bank, 1992). But, at
the same time, the EKC also suggests another tantalising idea. Becoming rich is the
practical solution to attain a decent environment (Beckerman, 1992). This means that
developing countries, where environmental deterioration has been more severe and
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whose emission intensities are higher, would still need to reach income levels high
enough to be able to move beyond their turning points. Nonetheless, after many years
of intense research, no consensus has been reached as whether these conclusions are
valid or not.
In the early 1990s, evidence was produced suggesting that it is possible to grow out of
certain environmental problems. Grossman and Krueger (1991) found that at higher
incomes, sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions and suspended particulate matter tend to
decrease. Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992) obtained equivalent results for these two
pollutants, and asserted that other problems, like access to safe water, urban
sanitation, and deforestation, are also likely to decline with higher income levels.
Panayotou (1993) and Selden and Song (1994) found comparable support regarding
nitrogen oxides (NOX) and carbon monoxide (CO). Grossman and Krueger (1995) later
determined that an analogous pattern applies for several indicators relating to water
quality. Overall, many other studies throughout the years have found proof at different
levels pointing towards the same kind of results, but these apply to certain pollutants
that produce short-term and local impacts. Stern et al. (1996), Ekins (1997), and Dinda
(2004) offer good reviews of the literature in this respect. The same logic, however, is
not always valid for those pollutants that generate global, indirect, and long-term
impacts (Arrow et al., 1995; Cole et al., 1997; Hanley et al., 2013). The immediate
effects related to these pollutants are harder to notice in the short-term and their
impacts are not limited to specific geographical locations. This is the case of CO2
emissions, for which the findings have remained inconclusive (Galeotti et al., 2006).
There have been numerous attempts to estimate the carbon EKC from a territorial
perspective. These analyses have been conducted either on a world scale, on
particular regions, such as OECD members, or on individual countries. Table 5
presents a set of existing studies that have analysed the territorial carbon EKC, either
by focusing exclusively on CO2 emissions or by examining CO2 within a host of other
pollutants. The table shows the number of countries included in the sample, the time
period that was analysed, the functional forms used, the statistical models employed,
and their main findings. As can be seen, the results have been highly incongruous.
Some authors have proved the validity of the carbon EKC; others have found an
inverted-U shape with out-of-sample turning points10, and still others have rejected the
10 The estimation of the turning point becomes less reliable as it moves further away from
the sample range. Alternate model forms could fit the data equally well and very different
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hypothesis. Moreover, a number of studies have also produced an N-shaped curve.
This indicates that CO2 emissions gradually decline or stabilise when income is
expanding, but only up to a certain level. From that point on, emissions increase again
as income rises. This finding consequently indicates that a cubic term should be tested
in the model specification.
Numerous authors, on the other hand, have warned about the various econometric
shortcomings and inconsistencies that commonly affect EKC analyses (e.g. Stern et
al., 1996; Millimet et al., 2003; Perman and Stern, 2003; Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh,
2005; Müller-Fürstenberger and Wagner, 2007; Romero-Ávila, 2008; Wagner, 2008;
Vollebergh et al., 2009; Stern, 2010). These are related to model misspecification due
to issues such as country heterogeneity, cross-sectional dependence, stationarity,
cointegration, among others (see section 3.2.1).
turning points could be found. Thus, when the turning point lies so far outside the data
range, it could be said that emissions just grow monotonically with income. See Loehle
(2010) as an example.
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Table 5 - Studies that have analysed the Carbon EKC from a territorial perspective
Author(s) Sample Years Findings Models Functional form/variables
Shafik and Bandyopadhyay
(1992) 149 countries 1960-1990
TP at over $7 million p/c with
quadratic specification Panel data regressions Quadratic and cubic (log-linear)
Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) 130 countries 1951-1986 TP of $35,428 (linear) and of above$8 million (logarithms)
Panel data with country and time
effects. Quadratic specification (linear and logarithms)
Cole et al. (1997) 7 regions 1960-1991 TP of $25,100 (linear) and $62,700(logarithms)
Panel regressions with
Generalized least squares (fixed
and random effects)
Quadratic (linear and log-linear)
Dietz and Rosa (1997) 111 countries 1989 CO2 emissions level off and declineabove $10,000 USD
General
additive model with a
nonparametric
regression procedure
Quadratic and cubic (log–polynomial and log-linear). GDP per
capita and CO2 in millions of metric tons of carbon.
Roberts and Grimes (1997) World 1962-1991
Relationship changed from being
linear in 1962 to curvilinear in
1991.
OLS Quadratic with CO2/$ instead of CO2 per capita
Moomaw and Unruh (1997) 16 developedcountries 1950-1992
Transition from positive to negative
emissions elasticities around 1973 Piece-wise linear spline function Quadratic and cubic
Schmalensee et al. (1998) 141 countries 1950-1990 Inverted-U with a within-sampleTP for highly developed countries. Segment splines Linear and log-linear
Galeotti and Lanza (1999) 110 countries 1960-1996 Inverted-U shape emerged in allcases
Three-parameter Gamma and
Weibull functions Non-linear functional form
Roca and Alcántara (2001) Spain 1972-1997 No evidence to support thehypothesis
Cumulative annual rate of
variation of CO2/$
First derivatives of variables
Neumayer (2002) 148 countries 1960-1988 Inverted-U with an out-of-sampleTP OLS panel regressions
Quadratic with additional variables (temperatures, land area,
energy, oil and gas reserves, trend)
Day and Grafton (2003) Canada 1958-1995 N-shaped curve OLS with cointegration andcausality tests Cubic in logarithms
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Table 5 - (continuation) Studies that have analysed the Carbon EKC from a territorial perspective
Author(s) Sample Years Findings Models Functional form/variables
Friedl and Getzner (2003) Austria 1960-1999 N-shaped curve OLS with stationarity andcointegration tests Linear, quadratic, cubic and cubic with additional variables
Martı́nez-Zarzoso and
Bengochea-Morancho (2004) 22 OECD countries 1975-1998
N-shaped curve for the majority of
countries Pooled Mean Group Estimator Different functional forms
Rosa et al. (2004) World 1996 Significant quadratic term with out-of-sample TP
Stochastic Estimation of Impacts
by Regression on Population,
Affluence, and Technology
Quadratic (linear and logarithms). GDP per capita and CO2 in
thousands of metric tonnes. Also tested Ecological Footprint
Galeotti and Lanza (2005) 28 OECD nationsand 8 Non-OECD 1960-1995
N-shaped curve and some evidence
of inverted-U Various models Different functional forms
Galeotti et al. (2006) OECD and Non-OECD countries 1960-1998
Inverted-U for OECD countries
with within-sample TPs Weibull functions Non-linear functional form
Huang et al. (2008) 40 countries 1990-2003 Inverted-U for 7 out of 21 Annex-IIcountries OLS Log-linear, quadratic and cubic
Atici (2009) Bulgaria, Hungary,Romania, and Turkey 1980-2002 Inverted-U for all countries
Panel data regressions (fixed
effects)
Quadratic with additional variables (energy per capita and trade
openness)
Apergis and Payne (2009) 6 Central Americancountries 1971-2004 Inverted-U for all countries
Panel regressions (heterogeneity
and cointegration tests) Quadratic
Jalil and Mahmud (2009) China 1975-2005 Inverted-U Autoregressive distributed lagmodel
Log linear quadratic with additional variables (energy
consumption, economic growth and foreign trade).
Aslanidis and Iranzo (2009) Non-OECD 1971-1997 No evidence for non-OECD nations Smooth transition regressionmodel Generalized Burr-type logistic function
He and Richard (2010) Canada 1948-2004 Weak evidence of inverted-U Semi-parametric and flexiblenonlinear parametric models Different functional forms
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All the studies that appear in Table 5 were conducted from a territorial perspective.
Authors like Ekins (1997) and Rothman (1998), however, have suggested that a
consumption-based approach is a more appropriate way to analyse the hypothesis,
than by employing the standard territorial or production-based method, which has been
used by the great majority of existing EKC analyses. The consumption-based approach
regards consumption as a critical driver behind environmental degradation. A country
may abate emissions within its own geographical borders, reflecting reductions in its
emissions inventories. Nevertheless, the same country may import highly carbon-
intensive goods from other regions of the planet. Therefore, it would be responsible for
the amount of CO2 emissions generated overseas associated with the production of
those goods. Rothman (1998), in this sense, has asserted that the downward slope of
the territorial-based EKC may actually be reflecting the wealthy countries’ ability to
detach themselves from the emissions they cause in other geographical areas due to
their consumption patterns. Hence, the inverted-U shape could be rejected if
consumption-based data, rather than territorial, was used to estimate the EKC.
It has been difficult to undertake consumption-based analyses of the EKC mainly due
to data availability. The range of existing consumption-based indicators is still very
limited. Moreover, there is an ongoing discussion about the proper methodologies that
are necessary to calculate these measures (Wiedmann, 2009). As explained in the
previous section, Peters et al. (2011b) have recently made available a consistent set of
global time series data for consumption-based CO2 emissions. This motivated testing
the hypothesis in this thesis with these figures and attempt to provide further insights
into the debate, since no other study has been undertaken at this scale.
Some of the first researchers to analyse the EKC from a consumption-based approach
are Gawande et al. (2001), who developed a consumption-side model for hazardous
waste sites in the US. Their findings support Rothman’s assertion. Aldy (2005) then
presented a state-level carbon EKC analysis for the US. Although his results vary by
state, he found that the consumption-based curves peak at significantly higher, within-
sample incomes than territorial ones. This indicates that per capita CO2 emissions in
rich states may decline “not because individuals consume less carbon-based goods in
those states than before, but because they consume carbon-based goods produced in
lower income states” (Aldy, 2005, p. 62). Similarly, Weber and Matthews (2008) have
asserted that 30% of the total US household CO2 impact in 2004 occurred outside the
US. In turn, Peters and Hertwich (2008a) estimated a crude territorial and
consumption-based carbon EKC analysis for OECD countries in the supporting
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information section of their paper. Their results agree with Aldy’s conclusions, in the
sense that the turning point for territorial emissions was lower ($46,109) than for
consumption-based emissions ($73,742). That same year, Bagliani et al. (2008a) and
Bagliani et al. (2008b) analysed this issue further by using ecological footprint data,
which is considered a consumption-based measure, for 141 countries for the year
2001. In a second study, the authors used data for 151 nations for 1961-2003. In
neither one of the studies the authors found evidence in favour of a bell-shaped
pattern. In both cases, their results show that the best-fitting curves exhibit either
monotonically increasing linear trends or an N-shape. More recently, Caviglia-Harris et
al. (2009) tested the validity of the EKC again by using ecological footprint indicators
for 146 countries covering a period of 40 years (1961-2000). They found that the
ecological footprint increases for both rich and poor nations, and much of this
expansion can be attributed to energy use (i.e. CO2). Wagner (2010) constructed a
dataset of oil and total energy embedded in world trade of manufacturing goods for 73
countries from 1978 to 2000. He determined that richer economies use relatively less
energy in their industrial production, yet still consume relatively large amounts of
energy indirectly.
The literature shows that consumption-based data produces more consistent results.
However, until now, the carbon EKC has not been properly tested using this approach
at a global scale. This constitutes a gap in the literature that this thesis intends to fill.
2.2.4. Addressing the issue of overconsumption
A call was made at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
in 1992, also known as the Rio Summit, for countries to promote sustainable
consumption (UN, 1992). The outcome document, or Agenda 21, recognised that
developed economies should take the lead. The rest of the nations should follow suit,
guaranteeing the provision of basic needs for their populations, while avoiding the
unsustainable pathways followed by their industrialised counterparts. Moreover, the
Agenda acknowledged the need to enhance technological and financial assistance to
poor nations, as well as to improve international cooperation. A couple of years later, in
1994, sustainable consumption was defined at the Oslo Roundtable on Sustainable
Production and Consumption as “the use of goods and services that respond to basic
needs and bring a better quality of life, while minimising the use of natural resources,
toxic materials and emissions of waste and pollutants over the life cycle, so as not to
jeopardise the needs of future generations” (Ministry of Environment Norway, 1994).
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The definition, however, is somewhat ambiguous as it does not clearly specify whether
it is enough to change consumption patterns by substituting some products for others,
or if there is the need to reduce overall consumption levels, particularly in developed
countries, in order to diminish environmental pressures (Lintott, 1998; Jackson, 2005;
Mont and Plepys, 2008). Choosing to substitute the consumption of resource- and
pollution-intensive goods and services for more efficient ones while maintaining the
total level of consumption constitutes a weak version of sustainable consumption
(Fuchs and Lorek, 2005), following the logic of the weak and strong sustainability
principles. For instance, McMichael et al. (2007) have suggested that global meat
consumption would need to drop to 50 grams of red meat per person per day from the
current global average of 100 grams in order to stabilise emissions from agriculture. In
wealthy nations, this amount of meat can be substituted by other less emissions-
intensive products, while maintaining the required daily caloric intake (Smith et al.,
2013). Strong sustainable consumption, in contrast, implies diminishing the general
level of economic throughput (Lorek and Fuchs, 2013). That is, it focuses on reducing
the overconsumption of resources, like water, minerals or fossil fuels, beyond the
quantities required to satisfy basic needs. On the whole, both weak and strong
approaches are centred on the notion that well-being must be enhanced with less
material and more sustainable lifestyles, but they differ on the scale. Lintott (1998)
argues that there is much scope for reducing consumption levels while increasing
welfare. For instance, Druckman and Jackson (2010) estimate that decreasing
consumption to a level compatible with a minimum income standard, which is deemed
to provide a decent standard of living, could achieve emissions reductions of about
37% in the UK.
Reducing the unsustainable scale of global economic throughput is an idea that started
gaining momentum in the 1970s, with works by Meadows et al. (1972) and other
authors, like Boulding (1966), Georgescu-Roegen (1971) and Daly (1972). Concerned
about the scale of the global economy and the increasing costs associated with
overconsumption, these researchers stressed the need to rely less on non-declining
material consumption and more on enhancing well-being in qualitative terms.
Nowadays, research in the field of steady-state economics and degrowth has
intensified. The former, initially created and advanced significantly by Daly, seeks to
maintain a nation’s economic throughput at a constant level, while improving societal
well-being. The latter, proposed by Latouche (2006), advocates for the need to
downscale the size of industrialised economies.
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Private and public consumption of goods and services currently represents more than
70% of the GDP in high and middle-income countries. Maximising consumption per
capita thus contributes to economic growth, which represents a priority for a
government’s economic policy. Nevertheless, marginal increases in economic material
expansion have not delivered higher levels of well-being in industrialised nations. The
costs of ever-increasing economic growth (e.g. resource exhaustion, environmental
degradation, health problems) have offset the benefits, up to a point where growth
becomes uneconomic (Daly, 2005). Figure 6 in section 2.2.1 shows that environmental
costs increase with consumption. Something similar is reflected in some welfare
indicators, such as the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) and the
Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), which subtract from consumption the associated
environmental and social costs (e.g. crime, unemployment, loss of leisure time,
commuting, etc.). These indicators show an increasing divergence with respect to GDP
over time (Lawn, 2003). For this reason, Victor and Rosenbluth (2007), Jackson (2009)
and Daly (2013), among others, have proposed that rich countries should abandon
their urge to pursue increasing growth as a national policy priority. This would leave
space for developing countries, which are the ones that still need to consume and
expand their economies.
Numerous efforts have been undertaken at country-scale to include sustainable
consumption policies in national legislations (see: OECD, 2000; Spaargaren, 2003;
Nash, 2009; Scholl et al., 2010). However, changing consumption patterns is not an
easy feat. Adjusting lifestyles and consumer behaviour requires structural
transformations not only in the economy, but also in terms of societal conventions and
institutions. Research has shown that consumers are most of the time locked-in due to
several economic, psychological, social and cultural circumstances (e.g. working
conditions, aspirations, pervasive marketing, available information, consumer
knowledge, prices, etc.) that restrict changing their patterns (see: Hobson, 2002;
Sanne, 2002; Zauberman, 2003; Shove, 2004; Schor, 2005; Jackson and
Papathanasopoulou, 2008; Press and Arnould, 2009). Moreover, although the idea of
reducing overall consumption levels may be supported by many researchers, it
represents a contentious issue and is far from being widely accepted, especially among
mainstream economists and politicians.
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2.3. Mitigating climate change
2.3.1. The IPAT equation
The IPCC (2007b, p. 818) states that the term mitigation “means implementing policies
to reduce GHG emissions and enhance sinks”, adding that this can be done through
“technological change and substitution that reduce resource inputs and emissions per
unit of output”. As was argued in the introductory chapter of this thesis, mitigation
actions in national and international policy agendas tend to privilege technological
solutions over other options. However, technology is just one of the anthropogenic
drivers of emissions (see: Rosa and Dietz, 2012). According to the IPAT identity
(Ehrlich and Holdren, 1971; Commoner, 1972), a level of environmental impact is
determined by population, affluence and technology, as expressed in the following
identity:
Impact = Population ×
GDP
Population
×
Impact
GDP
(1)
Affluence (A) is usually expressed as GDP per capita (i.e. income per capita), while
technology (T) is represented as pollution- or resource-intensity; that is, the amount of
pollutants or resources generated or used per unit of GDP. In the case of CO2
emissions, many future climate projections, like those of the IPCC (Nakicenovic and
Swart, 2000), have been developed with the use of the Kaya identity, a variant of the
IPAT (Kaya, 1990; Kaya and Yokobori, 1997). Its only difference is that the technology
term is disaggregated further into two individual components. In this sense, the
technology factor is composed of the energy intensity (i.e. energy use per unit of GDP)
and the carbon content of energy (i.e. CO2 emissions per unit of total primary energy
supply).
Emissions = Population ×
GDP
Population
×
Energy
GDP
×
Emissions
Energy
(2)
Improvements in technology will play a very important role to guarantee a low-carbon
future. Some policymakers and researchers display wide optimism in technological
mitigation (Pacala and Socolow, 2004; Vollebergh and Kemfert, 2005), but it has also
been acknowledged that it must be complemented with other measures. Technology is
a necessary, but not sufficient condition to combat climate change and achieve a 2°C
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future (Beder, 1994; Schor, 2005; Huesemann, 2006; Flavin and Engelman, 2009;
Jackson, 2009). Historical trends show that global improvements in carbon intensity
have been outweighed by population growth and the expansion of income per capita
(see Figure 10). Carbon intensity (i.e. CO2/GDP) worldwide improved on average by
around 1% per annum since 1960. Population and income per capita, on the other
hand, increased on average by 1.6% and 1.8%, respectively, every year. The pace of
technological change was not enough to compensate for the rise in the other two
factors. Jackson (2009), in this sense, argues that in order to achieve a 2°C future,
carbon intensity would require a 21-fold improvement by 2050, given that population
and income per capita grew annually at rates of 0.7% and 1.5%, respectively. This
would mean that technology would need to improve significantly faster than in the past,
and this would potentially include achieving negative emissions from the 2070s
according to the RCP3-PD scenario (see section 2.1.1). In this regard, technologies
like carbon capture and storage (CCS) and geo-engineering solutions, which could
potentially achieve this objective, are still surrounded by large uncertainties in terms of
their feasibility and possible effects on natural and human systems (see: Bengtsson,
2006; IPCC, 2007b; Boyd, 2008; Fox and Chapman, 2011; Szulczewski et al., 2012;
UNEP, 2012). Moreover, the deployment of these new technologies would need to
overcome current and future lock-in effects and diffusion barriers (e.g. market,
regulatory, trade, etc.) (see: Arthur, 1989; Unruh, 2000; Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla,
2006). Authors such as Huesemann (2006, p. 539) thus believe that mitigation
technologies have the capability to deliver the required emission cuts “only if population
and economic growth are halted without delay”.
Figure 10 - Growth in GDP per capita,
population and carbon intensity (1960-2009)
Source: Own figure based on data by UNSD (2013a) and
CDIAC (2013)
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Population is seldom addressed through climate change mitigation policies, but it is
rather treated as a development issue. For instance, family-planning programmes
deliver efficient results when combined with polices that seek to educate and empower
women. Evidence shows that these actions contribute significantly to reducing fertility
rates (Petroni, 2009; Das Gupta et al., 2011; World Bank, 2011). Smaller families imply
having less people to feed, clothe and shelter, and this helps societies to preserve
resources, lessen environmental burdens and improve quality of life. However, when
population policies are too stringent, they can engender negative social effects, as in
the case of China (Feng et al., 2013). Consumption, on the other hand, is usually dealt
in the context of sustainable development initiatives. As has been explained in section
2.1.3, climate change and sustainable development have tended to be treated as
separate discourses (Michaelis, 2003). As a consequence, sustainable consumption
policies are not always explicitly labelled as mitigation options. For instance, only two
Non-Annex I countries (i.e. Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana) use the precise term sustainable
consumption in their NAMAs (UNFCCC, 2011a). The majority of developing countries
include proposals to reduce energy consumption derived from fossil fuels, as well as to
decrease deforestation rates and land-use change, but do not consider the sustainable
use of a wider range of resources as climate change mitigation actions per se.
Developing nations generally argue in international climate negotiations that they have
the right to develop and continue rising their incomes and consuming more in per
capita terms (see: Jotzo, 2005). In relation to Annex I nations, their climate and
sustainable consumption policies show more integration (OECD, 2000; Nash, 2009;
Scholl et al., 2010). For example, the UK’s Climate Change Programme calls for setting
out a plan for action on sustainable consumption (HM Government, 2006). However,
policies in general refer to sustainable consumption in the weak sense of the term, but
do not consider imposing caps on the overall levels of affluence and consumption.
2.3.2. Demand-side mitigation
As has been mentioned in the previous section, mitigation policies tend to favour
technological change, as expressed by the IPCC (2007b) definition. Most technology-
led actions focus on the production of goods and services or the supply-side.
Surprisingly, very few efforts have been done in the scientific literature to provide a
definition for demand-side mitigation actions, which concentrate on the affluence or
consumption factor in the IPAT identity. The term demand-side mitigation is usually
employed in relation to energy use (see: Tanatvanit et al., 2004). It denotes reductions
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in electricity or energy utilisation in the consumer end by means of more efficient
technologies (i.e. household appliances, heating systems, insulation, etc.). To the best
of the researcher’s knowledge, Smith et al. (2013) are the only authors who offer a
formal and wider definition of the term going beyond technological solutions. They
recognise the differences and synergies that exist between supply- and demand-side
actions, and understand the latter as those measures that seek to lessen GHG
emissions in the context of food demand by (1) reducing “losses and waste in the
supply chain, as well as during final consumption”; (2) by achieving “changes in diet
towards less resource-intensive food”; and (3) by a “reduction in overconsumption in
regions where this is prevalent” (Smith et al., 2013, p. 6). This connotation serves as a
basis for constructing a working definition for demand-side mitigation to be used this
thesis, which is described more generally as those measures that pursue cuts in
consumption-induced emissions by modifying consumption patterns and/or reducing
overall levels of consumption. Making this differentiation between supply- and demand-
side strategies is useful so as to distinguish the latter from technology-centred
approaches.
Mitigation policies can thus be directed either to producers or consumers depending on
the desired goal. It is important to have in mind, though, that supply and demand are
two faces of the same coin. Some demand-side instruments can produce indirect
effects in supply, just as supply-side measures can cause indirect effects in demand
when the costs are transferred to the final consumer. For instance, a carbon
consumption tax applied directly to consumers may dissuade them from acquiring a
certain product. However, it may also represent an incentive for the producers to
manufacture it in a less carbon-intensive manner. On the other hand, there are
important synergies between supply and demand measures (Smith et al., 2013). As
has been discussed, technology-led mitigation should be complemented with
consumption-oriented policies. Emissions reductions can be more effective, for
example, if supply measures focused on incentivising producers to use more efficient
technologies are combined with demand-side actions seeking to inform consumers
about pollution-intensive goods. The efficacy of using combined measures depends on
their consistency to achieve the desired targets, like technology improvements and
changing consumption patterns as in the previous example. Combining policies
effectively implies that these should not be contradictory among each other and follow
the Tinbergen rule, which states that the number of policy instruments must at least be
equal to the number of policy targets (see: Knudson, 2009).
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Mitigation policy instruments can be of various types. Market-based tools make use of
prices and market mechanisms to incentivise economic agents to undertake certain
actions, with the aim of correcting market failure and externalities, of which climate
change is the most significant (Stern, 2007). These instruments can take the form of
taxes, fees, charges, subsidies or other more complex measures, such as tradable
permits (see Table 6). As said, carbon taxes can be applied to the supply- or the
demand-side. The latter can take a form similar to a value-added tax (VAT), increasing
the price consumers must pay for certain goods and services. Among market-based
policy instruments are the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms11 and the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme (ETS), which cap the amount of emissions and allocate permits to industries,
allowing them to generate a certain amount of CO2. On the other hand, command and
control policy tools, also known as regulatory, are directly administered by the
government, and are constituted by regulations, standards and quotas. These have
been criticised by being less efficient than market-based approaches and many options
are costlier for the government, as they do not always generate revenue (Tietenberg,
1990). From the supply-side, producers can be required to use certain types of
technologies and comply with certain standards. In contrast, from a demand-side
approach, consumers can be limited by quotas or be banned from acquiring specific
goods. The last type of policy instruments are informational, and consist basically of
public disclosure schemes, awareness and education campaigns and labelling
programmes. Firms, for example, can voluntarily disclose information about their
practices to gain trust from their stakeholders. When directed to consumers, these can
help them to make better-informed choices and change their behaviour accordingly.
Carbon-labelling schemes are designed to advise consumers about the amount of
carbon that was emitted during the life cycle of a certain product. Programmes like
these have been initiated in several countries, like the UK and France, and are
extending gradually to other nations, while covering a wider range of products (Brenton
et al., 2009; Vandenbergh et al., 2011). However, the number of studies that focus on
how demand-side policies, like carbon labelling and other instruments, may affect the
level of exports from other countries, particularly those located in the developing world,
is still limited. This is a research gap in the literature that needs to be addressed.
11 The Kyoto Protocol mechanisms are (1) the emissions trading, (2) the CDM, and (3) the
joint implementation.
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Table 6 - Types of mitigation policy instruments
Policy type Policy optionsSupply-side Demand-side
Market-based
(or economic)
instruments
GHG emissions taxes, fees
and charges
Subsidies and incentives
Tradable permits (cap and
trade or baseline and credit)
Carbon consumption taxes and
charges (domestic and imports)
Consumption subsidies and
incentives
Personal carbon quotas (cap and
trade)
Command and
control (or
regulatory)
instruments
Regulations (e.g. building,
automobile)
Technology or performance
standards (e.g. fuel, energy)
Production quotas
Licenses
Product bans
Consumption quotas
Information and
voluntary
instruments
Voluntary public disclosure
Rating programmes
Carbon certification and labelling
Awareness/education campaigns
Source: Own table based on IPCC (2007b), OECD (2009) and Fawcett (2010)
2.3.3. Border carbon adjustments
Border carbon adjustments (BCAs), also called carbon import tariffs (CITs) or more
generally border tax adjustments (BTAs), are taxes levied by nations that are subject to
legally binding carbon abatement schemes, such as the Kyoto Protocol or the EU ETS,
on imports produced by nations not bound by equivalent regulations. Although they
usually are applied as taxes or tariffs, BCAs can potentially take other forms, like
antidumping or countervailing duties, or requirements for importers to acquire
emissions trading certificates (Holmes et al., 2011). Whatever form they may adopt,
BCAs mainly respond to competitiveness issues, since carbon-taxing countries find
themselves in a competitive disadvantage over their counterparts, which do not face
carbon mitigation costs. Moreover, BCAs have the additional target of addressing
concerns about carbon leakage, which is defined by the IPCC (2007b, p. 811) as “the
part of emissions reductions in Annex B countries that may be offset by an increase of
the emissions in the non-constrained countries above their baseline levels [, which] can
occur through relocation of energy-intensive production in non-constrained regions”.
For Peters (2010, p. 36), this represents the strong or policy-induced version of carbon
leakage, which he defines in an alternative and simpler way: “Strong carbon leakage in
country or region R is the increase in greenhouse gas emission outside of R due to
climate policy in R”. BCAs thus aim to avoid industries from eluding national or regional
climate legislations by relocating in more legally-lenient regions. In this sense, the
implementation of this policy instrument ensures levelling the playing field among the
different parties involved by internalising abatement costs into the prices of traded
goods and services.
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The conception of strong carbon leakage was conceived with the purpose of
distinguishing it from the weak or demand-driven version, which is also defined by
Peters (2010, p. 35): “Weak carbon leakage in country R is the greenhouse gas
emissions outside of R that occur in order to meet consumption in R”. This kind of
leakage corresponds to the emissions transfers required to satisfy consumption in net-
importing economies via international trade, which were discussed in section 2.2.2.
Eckersley (2010, p. 371) provides a slightly different definition for weak leakage, which
he also calls indirect leakage. It represents “a type of carbon movement out of
developed countries that cannot be directly attributable to new climate policies”.
According to him, one of the factors that can cause this movement is “a more general
trend of industry relocation to the Global South to take advantage of a range of lower
factor costs”. A further discussion about carbon leakage is offered in section 2.4.3.
Lockwood and Whalley (2010) argue that the discussion about BCAs should make
reference to an older body of literature related to border tax adjustments initiated in the
1960s, following the adoption of the VAT in the EU. Such literature acknowledged the
different approaches of taxation (Grossman, 1980). Under the origin approach, BCAs
are applied to the exports in the country where they are produced. This consequently
constitutes a production or supply-side tax. In contrast, following a destination
approach, BCAs are applied to imports in the country where they are consumed, thus
representing a consumption or demand-side tax. This last approach requires
implementing, in addition, a rebate of the domestic tax on exports, since these are not
consumed in the country of origin. According to Whalley (1979), taxing at the origin or
at the destination does not generate trade-distorting effects, as long as the tax rates
are uniform across sectors and the prices of all factors of production and of all goods
and services, as well as exchange rates are flexible (see also Meade, 1974). This
means that changes caused by the tax are corrected through prices, and they are
reflected in monetary terms, but the volume of trade remains intact. Grossman (1980)
asserts, however, that when intermediate goods are included in the scheme, trade
neutrality is maintained from the destination approach, but distortions in trade are
generated from the origin approach unless intermediate goods are equally taxed and
not only final products. It is important to remember that Grossman is referring to an
indirect consumption tax and not a carbon levy, which would need to include
commodities and raw materials. Grossman’s assertion is straightforward. From the
destination approach, intermediate imports are used to produce final goods in the
country of consumption, and these would ultimately be taxed. On the other hand, when
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intermediates are not taxed in the country of origin, producers hold a competitive
advantage. Grossman (1980) thus suggests applying the BCA to all stages of
production, in which case trade neutrality is maintained as long as all prices are
flexible. Regardless of the approach, however, it is difficult that the principle of price
flexibility will hold in the real world, and this means that BCAs can potentially be trade-
distorting.
The current discussion about BCAs implies implementing them under the destination
approach, as they are being proposed unilaterally by some Annex I nations (i.e. US,
EU, Australia, etc.). Trade neutrality is thus a relevant issue, since they need to comply
with the existent World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, and this institution is
ultimately not motivated by environmental concerns, but by commercial ones.
Developing countries regularly claim that BCAs represent a form of protectionism or
trade barrier by industrialised nations and go against the spirit of free trade (Holmes et
al., 2011; Kaufmann and Weber, 2011). Furthermore, they assert that this policy
instrument conflicts with the UNFCCC principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities. The unilateral imposition of BCAs by developed countries would shift
climate change mitigation costs onto the developing world, who should carry less
onerous abatement obligations (Davidson Ladly, 2012). Along the same lines,
Eckersley (2010) states that BCAs emphasise “the short-term disadvantages of
domestic energy consumers and downplays the environmental and social injustices
that arise from uneven development”. Industrialised nations, in contrast, argue that the
existent situation comprises a subsidy to dirty production in non-regulated markets, and
that BCAs represent a strong incentive for the developing world to start adopting legally
binding responsibilities (Helm et al., 2012).
Holmes et al. (2011), Monjon and Quirion (2011) and Sheldon (2011) maintain that
BCAs are not necessarily in violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), which represents the basis of the WTO framework. GATT has a provision of
non-discrimination, which states that members of the WTO can impose border taxes on
imports, as long as they are equivalent to a domestic tax applied to the same types of
products. In this sense, the BCA rate cannot be proportionally greater than the existing
carbon price in the destination country, nor be applied to goods and services which are
not covered by the mitigation abatement schemes. Moreover, in order for the BCAs to
be effective, the carbon content of imported products should be estimated. Ensuring
that imports receive a fair and similar treatment than domestic products thus requires
not taxing them in excess of the domestic rates even if their carbon content is larger.
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This implies the application of carbon equalisation measures. Ismer and Neuhoff
(2007) propose using the principle of the best available technology (BAT), according to
which imports are supposed to have been manufactured with at least the best
technology existent in the country or region of consumption. Yet, the determination of
an appropriate BAT can be problematic. Monjon and Quirion (2010) suggest that an
easier way is to use product-specific benchmarks, like the ones set in the EU ETS for
industry products.
Some BCA proposals include provisions to exclude LDCs and in this way avoid
conflicts with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (see: Monjon
and Quirion, 2010; Winchester et al., 2011; Cosbey et al., 2012). Some authors believe
that this could clash with the most-favoured nation principle, which states that countries
cannot normally discriminate between their trading partners (e.g. Monjon and Quirion,
2011). If a specific nation receives special treatment, this same treatment must be
applied equally to all other trading parties. However, the WTO allows certain
exemptions according to its special and differential treatment provisions, which give
LDCs special rights and allow them to be treated more favourably than other WTO
members (see: Mah, 2011). In addition, certain proposals also include exemptions for
other countries, given that they are responsible for less than 0.5% of total global GHGs
and contribute with less than 5% of the total imports in a certain sector of the
consuming country or region (Monjon and Quirion, 2010; Winchester et al., 2011).
Moreover, the schemes proposed by the US sets criteria for sector coverage. Eligible
sectors would be those with an emission intensity of above 5%, trade intensity (i.e.
volume of trade per unit of sectoral GDP) of at least 15% or energy intensity higher
than 20% (van Asselt and Brewer, 2010; Cosbey et al., 2012).
Exempting LDCs, as well as certain sectors, from BCA coverage can simplify the
already complex administration that such a policy instrument would demand. The
requirement of complying with the provision of non-discrimination and determining an
adequate BAT encompass a significant complexity (Cosbey, 2008). But the challenge
in terms of management could be even greater if finished products (e.g. automobiles,
electronic appliances) were also included in the scheme, instead of just focusing on
intensive primary commodities (e.g. cement, iron, steel, aluminium, etc), given the
number of possible countries of origin and the various inputs included in a final good
(van Asselt and Brewer, 2010). Furthermore, BCAs require a constant revision of the
amount of emissions embedded in products. Updating these figures implies a
complicated, data-intensive and time-consuming process with associated monetary
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costs (Persson, 2010). However, if embedded emissions were rarely updated, then
there is the risk that the BCA could be viewed as a fixed import or anti-dumping tariff,
irresponsive to improvements in carbon intensity (Winchester, 2012). Moore (2010)
thus believes that a BCA scheme is too fraught with administrative difficulties to make it
viable in practice, and could additionally lead to an escalation of trade disputes in the
WTO.
Research in BCAs is relevant since discussions are happening in some Annex I
countries (e.g. US, EU, Australia) about their potential adoption. The US is the nation
that has considered this option in more serious terms. It has explicitly stated that an
emissions trading scheme will not be set up without a provision for BCAs. The Kerry-
Lieberman climate bill, which failed to gain support from the US congress, included this
policy instrument. The Waxman-Markey bill, passed by the House of Representatives
in 2009, involved a much more detailed BCA scheme, although the bill later failed to
obtain approval by the Senate. Nonetheless, it is expected that any future US climate
legislation would contain this kind of measures. This has generated concern in some
regions, like Latin America, about how the unilateral implementation of BCAs may
affect their trade flows (see: Schneider and Samaniego, 2010). Similar reactions have
taken place in China, who will become one of the main targets of such a scheme (see:
Lin and Li, 2011; Li and Zhang, 2012) and might oppose it, as well as Russia (see:
Weitzel et al., 2012). It is thus important to understand how BCAs might impact on the
demand from goods produced in Non-annex I nations and ultimately on trade flows and
welfare. Grubb (2011) asserts that final consumers are the ones who would absorb the
great majority of costs associated with BCAs, and that a carbon price on commodities
could reduce demand. The findings described in the literature regarding their potential
impacts and effectiveness, however, are mixed. Böhringer et al. (2012) state that BCAs
can effectively reduce leakage and, according to Bednar-Friedl et al. (2012), they can
be twice as effective when emissions emitted throughout the entire industrial process
are considered. Along the similar lines, Dissou and Eyland (2011) claim that they help
to improve the competitiveness of industries in consuming countries. Kuik and Hofkes
(2010) suggest that they might reduce leakage in the iron and steel industry, but that
the reduction would be less for the mineral-products sector. In relation to welfare and
trade, Dong and Whalley (2009) believe that the impacts would likely be small,
although they recognise that China’s imports would register a fall. Burniaux et al.
(2010) similarly recognise that welfare impacts would be small, but slightly negative at
the global level. However, other authors point out opposing findings. Atkinson et al.
(2011) suggest that BCAs would create distortions in trade, in the sense that its volume
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and composition will change, and this could bring about associated losses in efficiency
and welfare, particularly in developing nations. Lin and Li (2011) declare that BCAs
would induce a structural transformation in China, shifting production toward the non-
industrial outputs, which would generate impacts on the country’s regional
development strategy. Moreover, Dissou and Eyland (2011) estimate that BCAs would
entail a high welfare cost to households, while Jakob and Marschinski (2013) found
that they will not necessarily help to decrease overall CO2 emissions. The existing
research, however, has not focused on estimating the amount of global emissions that
could be captured with this policy instrument, and analyse which sectors in the
developing world could potentially be most affected. This represents a gap in the
literature that this thesis seeks to address.
2.4. International trade
2.4.1. Trade and development
Trade between different regions and societies has existed for thousands of years. It
has allowed people to enjoy a wider variety of goods and is viewed as a manner of
achieving progress and wealth. It was in the sixteenth century when the idea of foreign
trade started to be envisaged in Europe as an important doctrine for ensuring a
country’s political and economic dominance. This doctrine received the name of
mercantilism and maintained its relevance until the eighteenth century. It was based on
the principle that the richness of a nation depends on its ability to accumulate wealth
mainly in the form of precious metals (i.e. bullionism) by incurring in a positive trade
balance with respect to other countries (see: Barber, 2009; Peukert, 2012). Ruling
governments consequently had to encourage exports, while protecting domestic
producers from goods manufactured in foreign nations through prohibitions and tariffs.
Adam Smith criticised this view in his most notable work, known as The Wealth of
Nations, in which he proposed the initial basis for a first theory of international trade.
For him, the mercantilist approach meant that nations could not benefit simultaneously
from trade, since one nation’s exports are necessarily other nation’s imports, which is
now known as a zero-sum game (Engerman, 1994). He thus recommended that a
country should specialise in producing those goods which it can produce more
efficiently and at a lower cost with respect to others. The divergence in the levels of
efficiency and costs of producing traded goods between nations depends on their
different endowments of factors of production. In this sense, if a country possesses
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vast quantities of a certain resource or has enough skilled workers, it could produce
more of a given good at a lower cost than its competitors, holding an absolute
advantage. Smith then argued that a portion of the revenue derived from exporting the
surplus of those efficiently-produced commodities could be used to acquire other types
of products for which the nation does not have a productive advantage. Although Smith
is not properly esteemed as a trade theorist, he established clear link between
international trade and economic development (Myint, 1977). By acquiring an absolute
advantage in trade, countries can extend their markets and increase the real revenue
and wealth of their societies and thus their welfare. This idea was held until some
decades later David Ricardo revised the theory. According to him, all economies can
gain from trade even if they do not hold an absolute advantage. He thought that it is not
the absolute, but the relative or comparative advantage that determines the benefits of
international trade. In his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Ricardo uses
an example involving England and Portugal to explain the principle of comparative
advantage.
“To produce the wine in Portugal, might require only the labour of 80 men for
one year, and to produce the cloth in the same country, might require the labour
of 90 men for the same time. It would therefore be advantageous for her to
export wine in exchange for cloth. This exchange might even take place,
notwithstanding that the commodity imported by Portugal could be produced
there with less labour than in England. Though she could make the cloth with
the labour of 90 men, she would import it from a country where it required the
labour of 100 men to produce it, because it would be advantageous to her
rather to employ her capital in the production of wine, for which she would
obtain more cloth from England, than she could produce by diverting a portion
of her capital from the cultivation of vines to the manufacture of cloth.” (Ricardo,
1817, pp. 158-159)
Ricardo states that relative costs (i.e. labour cost of wine/labour cost of cloth) vary
across nations, and these can gain by specialising in the manufacture of those goods
for which the relative opportunity costs are lower. In Ricardo’s example, Portugal holds
an absolute advantage in both goods. However, it is more convenient for this country to
shift its factors of production to cultivate wine in exchange for more cloth than what
could be produced domestically, although cloth is more expensive to produce in
England. This last country, on the other hand, benefits by acquiring low-cost wine and
specialising in cloth. In this way, both parties benefit by engaging in trade, expanding
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their production frontiers, generating more income and increasing the welfare of their
societies. Ricardo’s theory thus comprises a positive-sum game or a win-win situation
(Kitson et al., 2004).
The Ricardian theory of comparative advantage prevailed during the nineteenth century
and part of the twentieth, until it started to be criticised by a new school of economic
thought. Structuralist economists noticed that trading under the principles of
comparative advantage had created an increasing divergence between rich and poor
countries. The structural-change school originated during the 1950s by the work of
economists working at the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC). They conceived the dependency theory, based on the Prebisch-
Singer hypothesis (Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950), and is closely linked to the world-
systems theory, which is rooted more in sociological sciences (see: Wallerstein, 1974;
Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995). These theories basically express that the world is
divided according to a power hierarchy, where the core or the North, composed of
industrialised economies, exploits the periphery or the South, formed by developing
countries12. The periphery specialises in the extraction of material resources, while the
core produces capital goods. Resources thus flow from the periphery to the core, while
capital goods flow in the inverse direction, leading to an unequal exchange. Prebisch
and Singer noticed that over the years the terms of trade (i.e. price of exports/price of
imports) of developing countries, which mainly depended on the production of primary
products, had deteriorated rapidly. This is due to the income elasticity of manufactured
goods, which is higher than that of commodities. Similarly, technological progress
augments the demand for manufactured goods compared to the demand for raw
materials. Consequently, as income rises and an economy becomes more
industrialised, the demand of manufactured goods relative to GDP increases, while the
demand for basic commodities falls. A higher demand of the former goods elevates its
price, while the latter become cheaper. For a country that exports primary products and
requires importing more elaborate goods, this translates into a worsening of its terms of
trade (see: Grilli and Yang, 1988; Sarkar and Singer, 1991; Bleaney and Greenaway,
12 The term “North-South divide” originated as an attempt to correct the usage of concepts
such as “First-World” and “Third-World” countries, which were introduced by Alfred Sauvy
in 1952 (see: Wolf-Phillips, 1987). It refers to a division between industrialised nations,
mostly located in the northern hemisphere, and non-industrialised, poor nations that are
predominantly located to the south of the equator. However, its meaning goes beyond
geographical location, since some countries, like Australia and New Zealand, are
considered to be part of the North. This classification has more socioeconomic and political
connotations, making a distinction between varying levels of development achieved by
different countries.
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1993). Hence, developing countries are structurally constrained and increasingly
dependent on the core over time. In other words, developing countries face a mounting
difficulty to become industrialised13. In order to prevent this situation from happening
and to reduce their foreign dependency, some regions decided to close their markets to
trade and implement an import-substitution scheme (Baer, 1972; Bruton, 1998).
Structuralism rejected the notion that Smith’s self-regulating market mechanism or the
invisible hand could lead the process of development. According to a Keynesian
rationale, government intervention was deemed as a necessary action. The main task
was thus to transform the structure of the economies under the supervision of the state
in order to industrialise key productive sectors on a gradual basis. This is how import-
substitution schemes started to be implemented. These consisted in putting into
practice protectionist measures so as to shield the nascent industrial sectors from
foreign competition. The aim was to strengthen the intermediate-goods sectors first
and, once they had achieved a higher level of productivity, similar measures would be
employed in capital-goods industries. This model delivered some results especially in
Brazil and Mexico (Alarcon and McKinley, 1992). However, the objectives were never
fully met. Industrialisation of capital-goods sectors was not achieved successfully.
State-protected sectors soon felt safe from any kind of competition, not having
incentives to become more productive. Moreover, some of the strategic industries were
state-owned, and corruption and bad practices started to corrode them. Finally, during
the late 1970’s and early 1980s, the model collapsed at a moment when the debt crisis
impacted some developing countries, especially in Latin America (Rodrik, 1992).
Empirically, the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis has been disputed by several authors (see:
Hadass and Williamson, 2003). Although some evidence has been found at the global
level, it is still elusive when examining specific cases (Ross, 1999). However, another
proposition that follows a similar line of reasoning emerged some years later. It goes in
line with post-Keynesian theory, and is known as the balance of payments constrained
growth (Thirlwall, 1979). Essentially, this model considers that the level of output is
demand-determined, and an economy’s long-term growth rate is given by the
expansion rate of its exports and the income elasticity of its imports. By following the
same logic used in the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, a country that experiences a
13 Also relevant to this discussion is the Resource Curse Hypothesis. It states that countries
which possess an abundance of natural resources, such as oil reserves, gas, or tropical
forests, have experienced lower economic growth rates and are less developed than
resource-poor but industrialised nations (see: Sachs and Warner, 1995).
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weakening of its terms of trade would also face an increasing current account deficit.
Since it is impossible to finance this deficit indefinitely, this situation constitutes a
constraint to growth. This idea was later known as Thirlwall's law. Some evidence that
supports this law has been produced. López and Cruz (2000) have shown that it is
relevant for Latin American economies. More recently, Bagnai (2010) found supportive
results in a study of 22 OECD countries.
During the late 1970s, the Ricardian theory stared gaining influence once more. The
liberalisation of international trade was sought as a measure to promote economic
growth and development in the long-run. Open economies could grow faster than those
that imposed restrictions to the free flow of goods and services (Bhagwati, 1988). The
export-led growth strategy considers that a country’s long-term economic growth rate is
determined by its openness to trade and its ability to produce for foreign markets
(Krueger, 1978; Edwards, 1992, 1993). In a few words, exports constitute the main
driver of industrialisation and development (Giles and Williams, 2000). The reasons
behind this assertion rest on demand and supply arguments. An increase in foreign
consumption leads to a rise in raw material and labour-based exports. A larger amount
of exports generates employment and more income, which can be invested. Present
consumption is thus sacrificed in order to promote future productivity gains. This,
together with a more efficient allocation of the factors of production and the creation of
economies of scale, generates a larger productive capacity. This strategy was
supported by the experiences of Japan and a group of Asian countries, known as the
Asian Tigers (i.e. South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan). After the Second
World War, Japan implemented an export-led model of growth, which prescribed
sacrificing present consumption in order to achieve higher levels of investment in
physical and human capital. All this was supported by strong national policy objectives
and clear government strategies (Klein and Cukier, 2009). A similar model was used by
the Asian Tigers, which started to register high economic growth rates and quickly
became industrialised in the 1980s. They had set an example of how developing
nations could effectively transform the structures of their economies and increase the
living standards of their populations. China later began following a similar approach.
Under the government of Ronald Reagan in the US and Margaret Thatcher in the UK,
the example of the Asian Tigers was translated into a set of policy prescriptions known
as the Washington Consensus (see: Gore, 2000). This model, which ideology then
became globally identified as neo-liberalism, rescued the core of Smith’s doctrine.
Mainly, trade liberalisation, privatisation of state-owned industries, downscaling the
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governmental apparatus, deregulation and fiscal discipline had to be promoted
(Williamson, 1993). With the endorsement of international organisations, such as the
WTO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, this model was
applied especially to Latin American countries, which required urgent help after the
crises in the 1980s. Soon, it was also implemented in other developing East Asian and
African countries as well. A large part of the developing world soon opened itself to
international trade and adopted an export-oriented industrialisation model, which is the
one that predominates in the world today. When the Eastern bloc of communist states,
who had adopted centrally planned models of industrialisation, collapsed at the end of
the 1980’s, the export-oriented scheme became the option to follow. Thus, for several
decades, this strategy has constituted the mainstream policy objective advocated by
international organisations, such as the World Bank, to achieve economic
development.
Not all nations, however, followed neoliberal measures. Countries like China and
Vietnam possess mixed economies, with strong state-controlled communist regimes
and productive export-oriented capitalist sectors. The success of these models, which
have been fuelled by significant levels of domestic and foreign investment, has allowed
them to grow at very high rates during more than one decade, and this has contributed
to raise the living standards of their populations.
2.4.2. Geographical fragmentation and the factor content of trade
During the last four decades, the average volume of global international trade has
grown almost three times faster than the world’s GDP (see Figure 11), showing a
significant acceleration since the 1990s and registering an important downfall during
the 2008/09 financial crisis. This trend reflects the increasing globalisation of markets.
Free trade has deepened the inter-dependency between nations. The developing world
has become more dependent on the North, not only to obtain the financial resources
they need via exports and foreign direct and indirect investment, but also to acquire
manufactured and capital goods, as well as basic commodities (Shafaeddin, 2009). On
the other hand, high-income countries have tended to depend more on the supply of
resources offered by resource-rich but underdeveloped countries (see: Muradian and
Martinez-Alier, 2001; Bringezu et al., 2004; Giljum, 2004; Giljum and Eisenmenger,
2004; Muñoz et al., 2011).
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This intricate network of trade interrelations between different regions and countries
has led to an intensification of the international division of labour and the geographical
fragmentation of production (Athukorala, 2005; Jones and Kierzkowski, 2005; Lanz et
al., 2011). It is common that products are manufactured with a range of raw materials
extracted from diverse regions. These products are then assembled in some other
nations, and then redistributed to yet other countries for consumption. The separation
of extraction, production and consumption, often by great distances, is a standard trait
of the current world’s economy (Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001). The rise of global
production chains and the profound interdependency imply important challenges to
analyse and measure the flows of traded goods.
Figure 11 - Growth in global volume of trade,
GDP and population (1970-2011)
Note: Trade volume = (exports + imports)/2. GDP and trade
are based on constant 2005 US dollars.
Source: Own figure based on data by UNSD (2013a)
In a world characterised by rapid globalisation and the geographical fragmentation of
production, the Ricardian model has been losing its ability to explain the reality.
Nowadays, specialisation depends no longer on a country’s comparative advantage of
producing a final good. Rather, it depends on the comparative advantage of the tasks
that a nation is required to undertake in order to complete one stage of the production
process (IDE-JETRO and WTO, 2011). This creates the need of determining a
country’s specific contribution to the factor contents of trade; that is, the amount of
labour, capital and natural resources that are embodied in trade flows.
The traditional framework to explain the factor contents of trade is the Heckscher-Ohlin
factor-proportions theory. Based on the Ricardian rationale, the theory states that
countries have different factor endowments of capital, labour and natural resources.
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The relative abundance or scarcity of any factor, in turn, influences its price. A nation
that is relatively well-endowed with a specific factor of production would enjoy the
relative advantage of being able to produce certain goods at a lower cost and more
efficiently than other economies. Hence, countries tend to specialise and become net
exporters of goods whose production makes intensive use of their most abundant
factors. In this sense, the specialised sectors in the economy would benefit from trade,
while those sectors that are intensive in the scarce factors would suffer a disadvantage.
However, and at least in theoretical terms, the overall gains would offset the losses. In
addition, the theory predicts a convergence of relative factor prices (i.e. interest, wages
and rents), which positively influences income distribution. Trade consequently
generates profits to all participants by expanding production frontiers, in contrast to
autarky. Economic agents optimise their behaviour and factors of production are
reallocated efficiently; consumers are able to acquire a wider array of goods at lower
prices; national production levels rise, and societies become better off. The factor-
proportions theory has been widely tested in order to prove its validity, and has
received numerous criticisms over time (Helpman, 1984; Bernhofen, 2007; Stone et al.,
2011). One of the strongest arguments against it is portrayed by the Leontief paradox,
which reflects the theory’s inability to predict the factor content and direction of trade
flows. Leontief (1953) found that the US imports more capital intensive goods than
what it exports, which represents a contradiction for a country that is considered to be
capital intensive.
In order to address the limitations of the factors-proportions theory, some researchers,
such as Hummels et al. (2001), Daudin et al. (2011) and IDE-JETRO and WTO (2011),
have recently suggested that trade should be measured by the amount of value added
that is incorporated in exports and imports, as opposed to using the traditional trade
statistics. Value added refers to the amount by which the value of a given product is
increased at each stage of its production. Alternatively, value added can also be
interpreted as the total payment received by the owners of the factors of production
(Black et al., 2009). Trade in value added allows a more precise determination of how
much value each economic sector in each country contributes during the production
process. Moreover, it is a useful tool to assess the impacts of foreign trade on
economic growth and employment. Studies in this subject are still scarce, since its
estimation requires a great amount of data in the form of multi-regional input-output
tables (see: Mattoo et al., 2011b). The OECD (2013) has recently started publishing
data for trade in value added, but it is highly aggregated for the majority of developing
countries. IDE-JETRO and WTO (2011, p. 104) used data covering nine Asian
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countries, finding that “the 2005 US-China trade shortfall would have even been cut by
more than half, from US$ 218 to US$ 101 billion, if it had been estimated in value
added”. Alternatively, Stehrer (2012) estimated that the US trade deficit with China
would be reduced by about 25%, but would rise in relation to the EU27 by about 20%.
Daudin et al. (2011) employed the GTAP database and their findings indicate that 32%
of the value added embodied in industrial exports is consumed by foreign consumers.
Stehrer et al. (2012) found that industrialised economies are net exporters of high-
educated labour as compared to the developing world. Furthermore, they show that the
role of services is more emphasised than what conventional trade statistics would
reflect, due to the significant contribution of the service sectors in the production of
manufacturing exports.
2.4.3. Potential social and environmental effects of trade
As has been explained in the previous sections, free trade contributes to enhancing
well-being and strengthening development. It allows an efficient allocation of the factors
of production, as incentives are created to shift capital and labour to the most efficient
sectors. Moreover, trade facilitates diffusion of knowledge and the transfer of
innovations between nations embodied in goods and services and through foreign
direct investment (FDI). It also encourages competition between foreign and domestic
industries leading to specialisation, increases in productivity and economies of scale
(see: European Commission, 2010). Frankel and Romer (1999) found empirical
evidence that shows that trade has a large positive effect on income. Along the same
lines, Davies and Quinlivan (2006) demonstrate that increases in trade are positively
associated with improvements in social welfare as defined by the HDI. In relation to the
environment, the role of trade is usually explained once more by the EKC hypothesis.
Suri and Chapman (1998) and Dinda (2004) recognised trade as a significant factor
that can explain the relationship between income and environmental degradation. If
trade positively influences economic growth and promotes structural change, then
emissions would fall with increasing levels of income per capita. If the EKC holds true,
a country would benefit in economic and in environmental terms by trading products
and services with the rest of the world. This optimistic viewpoint was shared by some of
the first EKC authors, such as Grossman and Krueger (1991) and Shafik and
Bandyopadhyay (1992), who asserted that more open economies tend to produce less
pollutants. More recently, this assertion was confirmed by Yamarik and Ghosh (2011),
who found that trade openness reduces air pollution measured by nitrogen dioxide
(NO2), sulphur dioxide (SO2) and particulate matter.
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Contrary to those who express optimism about free trade, other researchers have a
more pessimistic view on the matter. In social terms, some assert that trade can
worsen inequality in developing countries, since improvements in income favour the
exporting sectors and the benefits are not distributed equally across society. Zhu and
Trefler (2005) indicate that trade raises wage inequality in both industrialised and
developing countries. Least skill-intensive industries tend to migrate from the former to
the latter nations, where they become the more skill-intensive activities (also see:
Wood, 1995). They then concentrate the larger shares of exports, generating limited
spill-over effects to the rest of the economy. Meschi and Vivarelli (2009) and Popli
(2010) suggest that trade with high-income countries worsen income distribution in
developing nations for similar reasons. Moreover, Bensidoun et al. (2011) found that an
increase in the labour content of trade raises income inequality in poor countries, but
reduces it in industrialised economies, while the reverse is true for the physical-capital
content of trade. In relation to the environment, some authors state that trade
generates negative outcomes (Jayadevappa and Chhatre, 2000; Bulte and Barbier,
2005). Arrow et al. (1995) and Grossman and Krueger (1995) argued that, for some
pollutants, reductions in emissions in wealthy countries may not necessarily be due to
cleaner production processes and an increasing public demand for a better
environment, but to transfers of emissions to other nations. This has become known as
the Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH), which states that whilst income is rising and
more restrictive environmental regulations are being implemented, rich countries tend
to displace their polluting industries or export their wastes to nations with laxer
environmental standards. When the PHH is applied to CO2, it is better known as strong
or policy-induced carbon leakage, a term that was defined and discussed in section
2.3.3. PHH and strong carbon leakage undermine existing environmental protection
laws and treaties, inducing a regulatory race to the bottom.
Cole (2004) analysed 10 pollutants using data on North-South trade flows. He found
evidence that the pollution-haven effects exist, although these are not found for all
pollutants. Dinda and Coondoo (2006), in turn, obtained reinforcing evidence for the
PHH. They found that trade openness has helped to reduce CO2 emissions in Europe
as a whole, whereas it has led to increases in Africa and Central America. More
recently, Kearsley and Riddel (2010) used data for 7 pollutants, including CO2
emissions for 27 OECD countries, and tested the validity of the PHH. Their results
suggest that trade openness and dirty imports are weakly correlated with a rise in
emissions. Studies that have specifically quantified strong carbon leakage have found
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that it is modest or even negligible (e.g. Kuik and Reyer, 2003; Cole et al., 2005; Barker
et al., 2007) and that it can be offset by technology transfers (IPCC, 2007b; Di Maria
and van der Werf, 2008). Weak carbon leakage, on the other hand, as was defined in
section 2.3.3, corresponds to the emissions transfers required to satisfy consumption in
net-importing economies via international trade regardless of the environmental
policies in place in the consuming countries. As discussed in section 2.2.2, this type of
leakage has been increasingly growing over time as industrialised economies have
tended to depend more on imports from the developing world (Davis and Caldeira,
2010; Peters et al., 2011b). Jakob and Marschinski (2013) have recently proposed a
way to decompose these transfers. They show, for example, that around 43% of the
net transfer of emissions from China to the US is due to the trade balance between
both countries, and around 20% from China’s specialisation in high carbon intensive
products.
2.4.4. South-South trade
As has been argued, international trade has intensified the inter-dependency between
nations, which has not only manifested between industrialised and developing
countries. Trade flows among members of the latter nations have also tended to
increase over time. After observing a slowing down of economic growth rates in high-
income economies during the 1970s due to rising oil prices, Lewis (1980) stressed the
potential for increasing inter-developing-country trade so as to offset their dependency
from the North.
Until the 1980s, trade had been almost monopolised by industrialised economies and
the volume of South-South trade was small in comparison. However, in the last three
decades it has become the fastest growing segment of world trade. It more than tripled
between 1980 and 2011, going from 8.1% of global trade to 26.7%. During the same
period, North-North trade declined from 46% to 30% (UNDP, 2013). Moreover, intra-
South FDI grew on average 20% per annum from 1996 to 2009 (UNCTAD, 2011).
These patterns are mainly due to two factors. On the one hand, tariffs and barriers to
trade were significantly reduced in the developing world during the period (Agatiello,
2007). As an example, developing countries signed 70 trade agreements between
1990 and 2003 (Mayda and Steinberg, 2009). On the other hand, several developing
nations, particularly China and some East Asian economies, registered high rates of
economic growth and increased significantly their demand for goods and services.
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South-South trade, however, has been uneven. Trade involving low-income countries
has generally grown more slowly than trade related to upper- and lower-middle-income
countries. Only fourteen nations conduct three-quarters of Southern trade, of which
seven, including China and India, account for more than 70% of low-technology and
80% of high-technology exports from developing economies (UNDP, 2005; Hochstetler,
2013). The rest continue to be providers of natural resources, trading basic
commodities. On the other hand, developing countries persist in obtaining imports from
the North even though many products are available in other developing countries, often
in the same region on similar competitive conditions of price and quality (Kowalski and
Shepherd, 2006).
In relation to the environment, South-South trade might not deliver the same
improvements as some trade economists advocate in relation to the North-South
relationship. The Southern case is more ambiguous in this respect (Hochstetler, 2013).
For example, China’s trade with Sub-Saharan Africa rose from one billion US dollars to
more than 140 billion between 1992 and 2011 (UNDP, 2013). Nevertheless, there is
concern that Chinese firms are causing negative environmental impacts not only in that
region, but also in Latin America, repeating exploitation patterns followed in the past by
industrialised nations (Mol, 2011). The potential social and environmental impacts of
South-South trade thus require much more research. Particularly, it is relevant to
analyse how it can lead to more benign outcomes in terms of sustainable development.
2.5. Impacts to the developing world
Nobel laureate economist Arthur Lewis (1980, p. 555) recognised that “for the past
hundred years the rate of growth of output in the developing world has depended on
the rate of growth of output in the developed world. When the developed grow fast, the
developing grow fast, and when the developed slow down, the developing slow down”.
The logic behind this argument stresses, on the one hand, the importance of
international trade as the motor of growth that links these two types of economies and,
on the other, the notion of dependency. As was explained, the global South depends
on the larger Northern markets not only to sell its products, but also to attract
investments and new technologies, which are vital for its development needs. In this
sense, when the growth rate of imports decelerates in the North, developing
economies’ exports fall and their access to capital products and technology is reduced.
The pattern described by Lewis, however, did not apply entirely during the 2008/09
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financial crisis. While GDP in high-income nations fell 3.6% on average, the rest of the
world as a group still managed to achieve positive growth rates, although an overall
deceleration was still observed and the economic performance of several individual
developing countries registered important downfalls.
As was argued in section 2.2.4, it is urgent to address the problem of overconsumption,
especially in industrialised countries, in order to alleviate environmental pressures and
prevent dangerous climate change. As advocated by Agenda 21, consumer behaviour
needs to become more sustainable, either by making the basket of consumer goods
more energy- and environmentally efficient or by reducing the general levels of
consumption, like prescribed by steady-state economics and the degrowth movement.
However, the potential trade-offs between the environmental benefits of dematerialising
consumption and the developmental impacts caused via international trade by lower
imports from the developing world have not been properly analysed. A proper
examination of this issue is practically nonexistent. Martínez Alier (2009, p. 1117) is
one of the few researchers that have recognised the possible trade-offs. He admits
that, on the one hand, these nations would benefit by the availability of a larger stock of
natural resources freed by their rich counterparts but, on the other, they would “have
something to lose and little to gain from degrowth in the North because of fewer
opportunities for commodity and manufactured exports, and less availability of credits
and donations”. But apart from this brief assertion, few studies have delved any deeper
into the matter.
Studies undertaken either from the perspective of orthodox or heterodox economic
theories, have pointed out that when high-income countries have suffered a decline in
economic growth rates, the shocks experienced by the South have been more acute
(Willenbockel and Robinson, 2009). The majority of these analyses have evaluated
situations derived from disturbances to international trade or originated by regional or
global economic crises, like the ones experienced in the 1970s and 1980s, or the more
recent in 2008/09. In most of these cases, when the flow of goods and capitals from
North to South declined, the developing world tended to be affected by currency
devaluations, mounting inflation rates, rising levels of unemployment, higher poverty
rates, etc. Due to this fact, from the market optic of mainstream economics, deliberate
reductions in consumption in the world’s largest economies not only go against its main
theoretical principles, but they would also represent a clear threat to the less developed
nations.
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The 2008/09 financial crisis offers some examples of the risks that lower consumption
rates could entail for the developing world. The first effects of the crisis were felt by
those emerging economies that were closely linked to the global financial markets. But
international trade then fell sharply and commodity prices declined rapidly, hitting some
of the poorest nations (Karshenas, 2009). Some of the first examinations on this
matter, like the one conducted by Berkmen et al. (2009), found that those developing
countries that export manufacturing goods were more affected than those who export
food. Along similar lines, Willenbockel and Robinson (2009) detected that reductions in
welfare among developing nations were due to a high commodity composition of
exports and the degree of openness to international trade. For instance, Cambodia’s
economy was growing at a rate of 10.2% in 2007 (UNSD, 2013a). Its expansion was
mainly fuelled by exporting low-value garments to the USA and the EU. But during the
second half of 2009, 17% of the workforce was facing unemployment, compared to
2.5% in 2008. Its economy stagnated in 2009, leading to an increase in poverty. The
same was true for Mexico, whose economy is extremely linked to that of the USA.
Almost 80% of all its annual exports are destined for its Northern neighbour (INEGI,
2013). However, after the economic breakdown, the USA started demanding less
imports. Consequently, Mexico’s construction, automotive, and electrical appliance
sectors, among others, collapsed (World Bank, 2010). Mexico’s GDP fell 5.9%,
representing the second worst economic performance in seven and a half decades,
while the USA suffered a decline of 3.1% (UNSD, 2013a). Income per capita was
reduced by 8% in the poorest quintile of Mexican households, while the poverty rate
the poverty rate increased by nearly 4% between 2008 and 2010 (Habib et al., 2010).
The effects on developing countries caused by distortions in trade can be seen through
the Economic Vulnerability Index published by the UN Development Policy and
Analysis Division (UNDESA, 2012). It is mainly composed by seven indicators, which
are population, remoteness from world markets, export concentration, share of
agriculture in GDP, people affected by natural disasters, instability of agricultural
production, and instability of exports of goods and services (Guillaumont, 2009). As
shown in Figure 12, the average economic vulnerability of upper-middle and lower-
middle-income countries improved by 10.1% and 7.9%, respectively, from 1985 to
2008. These advancements were fuelled particularly by the performance of the big
emerging economies like China, India and Brazil. The behaviour of low-income
countries, however, showed a peculiar trend. Their average vulnerability score was
smaller than that of the lower-middle-income group in 1985, as they had remained
closed to international trade. When they started opening their markets, however, their
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economic vulnerability increased. In 2008, their score was around 4% higher than at
the beginning of the period. This means that they became more susceptible to trade
shocks. Some improvements have been registered since 2004, mainly due to higher
economic growth rates and more stable flows of goods and services.
Figure 12 - Economic vulnerability index
according to country group (1985-2008)
Source: Own figure based on data by UNDESA (2012)
Studies that analyse the specific consequences in developing nations of changes in
demand due to mitigation actions in the North are practically missing in the scientific
literature. The ones that are available are permeated by a strong Northern viewpoint
and have mainly concentrated on determining the costs for industrialised countries
derived from unilateral emission reductions and the implementation of trade policies
(see: Peterson and Schleich, 2007; Ho et al., 2008; Aldy and Pizer, 2011). However, a
full quantification of the impacts derived from these actions on developing countries is
still required. Mattoo et al. (2009, 2011a) have undertaken some of the few existing
analyses. In their first paper, the authors examine how changes in the price for carbon,
induced by emissions reductions, emissions tradability and international monetary
transfers to developing nations, may affect manufacturing sectors in the developing
world. They found that the impact differs according to the carbon intensity registered in
different regions. In India and China, even modest cuts would depress manufacturing
output by 6% to 7%, while this sector’s exports would fall by 9% to 11%. Meanwhile,
low carbon intensive countries, such as Brazil, would be less affected. Furthermore,
aggregate welfare would fall by 2% in low and middle-income nations. In their second
paper, they explore the effects on the developing world of implementing BCAs in
industrialised nations. Their findings indicate that when border taxes are based on the
carbon content of imports, China’s manufacturing exports would shrink by one fifth and
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those of low and middle-income economies by 8%. Moreover, income would decline by
approximately 4% and 2.5%, respectively. Other authors, like Atkinson et al. (2011),
recognise that demand-side mitigation policy instruments would modify the volume and
composition of international trade, leading to associated losses in welfare in developing
countries.
Authors, like Victor and Rosenbluth (2007) and Daly (2013), believe that downscaling
consumption in the North can be done through a planned and controlled process.
However, the specific mechanisms that could allow this to become a reality without
harming the developing South have not been detailed or sufficiently researched. This
research will address this issue.
2.6. Further remarks and research gaps
This chapter presented a critical review of the main bodies of literature related to this
research project. Its nature requires presenting a background of the most relevant
studies that focus on anthropogenic GHG emissions, development, consumption and
international trade, and explaining the profound interrelation that exists between these
topics. In addition, the chapter offers working definitions based on the literature for the
main terms used in this thesis (e.g. carbon and development spaces, economic and
human development, sustainable consumption, demand-side mitigation, etc.).
Throughout the review, research gaps were identified pertaining to the four research
questions presented in the introductory chapter (section 1.2). Regarding question 1, it
was argued that it is still not clear if the carbon EKC hypothesis is valid when including
consumption-based CO2 data. The majority of the existing analyses have utilised
territorial emissions, and there are no global and comprehensive consumption-based
studies. If the carbon EKC was to hold true, the best prescription to attain higher levels
of development and a better environment would be to increase income per capita
throughout the world. This thesis thus seeks to provide evidence in this respect in order
to accept or reject the hypothesis. The present chapter also explained that higher
incomes are usually associated with greater consumption rates of energy and
resources, and that there is the need to address overconsumption in wealthy nations
as it constitutes one of the main drivers of climate change. In this sense, there is the
need to either modify consumption patterns or reduce the overall levels of economic
throughput. This thesis emphasises the importance of achieving these objectives with
the use of demand-side mitigation options in conjunction with technological measures,
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as it will prove difficult for the latter to solve the climate problem by themselves in the
available timeframe. However, while changes in demand in the North could free carbon
space and deliver environmental benefits, they can generate negative effects in the
developing world via international trade and, more specifically, in low-income countries,
which are economically vulnerable. A proper examination of these trade-offs is
practically nonexistent in the scientific literature. The available studies have been
conducted from a Northern point of view and have mainly concentrated on determining
the costs for industrialised countries. In relation to research question 2, it is thus
uncertain how much value added, and particularly wages to skilled and unskilled
labour, embodied in imports from developing nations are associated with every tonne
of CO2 that is mitigated in the North through demand-side mitigation measures. This
thesis aims to cover this research gap and provide answers to this query. The present
literature review, moreover, identified the different forms that demand-side mitigation
policy instruments can adopt. It was explained that it is important to specifically analyse
the case of BCAs, as discussions are happening in some Annex I countries (e.g. US,
EU, Australia) about their potential adoption. The US has explicitly stated that it will not
implement an emissions trading scheme without a provision for BCAs. The existing
literature, however, offers mixed evidence about their potential impacts and
effectiveness. Several authors have built a strong case about their possible negative
effects, suggesting that they may distort trade flows and erode welfare levels in
developing countries. Furthermore, others indicate that BCAs would require a complex
administration that could make them unviable in practice. In this sense, with regards to
research question 3, the literature does not indicate the amount of global emissions
that could be captured with this policy instrument and, more importantly, which sectors
in the developing world could potentially be most affected in terms of losses in value
added, and especially in wages, due to distortions in trade. This thesis thus tries to fill
this gap in the knowledge base. The overall question, however, is to determine to what
extent human development can be enhanced with the available carbon space. The
present chapter presented different quantifications of the carbon budget according to
the RCPs that will be used in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report. The carbon space
compatible with a 2°C target is given by the RCP3-PD pathway, which requires
emissions peaking in 2020 and following a sustained decline onwards, becoming
negative from the 2070s. The largest share of carbon space per capita, however, would
correspond to industrialised nations, whereas low-income countries would receive a
significantly smaller proportion. This represents an enormous challenge, as the
necessary development space is still considerable. The achievement of the MDGs has
been uneven, and large efforts still need to be made to bring millions of people from
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extreme poverty and grant them access to an acceptable standard of living. Research
question 4 is thus relevant, as there is uncertainty in the literature about how much
development across the world can be improved with the available carbon space.
Although studies have evidenced a gradual decoupling between the satisfaction of
human needs and energy and carbon per capita, developmental improvements in the
South could be limited given their current economic structures. This gap is thus
addressed in this research.
The next chapter presents the different methods and data used in this thesis in order to
provide answers to the proposed research questions.
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Chapter 3
Methods and data
This chapter presents the research design and describes the methods and data used in
this thesis to provide answers to the research questions outlined in the introductory
chapter. Due to the nature of such queries, a multi-method approach is required. The
chapter starts in section 3.1 by discussing the research design and explaining the
reasons for selecting Panel Data analysis and Environmentally-Extended Multi-
Regional Input-Output (EE-MRIO) Analysis as the most appropriate methods. This is
then followed by a description of these techniques in section 3.2. Next, section 3.3
explains how the MRIO model was built based on the GTAP 8 database. Section 3.4,
in turn, covers the data and their sources. A discussion about the strengths and
limitations of each method is then presented in section 3.5. Finally, a brief summary is
offered in section 3.6.
3.1. Research design
As was explained in Chapter 1 (section 1.2), four separate but related aspects related
to the overarching aim were chosen to be explored, each guided by a specific sub-
research question. The nature of these queries demanded using different methods, as
can be appreciated in Table 7.
Table 7 - Methods used to address the proposed research questions
No. Research question Method used
1 Is the EKC for carbon valid from a consumption-based approach? Panel DataAnalysis
2
How much value added and wages paid to skilled and unskilled
labour in developing countries are associated with every unit of CO2
that is mitigated in different sectors through reductions in
consumption in industrialised nations?
Multi-Regional
Input-Output
Analysis (MRIO)
3
How much value added and wages paid to skilled and unskilled
labour in developing countries are associated with CO2 emissions that
would be captured in different sectors through the implementation of
border carbon adjustments in industrialised nations?
Multi-Regional
Input-Output
Analysis
(MRIO)
4
To what extent can human development be improved in the
developing world within the limits of the available carbon space as
defined by the RCP pathways given the continuity of the status quo?
Panel Data
Analysis
EKC studies have traditionally been carried out using econometric methods, and the
majority of them have employed panel data analysis (see: Stern et al., 1996; Dinda,
2004). Standard regression techniques and time series analysis are adequate when a
study is conducted using data for a single observational unit (i.e. one country).
Nonetheless, it is customary that testing the validity of the EKC involves focusing on
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more than one unit. In fact, existing examinations have tended to include an increasing
number of nations and longer time periods. In this sense, panel data analysis is an
appropriate method, since it allows estimating the relationship between a dependent
variable and one or more independent variables that change not only over time, but
also across numerous observational units. In this case, the income-emissions
relationship is wished to be examined using data for 109 individual countries and 20
regions which, in turn, comprise another 126 nations and territories corresponding to
the period 1990-2010. The specific panel data models that will be applied are explained
in section 3.2.1.
Panel data analysis is also used to scrutinise the evolving relationship between human
development and CO2 emissions due to the same reasons offered in the paragraph
above. Data for 187 individual countries pertaining to the period 1980-2010 are utilised
in order to assess the extent to which living standards can be improved across different
regions within the limits of the available carbon space (fourth research question). This
method is used to estimate the historical carbon elasticity of human development,
which is then used to project human development levels, as expressed by the HDI, into
the future according to the emissions described by the different RCPs (see section
3.2.1.6). These elasticities express how much CO2 emissions have been required over
time to achieve improvements in well-being. Again, the specific models that will be
used are described in section 3.2.1.
Input-Output Analysis, on the other hand, is a technique that is employed to assess the
interrelationships between economic sectors or industries. It is specifically useful to
examine the effects within an economic system caused by changes that take place in
other areas of that same system. When these effects are related to industries or
sectors that are located in several economies or regions, the technique adopts the
name of Multi-Regional Input-Output (MRIO) Analysis. The IO framework has been
widely applied to examine the environmental consequences of economic actions, and
has thus become a standard instrument in the field of ecological economics (Murray et
al., 2010). Furthermore, this method has been increasingly used to assess how much
CO2 is associated with the consumption of goods and services throughout the global
supply chain (see: Wiedmann et al., 2007; Wiedmann, 2009). The same procedure can
be applied to calculate the amount of value added and wages that are embedded in
products and services destined for final consumption (see: Daudin et al., 2011; IDE-
JETRO and WTO, 2011; Mattoo et al., 2011b). In this sense, it is an appropriate
method to address the second and third research questions. These analyses involve
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109 nation states and 20 aggregated regions, each with 57 economic sectors,
corresponding to the years 2004 and 2007 (see Appendix A.2 for a complete list).
3.2. Methods
This section focuses on describing the main features of the two methods used in this
thesis: Panel Data analysis and EE-MRIO analysis.
3.2.1. Panel Data analysis
As has been explained, panel data analysis is an econometric technique that is useful
to identify causal relationships between variables using data that involve several
observational units. Data can be either longitudinal (i.e. time series for a single unit),
cross-sectional (i.e. several units at a specific moment in time), or both. Panel data is
characterised by possessing a spatial (i.e. cross-sectional) dimension and a temporal
(i.e. longitudinal) dimension (Wooldridge, 2002). This method, in this sense, is
particularly helpful when relationships between variables are wished to be estimated in
relation to more than one country over a certain period of time. The amount of
methodological and empirical studies that have used panel data analysis has increased
significantly during the last two decades. According to Hsiao (2007), this has been
mainly due to a considerable increase in data availability, the method’s greater capacity
for modelling the complexity of human behaviour than by using single cross-section or
time-series data, and the growing methodological and computational advancements.
The number of different panel data models has increased significantly over the years.
Choosing the right model depends on the nature of the data and on the problem that is
wished to be analysed. As an initial exploratory approach, pooled Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regressions can be used to examine the overall behaviour of the
variables. This implies pooling the data for all the observational units and years
together and treating it homogeneously. In the case that there are no significant
country- or time-effects (i.e. both the intercepts and slopes are constant across units),
then it can be said that the estimated OLS coefficients are consistent and unbiased. In
the opposite case, a more appropriate model should be chosen. In order to assess the
viability of using the pooled OLS model, two tests can be applied. An F-test is usually
conducted to compare different models that make use of the same dataset in order to
select the one that produces a better fit. In this case, the F-test is employed to identify
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the presence of specific traits that are fixed to individual countries (i.e. fixed effects) by
contrasting this particular specification to a simple OLS model. If these traits were
present and were statistically significant, OLS estimators would not be valid, indicating
the need to use a fixed effects model (Baltagi, 2005). Moreover, the Breusch-Pagan
Lagrange Multiplier test can also be performed. It was designed to evaluate if the
variances across observational units are equal to zero. This means that no significant
differences exist across units. In case that variations are detected, then a random
effects model would be preferred over the OLS estimator (Breusch and Pagan, 1980).
Their respective null hypotheses can be found in Table 8.
Table 8 - F-test and Breusch-Pagan LM test
Test Null hypothesis
F-test: All fixed effects are null No fixed country-specific traits exist
Breusch-Pagan LM test for pooled versus
random effects Variances across entities are zero
3.2.1.1. Fixed and random effects models
Fixed and random effects models are generally applied in numerous panel data
analyses. They are useful since they can help to control for variables that cannot be
observed or measured (e.g. geographical location, cultural factors, different industrial
practices, etc.) or variables that change over time but not across units (i.e. regulations,
international agreements, etc.). According to Wooldridge (2002), one could decide
whether to use fixed or random effects models depending on how the term ci is treated
in the following equation.
ݕ௜௧ = ߚܺ௜௧+ ௜ܿ+ ݑ௜௧ (3)
where yit is the dependent variable and Xit stands for any independent variables that
change across time (t) but not units (i), or well that may vary across i but not t, or that
may change across i and t. Moreover, β is the estimated coefficient, uit is a stochastic
error term (i.e. disturbance) and ci represents unobserved effects. If ci is treated as
non-variant, then it is considered as a fixed effect and a parameter is estimated for
each i. On the contrary, if ci shows variations across i, then it is treated as a random
effect.
Fixed effects models should be used when the unobserved time-invariant effects are
not of interest. The random effects model should be employed when there are reasons
to believe that the differences across units have an influence on the dependent
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variable. However, in this last case it must be assumed that ci is not correlated with the
predictors included in the model. In other words, the individual unobserved effects or
characteristics should not explain the behaviour of the observed traits represented by
the independent variables.
In a fixed effects model, the slope coefficients are assumed to be constant (i.e.
homogenous) among units, but the intercept may vary across units or over time. In this
sense, unit-specific dummies are included to allow the intercept to differ across cross-
sectional units, while time-specific dummies allow the intercept to differ across different
time periods. On the other hand, the random effects model considers that the intercept
is the mean value of all the cross-sectional intercepts (Baltagi, 2005).
The key issue when choosing the appropriate model, however, lies on whether or not ci
is correlated with the observed explanatory variables Xit (Hausman and Taylor, 1981).
Regarding the random effects model, the correlation must be zero. In order to
determine this, the Hausman test is applied. Its null hypothesis assumes that the cross-
sectional unobserved effects are not correlated with the regressors. If such correlation
does not exist, then the random effects model would produce more consistent
estimators. In the opposite case, a fixed effects model would be preferred.
Apart from fixed and random effects, an alternative model can be used in case that
only the variations across units are deemed as relevant. The between-groups model, in
this sense, ignores the differences that exist within observational units. Its estimators
are calculated by using the mean values of the variables of every unit. Only the
variations between cross-sectional observations are thus captured and time effects are
eliminated. Stern (2010) proposed this method as an option to free the EKC estimation
from assumptions about time effects. However, there is a risk that the individual effects
would then be blended with the residuals. This can produce inconsistent results if the
cross-sectional errors are correlated with the group means of the regressors (Davidson
and MacKinnon, 1993). Random effects estimators, nonetheless, also suffer from this
potential problem, since individual effects are considered as error components.
Consequently, the Hausman test can be useful in this respect. If these effects are
correlated with any of the regressors, then the test would suggest that a fixed effects
estimator would be more suitable to obtain consistent parameter estimates.
Assessing the influence of the unobserved time-varying effects (i.e. regulations,
international agreements, etc.) is important in this thesis. In the case of the EKC and
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the relationship between human development and emissions per capita, they can affect
the shape of the estimated curves. If these effects are eliminated and the results
change substantially, then time-related effects can be regarded as important
explanatory factors.
3.2.1.2. GLS with panel-corrected standard errors
The generalised least squares (GLS) method is widely used whenever
heteroskedasticity is present and when the observations are correlated across panels
to some degree. Heteroskedasticity implies that the variance of the errors is not
constant over time. As a consequence, it violates the basic assumptions that the errors
are normally distributed and uncorrelated (Wooldridge, 2002). This condition often
affects cross-sectional panel data and may be caused by various reasons, like
measurement errors or data quality. Furthermore, if the observations are correlated
across the observational units, this could be reflected in the errors or disturbances,
which absorb these unobserved common factors. This matter is of special relevance for
the analyses undertaken in this thesis (see: Müller-Fürstenberger and Wagner, 2007;
Wagner, 2008). As was explained in section 2.4.2, globalisation has deepened the
interdependency between nations through international trade and related policies. As a
consequence, actions taken in one nation have repercussions in other regions. A
growing body of literature has recognised that panel data of this nature are likely to
exhibit cross-sectional dependence in the errors (see: Pesaran, 2004; Baltagi, 2005).
Heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional dependence, in this sense, invalidate the use of
fixed and random effects models since they cause their estimators to be inefficient and
produce biases in the standard errors (i.e. they may be smaller or larger than the true
population variance).
Another feature that is frequently present in time series is serial correlation or
autocorrelation. This condition indicates that the errors at time t are correlated with
those at t-p, where p is the number of lags. This is common when the data shows
seasonal or repeating patterns or when the current behaviour of a certain variable can
be explained by its past levels. For instance, the levels of public debt that a country
currently owes could depend on the debt levels it owed in the past. Serial correlation
can cause biases in the estimated coefficients, affecting the scale of their standard
errors and inflating the R2 (i.e. measure of goodness of fit) (Wooldridge, 2002).
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The GLS procedure thus corrects the estimation for heteroskedasticity and cross-
sectional dependence. In simple terms, it standardises the scale of the errors and de-
correlates them. A detailed explanation of the procedure is offered by Baltagi (2005). In
this sense, the basic GLS specification is the following:
ݕ௜௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܺ௜௧+ ݑ௜௧ (4)
where yit is the dependent variable and Xit stands for any independent variables, β0 and
β1 are the estimated coefficients and uit is the stochastic error term that may be
autocorrelated along t and/or contemporaneously correlated across i.
Serial correlation is addressed through a procedure developed by Prais and Winsten
(1954) by transforming the data in a manner consistent with an autoregressive model
of order 1, AR(1). In addition, this technique allows specifying if the autoregressive
term is common to all observational units or specific to each unit. A detailed description
of the Prais-Winsten transformation is also offered by Baltagi (2005).
In order to detect the presence of heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and cross-
sectional dependence, a series of tests can be run. The modified Wald test for
groupwise heteroskedasticity is used with a fixed effects model and assumes that the
errors may be homoskedastic within observational units, but may differ across them
(see: Greene, 2012). Its null hypothesis states that the error variance is constant
across units. In turn, the likelihood-ratio test for group heteroskedasticity is based on a
GLS procedure. Its null hypothesis also presupposes the absence of
heteroskedasticity. Regarding serial correlation, the Wooldridge (2002) test is
commonly used. Its null hypothesis assumes the absence of autocorrelation. Finally,
the Pesaran (2004) test can be applied to identify cross-sectional dependence. These
tests, along with their null hypotheses can be found in Table 9.
Table 9 - Tests for heteroskedasticity, serial correlation
and cross-sectional dependence
Test Null hypothesis
Modified Wald test for groupwise
heteroskedasticity
Error variance is constant across
units
Likelihood-ratio test for group
heteroskedasticity
Error variance is constant across
units
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel
data Absence of autocorrelation
Pesaran's test of cross-sectional
independence Country-specific independent errors
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3.2.1.3. Cointegration
The properties of many econometric techniques generally require the use of stationary
variables. Stationarity assumes that the parameters, such as the mean and variance,
do not change over time. That is to say, stationary variables do not adopt a trend-like
behaviour. If the condition of stationarity is not satisfied, then many techniques could
produce biased or spurious results (Enders, 1995). Many time series used in economic
analyses are non-stationary. In statistical terms, it would be said that they possess unit
roots. Consequently, proper methods need to be used in order to deal with non-
stationary and stochastically trending variables.
A variable can become stationary by differencing it; that is, by subtracting the
observation at time t from that at time t-1. If such variable does not display a unit root
after differencing, then it can be said that it is stationary of order 1; or well, that its order
of integration is 1, which in statistical notation is expressed as I(1). In some cases,
however, a variable must be differenced a second time in order for it to become
stationary. In that case, it is said that its order of integration is I(2).
Differencing the variables eliminates stochastic trends, but also reduces serial
correlation and specification problems derived from country-related effects (Stern and
Common, 2001). In addition, pooled OLS regressions can be used with differenced
variables, given that the cross-sectional units share a common intercept. If this
condition is tested and the null hypothesis of intercept homogeneity cannot be rejected,
then this method can be used instead of fixed and random effects.
Tests specifically designed for panel data are used to assess if a variable contains a
unit root (i.e. it is non-stationary). A first generation of tests were developed by Levin et
al. (2002), Im, Pesaran and Shin (Im et al., 2003), Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi
(2001). The latter two are based on Fisher-type Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and
Phillips-Perron (PP) tests, which were originally designed for single-country longitudinal
data. The first of these tests considers the null hypothesis that there is a common unit
root process across all the cross-sectional units included in the panel, while the rest of
the tests allow for individual root processes, so non-stationarity may differ across units.
In this sense, the alternative hypothesis in the latter tests presupposes that a
proportion of the observational units are stationary. Baltagi (2005) recognises,
however, that these tests assume cross-sectional independence. For this reason, a
second generation of more complex tests have been developed in order to allow for
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cross-sectional correlation, as well as for other issues. Pesaran (2007) has designed a
unit root test to handle heterogeneous panels (i.e. varying slopes) with cross-sectional
dependence. Its null hypothesis assumes that all series across the observational units
are non-stationary. On the other hand, when structural breaks are present, the
procedure developed by Zivot and Andrews (1992) is useful to detect unit roots in
panel data. This test is relevant in this thesis, since several of the time series involved
(e.g. income and emissions per capita) often show discontinuities in their trends due to
external shocks or structural changes, which can complicate assessing their
stationarity (see: Romero-Ávila, 2008). The disadvantage of the Zivot-Andrews test is
that it must be applied individually to each cross-sectional unit instead than to the
panels as a whole. All these unit root tests appear in Table 10.
Table 10 - Unit root tests
Test Null hypothesis
Levin et al. (2002) Common unit root process across allcross-sectional units
Im et al. (2003); Maddala and Wu (1999);
Choi (2001).
Unit root process across some cross-
sectional units
Pesaran (2007) Unit root process across allobservational units
Zivot and Andrews (1992) Time series possess unit roots
It is said, on the other hand, that when two variables share the same order of
integration, they can be cointegrated if a linear combination of both (i.e. residuals) is
stationary. If this condition is met, then the variables follow a common long-term trend
(Engle and Granger, 1987). This commonly happens with economic variables that
contain unit roots (i.e. are non-stationary). However, if the unit root tests reveal that the
time series are integrated of different orders, then cointegration would not be of
concern (Enders, 1995).
Westerlund (2007) developed a test to identify the presence of cointegration in the
case of heterogeneous panels and cross-sectional dependence. It additionally
estimates the short- and long-term coefficients for the variables included in the analysis
and produces an error correction term. This term represents the speed of adjustment of
a variable. In other words, it expresses how fast a variable returns to its long-run-
equilibrium trend after a disruption in the short-run (Engle and Granger, 1987). This test
employs two different statistics, called Pt and Pa, whose null hypotheses presuppose
no cointegration among all the panels. Moreover, the error correction term must be
statistically significant and possess a negative sign when the variables are
cointegrated.
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The short-run dynamics are modelled with an autoregressive distributed lags function,
which allows the estimation of the error correction term (γ). The basic specification of
this function is given by the following equation when the number of lags is equal to 1.
∆ݕ௜௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ∆ܺ௜௧+ ߛ(ܺ௜௧ି ଵ− ݕ௜௧ି ଵ) + ݑ௜௧ (5)
where Δ represents variables in first differences. In this sense, the change in the
dependent variable yit is related to the change in the independent variables Xit, as well
as the gap between the dependent and independent variables in time t-1. A
disadvantage involved in this procedure is that it requires using differenced and lagged
differenced series, which reduces the number of observations.
3.2.1.4. Heterogeneous panels
Several studies have found that the assumption of homogeneous slopes across
observational units can represent a stringent restriction (see: Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh,
2005). Fixed and random effects models allow a certain level of heterogeneity across
units, but they still maintain some rigidity in relation to the slopes. As has been said, the
procedure proposed by Westerlund (2007) allows for panel heterogeneity in relation to
intercepts, slopes and dynamic processes. It is based on the Mean Group model
developed by Pesaran and Smith (1995). It basically consists on running individual
regressions for each individual observational unit based on equation (5). Once the unit-
specific coefficients are obtained, they are then averaged and their standard errors are
computed. Equation (6) shows the procedure in the case of the estimated slope
coefficients. Eberhardt and Teal (2010) have more recently suggested a variation of
this model in order to correct for cross-sectional dependence. They added an additional
variable composed of year dummy coefficients estimated from a pooled regression in
first differences to capture cross-country effects. New individual coefficients are then
estimated for this additional regressor and are then averaged.
̅ߚଵ = ߚመଵଵ + ߚመଶଵ + … + ߚመ௡௧݊ (6)
The βs stand for the estimated coefficients corresponding to each observational unit
and n represents the total number of units.
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3.2.1.5. EKC functional forms
In order to estimate the parameters of the territorial and consumption-based carbon
EKCs, traditional linear, quadratic and cubic specifications are used. A cubic term is
regularly included to check for the possibility of obtaining a statistically significant N-
shaped curve. As it is commonly done in this literature, variables are expressed in
logarithms (see: Stern et al., 1996; Ekins, 1997; Dinda, 2004).
݈݊ ܥ௜௧= ߚመ଴ + ߚመଵ݈݊ ௜ܻ௧+ ߚመଶ݈݊ ௜ܻ௧ଶ + ߚመଷ݈݊ ௜ܻ௧ଷ + ߚመସ݈݊ ௜ܼ௧+ ߝ௜௧ (7)
In equation (7), C represents CO2 emissions per capita for country i at time t and Y
denotes real GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). The random
disturbances εit are assumed to be normally distributed and independent across
countries. The βs correspond to the regression coefficients, where β0 is a constant.
The inverted-U shape demands that β2<0, and β3=0. If β1>0 and β2=β3=0, then the
relation would be linear and monotonic. Moreover, if β3>0, then the function would
depict an N-shaped curve. On the other hand, the turning point (TP) level of income for
the quadratic specification is calculated by:
ܶܲ = ݁ݔ݌ቆ− ߚመଵ2ߚመଶቇ (8)
The TP corresponding to the cubic specification, in turn, is found by identifying the
levels of income per capita where the slope is zero. This is equivalent to the points at
which the first derivative of the cubic function is null. This can be found using the
following equation:
ܶܲ = ݁ݔ݌
⎝
⎛
−2ߚመଶ ± ට4൫ߚመଶ൯ଶ− 12ߚመଵߚመଷ6ߚመଷ
⎠
⎞ (9)
The equation above yields two roots. However, given the N-shapes of the observed
curves, only one of the two roots is relevant. Thus, the case where the radical is added
instead of subtracted in the numerator can be ignored.
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Apart from income per capita, it is also a common practice to use additional
independent variables, represented by Zit. These will be presented in Chapter 4.
3.2.1.6. HDI-emissions functional forms
Several functional forms have been used in the literature to express the relationship
between HDI and CO2 emissions. In this thesis, two different but related forms will be
used. The first one corresponds to a hyperbolic saturation curve, which has been
proposed by Steinberger and Roberts (2010) and Steinberger et al. (2012). It is
expressed as:
݈݊ (ܪܦܫ௦௔௧− ܪܦܫ௜௧) = ܣ+ ߚመ݈݊ܥ௜௧+ ߝ௜௧ (10)
where the HDIsat term represents the asymptote or saturation value, A is a constant and
β is expected to be negative, while Cit represents carbon emissions per capita per year
for country i at time t. In turn, the random disturbances εit are assumed to be normally
distributed and independent across countries. According to Steinberger and Roberts
(2010), this form offers some advantages. It produces a slightly better fit than other
functional forms, is invertible and allows data weighting. The disadvantage is that the
asymptote value has to be determined a priori from the data, as will be explained in
Chapter 7.
In addition to this functional form, a simplified log-log version is also tested. Its only
difference is that the saturation term is excluded. This form is thus not asymptotically
bounded, producing a slightly steeper slope at high levels of HDI.
݈݊ ܪܦܫ௜௧= ܣ+ ߚመ݈݊ܥ௜௧+ ߝ௜௧ (11)
In this case, β is expected to be positive and represents the carbon elasticity of human
development.
3.2.2. Environmentally-extended MRIO analysis
Input-Output (IO) analysis has been regarded as an important accounting technique to
study the complexity of economic systems (Miller and Blair, 2009). It was conceived by
Wassily Leontief in the 1930s with the purpose of providing a better understanding of
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the interdependencies that exist among different areas of an economy. It is useful for
economic analysis, since it shows how some parts of an economic system are
influenced by changes that take place in some other sections of that same system. For
example, it can describe how alterations in intermediate or final demand registered in a
particular industrial sector may generate changes in the amount of required inputs and
outputs in others.
Leontief (1970) also acknowledged that IO models could be useful to determine the
environmental repercussions of the economic activity. The different sectors of an
economy not only require natural resources in order to produce different goods and
services, but they also generate several by-products (e.g. pollution and waste) during
their production processes. In this sense, IO analysis can be used to trace the material
requirements of each sector, as well as the emissions and waste that are generated by
each of them. This means that the environmental pressure derived from the various
production stages of a particular good or service can be revealed. For instance, one
could calculate the amount of CO2 that is emitted upstream throughout the supply-
chain for any particular product or service. As has been said, IO analysis has become a
standard instrument in the field of ecological economics (Murray et al., 2010).
IO analysis relies on input-output tables, which are regularly published by most
countries according to guidelines established by the UN. These tables or matrices
represent the structure of an economy. In these matrices, all the outputs produced by
different sectors are at the same time inputs for the rest. The columns display the
inputs, while the rows exhibit the various outputs. In other words, the columns show the
flow of goods provided from each sector to the others in monetary or physical units,
while the rows depict the flows each sector receives from their counterparts.
The total output for each sector (xi) is distributed in rows in the following way:
ݔ௜= ݔ௜ଵ + ݔ௜ଶ+. . . +ݔ௜௝+. . . +ݔ௜௡ + ݕ௜ (12)
Where yi stands for final demand for sector i, and i,j = 1, 2,…, n. To calculate the
technical coefficient matrix, the inputs of the j-th sector are divided by the total inputs of
that sector (xj), so that:
௜ܽ௝ = ݔ௜௝ݔ௝ → ݔ௜௝ = ௜ܽ௝ݔ௝ (13)
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The coefficient aij shows the relative inputs that each sector uses. Substituting this last
equation in (12):
ݔ௜= ௜ܽଵݔ௜ଵ + ௜ܽଶݔ௜ଶ+. . . + ௜ܽ௝ݔ௜௝+. . . + ௜ܽ௡ݔ௜௡ + ݕ௜ (14)
In matrix notation, this new equation can be expressed as X=AX+Y, where:
ܣ = ൞ ଵܽଵ ଵܽଶ ⋯ ଵܽ௡ଶܽଵ ଶܽଶ ⋯ ଶܽ௡⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
௜ܽଵ ௜ܽଶ ⋯ ௜ܽ௡
ൢ ܺ = ൞ݔଵݔଶ⋮
ݔ௡
ൢ ܻ = ൞ݕଵݕଶ⋮
ݕ௡
ൢ
The A matrix shows the structure or the technological characteristics of an economy.
The terms in the equation can be rearranged to solve for X:
ܺ = (1 − ܣ)ିଵܻ = ܻܮ (15)
where I is an identity matrix and (I-A)-1 is known as the Leontief inverse (further
identified as L), which indicates the inter-industry requirements of the i-th sector to
deliver a unit of output. In turn, Y is a vector of final demand.
As has been said, when industries and consumers are located in different countries or
regions, then the traditional IO framework can be expanded, and the technique adopts
the name of Multi-Regional Input-Output (MRIO) Analysis. An MRIO model is useful
because it captures the underlying structure of several economies and the
interdependencies between their different industries through international trade. This
method has been frequently used to examine global value chains. The insights
obtained from these models are thus not only helpful for research purposes, but also
for policy making and economic planning.
In an MRIO framework, the technical coefficient matrix (A) accounts for domestically
produced goods and services within the different regions and also for the trade that
takes place between them. In this sense, the sectoral requirements of region m are
decomposed into a domestic component and an imports component. The former
represents inter-industry relationships within the region, while the latter shows the inter-
industry relationships with other sectors located in the n-th region.
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ܣ௠ = ܣ௠஽ + ෍ ܣ௡ூ (16)
Hence, A becomes a square composite matrix of technical coefficients formed by a
number of blocks or sub-matrices. The diagonal blocks (i.e. ܣ௠ ௡஽ , where m=n)
represent domestic IO matrices, which show the inter-linkages between sectors located
within regions. Conversely, the off-diagonal blocks (i.e. ܣ௠ ௡ூ , where m≠n) represent the
sectoral requirements of region m from other sectors located in region n. These are
known as the import matrices. The A matrix can thus be expressed as follows:
ܣ =
⎩
⎨
⎧
ܣଵଵ
஽ ܣଵଶ
ூ ⋯ ܣଵ௡
ூ
ܣଶଵ
ூ ܣଶଶ
஽ ⋯ ܣଶ௡
ூ
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
ܣ௠ ௡
ூ ܣ௠ ଶ
ூ ⋯ ܣ௠ ௡
஽ ⎭
⎬
⎫
As has been said, the A matrix is composed of domestic and import sub-matrices. For
the sake of clarity, this matrix is shown below in expanded form for a model with two
countries, named m and n, each with s sectors. The technology matrix can be
expressed in the following way:
ܣ =
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎧ ଵܽଵ
௠ ௠
ଵܽଶ
௠ ௠ ⋯ ଵܽ௦
௠ ௠
ଵܽଵ
௠ ௡
ଵܽଶ
௠ ௡ ⋯ ଵܽ௦
௠ ௡
ଶܽଵ
௠ ௠
ଶܽଶ
௠ ௠ ⋯ ଶܽ௦
௠ ௠
ଶܽଵ
௠ ௡
ଶܽଶ
௠ ௡ ⋯ ଶܽ௦
௠ ௡
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
௦ܽଵ
௠ ௠
௦ܽଶ
௠ ௠ ⋯ ௦ܽ௦
௠ ௠
௦ܽଵ
௠ ௡
௦ܽଶ
௠ ௡ ⋯ ௦ܽ௦
௠ ௡
ଵܽଵ
௡௠
ଵܽଶ
௡௠ ⋯ ଵܽ௦
௡௠
ଵܽଵ
௡௡
ଵܽଶ
௡௡ ⋯ ଵܽ௦
௡௡
ଶܽଵ
௡௠
ଶܽଶ
௡௠ ⋯ ଶܽ௦
௡௠
ଶܽଵ
௡௡
ଶܽଶ
௡௡ ⋯ ଶܽ௦
௡௡
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
௦ܽଵ
௡௠
௦ܽଶ
௡௠ ⋯ ௦ܽ௦
௡௠
௦ܽଵ
௡௡
௦ܽଶ
௡௡ ⋯ ௦ܽ௦
௡௡⎭
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎬
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎫
Where elements ௜ܽ௝௠ ௠ and ௜ܽ௝௡௡ represent the technical coefficients corresponding to the
domestic matrices, while elements ௜ܽ௝௡௠ and ௜ܽ௝௠ ௡ show the inter-country trade
coefficients pertaining to the import matrices. As can be appreciated, the size of the A
matrix grows considerably every time an additional region is included. In a model with n
nations or regions, each with s sectors, the dimension of the technology matrix would
be n*s by n*s. On the other hand, an n-country model would comprise n domestic
matrices and n2-n import matrices.
In the case of X and Y, the model must include total output and final demand,
respectively, of all sectors located in all regions. Regarding Y, it incorporates all the
components of final demand (i.e. private and public consumption, gross capital
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formation and change in stocks) of domestically produced goods and services (YD)
within region m, as well as of imported products and services to final demand (YI) from
region n to be consumed in m. Moreover, goods and services produced domestically
(E), but destined for final consumption in region n (i.e. exports) are additionally included
in Y.
ܺ = ൞ ଵܺܺଶ
⋮
ܺ௡
ൢ ܻ = ൞ ଵܻ + ∑ܧଵ௡ଶܻ + ∑ܧଶ௡
⋮
௡ܻ + ∑ܧ௠ ௡ൢ
In this sense, in an open economy the standard IO equation can be rewritten as:
ܺ = (ܣ஽ + ܣூ)ܺ + ܻ஽ + ܻூ+ ܧ − ܯ (17)
Since total imports (M) are equal to imports to intermediate demand (AI) plus imports to
final consumption (YI),
ܯ = ܣூܺ + ܻூ (18)
then, by substituting equation (18) in (17), exactly the same form of the standard
equation (15) is obtained, implying that Y=YD+E. This implies that it can be used to
determine the amount of output (X) from any arbitrary demand.
In addition to the MRIO model, this thesis also makes use of a Bilateral Trade Input-
Output (BTIO) model. This method does not split the bilateral trade flows into
components to intermediate and final consumption. It is particularly useful to build a
multi-regional model when import matrices are not available and the modeller has to
rely on bilateral trade data. It has also been regularly used to determine the amount of
emissions embedded in total trade flows, as opposed to only in final consumption. In
this last case, it is better known as an Emissions Embodied in Bilateral Trade (EEBT)
model (see: Peters, 2008; Atkinson et al., 2011). Its main difference with respect to an
MRIO is that the sectoral requirements of region m just include the domestic
component, while the imports component is omitted.
ܣ௠ = ܣ௠஽ (19)
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In this sense, the A matrix is sparse, with domestic components situated in the main
diagonal and zeros in the off-diagonal sub-matrices:
ܣ =
⎩
⎨
⎧
ܣଵଵ
஽ 0 ⋯ 00 ܣଶଶ஽ ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 0 ⋯ ܣ௠ ௡
஽ ⎭
⎬
⎫
The inter-industry requirements with respect to sectors located in region n are
appended to the Y vector.
ܻ =
⎩
⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪
⎧ ଵܻ + ෍ ܧଵ௡௜௡௧+ ෍ ܧଵ௡௙௜௡௔௟
ଶܻ + ෍ ܧଶ௡௜௡௧+ ෍ ܧଶ௡௙௜௡௔௟
⋮
௡ܻ + ෍ ܧ௠ ௡௜௡௧+ ෍ ܧ௠ ௡௙௜௡௔௟⎭⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪
⎫
where Eint represents exports to intermediate (i.e. inter-industry) demand and Efinal
stands for exports to final demand. In this manner, equation (17) becomes:
ܺ = ܣ஽ܺ + ܻ஽ + ܻூ+ ܧ௜௡௧+ ܧ௙௜௡௔௟− ܯ (20)
Then, by substituting equation (18) in (20), it can be inferred that the standard equation
(15) can be obtained as before, assuming that Y=YD+Eint+Efinal.
Both the MRIO and the EEBT models can be extended so as to include environmental
variables. In this case, a vector of CO2 emissions is built with data disaggregated into
sectors. It is assumed that CO2 is a function of output (X). The emissions generated by
sector i can be divided by the corresponding output (Xi) in order to obtain a row vector
of direct carbon intensities. These intensities can then be expressed as a diagonal
matrix (ܥመ). In order to determine the amount of emissions (C) associated with a given
output (X), ܥመcan be post-multiplied by X.
ܥ = ܥመܺ (21)
By substituting X according to equation (15), this is equal to:
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ܥ = ܥመܻܮ (22)
In this sense, the model is able to determine the amount of direct and indirect CO2
emissions that are associated with a certain level of final demand (Y). As can be
appreciated, equation (22) can also be rearranged to express final demand as the
endogenous variable: ܻ = (ܥመܮ)ିଵܥ. This particular inverted form is used in Chapter 5,
where it will be explained further.
The term C in equation (22) represents a rectangular matrix of CO2 emissions, with i*s
rows and i columns, where i is the number of countries and s the number of sectors. It
can alternatively be expressed in compact form. The matrix is constituted by domestic
and trade-related components. In the case of two regions, m and n, this matrix is equal
to:
ܥ = ቄܿ௠ ௠ ܿ௠ ௡
ܿ௡௠ ܿ௡௡
ቅ
where each component (c) in this matrix stands for a column vector, whose number of
rows correspond to the total amount of sectors (s). In this sense, cmm and cnn are the
emissions required to satisfy the domestic production of goods consumed within
regions m and n, respectively. In turn, cmn are the emissions necessary to manufacture
products in m that are consumed in n (i.e. exports from m to n). Accordingly, cnm are
the emissions required to produce goods in n that are consumed in m (i.e. imports from
n to m). The total sum of the rows in this matrix (i.e. domestic plus exports) yields direct
production or territorial emissions. Conversely, the total sum of the columns (i.e.
domestic plus imports) represents indirect consumption emissions. The trade balance
in emissions for country m, for example, is given by cmn minus cnm, which is exactly the
opposite with respect to region n’s trade balance. Both approaches return the same
amount of total emissions. However, they differ in terms of the entities to which they
are allocated (Munksgaard and Pedersen, 2001; Gallego and Lenzen, 2005; Lenzen et
al., 2007; Peters and Hertwich, 2008a). From a production perspective, these are
assigned to the sectors or industries where the emissions were generated during
production. Conversely, from a consumption perspective, these are allocated to the
final consumers (e.g. households, firms, government) according to their final demand.
Miller and Blair (2009) state that this same procedure can be applied to virtually any
factor associated with inter-industry activity that is assumed to vary linearly with output.
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Therefore, the diagonal matrix ܥመ in equation (21) can be substituted with intensities
derived from different variables, such as energy consumption or employment. It is
particularly helpful to determine the factor content of trade. In this thesis, direct
intensities for value added and for wages paid to skilled and unskilled labour are used
apart from CO2 emissions. When this procedure is used in the case of value added, it is
better known as trade in value added (Hummels et al., 2001; Daudin et al., 2011; IDE-
JETRO and WTO, 2011).
3.2.2.1. Multiplier analysis
Multiplier analysis has been extensively used in the IO literature, as has been
recognised by Miller and Blair (2009). According to them, one of its most frequent uses
is to assess economic impacts. They are useful, for example, to estimate how
exogenous changes in output or income can affect the different sectors of an economy.
The notion of the multipliers rests upon the difference between the initial or direct effect
of an exogenous change and the total effects caused by that change. The total effects
thus envelop the direct and indirect effects (i.e. the effects that occur throughout the
whole supply chain). The Leontief inverse or total requirements matrix presented in
equation (15) is in fact a matrix composed of direct and indirect output multipliers.
Specifically, each of its elements indicates the inter-industry requirements of the i-th
sector to deliver a unit of output, given a level of final demand. Other types of
multipliers can be built with the use of the L matrix, like employment, value-added or
CO2. In essence, the diagonal matrix of carbon intensities represented by ܥመin equation
(22) also represents a type of multipliers, this time for carbon. They can be labelled as
direct intensity multipliers (DIMs), since they show how much carbon is directly
generated by every unit of output. When this matrix is used in equation (22), it provides
a set of weights to L, forming total intensity multipliers (TIMs). In this sense, each
element in the TIMs matrix expresses how much CO2 would vary directly and indirectly
throughout the whole supply chain given a change in final demand. Equation (22) can
then be alternatively expressed as:
ܥ = ܶܫܯݏ∙ ܻ (23)
As has been said, the i-th row of the C matrix represents the production-based
emissions, while the j-th column stands for consumption-based emissions. On the other
hand, it must be noted that the TIMs form a square matrix comprised of domestic and
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trade-related square sub-matrices. In the case of two regions, m and n, this matrix is
equal to:
ܶܫܯݏ= ቄݐ௠ ௠ ݐ௠ ௡
ݐ௡௠ ݐ௡௡
ቅ
This matrix thus indicates how much CO2 is created directly and indirectly by an
additional unit of final demand. The elements of the sub-matrices placed in the main
diagonal (tmm and tnn) represent intra-regional multipliers, which determine the amount
of CO2 that is generated within regions m and n (i.e. direct effects) by every unit of final
demand. The elements in the off-diagonal sub-matrices, on the other hand, are inter-
regional multipliers. These specify the quantity of emissions generated indirectly in
regions m and n throughout the global supply chain (i.e. indirect effects) by the same
unit of final demand. The total effects, direct plus indirect, are given by the sum of the
columns. For example, the total amount of emissions generated directly within region m
and indirectly in region n by a change in final demand is determined by tmm+tnm. This
can similarly be calculated for the other region. It is worth noticing, on the other hand,
that TIMs can be regarded as the carbon intensity of final demand, since they indicate
the quantity of emissions generated per unit of final expenditure.
TIMs were calculated not only for CO2, but also for value added and wages to skilled
and unskilled labour following the same procedure. In this manner, the resulting
multipliers indicate the amount of value added and wages that are generated intra- and
inter-regionally by every unit of final demand. Apart from being useful to determine the
magnitude of the effects, TIMs can also be used to calculate the labour productivity of
carbon (LPC). This indicator expresses the quantity of wages associated inter- and
intra-regionally with every unit of emissions generated by a dollar of final demand. This
is achieved by dividing the labour multipliers by the carbon multipliers.
ܲܮ ܥ௠ = ݐ௟௔௕௢௨௥௠ ௠ (ݐ௖௔௥௕௢௡௠ ௠ + ݐ௖௔௥௕௢௡௡௠ )ିଵ (24)
Equation (24), for example, expresses the amount of wages generated in region m that
are associated with every a unit of CO2 emitted throughout the entire supply chain. As
can be noted, the intra-regional multipliers are multiplied by the inverse of the total
carbon multipliers of region m. This can equally be repeated in the case of region n.
Moreover, this same procedure applies for wages paid to skilled and unskilled labour.
Another indicator that can be estimated in this manner is the carbon intensity of value
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added, which can deliver more useful information than the traditional intensities used
based on GDP (i.e. CO2 per unit of GDP), since it allows distinguishing the direct from
the indirect effects.
3.2.2.2. BCA analysis
As has been explained, MRIO analysis is used to address the third research question
proposed in this thesis, related to the potential implementation of a BCA scheme. This
study relies basically on manipulating the C matrix as expressed by equation (22).
According to what was said in section 3.2.2, this matrix is made of domestic and trade-
related components:
ܥ = ቄܿ௠ ௠ ܿ௠ ௡
ܿ௡௠ ܿ௡௡
ቅ
If region m corresponds to a group of economies subject to legally-binding emissions
targets (i.e. Annex B nations), the column vector cnm then represents the emissions
embedded in their imports manufactured in region n, which could therefore be levied by
a BCA scheme. On the other hand, cmn stands for emissions already priced that are
embedded in products manufactured in region m to be consumed in n. These are the
exports that can be subject to a rebate (see section 2.3.3).
The tariff rates faced by region n depend on the price for carbon (p). In order to
calculate the tariffs, p is multiplied to the amount of emissions embedded in imports.
This is then divided by the value of those same imports, expressed in terms of their
value added. As has been said, the amount of value added embedded in imports to
region m can be determined using equation (22). In this sense, the rectangular matrix
ܸ = ෠ܸܻܮ expresses the amount of value added created directly and indirectly by a
given level of final demand, where ෠ܸ represents a diagonal matrix of value added DIMs
(i.e. value added per unit of output for every sector). The V matrix is also comprised of
domestic and trade-related components. The tariff can then be calculated in the
following manner:
tariff = ݌ܿ௡௠ (ݒ௡௠ )ିଵ (25)
where p is a scalar (i.e. price for carbon), cnm represents the emissions embedded in
imports and (vnm)-1 is the inverse of the value of those imports.
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Finally, the BATs, which were described in section 2.3.3, were calculated as the
average DIMs of the 33% most carbon efficient countries under the scheme. Individual
nations were ranked, once for every economic sector, according to their DIMs. The
BATs were then estimated as the mean carbon intensity of the most efficient tercile.
3.3. Constructing an MRIO
The MRIO model used in this thesis was constructed by the author following the
guidelines described by Peters et al. (2011a), based on the GTAP 8 database. As is
explained by these authors, an advantage of using this dataset is that it is already
balanced and harmonised, so there is no further need to perform these tasks. The data
only requires to be manipulated into an MRIO table. However, attention needs to be
taken in order to satisfy several accounting identities, according to the UN system of
national accounts. The procedure is summarised here, but complete details are
provided by the aforementioned authors. In this sense, the total output in region m is
given by:
ݔ௠ = ܼ௠ ௠ + ݕ௠ ௠ + ݐ௡ + ෍ ݁௠ ௡
௡
(26)
where, xm is total output in region m, Zmm are the domestic inter-industry purchases,
ymm are the domestic purchases by final consumers, tn is the export of international
transport services from region n, and emn are the exports of region m to region n. Since
exports can be purchased by either industries or final consumers, then:
݁௠ ௡ = ܼ௠ ௡ + ݕ௠ ௡ (27)
Substituting (27) into (26):
ݔ௠ = ܼ௠ ௠ + ݕ௠ ௠ + ݐ௡ + ෍ (ܼ௠ ௡ + ݕ௠ ௡)
௡
(28)
This equation can be normalised (A=Zx-1), which results in a system of linear
equations:
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ݔ௠ = ܣ௠ ௠ ݔ௠ + ෍ ܣ௠ ௡ݔ௡ +
௡
ݕ௠ ௠ + ෍ ݕ௠ ௡ +
௡
ݐ௡ (29)
GTAP 8 comprises data for two years, 2004 and 2007, so two MRIO tables, one for
each year, were constructed.
3.4. Data and sources
The construction of MRIO and EEBT models requires a number of national IO tables.
Many countries make them available, but assembling them into a multi-regional model
requires undertaking a process of balancing and harmonisation. This is a time
consuming procedure, since different nations use varying sector classifications,
number of economic sectors, years, prices and currencies. Very few sources offer
these tables with a certain degree of harmonisation. The World Input Output Database
(WIOD) constitutes perhaps the greatest effort to bring together national IO tables and
create a harmonised time series. Until now, it has gathered tables for the EU27 plus 13
other major countries, corresponding to 1995 to 2009 (see: Timmer, 2012). The OECD
also provides internationally harmonised IO tables for domestic production and imports,
as well as bilateral trade data. Some researchers, such as Giljum et al. (2008), believe
that their level of harmonisation makes this data more reliable than that offered by
other sources. Nevertheless, the range of nations included in the OECD database is
limited. It comprises data for 30 of its member countries and 13 non-OECD nations for
43 sectors, covering the years 1995, 2000 and 2005. The Global Trade Analysis
Project (GTAP) represents another important source. It also collects national IO tables
and offers them along with bilateral trade data with an acceptable level of
harmonisation. Different versions have been made available at a regular basis. The
most recent one, version 8, contains data for 57 economic sectors corresponding to
109 nation states and 20 aggregated regions (see Appendix A.2 for a complete list) for
the years 2004 and 2007. The GTAP datasets have been used in multiple studies, and
represent the main data source for this research. GTAP 8 was selected due to the
range of countries covered and, more importantly, because the data is already
balanced. In other words, the data has been previously calibrated so that global supply
equals global demand. This significantly facilitates the construction of multi-regional
models.
GTAP 8 also includes data for wages to skilled and unskilled labour for all regions and
sectors, which are used in the analyses presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 (see:
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Narayanan G. et al., 2012). GTAP 8 also encloses an environmental extension in the
form of total CO2 emissions for each region derived from six energy carriers: coal,
crude oil, natural gas, petroleum products, electricity and gas distribution (also see:
Narayanan G. et al., 2012). These figures are based on energy statistics published by
the International Energy Agency (IEA). This dataset was complemented with national
CO2 annual emissions for cement production taken from the Carbon Dioxide
Information Analysis Centre (CDIAC, 2013). It is worth mentioning, however, that CO2
emissions related to shipping are not well accounted for in GTAP. In addition, CO2
generated from land use change is not included in GTAP 8. Furthermore, data for non-
CO2 GHGs was not available at this level of disaggregation, especially nitrous oxide
(N2O), methane (CH4) and fluorinated gases, so this type of emissions was not taken
into account in this thesis.
Time series for production and consumption-based CO2 emissions were provided by
Peters et al. (2010). The authors basically extended global estimates for 1997, 2001,
and 2004 over the period 1990-2008 using a combination of GDP, emissions, and
trade statistics extracted from established global datasets, such as CDIAC (2013) and
the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD, 2013a) (see their paper for precise
details about the methodology). These time series comply with the GTAP 8
classification, thus comprising 109 nation states and 20 aggregated regions. It is
important to notice that the production and consumption-based approaches yield the
same amount of total global emissions, but differ in terms of how emissions are
allocated to countries (see section 2.2.2). In this sense, the level of uncertainty related
to the consumption-based CO2 dataset is deemed to be very similar than that of
production-based data taken from CDIAC. More about the uncertainty of CO2
emissions data is covered in the next section.
Data for future CO2 emissions pathways, as described by the different RCPs, are used
in Chapter 7. These datasets are offered in the form of midyear atmospheric CO2
concentrations and annual emissions (Gt per year). They are derived from the use of
fossil fuels from 2000 to 2100 corresponding to 5 regions (see Figure 4, page 23)
which, in turn, cover 184 individual countries. Emissions from the RCP3-PD, RCP6 and
RCP8.5 pathways were obtained from van Vuuren et al. (2007), Fujino et al. (2006)
and Riahi et al. (2007), respectively. Projections for RCP4.5 were taken from Smith and
Wigley (2006), Clarke et al. (2007) and Wise et al. (2009).
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GDP data at a national level was acquired from the World Bank (2013) and is
expressed in constant 2005 international dollars converted with purchasing power
parity (PPP) rates. The percentage of people living in urban areas and the proportion of
industrial value added with respect to total GDP were also obtained from this same
source.
Population figures for individual countries were extracted from the UNSD (2013a)
website. Future population projections from 2010 to 2050 corresponding to SSP1,
SSP3 and SSP5 were retrieved from the database published by the International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA, 2012). These figures are used in Chapter
7.
The Human Development Index (HDI) was taken from the 2013 Human Development
Report, published by the UNDP (2013). The dataset encompasses sub-indices
corresponding to income per capita, life expectancy, and the observed and expected
years of schooling. Data is available for 187 individual countries and eight years (1980,
1990, 2000, 2005, 2007, 2010, 2011 and 2012).
3.5. Strengths and limitations
This section discusses the strengths and limitations of panel data analysis and EE-
MRIO analysis. It also talks about the uncertainties that are involved in MRIO models
and in the GTAP database.
3.5.1. Panel Data
As was explained in section 3.2.1, one of the major strengths of panel data analysis is
its ability to establish robust long-term causal relationships between a dependent and
independent variables when more than one observational unit is considered. Apart
from this, Baltagi (2005) makes reference to Klevmarken (1989) and Hsiao (2003), who
have enumerated other advantages, as well as limitations. Still other benefits and
drawbacks are highlighted by Hsiao (2007). All these are listed below:
Advantages:
 Controlling for individual heterogeneity.
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 Panel data provide more informative data, more variability, less collinearity
among the variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency.
 Panel data are appropriate to study the dynamics of adjustment (see section
3.2.1.3).
 Panel data are able to identify and measure effects that are simply not
detectable in pure cross-section or pure time-series data.
 Panel data models allow constructing and testing more complicated behavioural
models than purely cross-section or time-series data.
 Biases resulting from aggregation over individuals may be reduced or
eliminated.
Perhaps the main limitation of panel data analysis is data availability. It is a frequent
problem faced by researchers who need to deal with missing observations. When data
is not available for several cross-sectional units, the panels are technically referred to
as being unbalanced. However, several procedures have been designed to overcome
these difficulties. In the case of this study, the methods that are used allow for missing
observations without affecting the robustness of the results. Other limitations identified
by the aforementioned authors are:
 Design and data collection problems
 Distortions due to measurement errors
 Selectivity problems
 Short time-series
 Cross-sectional dependence (see section 3.2.1.2)
3.5.2. MRIO
When it comes to environmentally-extended IO analysis, this tool offers several
advantages over other techniques. In relation to CO2 emissions accounting, Murray et
al. (2010) argue that IO’s most important virtue over life cycle assessment lies in its
ability to overcome the issues of establishing boundaries and double counting. IO takes
into account all the impacts derived from the full upstream supply chain, without leaving
anything unaccounted for. On the other hand, the problem of double counting
emissions is solved by apportioning the impacts along the entire supply chain. This
basically means that it is possible to determine the specific amount of emissions every
actor in the economic system is responsible for.
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MRIO analysis is also useful in developing scenario analysis. By modifying a number of
initial conditions (e.g. increasing demand for inputs by any sector or alterations in final
demand in a particular industry), different policy options can be explored and their
possible outcomes can be verified. It must be noted, nevertheless, that scenarios
produced using MRIO analysis are limited by constraints on how much the economy
can be altered. Miller and Blair (2009) also recognise that single and multi-regional IO
analyses can be complemented with other techniques, like linear programming, life
cycle analysis and econometric models.
However, IO analysis also entails certain drawbacks. One of the most relevant ones is
the level of uncertainty that is involved. Since the data contained in IO tables is derived
from thousands or millions of data points, it is almost impossible to determine how
many errors are involved. And, most importantly, it is difficult to estimate how this
uncertainty would propagate through the entire modelling process (Lenzen, 2000).
One other major disadvantage of MRIO analysis is data availability. The amount of
resources and time that are necessary to produce IO tables is considerable, so some
national governments only publish them sporadically. This makes it difficult to obtain
updated figures for all the regions for the same base years that are to be included in a
model. This contributes to increase the uncertainty. In addition, the issue of
aggregation is also present. Despite the reporting guidelines provided by the UN, some
countries do not offer a sufficient level of disaggregation regarding certain economic
sectors. This creates a problem of harmonisation and hinders the detail with which the
analysis can be undertaken (Wiedmann, 2009).
3.5.2.1. Uncertainties related to MRIO models and GTAP data
There are a number of uncertainties associated with the GTAP database and to the
construction of MRIO models in general. These are related to a number of issues, like
manipulation due to calibration, balancing and harmonisation, use of different time
periods, currencies, country and sectoral classifications and levels of aggregation,
accounting for inflation effects, data errors, among others (see: Lenzen, 2000; Lenzen
et al., 2004; Peters, 2007; Weber, 2008; Lenzen et al., 2010).
According to Peters (2007), the biggest uncertainty might be the one related to its
manipulation. GTAP data is collected from voluntary submissions by individuals or
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organisations at an international scale, and these receive in return the right to use the
dataset. Thus, the data is presented in different country classifications and levels of
aggregation. Aguiar and Walmsley (2012) have claimed that of all the contributed
tables, 86 did not contain all 57 sectors, so disaggregation was required. Moreover,
data generally corresponds to different years. IO tables for some countries, like Hong
Kong and Zimbabwe, date from 1988 and 1991, respectively. Only a small fraction of
the entire set of domestic IO tables is newer than 2004. Furthermore, the data is often
expressed in national currencies. For these reasons, after receiving the data from its
original sources, GTAP undertakes a process of harmonisation. The data is initially
transformed in order to comply with GTAP classification. It is subsequently valuated by
taking into account currency conversions and inflation, so all tables are expressed in a
common unit valued at the prices of a base year. Then, it is further calibrated and
balanced, making it suitable to be used in a computable general equilibrium model. The
precise details of these harmonisation, calibration and balancing processes are not
transparent enough. This affects data consistency and generates a degree of
uncertainty that is hard to estimate.
Regarding MRIO models in general, Weber (2008) has analysed their uncertainties
associated with aggregation issues. By using IO data from the United States and
several of its largest trading partners, he determined that aggregation and concordance
to a common sectoral classification, the treatment of the rest-of-world (ROW) region,
and monetary exchange rates represent the greatest sources of uncertainty. In the
particular case of the GTAP EE-MRIO model that is used to produce the results for this
thesis, these problems seem to be also present at a certain extent. Some of these have
already been mentioned, but it is worth highlighting the ROW issue. Although it does
not include a ROW region as such, it does possess 20 aggregated regions that
comprise another 126 nations and territories14. Due to the reduced size of their
economies and the lack of data at a national level, these were aggregated instead of
being presented individually. This aggregation, according to Lenzen et al. (2004) and
Weber (2008), is likely to result in some errors.
Some other issues further contribute to increase the level of uncertainty that is present
in any model of this kind. In general terms, raw macroeconomic and energy data, as is
generated by national sources, is already associated with a series of errors. These are
seldom estimated by governmental offices of statistics at a national scale, so it is
14 See GTAP 8 country classification in Appendix A.2.1.
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difficult to determine their magnitude. Guan et al. (2012), for instance, found a
discrepancy of about 1.4 gigatonnes of CO2 for 2010 between the figure reported by
China as a whole and the emissions estimates from China’s individual provinces and
municipalities. Moreover, data from different sources often varies due to differing
definitions or methodologies for data collection. For example, GTAP CO2 data is
calculated by using IEA energy statistics. However, it may vary from 10% to 20% at a
national level, and maybe even more at a sectoral level, when compared to other
sources, such as CDIAC (see: Minx et al., 2008). Significant variations have been
found particularly in the case of the United States, China and the EU. In this same
respect, Lenzen et al. (2010), while undertaking an uncertainty analysis of the UK’s
carbon footprint by using an MRIO model, estimated an 89% probability that the
footprint might have been significantly larger than originally calculated due to errors
related to the carbon multipliers.
In summary, it is almost impossible to know how big the uncertainties are. But, in spite
of all these issues, Weber (2008) thinks that the advantages of MRIO models outweigh
these problems. Regarding GTAP, it still constitutes one of the most reputable sources
and its data is currently being used in numerous studies.
3.6. Summary and further remarks
This chapter presented the methods and data that are used in this thesis. It explained
the reasons for following a multi-method approach and for selecting Panel Data
analysis and EE-MRIO analysis as the most appropriate techniques to address the
research questions outlined in the introductory chapter. It provided a detailed
description of these methods and presented the data and their sources. The process to
build the MRIO model was also illustrated. This was followed by a discussion about the
strengths and limitations of each technique and the last section talked about the
uncertainties that are involved in MRIO models and in the GTAP database.
The next chapter focuses on providing answers to the first research question, which
deals with the carbon EKC.
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Chapter 4
The Consumption-Based Carbon Kuznets Curve
This chapter presents the empirical findings related to the first research question
proposed in this thesis (see section 1.2): Is the EKC for carbon valid from a
consumption-based approach? As was explained in the literature review chapter, if the
carbon EKC was to hold true, a possible prescription for attaining higher levels of
development and prevent dangerous climate change would be to increase income per
capita throughout the world. However, the analyses undertaken so far have yielded
mixed findings in relation to CO2 emissions. The majority of studies have used territorial
emissions and only a few have tested the hypothesis from a consumption-based
perspective (see section 2.2.3). Authors like Ekins (1997) and Rothman (1998) have
suggested that analysing the income-emissions relationship from the consumption-side
can deliver more consistent results. This chapter thus analyses this assertion by testing
the consumption-based carbon EKC hypothesis using a large set of cross-country data.
As was explained in section 3.1, the best method to examine this particular query is
panel data analysis. This chapter starts by inspecting the historical trends of CO2 and
GDP per capita according to country groups. Next, the variables used in the study are
described in section 4.2. This is followed by the presentation of the results obtained by
various econometric methods in section 4.3. Finally a summary of the results is
presented in section 4.4.
4.1. Historical trends of CO2 and GDP per capita
Section 2.2.2 explained the differences between territorial- and consumption-based
emissions. Figure 9, which is included in that same section, shows the historical trends
of both types of emissions for Annex B and Non-Annex B countries in absolute terms
on a yearly basis. Figure 13a, seen below, shows the same data, but this time
expressed in per capita terms. The first obvious difference between both graphs is that
Non-Annex B per capita emissions have not surpassed those of their counterparts. In
contrast to absolute figures, a significant gap exists between both groups of nations. In
1990, territorial- and consumption-based emissions per capita were around 7 times
greater in Annex B nations than those of the rest of the world, but this proportion
declined in 2010 to 3.4 times for territorial and 4 times for consumption. Despite this
catching-up by Non-Annex B countries, the inequality in per capita emissions remains
high. Another important aspect reflected in the graph is the divergence between both
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types of emissions. Annex B economies have increasingly become net-importers of
CO2. In 1990, territorial and consumption-based emissions per capita were roughly the
same, but the gap became approximately 9.3% larger in 2010. Non-Annex B nations,
on the other hand, have gradually become net-exporters of emissions. Their territorial
CO2 per capita was similar to their consumption-based levels in 1990, but the former
became almost 8% larger in 2010. This means that the net transfer of emissions (i.e.
weak carbon leakage) via international trade grew significantly over time. In terms of
their overall levels, Annex B countries observed a decrease of about 13% in their
territorial emissions in per capita terms over the period, in some part due to the effects
of the 2008/09 financial crisis. However, their consumption-based emissions kept their
1990 levels for most of the time. An opposite effect took place in the rest of the world.
Although it is not clearly seen in Figure 13 due to its scale, territorial and consumption
emissions per capita rose 70% and 80%, respectively, in 2010 compared to 1990,
showing a special acceleration since the first years of the 2000s. This coincides with
the period of high economic growth registered in developing economies, particularly in
China.
In relation to income per capita, the same levels of inequality are found, as was already
shown in Figure 7 and discussed in section 2.2.1. Figure 13b, seen below, displays the
same data, but this time for Annex B and Non-Annex B countries. In 1990, income
levels in the former nations were about 8.7 times larger. This proportion was reduced to
5.7 times in 2010. In relation to per capita income growth, Annex B nations
experienced an improvement of nearly 33% in real terms during the period, while their
counterparts’ income almost doubled over the same time, reflecting what the UNDP
(2013) calls the rise of the South.
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Figure 13 - Consumption and territorial emissions per capita (a) and GDP per
capita (b) according to country group (1990-2010)
(a) (b)
Source: Own figures based on data by UNSD (2013a), CDIAC (2013), (World Bank, 2013)
4.2. Overview of the variables and data
CO2 emissions and GDP, both expressed in per capita terms, are the basic data inputs
used in a carbon EKC analysis, in which the former represents the dependent variable.
As explained in section 3.2.1.5, apart from linear and quadratic income per capita
terms, a cubic term is also regularly included as an independent variable to check for
the possibility of obtaining a statistically significant N-shaped curve. In addition, it is
also a common practice to use additional independent variables to improve the fit of the
regression (see: Stern et al., 1996; Ekins, 1997; Dinda, 2004). In this case, the
percentage of people living in urban areas and the proportion of industrial value added
with respect to total GDP are included in the functional specification. These two
variables are deemed relevant since they can capture signs of structural change. As
explained in section 2.2.3, while an economy changes its structure from an agrarian to
an industrial regime, more people move to urban areas and income per capita rises.
According to the EKC hypothesis, this would be associated with lower environmental
degradation rates. Table 11 presents the descriptive statistics for each of the variables
used in the analysis.
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Table 11 - Descriptive statistics for variables
included in the carbon EKC analysis
Statistic CB TB GDP Urban Industrial
World
Mean 5.30 4.70 11,040 58.26 30.90
Median 3.37 3.19 6,547 59.38 29.66
St. Dev. 5.39 4.96 11,657 22.18 10.07
Minimum -0.36 0.01 62 8.85 6.84
Maximum 35.21 29.80 74,021 100.00 75.38
No. Obs. 2,520 2,520 2,477 2,520 2,349
Annex B
Mean 12.47 11.80 23,533 71.33 30.74
Median 9.62 8.10 24,567 73.10 29.73
St. Dev. 4.51 4.26 11,823 11.15 6.31
Minimum 2.84 2.63 3,429 47.92 12.97
Maximum 35.21 27.51 74,021 97.46 60.12
No. Obs. 777 777 757 777 742
Non-Annex B
Mean 2.95 2.76 5,654 52.89 30.96
Median 1.55 1.33 3,326 50.46 29.58
St. Dev. 3.83 3.88 6,159 23.33 11.29
Minimum -0.36 0.01 62 8.85 6.84
Maximum 25.77 29.80 42,848 100.00 75.38
No. Obs. 1,743 1,743 1,720 1,743 1,607
Note: Data corresponds to time series for the 1990-2010 period
CB: Consumption-based emissions and TB: Territorial-based
emissions (metric tonnes per capita); GDP is expressed at PPP
constant (2005) international dollars; Urban and industrial are
expressed as percentages. The average per capita emissions
differ between the consumption and territorial approaches at a
global scale due to the exclusion of certain regions.
Source: Own table based on data by Peters et al. (2011b), CDIAC
(2013), UNSD (2013a) and the World Bank (2013)
As was explained in section 3.4, the data was obtained from various sources. The
country classification is compatible with the GTAP 8 dataset, covering 109 individual
countries and 20 regions which, in turn, comprise another 126 nations and territories15.
In this analysis, each of these 20 aggregated regions is treated as an individual
country. It would have been ideal to possess data for every single nation.
Unfortunately, the yearly CO2 figures estimated by Peters et al. (2011b) are only
provided in this form. On the other hand, 3 countries and 6 regions had to be excluded,
since time series for GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita were not
available for them16. Their territorial emissions represent approximately 1.1% of the
total. Furthermore, again due to data availability, the panel used in this analysis is still
unbalanced for GDP per capita and the share of industrial value added; that is, there
are missing values for some countries (see Table 11). This is a common problem found
in the majority of large-scale cross-country studies (Mátyás and Lovrics, 1991). In this
case, however, the results are not deemed to be affected by this issue. In relation to
GDP per capita, missing values represent only 1.7% of the total, and in the case of
industrial value added, they represent 6.7%. In addition, the methods that will be used
15 See GTAP 8 country classification in Appendix A.2.1.
16 See list of excluded countries in Appendix B.1.1.
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in the analysis allow for missing observations without affecting the robustness of the
results.
All the variables used in the regressions are expressed in natural logarithms in order to
correct their scale, as is the common practice in EKC studies (see: Stern et al., 1996;
Ekins, 1997; Dinda, 2004). An initial visual inspection of the main variables can be
done in Figure 14, which shows the correlation between the logarithms of territorial and
consumption emissions against GDP, both in per capita terms. It should be noticed that
data for all countries and all years were pooled together in this graph. As it can be
seen, while income grows, both types of emissions also tend to rise. The EKC analysis
then basically consists in estimating the best fitting curves for these data points.
Figure 14 - Territorial and consumption
emissions per capita versus GDP per capita
(logs) for 120 countries, 1990-2010
Source: Own figure based on data by Peters et al. (2011b),
CDIAC (2013), UNSD (2013a) and the World Bank (2013)
4.3. Testing the carbon EKC
The following sub-sections offer the results obtained by the various cross-country
panel-data methods used in the analysis, which were presented and described in
section 3.2.1.
4.3.1. Pooled OLS
As a first approach, conducting an initial OLS regression with pooled data is useful to
observe the overall behaviour of the variables included in the analysis in spite of not
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always being the most suitable method. This implies pooling all the data together and
treating it homogeneously. The following table presents the results from these
regressions.
Table 12 - Pooled OLS carbon EKC regression results
Coefficient Territorial ConsumptionQuadratic Cubic Quadratic Cubic
β1
2.93***
(21.94)
9.11***
(6.43)
1.91***
(13.88)
3.89***
(2.66)
β2
-0.11***
(-15.20)
-0.84***
(-5.08)
-0.05***
(-7.11)
-0.29*
(-1.70)
β3 ---
0.03***
(4.41) ---
0.01
(1.39)
Urban 0.01***(7.64)
0.01***
(8.01)
0.01***
(6.31)
0.01***
(6.48)
Industrial 0.02***(16.89)
0.02***
(16.88)
0.01***
(9.56)
0.01***
(9.51)
Constant -18.50***(-32.72)
-35.78***
(-8.95)
-13.58***
(-23.17)
-19.12***
(-4.60)
R2 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.87
Turning point 372,174 --- 44,390,312 ---
Note: t-stats are shown in parentheses.
***, **, * Significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively
The quadratic specifications for both territorial- and consumption-based emissions yield
significant coefficients, and the quadratic terms display negative values consistent with
an inverted-U. However, in both cases, the turning points show out-of-sample income
per capita values, with the inflection point being extremely high in the case of the
consumption specification. When the turning points lie so far outside the data range, it
means that only the increasing part of a possible inverted-U is seen, so in fact the
observation is that emissions grow monotonically with income. In relation to the cubic
specifications, the coefficient corresponding to β3 is only significantly different from zero
in the case of territorial emissions, suggesting the presence of an N-shaped curve, but
it is not significant for consumption-based CO2. This means that in the case of territorial
emissions, both quadratic and cubic specifications can fit the data equally well,
although it is difficult to identify which is better just by looking at their R2s. The Akaike
criterion (AIC), in this sense, is often used to choose between a set of similar models.
As the cubic form possesses a slightly smaller AIC (4165.9) compared to the quadratic
one (4182.5), the former would be preferred, but the difference is not large. No turning
points, however, could be estimated for the cubic polynomials due to imaginary roots.
Table 12 also shows that the urban and industrial variables are positive and significant
across all specifications, reflecting their relevance as explanatory factors of CO2
emissions.
The OLS results, nonetheless, are inconsistent, as the method assumes homogeneity
across countries (i.e. the same coefficients are applied to all nations). Country-specific
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differences in terms of their intercepts and slopes are not taken into account. Two tests
were thus conducted in order to prove the viability of OLS against other techniques.
First, an F-test was applied to check for the presence of specific traits fixed to individual
countries (i.e. fixed effects). If this was the case, then OLS would not be valid,
indicating the need to use a fixed effects model. Second, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange
Multiplier test was performed, which is designed to confirm or reject the validity of OLS
against a random effects model. The results derived from both tests can be found in
the following table.
Table 13 - F-test and Breusch-Pagan LM test for quadratic and cubic specifications
Test Specification Territorial Consumption Result
F-test: All fixed effects are
null
Quadratic F(116, 2204)=201.48*** F(116, 2201)=117.04*** OLS not valid
Cubic F(116, 2203)=199.71*** F(116, 2200)=116.86*** OLS not valid
Breusch-Pagan LM test for
pooled vs random effects
Quadratic chi2(1)=16820.65*** chi2(1)=14878.73*** OLS not valid
Cubic chi2(1)=16646.28*** chi2(1)=14842.55*** OLS not valid
*** Significant at 0.01 level
The null hypothesis in the F-test states that no fixed country-specific traits exist, and it
is significantly rejected for all quadratic and cubic specifications for territorial and
consumption emissions. This indicates that OLS is not a valid estimation method.
Similarly, the null hypothesis in the Breusch-Pagan test assumes the absence of
random individual-specific effects. It is again rejected at a level of significance of 1% for
all specifications and types of emissions. Hence, a fixed or random effects model
should be used instead of pooled OLS.
4.3.2. Fixed and random effects
Running pooled OLS regressions served as an initial exploratory measure, but they
yielded misleading results. As was explained in section 3.2.1.1, the assumption that all
countries possess homogenous traits is too restrictive. The fixed effects model thus
takes into account that the intercepts may differ across individual countries, but not
over time. In other words, the model is designed to differentiate heterogeneous and
time-invariant (i.e. fixed) country-specific intercepts. In this sense, it controls for all
those unobserved time-invariant characteristics that may affect the generation of CO2
emissions (e.g. geographical location, area, culture, etc.) and which may bias the
results. In a similar fashion, the random effects model also allows for differences
across countries in terms of their intercepts, but these variations are assumed to occur
randomly. This method is usually utilised when individual observations are known to
constitute a random sample extracted from a given population. An advantage of this
method is that time-invariant unobserved variables are accounted for in the regression.
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However, these unobserved effects must not be correlated with the regressors. If this
was the case, then random effects are not valid and a fixed effects model would be
required instead. In order to choose between the fixed and the random effects model,
the Hausman test is widely used (again, see section 3.2.1.1). Its null hypothesis
assumes that the cross-sectional unobserved effects are not correlated with the
independent variables. The results are presented in the following table.
Table 14 - Hausman test to select between fixed and random effects
Test Specification Territorial Consumption Result
Hausman: fixed vs random Quadratic chi
2(4)=509.34 chi2(4)=49.33 Fixed effects
Cubic chi2(4)=15.88 chi2(5)=157.43 Fixed effects
*** Significant at 0.01 level
The test shows that the null hypothesis is rejected in both specifications and both types
of emissions, as the unobserved effects are correlated with the regressors (see Table
14). This indicates that a fixed effects model is more appropriate in all cases and,
hence, it was used to estimate a new set of regressions.
Table 15 shows the results derived from the fixed effects model. As in the case of the
pooled OLS regressions, the quadratic specifications produced statistically significant
coefficients for β1 and β2 for both territorial and consumption-based emissions. The
signs of the quadratic terms are negative indicating bell-shaped curves or inverted-Us.
Once again, the consumption specification peaks at a higher income level than its
counterpart, but this time both turning points lie within the sample. Territorial emissions
peak at around $17,168 dollars per capita, while consumption emissions do so at
around $27,740. In relation to the other variables, urban is statistically significant in
both types of emissions, but industrial is only relevant in the territorial specification.
Before drawing any conclusions in this particular respect, further analyses must be
done using the additional methods to ensure the viability of this variable. On the other
hand, the cubic specifications did not produce statistically significant fits. However, their
inflection points were still calculated and these are almost identical to those of the
quadratic specifications.
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Table 15 - Fixed effects carbon EKC regression results
Coefficient Territorial ConsumptionQuadratic Cubic Quadratic Cubic
β1
2.84***
(5.40)
1.99
(0.53)
2.97***
(5.35)
2.42
(0.63)
β2
-0.15***
(-4.69)
-0.04
(-0.10)
-0.14***
(-4.60)
-0.08
(-0.18)
β3 ---
0.00
(-0.23) ---
0.00
(-0.15)
Urban 0.02***(4.87)
0.02***
(4.84)
0.02***
(3.45)
0.02***
(3.45)
Industrial 0.01***(2.77)
0.01***
(2.76)
0.00
(1.10)
0.00
(1.09)
Constant -15.50***(-6.89)
-13.11
(-1.24)
-15.98***
(-6.59)
-14.46
(-1.32)
R2 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.81
Turning point 17,168 17,056 28,828 27,740
Note: t-stats are shown in parentheses.
***, **, * Significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively
Figure 15 shows a visual approximation of the estimated territorial and consumption
carbon EKCs. It can be clearly seen that the latter peaks at a higher income level. The
gap that exists between both curves represents the magnitude of the weak carbon
leakage. In addition, it is interesting to notice that Annex-B nations are situated on the
top-ends of the curves, while the great majority of Non-Annex B countries occupy the
leftmost and steepest sections. This reflects the disparities between the stages of
economic development of both groups. The majority of developing countries possess
agrarian regimes and are located at the earlier stages of the EKC.
Figure 15 - Estimated carbon EKCs for
territorial- and consumption-based emissions
using fixed effects according to country
groups (1990-2010)
Source: Own figure
If these results were valid, then countries, on an average basis, would be on track of
achieving emissions reductions by becoming wealthier. In order to confirm their
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consistency and robustness, several tests were applied to the residuals to identify the
presence of heteroskedasticity, serial autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependency.
If any of these conditions were present, the findings could lead to incorrect conclusions.
The results from the tests are presented in the following table.
Table 16 - Heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-country correlation tests
Test Specification Territorial Consumption Result
Modified Wald test for
groupwise
heteroskedasticity
Quadratic chi2 (117)=70,230.88*** chi2(117)=62,650.28*** Heteroskedasticity
Cubic chi2(117)=73,706.80*** chi2(117)=59,633.74*** Heteroskedasticity
Likelihood-ratio test for
group heteroskedasticity
Quadratic chi2(116)=2,306.31*** chi2(116)=2,343.32*** Heteroskedasticity
Cubic chi2(116)=2,306.86*** chi2(116)=2,359.99*** Heteroskedasticity
Wooldridge test for
autocorrelation in panel
data
Quadratic F(1,116)=94.05*** F(1,116)=90.43*** Autocorrelation
Cubic F(1,116)=93.78*** F(1,116)=90.47*** Autocorrelation
Pesaran's test of cross-
sectional independence
Quadratic 13.85*** 10.51*** Cross-sectionaldependence*
Cubic 13.67*** 10.48*** Cross-sectionaldependence*
Note: * Tested without industrial variable
*** Significant at 0.01 level
Two tests were applied to detect the presence of heteroskedasticity in the residuals.
This condition implies that the variance of the errors is not constant over time. It often
affects cross-sectional aggregated data, and may be caused by measurement errors or
data quality. The modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity is used with fixed
effects regressions and assumes that the residuals may be homoskedastic (i.e.
constant variance) within countries, but may differ across them. Its null hypothesis
states that the error variance is constant across nations. The likelihood-ratio test for
group heteroskedasticity works in a similar way, but it is based on a generalised least
squares (GLS) procedure. Its null hypothesis also presupposes the absence of
heteroskedasticity. In both tests, the null hypotheses are rejected in all specifications
and types of emissions, indicating that the residual variance is not constant across
groups. The next test applied was the Wooldridge (2002) test for serial correlation. If
this condition was present, then it would mean that the errors at a certain point in time
are to some extent explained by their own past levels, biasing the coefficients. Its null
hypothesis assumes the absence of autocorrelation, and it was rejected at a
significance level of 1% for all specifications. Finally, the Pesaran (2004) test for cross-
sectional independence was applied to identify if country-specific errors are correlated
between them, as this can bias the estimated coefficients (Müller-Fürstenberger and
Wagner, 2007; Wagner, 2008). This is very relevant, as nations have become
increasingly interdependent of each other through international trade and economic
and financial integration policies. The null hypothesis, presumes country-specific
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independent errors. It was rejected in all cases, indicating the presence of cross-
country dependency.
The results from all these tests cast doubts on the robustness and validity of the
quadratic curves produced with the fixed effects model. Although they might seem
attractive from a policy perspective, they lead to wrong conclusions, as they are
affected by heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-country dependence.
4.3.3. Panel-corrected standard errors
The GLS method is broadly used whenever heteroskedasticity is present and when the
observations are correlated to some degree. Several variations of the technique have
been built upon the GLS framework to allow estimating parameters in the presence of
groupwise heteroskedasticity and cross-country dependence. In this case, the Prais-
Winsten regression is an appropriate method because, apart from correcting these
problems, it also eliminates biases derived from autocorrelation. As has been explained
in section 3.2.1.2, this tool has been used in some EKC studies, yielding unbiased and
consistent estimators. The results produced by these regressions are presented in the
following table.
Table 17 - PCSE carbon EKC regression results
Coefficient Territorial ConsumptionQuadratic Cubic Quadratic Cubic
β1
2.99***
(15.23)
6.40***
(3.06)
1.87***
(8.06)
2.69
(1.42)
β2
-0.12***
(-11.80)
-0.52***
(-2.11)
-0.05***
(-4.34)
-0.15
(-0.68)
β3 ---
0.02
(1.61) ---
0.00
(0.43)
Urban 0.01***(6.44)
0.01***
(6.50)
0.01***
(4.58)
0.01***
(4.58)
Industrial 0.01***(5.39)
0.01***
(5.40)
0.004**
(1.99)
0.004*
(1.95)
Constant -18.32***(-21.09)
-27.84***
(-4.78)
-13.15***
(-13.13)
-15.45***
(-2.91)
R2 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.71
Turning point 211,151 32,618,691
Note: PCSE: Panel-corrected standard errors; t-stats are shown in parentheses.
***, **, * Significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively
The quadratic specifications produced statistically significant coefficients for all
variables. The estimated coefficients for the β2s are negative, evidencing once more
inverted-U shapes. As with the previous methods, the turning point is much higher
when using consumption data. However, in this case, the turning points are located in
an out-of-sample region, which indicates that emissions continue growing
monotonically over time. The variables urban and industrial are significantly different
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from zero in all the regressions, showing their relevance as explicative factors. On the
other hand, the cubic specification is not significant at all in relation to consumption
emissions, while the coefficient of term β3 is statistically equal to zero for territorial CO2,
which confirms the appropriateness of using the quadratic specification. The inflection
points for the cubic polynomials were again impossible to calculate due to the presence
of imaginary roots.
Figure 16 - Estimated carbon EKCs for
territorial- and consumption-based emissions
using PCSE regressions according to
country groups (1990-2010)
Source: Own figure
Figure 16 shows a visual approximation of the estimated quadratic curves. The first
noticeable difference with respect to those calculated with the fixed effects model is
that the consumption-based carbon EKC is almost a straight line. The territorial curve
shows a slightly higher concavity, but it can equally be said that it grows monotonically
with income, as its turning point is significantly higher. The bulk of the Non-Annex B
nations are grouped at the bottom left sections of the curves, while their wealthier
counterparts are situated in the upper extremes. It is worth highlighting, on the other
hand, the gap that exists between both curves at the lower levels of GDP per capita. It
is partially due to the restriction of fitting the data to specific polynomial forms. Other
more flexible ways of fitting the data, such as non-parametric methods, could have
modified these patterns. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the poorest countries
are also net importers of emissions, as can be seen in the bottom left corner of Figure
14. In order to verify this issue, a simple calculation was made. Net emissions transfers
(i.e. territorial minus consumption emissions) were averaged for every country in the
sample over 1990 to 2010 in order to find those nations that were net exporters during
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the whole period. This resulted in only 35 countries, which are mainly middle-income
nations, while the rest are net importers. The net transfers were then expressed as the
proportion of total territorial emissions for each nation and grouped according to
income terciles. For the richest tercile, negative emissions transfers represented on
average 35.8% of their territorial emissions, while for the poorest tercile they accounted
for 38.7%. These rough figures show that many poor nations, not being self-sufficient,
have become net importers of carbon embedded in a range of commodities and
capital-goods manufactured in other regions. This issue requires further examination,
since it has not received an adequate attention in the literature. Some of its implications
will be discussed with more detail in Chapter 8.
An examination of the residuals from the two quadratic regressions shows that they
effectively do not present problems of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-
country correlation. However, there are still two issues that must be taken into account
and explored. As explained in section 3.2.1.3, non-stationary variables can be
cointegrated, and may thus lead to spurious results. It is important to check if this is the
case. Furthermore, another condition that must be examined is if the heterogeneity
between country-specific slopes influences the results. Fixed and random effects
models allow a certain level of heterogeneity across nations, but they still maintain the
homogeneity assumption in relation to the turning points. As was mentioned in section
3.2.1.4, studies have found that assuming homogeneous slopes across countries can
represent a stringent restriction (e.g. Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh, 2005). In this sense,
cointegration and slope heterogeneity are examined next.
4.3.4. Cointegration
In section 3.2.1.3, it was explained that the properties of many econometric techniques
require the use of stationary variables in general, so if the condition of stationarity is not
confirmed, the results can be biased or spurious. Many time series used in economic
analyses are non-stationary; that is, they possess unit roots. Consequently, proper
methods need to be used to deal with non-stationary and stochastically trending
variables. On the other hand, it is said that if two variables share the same order of
integration, they can be cointegrated or share a long-term trend if a linear combination
of both (i.e. residuals) is stationary. Unit root tests are then applied to determine the
order of integration of the variables that are being used in this analysis.
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Three different unit root tests were applied. The first one is the Im-Pesaran-Shin test,
which represents a conventional tool widely used for panel-data. The next one is a
second-generation test, developed by Pesaran (2007), designed to handle
heterogeneous panels with cross-sectional dependence. The third one is the Zivot and
Andrews (1992) unit root test used with time series that possess a structural break.
This test is useful, as sometimes variables show temporal discontinuities in their trends
due to shocks or structural changes, which can complicate assessing their stationarity
(see: Romero-Ávila, 2008). All the variables were tested twice, once in their original
levels and another in first differences. The results obtained after applying the tests are
presented in the following table.
Table 18 - Unit root tests for variables used in the carbon EKC analysis
Variable Lags Im-Pesaran-Shin Pesaran Zivot-AndrewsStatistic (t-bar) Statistic (t-bar) Statistic (average t-stat)
Territorial 3.29 -0.53 -1.73 31 panels are stationary (-5.44)
Δ Territorial 2.28 -20.68*** -2.10*** 98 panels are stationary (-6.03)
Consumption 3.39 -0.12 -1.53 37 panels are stationary (-5.38)
Δ Consumption 2.50 -17.74*** -2.30*** 106 panels are stationary (-6.44)
GDP 3.43 9.17 -1.59 38 panels are stationary (-5.91)
Δ GDP 2.64 -12.66*** -1.86* 58 panels are stationary (-5.88)
GDP2 3.41 10.39 -1.57 38 panels are stationary (-5.80)
Δ GDP2 2.69 -12.65*** -1.86* 59 panels are stationary (-5.90)
GDP3 3.40 11.30 -1.55 36 panels are stationary (-5.75)
Δ GDP3 2.68 -12.02*** -1.85* 57 panels are stationary (-5.89)
Urban 0.94 0.67 -1.53 65 panels are stationary (-8.01)
Δ Urban 1.37 1.00*** -2.39*** 92 panels are stationary (-14.12)
Note: Number of panels = 120; ***, * Null significantly rejected at 0.01 and 0.10 levels, respectively
Number of average lags obtained according to AIC provided by the Im-Pesaran-Shin test
Δ: First differences. All variables tested with constant. Industrial not tested due to missing values 
The results derived from the Im-Pesaran-Shin and Pesaran tests convey the same
message. Their null hypotheses state that all the series in every panel present unit
roots. The nulls were accepted for variables in levels, but rejected for differenced
variables. In other words, all the variables used are non-stationary in levels, but
become stationary when transformed to first differences. This means that all the
variables possess an order of integration of 1, which is expressed in statistical notation
as I(1). The Zivot-Andrews test presents a more complex message, as it is applied
individually to each panel. Its results indicate that for all variables only a small fraction
of the panels are stationary in levels in the presence of structural breaks, whereas the
majority become stationary when differenced. The rest of the panels might possess
higher orders of integration, although this cannot be confirmed as the results could be
affected by the small number of years in the sample. This is especially the case with
respect to GDP per capita in its linear, quadratic and cubic forms. Consequently, in the
case of some panels, cointegration might not be applicable, as GDP and both types of
emissions could not share the same level of integration. However, seen as a whole, the
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three tests point out that cointegration could be present and, therefore, should be
tested in order to detect it.
Table 19 - Westerlund’s cointegration tests
Statistic Territorial ConsumptionQuadratic Cubic Quadratic Cubic
Pt -7.56 (0.000) -4.76 (0.000) -8.99 (0.000) -8.81 (0.000)
Pa -5.11 (0.000) -1.61 (0.053) -4.99 (0.000) -4.40 (0.000)
Note: Reported Z-values and P-values in parentheses; tested with an average of 2
lags, based on AIC with a constant
The cointegration test developed by Westerlund (2007) is well suited for this dataset,
as it allows for country heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence. It employs two
different statistics (i.e. Pt and Pa), whose null hypotheses presuppose no cointegration
among all the panels. Both of them are rejected for the quadratic and cubic
specifications, with the exception of the cubic polynomial corresponding to territorial
emissions, for which the null is nearly accepted at a 5% level of significance. On the
whole, however, it can be said that the variables are cointegrated and thus share a
long-term trend.
4.3.5. Panel heterogeneity
The evidence suggests that cointegration is present in the income-emissions
relationship, which means that both variables follow a common long-term process. This
should be evident, as greater levels of affluence and economic activity have regularly
led to higher emissions over time. In order to capture this long-term association, the
same technique designed by Westerlund (2007) is used. Apart from testing for
cointegration, it estimates the short- and long-term coefficients of the various
specifications allowing for panel heterogeneity in relation to intercepts, slopes and
dynamic processes. Instead of imposing homogenous estimates to the entire panel,
individual regressions are run for each individual country according the Mean Group
procedure proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995). Once the unit-specific coefficients
are obtained, they are then averaged and their standard errors are computed. The
short-run dynamics are modelled with an autoregressive distributed lags function,
which allows the estimation of the error correction term. This term shows how fast
short-term deviations converge back to their long-term values. In other words, income
and emissions usually register increases or decreases on a yearly basis, but their
levels tend to return to a common cointegrating trend in the long-run. In order to
confirm signs of cointegration, the error correction term must be negative and
statistically significant (see section 3.2.1.3). On the other hand, the procedure requires
Chapter 4: The Consumption-Based Carbon Kuznets Curve 131
using differenced and lagged differenced series, which reduces the available time
periods. For this reason, the variables urban and industrial were omitted in this
analysis, to ensure the robustness of the income effects on the level of emissions. The
results from this set of regressions are shown in the following table.
Table 20 - Cointegrating carbon EKC regressions with panel heterogeneity
Coefficient Territorial ConsumptionLinear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic Cubic
β1
0.56***
(4.03)
28.50
(1.39)
-12.51
(-1.56)
0.66***
(5.20)
34.04
(1.06)
-10.78
(-0.88)
β2 ---
-1.58
(-1.51)
10.30*
(1.67) ---
-0.97
(-0.92)
5.30
(1.41)
β3 --- ---
-0.77
(-1.60) --- ---
-0.38
(-1.45)
Constant -5.07***(-3.96)
-8.18
(-0.28)
4.14
(0.02)
-5.93***
(-5.84)
35.10
(0.42)
-51.35
(-0.94)
EC -0.49***(-15.17)
-1.16***
(-14.75)
-1.36***
(-10.18)
-0.59***
(-19.45)
-1.13***
(-17.78)
-1.41***
(-13.15)
R2 0.93 0.98 0.99 0.58 0.84 0.91
Turning point --- 8,368 3,923 --- 41,205,795 3,539
Note: Error correction (EC) term obtained with short-term specification not shown here.
Regressions with an average of 2 lags; t-stats are shown in parentheses.
***, **, * Significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively
Table 20 shows the averaged unweighted coefficients derived from the individual
country-specific regressions. As can be seen, the quadratic specifications yield non-
significant coefficients, although the β2 values display negative signs. This is due to the
fact that only 23% of the countries, on an individual basis, presented evidence of a
statistically significant inverted-U shape at a 5% confidence level when using territorial
emissions and only 15% with consumption-based data. Hence, on average, the
quadratic polynomials are deemed as invalid. Still, it is worth noticing that the mean
turning point for the consumption curve shows an extremely high level. The same
conclusions are derived from the cubic specifications, which produced non-significant
estimates, with the sole exception of the β2 coefficient for territorial emissions. These
results made necessary testing an additional specification with just the linear term,
which generated significant coefficients in both cases at a 1% confidence level. Thus,
the best fitting curves in the long-run when controlling for panel heterogeneity and
taking cointegration into account are straight lines, reflecting a monotonic increase of
territorial and consumption emissions with higher levels of income.
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Figure 17 - Estimated carbon EKCs for
territorial- and consumption-based emissions
using cointegrating and panel heterogeneity
regressions according to country groups
(1990-2010)
Source: Own figure
Figure 17 shows the long-term trends of both types of emissions. The consumption-
based curve possesses a slightly steeper slope and a lower intercept than its
counterpart. Consequently, both curves cross at an income level of approximately
$3,955.8 dollars per capita, which corresponds to the middle-income group. In this
case, the poorer countries appear to be net exporters of emissions, while in fact they
are not. The effect reflected in Figure 16 at low income levels is lost due to the shape
of the fitted line. It must thus be remembered that these lines show the average long-
run behaviour of all the countries in the sample and that individually they may present
different patterns. However, the figure shows that on average the majority of Annex B
economies are net importers of CO2, and that negative emission transfers (i.e. deficits)
tend to increase with income via international trade. In other words, the wealthier
nations tend to be the largest net-importers. On the other hand, the error correction
terms, obtained with the short-term dynamics, were negative and statistically significant
in all the different specifications (see Table 20). This confirms that the series are
cointegrated. Interestingly, the speed of adjustment from short- to long-run dynamics is
somewhat higher for consumption emissions, as the absolute values of the error
correction terms are greater by around 20%. This suggests that consumption tends to
respond at a faster pace after short-term disturbances in GDP than production.
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4.3.6. Income elasticity of carbon
The previous section explained that when the estimations are free from the restriction
of parameter homogeneity, the long-term cointegrating relationship between income
and emissions is linear. Higher levels of income are thus associated with higher levels
of emissions. The slopes portrayed in Figure 17 represent the average carbon intensity
over the period. More specifically, they represent the income elasticity of carbon. In
order to be more precise and calculate the extent to which income increases when
emissions grow by 1%, both the dependent and independent variables must be
expressed in growth rates, and this is achieved by applying logarithms and first
differences to the time series. For this purpose, a new set of regressions were tested
for the linear specifications, but this time taking into account cross-country
dependency. While the procedure designed by Westerlund (2007) corrects cross-
country correlation with regards to the cointegration-test statistics, the technique does
not control for this issue when estimating the individual coefficients. Thus, new
regressions were estimated using the same Mean Group method used in the previous
section, but adding an additional variable to capture cross-country effects according to
the procedure proposed by Eberhardt and Teal (2010). In this sense, regressions were
conducted individually on a country by country basis and the coefficients were then
averaged. The results are presented in the following table.
Table 21 - Estimated income elasticity of carbon
for territorial and consumption emissions
Coefficient Territorial ConsumptionLinear Linear
β1
0.53***
(8.25)
0.75***
(9.10)
Common dynamic process 0.60***(5.12)
0.84***
(6.93)
Constant 0.00(1.11)
-0.02***
(-6.15)
t-stats are shown in parentheses
*** Significant at a 0.10 level
Table 21 shows the estimated average income elasticities of carbon using only the
linear specifications. In the case of territorial emissions, the estimated coefficient is
almost the same as the one presented in the previous section. In this sense, when
income per capita grew by 1% during the period, emissions per capita increased by
0.53%. This figure is almost identical to the one obtained by York (2012). On the other
hand, for every 1% rise in income per capita, consumption emissions grew by 0.75%,
which is slightly higher than the estimate obtained in the preceding section. This figure
had never been estimated in the literature before. Furthermore, the cross-country
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dependence variable confirms that countries have been profoundly interrelated due, for
example, to economic, financial and trade policies.
4.4. Summary and further remarks
This chapter presented the findings related to the consumption-based carbon EKC
analysis. Section 4.1 talked about the inequality that exists not only in relation to
income per capita, but also with respect to emissions. The gaps, however, have been
gradually decreasing over the years. Moreover, Annex B countries have increasingly
become net importers of emissions via international trade, exceeding their Kyoto
reduction commitments (Peters et al., 2011b). In section 4.2, descriptive statistics were
offered for each of the time series used in the analysis. The results obtained with the
different econometric methods were then presented in section 4.3. There, it was
argued that pooled OLS regressions are not valid, as they impose a strict restriction in
relation to country-specific traits. When the income-emissions relationship was
examined with the use of the fixed effects method that allows for differing country
intercepts, the results favoured the quadratic specifications. Thus, the estimated curves
follow an inverted-U shape, and emissions seem to gradually decline after reaching a
within-sample income level. This turning point, nonetheless, is always higher for
consumption emissions, reflecting the magnitude of weak carbon leakage. Although
these estimates may seem attractive from a policy point of view, they are misleading. It
was explained that they are affected by heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-
country correlation. When these issues were controlled for using the PCSE technique,
the best fitting polynomials were again quadratic. However, both curves show lower
concavities with out-of-sample turning points, especially in the case of consumption
emissions, which follow almost a straight line. This indicates that emissions tend to
grow monotonically with income. An interesting finding, on the other hand, is reflected
by the shape of the curves, showing that the poorest nations are also net importers of
emissions, as they depend on international trade to obtain the goods and services they
require to pursue economic development. In addition, the bulk of Non-Annex B nations
are concentrated on the steepest and earlier stages of the curves. In spite of the
robustness of these results, the estimated parameters were still restricted by an
assumption of slope homogeneity. Freeing the estimates from these limitations and
calculating the long-term relationship between income and emissions, proved to be a
more appropriate way of obtaining robust results. By following the procedure proposed
by Westerlund (2007), the findings indicate that income and emissions shared a linear
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long-term trend during the period under study, and that consumption adjusts slightly
faster to short-term fluctuations in GDP than production. On average, Non-Annex B
nations tend to be net exporters of emissions, while the richest nations are the largest
net importers. Finally, the average income elasticities of carbon were estimated, finding
that the elasticity for consumption emissions was significantly higher, and that nations
are deeply interdependent. In summary, the results lead to completely reject any
evidence of the EKC hypothesis for CO2 emissions. All these findings, and their various
implications, will be discussed more extensively in Chapter 8.
The next chapter presents the results related to the second research question
proposed in this thesis.
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Chapter 5
Demand-side mitigation impacts in the developing world
This chapter focuses on providing empirical answers to the second research question
proposed in this thesis (see section 1.2): How much value added and wages paid to
skilled and unskilled labour in developing countries are associated with every unit of
CO2 that is mitigated in different sectors through reductions in consumption in
industrialised nations? As was explained in the previous chapter, CO2 emissions tend
to rise monotonically with higher levels of income per capita in the long-run, and this
increase is particularly accentuated from a consumption-based approach. The
wealthier economies tend to import more CO2 embedded in the foreign goods and
services they consume, and have thus become net importers of emissions. This
exposes their substantially greater consumption per capita levels compared to middle-
and low-income countries, as well as their growing dependency on resources and
products extracted and manufactured in the developing world. As implicitly reflected in
the results derived from the carbon EKC analysis, and as argued in section 2.3.1, the
pace of technological change has not been enough to compensate for the emissions
associated with the rise in population and per capita income. Thus, demand-side
mitigation measures oriented to change/reduce consumption are deemed as essential
to complement technology-led mitigation actions in order to achieve a 2°C target and
prevent dangerous climate change in the long-run. However, in the context of a
globalised planet, in which countries are ever more dependent on each other through
international trade, changes in demand registered in industrialised nations can bring
negative developmental consequences in the global South. By adopting free-market
policies and export-led models of growth, many developing countries depend
significantly on the revenue and employment generated by their exporting sectors. In
this sense, while changes/reductions in final demand in the North can free carbon
space and make it available for developing economies, the development process in the
latter regions could be affected by lower flows of traded goods and services. This
chapter thus examines this trade-off, specifically scrutinising if Northern demand-side
mitigation actions, in general, affect the capacity of developing countries to create
value added and wages for their labour force. As was explained in section 3.2.2, the
best technique to undertake this examination and provide answers to this particular
query is the so-called Environmentally-Extended Multi-Regional Input-Output (EE-
MRIO) analysis. The chapter begins by providing a brief overview of the variables used
in the study in section 5.1. The empirical findings are then presented, starting in section
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5.2, which describes the global production structure. This is followed by an examination
of the factor content of trade in section 5.3, as well as its carbon content in section 5.4.
The labour productivity of carbon is calculated in section 5.5 for different country
groups. This indicator shows the amount of wages to skilled and unskilled labour that
are associated with every unit of emissions. Section 5.6 then identifies the most trade-
dependent nations, which are particularly vulnerable to external economic shocks.
Section 5.7 quantifies how much value added and wages to skilled and unskilled labour
in developing countries decline when final demand is reduced in industrialised nations.
Finally, a summary of the results is presented in section 5.8.
5.1. Overview of the variables and data
Although the characteristics of an MRIO model have been described in detail in section
3.2.2, the particular variables used in this analysis are presented again in a brief
manner to assist the reader throughout the exposition. As has been said, the MRIO
technique demands a significant amount of data, mainly in the form of national Input-
Output (IO) tables. One of the available sources for this information is the Global Trade
Analysis Project (GTAP). The most recent version of its dataset, number 8, was used in
this study, which comprises records for years 2004 and 2007. The data corresponds to
109 nation states and 20 aggregated regions, which are treated as individual countries.
Moreover, the national IO tables for domestic production and imports cover 57
economic sectors17. This data was then assembled in the form of two square MRIO
transaction matrices, one for each year, by the author of this thesis, representing
intermediate demand by industries. Their dimensions are 7,353 (129*57) rows by 7,353
columns. Each of these matrices is accompanied by an additional matrix of final
demand for domestic and imported goods, whose dimensions are 7,353 rows by 129
columns (i.e. one column for each country). In addition, there is a row vector of total
output and another of value added, which represents the amount by which the value of
a sector’s output is increased at each stage of production. It is expressed as the total
payment received by the owners of the factors of production in the form of wages to
skilled and unskilled labour, rents received by land owners, and interest plus profits
paid for capital services. Value added is thus analogous to a country’s GDP from an
income approach. The environmental extension is represented by a row vector of CO2
emissions disaggregated into economic sectors, derived from the use of coal, crude oil,
natural gas, petroleum products and electricity, as well as gas distribution.
17 See Appendix A.2 for GTAP 8 country and sectoral classification.
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Unfortunately, data for non-CO2 GHGs is not available for GTAP 8, especially nitrous
oxide (N2O), methane (CH4) and fluorinated gases. This constitutes a limitation of the
study, and its implications will be discussed in Chapter 8.
Value added and wages paid to skilled and unskilled workers are used in this
examination as proxies for development indicators, as these variables are relevant for
promoting economic growth and improving welfare. Due to the methodological nature
of MRIO analysis, explained in section 3.2.2, it requires data at a sector-level, which is
not available for human-development-related indicators, such as life expectancy,
observed and expected years of schooling, etc. Data for number of people employed
by country and by sector was also not accessible. This represents a second limitation,
also to be discussed in Chapter 8. However, while focusing on value added and wages
may provide a partial view of the effects caused by Northern demand-side mitigation
actions on the global development process, they can provide valuable insights
regarding the magnitude and direction of the potential impacts. It is important to have in
mind that the data for wages used in this analysis represent sectoral averages, so it is
not possible to take into account wage disparities that exist between the different types
of jobs within an individual sector. Moreover, having data for two different years is
useful to assess if these effects have changed over the years.
In this analysis, countries are grouped according to the UNDP’s 2013 HDI-quartile they
belong to, being classified as very-high-, high-, medium-, and low-human-development
countries18. This simplifies the presentation of the results and allows distinguishing the
effects that take place in nations with different levels of development with more detail
than by just differentiating them as Annex B or Non-Annex B economies as was done
in the previous chapter. However, individual countries will be singled out to illustrate
interesting and outstanding cases, or when the interpretation of the results requires
doing so.
5.2. The global production structure
MRIO analysis has been increasingly used to assess how much CO2 is associated with
the consumption of goods and services throughout the global supply chain. As
explained in section 3.2.2, the same procedure can be applied to calculate the amount
of value added that is embedded in products and services destined for final
18 Appendix A.1.2 contains a list of the different countries that compose each group.
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consumption. It is important to bear in mind that value added is generated at every
stage of production. This procedure thus allows a precise determination of how much
value each economic sector in each country contributes during the production process
(see section 2.4.2).
Figure 18 - Global structure of value added in 2007 according to economic
activity (a) and country group (b)
(a) (b)
Source: Own graphs
The global production structure is represented by the amount of value added that is
generated by the production of finished goods and services for domestic consumption
and exports according to economic activity. Figure 18a shows that the global
production structure in 2007 was largely dominated by services, accounting for around
62% of the total value added (i.e. trade, transport and communications and other
services). Agricultural activities and mining contributed with approximately 8%, while
industry created slightly more than 21%. The rest corresponded to construction (7%)
and electricity, gas and water supply (2%). Viewed from the perspective of country-
groupings, shown in Figure 18b, the distribution of value added shows a profound
disparity. As has already been noted in section 2.2.1, very-high-human-development
nations produced almost 75% of the total value added, even though they possess only
15% of the world population. High- and medium-human-development economies
generated jointly nearly 24%, while low-development nations were barely responsible
for the remaining 1%. In terms of individual countries, the US was accountable for
creating almost one fourth of the world’s total value added, while nearly another third
was created by the EU27. Meanwhile, the big emerging economies, such as China,
India, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia and others, created approximately 12%. All these
shares basically remained unchanged with respect to 2004, and a very similar structure
is considered to prevail nowadays.
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A portion of the global value added is due to international trade. This is what has
become known as trade in value added, an indicator that has been deemed as more
precise than traditional trade statistics to measure the value of trade flows (IDE-JETRO
and WTO, 2011). Almost 15% of the total value added is embodied in trade, but in the
cases of agriculture and mining this figure reaches almost 40%. In relation to industry,
it is 30%, which is very close to the estimation done by Daudin et al. (2011), while in
services it is only 8%.
5.3. Factor content of trade
The previous section described the global production structure, showing the general
composition of the world economy in terms of economic activities and how much value
added is created by each group of countries. It also pointed out the proportion of value
added that is embodied in trade flows. The following sections will present a more
detailed analysis of the factor content of trade, disaggregating into sectors the amount
of value added that is traded. The same is done for skilled and unskilled labour, also
from a sectoral perspective.
5.3.1. Trade in value added
Figure 19a presents the value added embodied in exports and imports for the different
country groups in 2007. Very-high-human-development nations are, on the whole, net
importers of value added, since the total value of their imports is higher than the total
value of their exports. Said differently, the amount of value added that they create
domestically, and which is embodied in their exports, is lower than the value added
incorporated in their imports, which is generated in foreign regions. In this sense, these
economies tend to create wealth in the rest of the world through international trade. As
can be seen in the graph, the rest of the country groups are net exporters of value
added. However, it is important to notice that the least developed nations barely
manage to achieve a trade-balance surplus. As was explained in the previous chapter,
many of these countries are not self-sufficient and rely on foreign trade to acquire
commodities and capital-intensive goods that are necessary for their development
process. In individual terms (see Figure 19b), the US is the largest net importer of
value added in the world, having an overall deficit of nearly 750 billion dollars. Its
shortfall against China alone is close to 150 billion, and with respect to the EU27 it is
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approximately 120 billion. The trade deficit with China is thus reduced by around 45%
when using this method than when employing traditional trade statistics, which report a
deficit of 275 billion (UNSD, 2013b). However, the deficit grows around 11% in relation
to the EU27 from a reported 109 billion utilising the traditional approach (UNSD,
2013b). These findings are consistent with those obtained by IDE-JETRO and WTO
(2011) and Stehrer (2012). Moreover, the US deficit increased around 28% in real
terms with respect to 2004. The EU27 is also an important net importer of value added,
with a deficit of nearly 150 billion dollars, which grew in real terms more than 60% since
2004. It is worthy to mention that, within this group, the UK was the second largest net
importer after the US, possessing a deficit of 125 billion. Meanwhile, Japan is one of
the very-high-development nations with a trade surplus, which amounts to around 80
billion. China, on the other hand, a medium-human-development country, is the largest
net exporter of value added in the planet, with a surplus of 230 billion dollars, of which
almost two thirds are against the US. Its surplus increased 1.7 times with respect to
2004. The other important net exporters are the big emerging economies of the G20
(i.e. Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and
Turkey), which together hold a surplus of 180 billion, observing a rise of 20% compared
to three years earlier. These nations, which mainly belong to the medium- and high-
development groups, are key players in the global supply chain. They possess large
exporting capacities, providing not only raw materials, but also more elaborate
intermediate and finished manufacturing goods to foreign markets.
Figure 19 - Value added embodied in exports and imports in 2007 according to
country group (a) or selected nations (b)
(a) (b)
Source: Own graphs
An analysis of the sectoral composition of national and regional trade balances has not
been sufficiently undertaken in the existing trade-in-value-added literature, which has
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mainly focused on manufacturing. Undertaking this analysis reveals important
characteristics of the global production structure. It allows, among other things,
determining “who produces what and for whom”, to employ a phrase by Daudin et al.
(2011). The trade balances according to country group, but this time disaggregated into
sectors, are displayed in Figure 20a. Positive numbers indicate that a country has a
trade-balance surplus in a given sector. That is, it generates more value added within
its own territory by producing goods for external markets. Conversely, negative
numbers show that nations have a trade-balance deficit in a certain sector by importing
more value added from foreign regions via imported goods. In relation to agricultural
activities, very-high-development economies are net importers, as they are the only
group that presents a deficit in value added. In contrast, the rest of the countries are
net exporters, since they register surpluses, which are small in the cases of high- and
low-development nations, but much bigger in the case of the middle-human-
development group. When it comes to mining and quarrying, it is clear that high-
development nations constitute the main net exporters, since they encompass the
major oil and gas producers, like Bahrain, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Oman,
etc. In this activity, the least developed countries also hold an important surplus. The
very-high-development group, on the contrary, represents the big net importer of
mining goods and consequently possess a significant deficit. Regarding light industry19,
medium-development nations constitute the main net exporters, and more specifically
China (see Figure 20b), who belongs to this classification. The very-high-development
nations, in turn, are the main net importers of light-industry goods. This latter group, on
the other hand, possesses an important trade surplus in heavy, capital-intensive
industry. A smaller surplus is achieved by the middle-development group, again mainly
due to China. The rest of the world is, hence, a net importer of heavy-industry products.
Moreover, with regards to services, the very-high-development group stands as the
main net exporter, while the rest of the world presents deficits. An opposing pattern is
observed in the transport sector, in which the very-high-development economies are
net importers and the rest of the world presents trade-balance surpluses.
In terms of individual nations (Figure 20b), the US holds deficits in every sector,
reflecting its strong dependency on all types of imports. The EU27, along with Japan,
are important net exporters of heavy-industry goods and services. China, on the other
hand, achieves surpluses in agriculture and in light and heavy industry, but is a net
19 See Appendix A.2.3 for a list of the economic sectors that are classified as light and
heavy industries.
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importer of mineral resources. The major emerging economies of the G20 specialise in
the extraction of these resources, as well as in agricultural activities, but require
importing capital-intensive goods and services.
These trade patterns reflect to some extent the flows described by the Prebisch-Singer
hypothesis (Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950). It can be appreciated that the periphery (i.e.
the developing world) specialises in the extraction of material resources and the
production of labour-intensive goods. The so-called global South is a net exporter of
value added embodied in agricultural, mining and light-industry goods. On the other
hand, the core (i.e. industrialised nations) is a net exporter of capital-intensive
products, as well as in services. China, however, has managed to break this pattern
due to its rapid industrialisation process, managing to become an important net
exporter of value added embodied in light- and heavy-industry goods.
Figure 20 - Sectoral composition of trade balances in value added in 2007
according to economic activity for country groups (a) and selected nations (b)
(a) (b)
Source: Own figures
5.3.2. Trade in skilled and unskilled labour
The analysis of the sectoral composition of the regional trade balances in value added
offers a more detailed view of the global production structure, as it allows identifying
which regions represent net exporters or net importers of different types of goods and
services. A more exhaustive examination requires focusing on the payments to labour,
one of the components of value added. As has been explained, the revenues
associated with this factor of production serve as a proxy for economic development in
this thesis, as they contribute to economic growth and to improve a society’s level of
well-being. Wages received by skilled labour will be examined first.
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A portion of the total wages paid for labour services are due to international trade.
Around 10% of the wages to skilled labour are embodied in trade flows, but this figure
rises to nearly 40% in agricultural and mining activities, and around 28% in the case of
industry. In services, it represents approximately 7%.
Looking at total figures, very-high-human-development countries are net exporters of
skilled labour embodied in trade, with a trade-balance surplus in 2007 of around 130
billion dollars. The rest of the world, in turn, constitutes a net importer. However,
looking at the sectoral composition reveals how the balances are formed with more
detail, reflecting the global division of labour. Skilled labour is embodied primarily in the
heavy industry and services sectors, as can be seen in Figure 21a. These graphs must
be interpreted in the same way as the previous ones, which presented total value
added. The magnitude of the trade-balance surplus in the case of the very-high-
development group is significant, reflecting an evident global disparity. The types of
products and services that are intensive in skilled labour usually encompass more
technology and physical capital, and thus yield much more value for every unit that is
produced. The developing world has still not achieved this level of economic
development and, hence, of productivity. In consequence, it relies on the wealthier
economies for skilled-labour-intensive products and services. However, the high-
human-development group holds a small surplus in the mining sector, and the medium-
development group also possesses one in light-industry activities, mainly due to China
(see Figure 21b). The low-development countries, on the other hand, have deficits in
every sector.
Figure 21 - Sectoral composition of trade balances in skilled labour in 2007
according to economic activity for country groups (a) and selected nations (b)
(a) (b)
Source: Own figures
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In terms of individual countries, the US is the world’s largest net exporter of skilled
labour embodied in trade. Its surplus grew around 20% in real terms from 2004 to
2007, ranging from nearly 70 billion dollars to 83 billion, respectively. This country,
however, presents small deficits in mining, light industry and transport, as seen in
Figure 21b. The US is followed by Japan, the second largest net exporter, who
presents a very similar pattern, although its surplus in services is much smaller.
Surprisingly, the EU27 as a group is a net importer of skilled labour in the services
sector, which reflects its reliance on other high-development countries, especially the
US. Nonetheless, in terms of its individual members, Germany, the UK, Denmark,
Finland, Sweden and others have significant surpluses in this sector. The EU27, in
turn, is a net exporter of skilled labour in heavy-industry products. In relation to
developing nations, México is the biggest global net importer of skilled labour, followed
by China, Russia and most of the emerging economies of the G20. China just
possesses a small surplus in the light-industry sector, although it managed to reduce
its total deficit by around 17% since 2004, which reflects its increased investments in
human capital. In contrast, the emerging economies of the G20 possess significant
deficits in heavy industry and services, with just a small surplus in mining. This
condition has aggravated over time, as their general deficit grew almost 25% in real
terms during the same period.
International trade also contributes to generate wages to unskilled labour, of which
approximately 13% was embodied in trade flows in 2007. This number goes up to 23%
with regards to agriculture and mining, while it represented 28% in industrial activities.
In the services sector, unskilled labour embodied in trade accounted for nearly 8%.
Focusing on total figures, the only net exporters of unskilled labour are the middle-
human-development countries, holding a surplus of around 145 billion dollars in 2007,
while the rest of the nations are net importers. The very-high-development group
registered a deficit of nearly 113 billion. The sectoral composition, on the other hand,
shows a more complex scene than the one displayed by skilled labour, as unskilled
workers are distributed along a wider range of economic sectors, as shown in Figure
22a. However, they are still mainly concentrated in agriculture, mining and light
industry. Very-high-development countries are net importers of unskilled labour in all
sectors, except in heavy industry and services, in which they still maintain an
advantage. The next group, formed by high-development nations, is a net exporter in
agriculture, mining and transport, but possesses deficits in the rest of the sectors.
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Middle-development economies, in turn, enjoy trade-balance surpluses in every sector,
but this effect is strongly influenced by China, who belongs to this group. Finally, the
least developed nations are net importers of unskilled labour in light and heavy
industry, as well as in services.
Figure 22 - Sectoral composition of trade balances in unskilled labour in 2007
according to economic activity for country groups (a) and selected nations (b)
(a) (b)
Source: Own figures
Regarding individual nations, the US is the largest net importer of unskilled labour in
the world, with a total deficit in 2007 of around 90 billion dollars, which worsened in real
terms approximately 37% compared to 2004. This country only manages to be a net
exporter in the services sector, as can be seen in Figure 22b. The US is followed by
France and the UK, with deficits of 39 billion and 28 billion, respectively. The EU27, as
a whole, is a net importer of unskilled labour in all sectors, except in heavy industry,
while its total deficit increased by 13% with respect to 2004. Japan is a net exporter in
heavy industry, as well as in services and transport. In relation to the developing world,
China is the biggest net exporter of unskilled labour in the globe, which has constituted
one of its main comparative advantages and a pillar of its development strategy.
Moreover, its total surplus almost doubled in real terms in three years. It only
possesses a small deficit in the services sector. The rest of the big emerging
economies, on the other hand, are net exporters in all sectors, except in heavy industry
and services. Their deficit in these activities worsened significantly since 2004,
increasing nearly 80% in real terms. This reflects a weakening of these particular
sectors and, hence, of their industrialisation processes.
These results complement those obtained in the previous section, offering a more
detailed view of the global production structure and the international division of labour.
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The global South specialises in low-capital- and unskilled-labour-intensive goods
related mainly to agriculture, mining and light-industry. The North, on the other hand,
focuses on producing high-capital- and skilled-labour-intensive products and services.
5.4. Carbon content of trade
Many studies have focused on calculating the carbon content of trade (e.g. Peters and
Hertwich, 2008a; Davis and Caldeira, 2010; Peters et al., 2011b) (see section 2.2.2).
However, the sectoral composition of national or regional trade balances of CO2 is not
always examined in detail. This is done here in the same manner as in the previous
section, inspecting the sectoral shares of the trade balances.
The analysis shows that around 21% of CO2 was embodied in trade flows in 2007.
However, the amount in agricultural and mining goods was nearly 37%, while it was
29% in relation to industrial products. Services, on the other hand, accounted for close
to 18%.
In the case of CO2, the division between nations is clear-cut, as shown in Figure 23a.
The very-high-development economies are net importers of emissions, while most of
the rest of the world is a net exporter. The former group did not possess a trade surplus
in any economic activity in 2007, registering an overall deficit of 677 Mt. In turn, high-
and medium-development nations did not hold trade deficits in any sector. A different
picture, however, is presented by the least developed economies, who are net
importers of emissions in agriculture, as well as in light and heavy industries. These
findings coincide with those presented in the previous chapter (see section 4.3.3). As
said, many of the poorest nations are not self-sufficient and thus import CO2 embodied
in a range of commodities and industrial goods produced in foreign regions.
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Figure 23 - Sectoral composition of trade balances in CO2 in 2007 according to
economic activity for country groups (a) and selected nations (b)
(a) (b)
Source: Own figures
The largest surpluses and deficits corresponded to the heavy-industry sector, followed
by mining and light industry. Concentrating on individual countries, the results indicate
that the US is the largest net importer of emissions, with a total trade deficit of 505 Mt,
which almost maintained its same level since 2004. The EU27 is a net importer in
every sector as shown in Figure 23b, with an overall deficit of 814 Mt, which increased
almost 8% in three years. The UK stands out within this group, as it was the second
largest net importer of emissions in 2007 with a deficit of 204 Mt. It was followed by
Japan, with a deficit of 164 Mt. Regarding developing nations, China is the largest net
exporter of CO2, registering an emissions surplus of 1.1 Gt, which was almost 38%
larger than its 2004 levels. This surplus is mainly created by its industrial sectors. The
big emerging economies also held an important surplus in 2007 of 322 Mt, but it
diminished almost 33% since 2004. This decline could have been due to a relocation of
industries to China, more than to technological improvements. It is also interesting to
notice that in the heavy-industry sector, the G20 developing countries are net importers
of value added, but are net exporters of emissions. This evidences their high carbon
intensity and low productivity in this particular sector.
These results and those presented in the previous section can now be interpreted
together. As said, the global South specialises in low-capital- and unskilled-labour-
intensive goods, and these have high carbon contents. The North focuses on
producing high-capital- and skilled-labour-intensive goods and services, produced with
cleaner technologies.
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5.5. Labour productivity of carbon
The chapter so far has focused on analysing the global production structure, as well as
the factor and carbon content of trade from a sectoral perspective. This section, in turn,
presents the labour productivity of carbon for the different country groups and different
economic sectors. This measure indicates the amount of wages to skilled and unskilled
labour that are associated with every unit of emissions. Apart from being an efficiency
indicator, it is also useful to determine to what extent wages could decrease within a
given region by every kilogram of CO2 that is mitigated along the supply chain due to
reductions in final demand.
In order to calculate the labour productivity of carbon, multiplier analysis is used. As a
reminder to the reader, this consists in examining the matrix of total intensity multipliers
(TIMs), which was described in section 3.2.2.1. As was explained there, each element
of the Leontief matrix represents an output multiplier, which basically indicates how
much output is augmented in a given sector by every dollar of final demand. Another
characteristic of this matrix is its ability to differentiate between the direct effects of an
additional unit of final demand on a given sector and the associated indirect effects that
are triggered throughout the economy. In an MRIO context, the Leontief matrix can
identify the direct effects that occur in a specific sector within a region and the indirect
effects that take place throughout the global supply chain in other regions derived by
an additional dollar spent either on finished domestic or imported goods. When the
Leontief matrix is pre-multiplied, for example, by a diagonalised matrix of carbon
intensities (i.e. CO2/total output), the result is a matrix of carbon TIMs. Each element of
this matrix thus indicates how much CO2 is created directly and indirectly by an
additional unit of final demand. The elements of the regional sub-matrices placed in the
main diagonal represent intra-regional multipliers, which determine the amount of CO2
that is created within a region (i.e. direct effects) by every dollar of final expenditure.
The elements of the off-diagonal import sub-matrices, on the other hand, are inter-
regional multipliers, which specify the quantity of emissions generated in other regions
along the supply chain (i.e. indirect effects) by the same dollar of final demand. In this
section, TIMS were calculated not only for CO2, but also for value added and wages to
skilled and unskilled labour. In this manner, the resulting multipliers indicate the amount
of value added, wages and CO2 that are generated intra- and inter-regionally by every
dollar of final demand. To calculate the labour productivity of carbon, the labour
multipliers are divided by the carbon multipliers, and the resulting indicator expresses
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the quantity of wages associated inter- and intra-regionally with every unit of emissions
generated by a dollar of final demand. The value added multipliers are not directly used
to determine the labour productivity of carbon, but they offer interesting insights, as will
be explained. These and the CO2 multipliers are presented first in Figure 24.
Figure 24 - Value added (a) and CO2 (b) per dollar of final demand in 2007
(a) (b)
Note: Solid bars represent intra-regional multipliers, while dashed bars represent inter-regional multipliers.
The graphs above contain a lot of information, so it is advisable to examine them
attentively. Figure 24a presents the multipliers for value added. It is important to notice
that these multipliers add up to 1, since one dollar of final demand generates exactly
one dollar of value added, given the income-expenditure identity of GDP. In other
words, a dollar spent by someone represents a dollar earned by someone else in the
form of income. The interesting aspect of this graph is the magnitude of the intra- and
inter-regional multipliers. For example, for every dollar spent in 2007 in final agricultural
goods produced in very-high-human-development countries (see first blue bar), 87
cents were generated within the region (i.e. solid portion of the bar) and an additional
13 cents throughout the global supply chain in other regions of the world (i.e. dashed
portion of the bar). The remaining bars in the graph should be read following the same
logic. It can be seen that the inter-regional multipliers for the services sector are
proportionally the smallest (i.e. around 10% on average), since only a small fraction of
services is traded. The inter-regional multipliers for heavy industry are much higher (i.e.
25% on average), reflecting the geographical fragmentation of the global production
process. For instance, every additional dollar of final expenditure in heavy-industry
products manufactured in very-high-development economies generates nearly 79 cents
within the region and an extra 21 cents in foreign nations. Focusing on the overall
average values for each region, it is found that the least developed countries possess
the lowest intra-regional multipliers. For every dollar spent on goods and services
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produced within the region, only 80 cents on average are kept internally, while 20 cents
are captured by other nations. This reflects their weak internal structures and their
dependency on foreign regions for intermediate goods. The highest intra-regional
multipliers correspond to the very-high-development nations with an average of 85
cents per dollar of final demand. The difference with respect to the least developed
group might seem small, but these can be significant if it is taken into account that
trillions of dollars of final demand are involved. In this sense, least developed
economies capture less value domestically for every dollar of final expenditure than the
other country groups.
Figure 24b shows the same type of multipliers, but this time for CO2 emissions. In this
case, they can be interpreted as the carbon intensity of final demand, since they
indicate the amount of emissions generated per dollar of final expenditure. This graph
must be read in the same way as the previous one. For instance, every dollar spent on
finished agricultural goods produced in very-high-development nations (see again first
blue bar), creates 0.40 kg of CO2 within the region and an additional 0.07 kg externally
along the supply chain. The differences between sectors in this case are more
notorious. The most carbon-intensive activity on average across regions is mining,
followed by heavy industry and then transport. In turn, the less carbon-intensive sector
is services. In relation to regions, the most carbon intensive on average is the medium-
development group (1.32 kg/$), which includes China, followed by high-development
nations (0.94 kg/$), then the least developed countries (0.76 kg/$) and, finally, the very-
high-development economies (0.67 kg/$). Analysing the different types of multipliers
also offers interesting insights. The highest inter-regional multipliers proportionally
correspond to the least-developed economies, followed by very-high-development
nations. On average, around 24.7% and 18.3%, respectively, of the emissions per
dollar of final demand for products produced in those regions occur outside their
territories along the supply chain. This reflects the high carbon intensity of the
intermediates used in their production processes, which are manufactured or
incorporated in other regions. For instance, one dollar spent on an average good or
service produced in least developed nations generates 0.57 kg of CO2 internally, and
an additional 0.18 kg externally. In contrast, around 12.5% and 9.5%, on average, of
the emissions associated with a dollar of final demand for goods and services
produced in high- and medium-development nations are generated in other
geographical regions.
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The information contained in both graphs in Figure 24 can be used to determine the
simultaneous effects of an additional dollar of final demand on both the generation of
value added and CO2 emissions. For example, focusing on the low-development group,
it can be said that one dollar of final demand spent on heavy-industry products
generates 1.3 kg of CO2 emissions along the supply chain and close to 70 cents of
value added within the region. Accordingly, it could equally be said, along the same
lines, that for every unspent dollar in this sector, 1.3 kg of CO2 could be mitigated, but
70 cents of the payments to the factors of production would be lost.
In addition to the TIMS calculated for value added, two more sets of intra- and inter-
regional multipliers were estimated for wages to skilled and unskilled labour. A
summary of them is presented in Figure 25.
Figure 25 - Wages to skilled (a) and unskilled labour (b) per dollar of final
demand in 2007
(a) (b)
Note: Solid bars represent intra-regional multipliers, while dashed bars represent inter-regional multipliers.
As has been said, skilled labour is mainly concentrated in the services and heavy-
industry sectors, as seen in Figure 25a. Consequently, these activities possess on
average the highest multipliers across regions (9.6 and 14.3 cents per dollar), along
with transport (10.1 cents). In contrast, the lowest multipliers for skilled labour
correspond on average to agriculture and mining with 5.0 and 7.3 cents, respectively.
Regarding country groupings, very-high-development economies obtain on average the
higher amount of wages per dollar of final demand across sectors (12.5 cents). The
rest of the groups register very similar average levels of around 7.9 cents. The smallest
intra-regional multipliers, on the other hand, correspond to least developed countries.
Around 70% (5.8 cents) of the wages to skilled labour for every dollar spent on an
average good or service produced in the region are generated internally, and 30% (2.3
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cents) are created elsewhere. This reflects their scarcity of skilled labour and their
dependency on other regions to acquire different types of goods. The largest intra-
regional multipliers, on average, are held by the very-high-development group, where
nearly 80% of the wages to skilled labour are generated internally (10.8 cents). The
average intra-regional figures for the high- and medium-development nations are 75%
(5.9 cents) and 72.5% (5.6 cents), respectively.
The multipliers for unskilled labour (see Figure 25b) show an opposing picture, as the
highest values across regions on average correspond to agriculture (40.9 cents per
dollar of final demand) and light industry (35.0 cents per dollar), followed by heavy
industry and services (28.2 cents each). In relation to regions, the least- and medium-
development groups hold the largest average total multipliers across sectors (31.1
cents per dollar each), followed by high-development (28.9 cents) and very-high-
development economies (27.5 cents). Analysing the different types of multipliers
reveals that the smallest intra-regional effects correspond once more to the low-
development group. Around 80% (26.1 cents) of the wages to unskilled labour for every
dollar spent on an average good or service produced in this region are generated
internally, and an additional 20% (4.9 cents) are captured externally along the supply
chain. Although the nations in this group possess high total multipliers, the intra-
regional effects evidence once again their inability to be self-sufficient. Very-high-
development nations, in contrast, generate on average 86% (24.0 cents) internally and
13.9% (3.5 cents) externally. Intra-regional figures for the high- and medium-
development groups are 85.1% (24.8 cents) and 83.3% (26.8) on average,
respectively.
The information provided by both graphs in Figure 25 can now be combined with the
figures contained in Figure 24b, to assess the joint effects of a reduction of one dollar
of final demand on CO2 emissions and skilled and unskilled labour. Focusing on the
agricultural sector, for example, it can be said that for every unspent dollar in goods
produced in low-development nations, around 0.32 kg of CO2 could be mitigated along
the supply chain, but nearly 43 cents would be lost in wages to unskilled labour within
the region, along with an additional 1.9 cents to skilled labour. The effects related to the
rest of the sectors and regions can thus be read in the same manner.
The multipliers that have been presented here were used to calculate the labour
productivity of carbon. As explained, dividing the labour multipliers by the CO2
multipliers allows determining the amount of skilled and unskilled labour associated
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with every kg of emissions. As the within-regional effects on labour are specifically of
interest to this study, intra-regional labour multipliers are divided by the total CO2
multipliers. In this sense, the resulting indicator expresses the quantity of wages within
a region that are associated with a kg of CO2 emitted along the entire supply chain.
Figure 26 - Skilled (a) and unskilled labour (b) productivity of carbon in 2007
(a) (b)
Source: Own graphs
The skilled-labour productivity of carbon is much higher in the services sector, as can
be seen in Figure 26a. In very-high-development economies, nearly 70 cents of wages
are created within their territories for every kg of CO2 emissions emitted throughout the
entire supply chain. In low-development countries, almost 38.5 cents are generated by
the same amount of emissions. This figure actually constitutes the global average
across regions for services. The next most productive sector is light industry where,
across regions, 11.7 cents are associated on average to every kg of CO2. This sector is
followed by agriculture and heavy industry, with an average of 7.5 cents each.
Transport comes next with 6.1 cents, and finally mining with 3.9 cents. The most
productive region in skilled labour, on the other hand, is the very-high-development
group, with an average across sectors of 24.1 cents. Low development nations
possess an average of 11.5 cents, while high- and medium-development countries
have averages of 8.9 and 5.7 cents, respectively.
When it comes to unskilled labour (see Figure 26b), the most productive sector in very-
high-development nations is services, generating a little more than 1 dollar of wages
internally per kg of emissions emitted along the supply chain. Agricultural activities are,
in turn, the most productive sector in the low-development group, with around 1.3
dollars. This result, however, has to be taken with caution, considering that non-CO2
emissions are not included in the analysis. This figure could thus be much lower. On
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average, the most productive activity across regions is agriculture, with 0.84 dollars per
kg, followed by services (0.73), light industry (0.54), heavy industry (0.22), transport
(0.15) and mining (0.13). When it comes to regions, the most productive group is the
one formed by the least developed nations, with an average across sectors of 0.56
dollars per kg of CO2. They are followed by the very-high-development economies,
which possess an average of 0.51 dollars. High- and medium-development countries
hold averages of 0.38 and 0.28, respectively.
As has been said, apart from representing measures of productivity, the figures
presented can also be useful to determine the sensitivity of regions and sectors to
demand-driven mitigation actions. For instance, mitigating one kilogram of CO2 by
reducing the demand of agricultural imports from low-human-development nations
could yield losses of 1.4 dollars in wages to unskilled labour and 6 cents to skilled
labour. Understanding these figures is important, as they represent the underlying
mechanism that explains the impacts on skilled and unskilled wages in the global
South derived from changes in final demand registered in the North. An analysis of
these impacts is presented in section 5.7.
5.6. Trade-dependent countries
Before presenting the impacts on value added and wages in the developing world
caused by mitigation-induced changes in final demand, the analysis of trade in value
added is undertaken once again in this section to identify those countries that are more
dependent on trade.
Some economies are especially dependent on foreign markets. These are generally
low- or medium-developed countries, small nations, small-island states and fossil-fuel
producers with either limited or weak domestic markets, limited factor endowments, low
industrialisation levels, an outward-market orientation, or a mix of these factors. Table
22 shows the 15 most trade-dependent countries or regions. They generate more value
added through their exports of goods than what they produce in their own internal
markets. The content of value added included in their exports thus surpasses that of
their domestically-consumed products and services. Five of them correspond to low-
and medium-human-development countries or regions. According to the analysis,
Malaysia is the most trade-dependent nation. The value added that it produces through
its exports is approximately 1.6 times greater than what it obtains domestically. Nearly
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60% of its exports are destined for the US, the EU, Japan and China. A similar situation
is found in Vietnam, who possesses a mixed economic regime similar to China’s, and
represents one of Asia’s most open economies. This country acquires almost the same
amount of value added through trade than what it creates internally. In the cases of
Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Iraq,
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, these countries had either weak economic
structures or had endured internal periods of social and political unrest. Although some
of them possess vast resource endowments, such as oil and natural gas, they have
been unable to strengthen their internal economies and depend heavily on foreign
markets. On the other hand, a second group of countries are formed by oil-exporting
nations with high-human-development status, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman and
Bahrain. Their economies are mainly based on the oil extracting industry. Their exports’
content of value added augmented from 2004 to 2007 as a result of rising oil prices,
which explains why the rankings of two of these nations increased during the period.
Saudi Arabia, for example, was the twentieth most trade-dependent country in 2004,
but moved up to sixth place in 2007. The next group is formed by small states and
small-island states, whose economies are highly dependent on exports, due to their
limited territories and their clearly defined outward-market orientations. This is the case
of Malta, Singapore, Luxembourg, Hong Kong and Mauritius which, except for the last
one, enjoy very-high-human-development levels. Surprisingly, the last country in the list
is Ireland, whose exports generate nearly 1.4 times more than its internal market. It
depends strongly on the rest of the EU members and the US. From all these countries,
only three (i.e. Malta, Luxembourg and Vietnam) registered deficits in their value-added
trade balances, indicating a dependency on imports as well. Overall, it can be said that
all these countries and regions are highly vulnerable to external shocks in foreign final
demand. The 2008/2009 crisis can provide some insights in this respect. Malaysia’s
economy was growing at a rate of 6.3% before the crisis (World Bank, 2013), mainly
fuelled by its manufacturing sector, producing exports for the US and the EU. But
during the second half of 2009, its growth dropped to minus 6.2% and 3.9% in the first
two quarters of 2009, respectively. Manufacturing employment fell 7.8% from 2008 to
2009, which led to an increase in poverty (Abidin and Rasiah, 2009). Moreover,
Ireland’s vulnerability to external shocks may represent a significant factor of its most
recent economic downturn. It was one of the first EU member countries to receive
bailout funds after the crisis.
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Table 22 - Countries with the largest dependencies on international trade in 2007
Rank Rankin 2004 Country
VA embodied in
exports as % of
domestic VA
Trade
balance *
% of
exports to
US
% of
exports to
EU27
% of exports
to Japan and
China
1 1 Malaysia 163.06% 52,587 20.27% 20.11% 19.53%
2 2 Malta 160.08% -1,391 12.72% 48.03% 8.75%
3 6 Kuwait 152.24% 41,996 13.09% 16.79% 18.68%
4 4 Ireland 141.01% 59,445 17.80% 58.80% 4.33%
5 21 Angola and DRof Congo 136.80% 19,155 36.00% 14.48% 22.97%
6 19 Saudi Arabia 136.80% 120,027 18.38% 19.41% 19.61%
7 8 Singapore 124.42% 27,412 15.32% 24.24% 16.27%
8 7 Oman 121.56% 7,255 7.10% 10.25% 42.81%
9 9
Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan
and
Uzbekistan
118.95% 11,254 7.91% 31.33% 4.63%
10 11 Luxembourg 101.86% -3,567 10.02% 66.61% 3.00%
11 5 Bahrain 99.54% 2,848 13.02% 24.68% 7.92%
12 14 Hong Kong 97.52% 14,156 19.41% 24.64% 29.25%
13 17
Iraq, Jordan,
Lebanon, Syria
and Yemen
94.10% 6,928 21.98% 29.48% 7.77%
14 20 Vietnam 90.50% -6,844 21.86% 24.53% 17.62%
15 18 Mauritius 88.20% 257 14.22% 52.81% 5.94%
Note: * Trade balance expressed in millions of dollars. VA: Value added.
5.7. Demand-side mitigation impacts on value added, skilled
and unskilled labour
This chapter has already described the global production structure and the sectoral
composition of the trade balances for value added, CO2 emissions and wages to skilled
and unskilled labour. These results constitute the background that helps to understand
how the developing world could be affected by mitigation-induced changes in final
demand registered in developed nations. The analysis on the labour productivity of
carbon is specifically useful, as it represents the underlying mechanism that explains
the impacts. This section quantifies how much value added and wages to skilled and
unskilled labour in developing countries fall when final demand is reduced in
industrialised nations. As a reminder to the reader, the first stage of this analysis,
described in section 3.2.2, consists in determining the extent to which final demand for
imports, either in a given sector or across-the-board, are required to be reduced in
very-high-development economies in order to mitigate 1% of their total consumption
emissions. The second stage then involves calculating how much value added and
wages to skilled and unskilled labour would fall in the different developing-country
groups caused by those reductions in final demand. This made necessary
reformulating the traditional IO equation to express final demand as the endogenous
variable, as was explained in section 3.2.2. A reduction of 1% was applied to the
exogenous CO2 emissions that correspond to the imported goods and services
purchased by the very-high-development group, focusing on certain sectors or across-
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the board, in order to estimate the new level of final demand associated with the new
level of consumption-based emissions. These reductions were weighted according to
the share that each developing country holds in relation to the very-high-development
group’s total imports. The results were used next to find the associated reductions in
value added and wages to skilled and unskilled labour that take place in the rest of the
country groups.
Table 23 shows the results from this analysis. The first column from left to right shows
the sectors where mitigation-driven demand reductions are undertaken in order to cut
very-high-development countries’ total consumption emissions by 1%. The second
column shows the required decline in total final demand to attain the specified
emissions reduction. The last three columns show how much value added and wages
to skilled and unskilled labour fall in the developing world as a consequence of the
decrease in final demand. The rows, on the other hand, show the different economic
sectors. In each case, it is assumed that the 1% reduction in total consumption
emissions is achieved just by reducing imports from that specific sector. The last row,
however, shows a special case, in which the cut in emissions is accomplished through
across-the-board reductions in imports. Focusing on individual sectors is useful, as it
allows determining the vulnerability of the different developing-country groups in each
case. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that all the figures in the table
represent group averages.
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Table 23 - Demand-side mitigation impacts on value added,
skilled and unskilled labour, according to country group
Sector where
mitigation-driven
demand reductions
are undertaken to
reduce VHD’s total
consumption
emissions by 1%
Required
reductions in
total Final
Demand in VHD
economies to
achieve the CO2
reduction
Impacts on total
Value Added in
the developing
world
Impacts on total
wages to Skilled
Labour in the
developing
world
Impacts on total
wages to
Unskilled
Labour in the
developing
world
Agriculture, hunting,
forestry and fishing -1.7%
High: -3.4%
Medium: -6.2%
Low: -7.2%
High: -0.2%
Medium: -0.2%
Low: -0.3%
High: -5.1%
Medium: -9.9%
Low: -11.6%
Mining and quarrying -1.2%
High: -4.3%
Medium: -2.4%
Low: -5.6%
High: -0.7%
Medium: -0.5%
Low: -1.0%
High: -1.6%
Medium: -1.1%
Low: -1.8%
Light industry -1.5%
High: -3.0%
Medium: -5.9%
Low: -2.8%
High: -1.4%
Medium: -3.7%
Low: -1.6%
High: -3.9%
Medium: -7.7%
Low: -2.7%
Heavy industry -1.8%
High: -5.3%
Medium: -6.4%
Low: -0.7%
High: -2.3%
Medium: -3.6%
Low: -0.4%
High: -5.0%
Medium: -6.4%
Low: -0.6%
Transport and
communications -1.6%
High: -12.0%
Medium: -12.6%
Low: -11.4%
High: -4.7%
Medium: -4.9%
Low: -6.5%
High: -2.7%
Medium: -2.6%
Low: -3.0%
Other services -4.8%
High: -13.2%
Medium: -16.1%
Low: -13.3%
High: -13.6%
Medium: -19.8%
Low: -24.5%
High: -11.5%
Medium: -13.1%
Low: -14.1%
Across-the-board -0.34%
High: -0.98%
Medium: -1.03%
Low: -1.07%
High: -0.45%
Medium: -0.67%
Low: -0.66%
High: -0.73%
Medium: -0.95%
Low: -0.69%
Note: Impacts refer to region-wide declines in total value added and total wages to skilled and unskilled
labour in high-, medium- and low-development nations derived from reductions in final demand for imports
in the specified sectors. These reductions take place in very-high-development nations, which are required
to mitigate their total consumption emissions by 1%. VHD: Very-high-human-development economies.
Countries are classified according to the UNDP’s 2013 classification.
The first case corresponds to the agricultural sector. If 1% of very-high-development
countries’ consumption emissions were to be mitigated just by reducing their
agricultural imports, their final demand would need to fall by 1.7%. This would cause
losses in developing nations in terms of value added and wages, especially in least
developed countries, which turn out to be the most affected group. Their total value
added, which is analogous to their GDP, would decline around 7.2%. Moreover, total
wages to skilled and unskilled labour would suffer a decrease of 0.3% and 11.6%,
respectively, significantly affecting their exporting sectors. Medium-development
nations would experience similar losses, while the high-development group would be
the least affected.
In relation to mining, very-high-development nations would need to reduce their final
demand by 1.2% in order to mitigate 1% of their total consumption emissions. Least
developed countries would be again the most affected, losing around 5.6% of their
value added. However, wages to unskilled labour would not fall as much, as in the case
of agriculture, dropping only by 1.8%. Skilled labour, however, would register a slightly
larger decrease of 1%. The next most affected group corresponds to the high-
development countries which, as has been said, constitute the big oil and gas
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producers. Their value added would fall by 4.3% and their wages to skilled and
unskilled labour by 0.7 and 1.6%, respectively. Medium-development nations, in this
case, would register the smallest impacts.
Regarding the light-industry sector, a 1.5% reduction in total final demand is required in
industrialised nations to bring their total consumption emissions by 1%. Medium-
development economies, to which China belongs, would become the most affected
group. Their total value added would fall 5.9%, while the wages to skilled and unskilled
labour would drop by 3.7% and 7.7%, respectively. High-development nations are the
second most affected group, registering a decline of 3% in value added, with drops of
1.4% and 3.9% in wages to skilled and unskilled labour, respectively. Low-development
countries, in turn, are the least affected.
Heavy industry displays a very similar picture to the case of light industry. A 1.8%
reduction in final demand is required to achieve the emissions cut in very-high-
development economies. Once again, the most affected group corresponds to middle-
development nations with similar reductions as those that take place in light industry.
Moreover, least developed countries again experience the smallest impacts.
When it comes to transport, a 1.6% reduction in final demand in very-high-development
economies produces considerable losses of total value added in all country groups,
which range from 11.4% in least developed countries to 12% in high- and 12.6% in
medium-development nations. In this case, the wages to skilled labour register larger
losses, being the low-development group the most affected with a fall of 6.5%. This last
group is also the most impacted in relation to unskilled labour, experiencing a decline
of 3%.
Achieving the emissions cut in services requires a much larger reduction in final
demand in industrialised nations, given the sector’s lower carbon intensity and the
small fraction of output that is traded. Consequently, final demand would need to drop
by 4.8%. The consequences to the developing world are significant, since these
nations are not specialised in these activities, as was explained in the previous
sections. Medium-development economies are the most affected in terms of total value
added, observing a drop of 16.1%. However, in relation to wages, the low-development
group would suffer the biggest declines of 24.5% and 14.1% in skilled and unskilled
labour, respectively. The rest of the countries would also suffer considerable losses.
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Finally, when the same emissions reduction is achieved by cutting imports across-the-
board, the required decline in total final demand is much smaller (0.34%), as the effect
is distributed along all the sectors. The low- and medium-development groups would
register similar impacts. In the case of value added, they would experience falls of
1.07% and 1.03%, respectively, while in wages to skilled labour they would suffer drops
of 0.66% and 0.67%. Medium-development nations, in turn, suffer the biggest cuts to
wages to unskilled labour (0.95%).
These results reveal that mitigation-induced reductions in demand registered in
developed countries can free carbon space and make it available to the developing
world. Nonetheless, these actions can also produce significant consequences in the
developing world in terms of losses in payments to the factors of production. Low-
development nations are particularly vulnerable to lower levels of imports in the
agricultural and mining sectors. The medium-development group, in turn, is more
vulnerable in the case of the industrial sectors. Finally, when it comes to services, all
groups are particularly vulnerable. Lower levels of value added and wages, and
consequently of GDP per capita, motivated by reductions in final demand for imports,
can thus produce significant developmental consequences in the developing world via
international trade.
5.8. Summary and further remarks
This chapter provided answers to the second research question proposed in this thesis.
The empirical results derived from the EE-MRIO analysis show, on the one hand, how
much value added, skilled and unskilled wages are associated in developing countries
to every kilogram of CO2 that is mitigated in different sectors through reductions in
consumption in industrialised nations. On the other hand, the examination allowed
quantifying the magnitude and direction of the potential losses in terms of value added
and wages that could affect the global South if industrialised nations were to undertake
demand-side mitigation measures. Overall, a significant amount of information was
presented in this chapter. A brief summary of the main results is thus offered in this
final section.
The global production structure, presented in section 5.2, reflects that the world’s
economy is largely dominated by services. Moreover, the global distribution of value
added shows a profound disparity. Very-high-human-development nations produced in
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2007 almost 75% of the total value added, in spite of possessing only 15% of the world
population. The US was accountable for creating almost one fourth of the world’s total
value added, while nearly another third was created by the EU27. Least developed
countries, in contrast, barely generated 1% of the total.
In that same section, it was argued that trade in value added offers a more precise
measure of the value of trade flows than traditional trade statistics. The US trade deficit
with China, for example, is reduced by around 55% when using this method than when
employing traditional trade statistics, but its deficit with the EU27 grows around 12%.
These differences are explained by the fact that traditional trade statistics consider that
a product is entirely manufactured in the country of origin. In contrast, trade in value
added takes into account the geographical fragmentation of production. It measures
the precise value that each sector in each country along the global supply chain
contributes during the production process.
In section 5.3, it was explained that very-high-development economies tend to create
wealth in the rest of the world through international trade, since they are net importers
of value added. This reflects their larger levels of consumption and their dependency
on the developing world to obtain resources and a wide range of products. The rest of
the world, in contrast, is a net exporter of value added.
The same section, along with section 5.5, showed that the global South specialises in
low-capital- and unskilled-labour-intensive activities, while their economies are highly
carbon intensive. The North, on the other hand, focuses on producing goods that are
highly intensive in capital and skilled labour. Moreover, they possess much cleaner
technologies, making their economies less carbon intensive. This situation supports to
a certain extent the validity of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis (Prebisch, 1950; Singer,
1950), as the periphery (i.e. the developing world) is structurally constrained and
depends significantly on the core (i.e. industrialised nations) to obtain more elaborate
capital- and technology-intensive goods.
Section 5.5 argued that examining the labour productivity of carbon can be useful to
determine the sensitivity of regions and sectors to demand-driven mitigation actions,
since it indicates the amount of wages to skilled and unskilled labour that are
associated with every unit of emissions. Moreover, it represents the underlying
mechanism that explains the impacts on skilled and unskilled wages in the global
South derived from changes in final demand registered in the North. Its calculation
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required calculating intra- and inter-regional multipliers of CO2 and wages to skilled and
unskilled labour. The analysis showed that, on average, the smallest intra-regional
multipliers for value added and wages corresponded to least developed nations,
revealing their weak internal structures and their inability to capture more revenue per
dollar of final demand within their domestic markets. In contrast, the largest intra-
regional multipliers are held by the industrialised and very-high-development group,
whose economies capture internally more value and wages than any other region.
However, when it comes to CO2 emissions, high- and medium-development nations
possess the largest intra-regional multipliers, evidencing their high carbon intensities.
Moreover, the analysis on labour productivity of carbon shows that these regions are
the least productive, generating less wages for every kilogram of CO2. The most
productive in terms of skilled labour, in turn, are the least developed nations.
Section 5.6 presented the most trade-dependent economies, which are generally low-
or medium-developed countries, small nations, small-island states and fossil-fuel
producers with either limited or weak domestic markets, limited factor endowments, low
industrialisation levels, an outward-market orientation, or a mix of these factors. These
countries are highly vulnerable to external shocks in foreign final demand, as
evidenced, for example, by Malaysia’s response after the 2008/09 crisis.
Finally, the analysis showed that the developing world can suffer potential impacts in
relation to losses in value added and wages derived from demand-side mitigation
measures undertaken by very-high-development nations. While these actions can free
carbon space, a decline in value added and wages can lead to negative developmental
consequences in the developing world via international trade. Understanding the
vulnerability of different country groups to lower levels of different kinds of imports is
important to better inform policy decisions. For instance, the study revealed that low-
development nations are particularly sensitive to a decrease in agricultural and mining
imports. The medium-development group, in turn, is more vulnerable in the case of the
industrial sectors. Mitigation-driven reductions in final demand oriented towards those
sectors can thus put at risk their developmental processes. The implications and
limitations of all these results will be further discussed in Chapter 8.
The next chapter will focus on the case of Border Carbon Adjustments, and thus
provides answers to the third research question proposed in this thesis.
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Chapter 6
The case of Border Carbon Adjustments
The objective of this chapter is to offer empirical answers to the third research question
proposed in this thesis (see section 1.2): How much value added and wages paid to
skilled and unskilled labour in developing countries are associated with CO2 emissions
that would be captured in different sectors through the implementation of border carbon
adjustments in industrialised nations? The previous chapter showed that mitigation-
induced reductions in final demand for imports undertaken in developed nations can
contribute positively to cut CO2 emissions and free carbon space. Nonetheless, these
actions can significantly lower the revenue that developing countries obtain via
international trade. A lower amount of exports in the global South implies the creation
of less value added and wages to skilled and unskilled workers domestically. As a
consequence, the development process in many developing economies can be
impaired. Understanding the underlying mechanisms behind this trade-off and its
effects on different types of countries is important in an ever more globalised world. As
the inter-dependence of nations is intensified by an increasing volume of traded goods
and services, it is more likely that policy decisions made in one region of the planet can
produce significant effects on others. This can be the case of border carbon
adjustments (BCAs). As was explained in section 2.3.3, discussions are happening in
some Annex I countries (e.g. US, EU, Australia) about their potential adoption. It is
argued that these policy instruments are essential to ensure the competitiveness of
their industries and thus level the playing field with respect to nations not bound to legal
emissions-reduction commitments. Moreover, it is deemed that they can help to reduce
strong carbon leakage. The US, in particular, has been considering this option more
seriously, expressing that it will not implement an emissions trading scheme without a
provision for BCAs. Nonetheless, as discussed in section 2.3.3, these measures can
produce direct effects on the producer-side. If BCAs lead to a reduction in final demand
for imports, then, according to the results presented in the previous chapter, they could
potentially distort trade flows and have negative impacts on welfare in the developing
world. The academic literature on the topic has pointed out this possibility. However,
existing studies have not focused on estimating the amount of emissions that could be
captured with this policy tool from different country groups in the global South, and
analyse which of these groups could potentially be most affected. This chapter thus
seeks to provide these answers. Once again, the technique used for this purpose is
EE-MRIO analysis. Section 6.1 starts by describing the specific variables used in this
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study. The empirical findings are then presented, starting in section 6.2, which
examines the potential scope for BCAs. There it is shown that the amount of emissions
that could be captured is influenced by a number of issues, such as GATT’s provision
of non-discrimination, the ability to differentiate between emissions caused by
intermediate and final demand, and nation and sectoral exemptions. This is followed in
section 6.3 by the quantification of BCAs for different country groups, where it is argued
that the estimated tariff rates can potentially cause disruptions in trade flows due to
their magnitude. Section 6.4 then focuses on identifying which country groups could be
particularly affected by changes in final demand for imports caused by the BCAs.
Finally, section 6.5 offers a brief summary of the results.
6.1. Overview of the variables and data
This analysis, once more, makes use of the MRIO framework already described in
detail in section 3.2.2, and additionally employs the Emissions Embodied in Bilateral
Trade (EEBT) model, also presented in that section. Moreover, the study involves the
same variables utilised in the previous chapter. However, in this case, only data for
2007 is used, since no comparisons over time are considered. The GTAP 8 dataset
formed the basis to assemble the MRIO and EEBT models, consisting of large square
transactions matrices that represent the structure of the global economy. They include
129 countries and regions, each encompassing 57 economic sectors. These matrices
are accompanied by another one representing final demand and additional row vectors
for value added and wages to skilled and unskilled labour. The environmental
extension is given by a row vector of emissions which, as has been said, do not include
non-CO2 GHGs. This constitutes a limitation to be discussed in Chapter 8, as many of
the existing emissions trading schemes (i.e. Kyoto Protocol, EU ETS, etc.) cover a
range of GHGs apart from CO2. Moreover, emissions from aviation are not included,
which started to be covered in the EU ETS since 2012.
As was done in the previous chapter, countries will be classified according to the
UNDP’s 2013 HDI-quartile they belong to. As said, this simplifies the interpretation and
presentation of the results and allows differentiating the effects on nations with different
levels of development.
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6.2. Potential scope for BCAs
Section 2.2.2 of the literature review chapter describes how emissions have evolved
over time in Annex B and Non-Annex B nations. Figure 9, which appears in that same
section, shows that the latter group’s territorial emissions surpassed those of their
counterparts by the mid 2000s. In 2007, 47.4% of the total global emissions
corresponded to countries that have adopted quantified legally-binding emissions-
reductions pledges and that are thus subject to carbon pricing, as can be seen in
Figure 27. This group includes the majority of industrialised countries and economies in
transition. However, in strict terms, the actual estimate is approximately 20% lower.
The reason is that the US, despite being traditionally listed as an Annex B nation, has
not ratified the Kyoto Protocol and has consequently not been obliged to undertake
quantified reductions20. A more precise estimate of the proportion of emissions subject
to carbon pricing is thus 28%, constituted by emissions from the EU members which,
apart from being Annex B parties of the Protocol, also belong to the EU ETS21. They
generated 13.5% of the global emissions. The rest of Annex B nations emitted jointly
the remaining 14.4%, including Canada and Japan, who have decided not to
participate in the second phase of the Kyoto Protocol corresponding to the period
2013-2020, along with New Zealand and Russia. In turn, more than half of the global
emissions in 2007 were emitted in Non-Annex B countries. Very-high-human-
development economies, which do not possess binding targets, such as Hong Kong,
Korea, Singapore and oil producers, like Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates,
contributed with 4.9%. The bulk of unpriced CO2 emissions were mainly generated in
the developing world. Medium-human-development economies, to which China
belongs, produced 35.4% of total emissions. The high-development group emitted
10.4%, while least developed countries, in contrast, were responsible for only 1.8%.
20 In proper terms, the US is only an Annex I country or party to the UNFCCC (see footnote
9).
21 The exceptions are Cyprus and Malta, which belong to the EU ETS but are not Annex B
nations.
Chapter 6: The case of Border Carbon Adjustments 167
Figure 27 - Total global emissions in 2007
according to country group
Source: Own figure
Without the US, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Russia, the proportion of priced
emissions would be less than one fifth of the total. For the purpose of this study,
emissions from these nations will be considered as being subject to carbon pricing
along with all the other Annex B countries, as it is expected that they will adopt some
kind of reduction targets in future international climate negotiations. In addition, the
purpose of this study is to assess the effects on the developing world derived from the
hypothetical implementation of BCA schemes in all Annex B economies, including the
US22. Under this assumption, it can be said that the amount of priced emissions would
have been 14.2 Gt in 2007; that is, 47.4% of the total.
The production emissions from the countries subject to carbon pricing (i.e. carbon-
priced economies) is thus formed by the emissions embodied in the goods and
services they consume domestically and by the emissions embedded in their exports,
as is represented by the first column in Figure 28. Consumption emissions, on the
other hand, are comprised by the domestic component, plus the emissions embodied
in their imports. These are represented by the column at the right. As can be seen in
the graph, these carbon-priced economies (i.e. Annex B) are net importers of CO2,
since their consumption emissions are larger in magnitude.
A BCA scheme just focuses on those emissions that are traded with unpriced
economies. It can be appreciated in Figure 28 that in the carbon-priced region a portion
22 See Appendix A.2.4 for a list of countries considered to be under the BCA scheme in this
analysis.
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of the emissions embodied in their exports and imports is traded intra-regionally and,
therefore, would not be covered under the scheme. In contrast, the fraction of
emissions traded with regions not bound to reduction commitments constitutes the
hypothetical amount of emissions that could be included in such a scheme. They are
portrayed in Figure 28 as the area within the dotted lines. In other words, this portion of
emissions represents the potential scope for BCAs. As explained in section 2.3.3,
exports destined to unpriced economies would be subject to a rebate, since they are
not consumed in the region of origin. These represent 1.1 Gt or 7.8% of total
production emissions. In contrast, the amount of CO2 that is embodied in imported
goods from nations without binding targets would be taxed according to a given carbon
price. These constitute approximately 2.9 Gt or 18.3% of total consumption emissions.
The larger fraction corresponds to the medium-human-development group, which
includes China, and amounts to 12.3%.
Figure 28 - Potential scope for BCAs given
production and consumption emissions in
2007
Source: Own figure
The potential scope for BCAs is, however, influenced by a number of issues, such as
GATT’s provision of non-discrimination, which includes the principle of best available
technology (BAT) (see: Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007), as well as the composition of
intermediate and final products, and sectoral and country exemptions. As will be
explained, the amount of emissions that could be captured by a BCA scheme can be
significantly reduced when these factors are taken into account.
In order to comply with GATT’s provision of non-discrimination, and thus ensure that
imports receive a fair and similar treatment than domestic products, not all types of
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imports can be levied (see section 2.3.3). BCAs can only be applied to comparable
products that are covered domestically in the region of consumption by the emissions
trading scheme23. In this manner, around 17% of the emissions embodied in remitted
exports and 28.8% of the emissions embedded in imports would not be included in the
scheme, as is shown in Figure 29a. These emissions correspond to economic sectors
not covered in the Kyoto Protocol and the EU ETS, and which are consequently not
priced. Regarding the emissions that could be potentially taxed, 34.0% of exports and
33.4% of imports correspond to carbon-intensive and trade-exposed sectors (i.e. lime
and cement, basic iron and steel, refined petroleum, aluminium, inorganic basic
chemicals, and pulp and paper), which are considered by Stephenson and Upton
(2009) as particularly at risk from foreign competition and strong carbon leakage.
These are the emissions that are most likely to be taxed by future BCA schemes. On
the other hand, a significant amount of emissions, 34.9% in exports and 30.5% in
imports, corresponds to the on- and off-site generation of electricity. Although a fraction
of electricity is traded between countries, the majority of these emissions are embodied
in the products that are consumed. In order to tax these emissions and enhance the
scope of the BCAs, it would be necessary to calculate the amount of electricity used
during the production process. However, this would increase the complexity of
administrating the scheme, apart from requiring a precise and updated carbon
accounting method. The rest of the emissions that could be covered correspond to
other light- and heavy-industry sectors; that is, 14.2% of CO2 embodied in remitted
exports and 7.2% contained in imports.
Figure 29 - Share of unpriced emissions embodied in exports and imports
according to economic sector by BCA coverage (a) and use of BATs (b)
(a) (b)
Source: Own graphs
23 See Appendix A.2.4 for a list of the economic sectors that are assumed to be covered by
the BCA scheme in this analysis.
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GATT’s provision of non-discrimination would also require not taxing imports in excess
of the domestic rates, even if their carbon content is greater. This implies the
application of carbon equalisation measures, such as using BATs. In this sense,
imports are assumed to have been manufactured with at least the best clean
technology existent in the region of consumption. The determination of an appropriate
BAT is, however, problematic. Monjon and Quirion (2010), for example, suggest
utilising product-specific benchmarks, like the ones developed under the EU ETS
framework for industry products. In the case of this analysis, finding suitable and
homogeneous BATs for each sector is complicated, as all Annex B countries are
aggregated into a single region. In reality, each individual country or bloc of nations
would possess a specific BAT. The standards used in the US would, for instance, differ
from those that are relevant in the EU or in Japan. With the purpose of illustrating the
effects of applying BATs in the whole region and to simplify the examination, these
were calculated for each economic sector as the average carbon intensity of the 33%
most carbon efficient countries under the scheme. In other words, individual nations
were ranked, once for every economic sector, according to their carbon intensities (i.e.
CO2/total output). The BAT rates were then estimated as the mean carbon intensity of
the most efficient tercile. This procedure was preferred over the option of selecting
those countries with the minimum carbon intensities for each sector. As an example, it
was identified that some nations present very low carbon intensities in the production of
mineral products. This is the case of Luxembourg and Malta. However, these countries
are not significant producers or possess comparative advantages in this particular
sector. Hence, their carbon intensities cannot be considered as representative of high-
yielding and efficient industries in the mineral sector. By using the mean carbon
intensity of the most efficient terciles, this problem is avoided, along with others derived
from country-heterogeneity. In this way, a more representative estimation of the best
available technologies in the region is ensured.
As can be seen in Figure 29b, when applying BATs to each sector, the results reveal
that the scope for BCAs would decrease significantly. The scheme would capture
nearly 75% less emissions from Non-Annex B nations. This evidences, on the one
hand, the high carbon intensities registered in the developing world with respect to
Annex B economies; and, on the other hand, the implications that using the BAT
principle have in terms of the effectiveness of BCAs. The objectives of the scheme are
to address competitiveness issues and avoid strong carbon leakage, but these can be
compromised with the use of BATs. By capturing just one fourth of the total amount of
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potential emissions, the playing field between nations is only levelled partially.
Moreover, the stimulus to encourage the adoption of cleaner technologies in high
carbon-intensity regions is weakened.
Figure 30 - Unpriced emissions embodied in
exports and imports according to
intermediate and final demand
Source: Own figure
Another factor that can limit the scope of BCAs, and which has been briefly discussed
in the case of electricity, is the challenge of obtaining a precise measure of the carbon
content and origin of the different constituent parts that integrate a certain product. In
order to achieve a clear differentiation between emissions caused by final and
intermediate demand, the EEBT model was used in this examination. Its main
difference with respect to an MRIO model is that intermediate demand for imports is
extracted from the transactions matrix, leaving just domestic IO tables on the main
diagonal. Intermediate demand for imports is then appended to the final demand matrix
(see section 3.2.2). This allows distinguishing the amount of emissions that are
generated due to inter-industry requirements between regions and those derived from
the final consumption of goods.
The results obtained from the EEBT analysis reveal that the major flows of traded CO2
emissions are associated with intermediate demand; that is, 72.9% of exports and
66.9% of imports, as can be seen in Figure 30. Estimating the amount and origin of
emissions that are embodied in intermediate goods can be simpler in the case of
intensive primary commodities, but this can become a challenging task with regards to
more elaborate products, such as electronic or mechanical components. In the case of
finished goods, such as cars or heavy equipment, the complexity is even greater.
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Consequently, estimating the exact carbon content and origin of different goods
requires a robust administrative system and an adequate and regularly updated carbon
accounting procedure. However, this would elevate the costs and difficulty of managing
a BCA scheme effectively. Winchester (2012), for example, points out that the risk of
not implementing a robust system, capable of precisely determining and updating the
carbon content of different products, can lead to BCAs being viewed as fixed import or
anti-dumping tariffs, irresponsive to improvements in carbon intensity. This, in turn,
could generate trade disputes within the WTO. Moreover, just focusing on certain
intermediate commodities and final goods would reduce the scope of the scheme
which, as has been explained, is already at risk of being significantly diminished by the
application of the BAT principle.
Country and sectoral exemptions constitute one more factor that can influence the
scope of BCAs. Certain proposals, such as the ones initiated in the US, contemplate
exempting least developed countries, as long as they are responsible individually for
less than 0.5% of global GHGs (see: Monjon and Quirion, 2010; Winchester et al.,
2011). Furthermore, criteria have also been proposed to exclude those activities that
contribute with less than 5% of the total imports in a given sector of the consuming
country or region (see: van Asselt and Brewer, 2010; Cosbey et al., 2012). As is shown
in Figure 28, the implications of excluding least developed countries from the scheme,
in terms of its effectiveness, are minimal. The CO2 captured from these nations
amounts to barely 0.5% of total consumption emissions in the carbon-priced region.
However, exempting sectors based on the 5% criterion reduces the amount of captured
emissions by approximately 35%, as shown in Figure 31. The most drastic decreases
take place, proportionally, in least developed nations, with a decline of about 78.9%.
The lower changes occur in the medium-human-development group, which includes
China, with a fall of 29.1%.
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Figure 31 - Reduction in BCA scope
(unpriced emissions embodied in imports)
due to sectoral exemption (5% criterion)
Source: Own figure
As has been explained, the potential scope for BCAs is influenced by a number of
factors. From a hypothetical amount of emissions that could be captured by the
scheme, the actual quantity that could be covered is determined by issues like GATT’s
provision of non-discrimination, the proper estimation of emissions embedded in
intermediate and final goods, as well as country and sectoral exemptions. All these
aspects can significantly reduce the effectiveness of BCAs. Given these results, the
next step consists in quantifying the magnitude of the BCAs for each of the regions in
the developing world.
6.3. Quantification of BCAs
Quantifying effective tariff rates that the consuming region would impose to different
Non-Annex B country groups requires determining a carbon price. The term effective
here denotes the ability of the tariff rates to level the playing field between carbon-
priced and unpriced nations. Atkinson et al. (2011, p. 572) suggest using an illustrative
price of $50 dollars per tonne of CO2, arguing that it is compatible with “a fairly
ambitious” emissions reduction target for highly-developed economies. Although the
carbon price would be required to augment more in the future to encourage yet deeper
reductions, the proposed price is useful to show the scale that BCAs could reach in the
case of different regions. The first step to calculate the tariff rates is to multiply the
amount of emissions embodied in imports by the carbon price. Then, the result is
divided by the value of those imports, expressed in terms of their value added, which
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
Emissions imported from Non-Annex B
(All sectors)
Emissions imported from Non-Annex B
(Exempting sectors)
G
to
fC
O
2
yr
-1
Other very high human
development
High human development
Medium human development
Low human development
0.23 Gt
1.22 Gt
1.72 Gt
0.28 Gt
0.43 Gt
0.05 Gt
0.01 Gt
0.07 Gt
174 Chapter 6: The case of Border Carbon Adjustments
was estimated in section 5.3.1 and presented in Figure 19. In basic terms, this consists
in multiplying the carbon price by the carbon intensity of value added. The resulting
rate, in this sense, represents the proportion by which the monetary value of the
imports would increase due to the BCA. This, in consequence, would translate into a
rise in the price paid by consumers for the imported goods. The same procedure is
followed, on the other hand, to calculate the rebate rates for the remitted exports.
These rates show the fraction of value added that is returned to the producers who
were already taxed, since their products are being consumed in unpriced economies.
Table 24 shows the average tariff and rebate rates faced by different country groups,
depending on sectoral coverage and the implementation of the BAT principle. In the
case of imports, if all sectors were taxed, regardless of their treatment by the operating
emissions trading scheme, the medium-human-development group, which includes
China, would face the largest rates of about 8.9% on average, since it is the most
carbon intensive region. It must be remembered that the rates are directly proportional
to the carbon intensity of the region of origin. In turn, very-high-development nations
with no binding targets would meet an average rate of 2.9%, similar to that of least
developed nations (2.8%). The high-development group would confront a tax burden of
3.7%. When only the priced sectors are taken into account (i.e. sectors covered in the
scheme), which represents the benchmark case in this analysis, the tax rates increase
due to the higher carbon intensity of the sectors involved. The rates then vary from
2.9% in the low development group to 12.3% in medium-development economies. On
the other hand, when only emissions associated with intermediate demand are
considered, the rates go down by almost half when compared to the benchmark.
However, here the decrease is not so marked for least developed nations (i.e. 2.9% to
2.0%), which have a lower share in the production of intermediate goods. The next row
in the table shows the rates that are relevant when the 5% criterion is applied to
exclude certain sectors. The rates go down with respect to the benchmark, especially
favouring least developed nations (0.6%) and the very-high-development group (1.3%).
The following case involves excluding the emissions from electricity embodied in
imports, which particularly lowers by half the rate faced by the medium-development
group (6.9%), while the lowest rate corresponds to very-high-development nations
(2.1%). The last option in the table encompasses applying BATs in all priced sectors.
This reduces the rates significantly for the medium-development group, whose imports
face a burden of 1.2%, almost a tenth of the tariff without BATs. Similarly, the rest of
the country groups also result notably favoured by this principle.
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Table 24 - Average tariff rates on imports and rebate rates on
exports by taxing embodied CO2 at $50 per tonne
Sectoral coverage
Other very
high human
development *
High human
development
Medium
human
development
Low human
development
Imports
All sectors 2.94% 3.70% 8.98% 2.81%
Only priced sectors
(benchmark) 4.10% 4.00% 12.31% 2.95%
Priced sectors including
intermediate demand only 2.40% 2.91% 7.34% 2.06%
Priced sectors using 5%
criterion 1.34% 2.54% 8.73% 0.62%
Priced sectors excluding
electricity 2.12% 3.08% 6.93% 2.46%
Priced sectors including
BATs and electricity 1.18% 0.89% 1.28% 0.65%
Exports
All sectors 3.06% 3.37% 2.87% 2.48%
Only priced sectors
(benchmark) 3.75% 4.50% 3.90% 3.69%
Priced sectors including
intermediate demand only 3.64% 3.26% 3.15% 1.66%
Priced sectors excluding
electricity 2.22% 2.77% 2.26% 2.34%
Note: * Refers to very-high-development nations without binding targets
Regarding exports, shown in the lower part of Table 24, the differences between the
rates across the various country groups are not so marked. When all sectors are
included in the scheme, the rebate rates vary from 2.4% for remitted exports to least
developed countries, to 3.3% for those destined to the high-development group. As in
the case of imports, considering only the priced sectors causes the rates to rise,
ranging from 3.6% for least developed nations to 4.5% for high-development
economies. Excluding emissions from final demand, on the other hand, decreases the
rate with respect to the benchmark, again particularly for exports to the least-
development group. Finally, leaving out emissions from electricity causes the rates to
fall by approximately 1.5% on average across the country groups.
In individual terms, the ten countries that would face the largest import tariffs are mainly
medium- and low-human-development nations. South Africa and China would face the
highest rates of 13.8% and 10.2%, respectively, when only the priced sectors are
considered. They are followed by Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which were
identified in the previous chapter as some of the most trade-dependent nations (see
Table 22 in section 5.6). Zimbabwe would also carry a significant tariff burden of
around 9.1%. The rest of the countries in the table would confront rates that range from
7.9% to 6.1%.
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Table 25 - The 10 countries or regions with largest tariff rates
Country Tariff ratePriced sectors *
Tariff rate
All sectors **
South Africa 13.87% 15.07%
China 10.20% 11.11%
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan 9.77% 17.52%
Zimbabwe 9.13% 11.37%
Egypt 7.93% 11.51%
Mongolia 7.85% 11.20%
Kazakhstan 7.82% 8.94%
Kyrgyzstan 7.73% 11.66%
India 7.09% 7.82%
Venezuela 6.19% 6.79%
Note: * Refers to sectors covered under the scheme; ** refers to all
sectors regardless of their treatment by the operating ETS.
The rates produced by this analysis have the potential to distort trade flows and affect
welfare levels in developing countries, as the price flexibility assumption is not
expected to hold in reality (see section 2.3.3). It is difficult, however, to ascertain to
what extent consumer prices would increase beyond the estimated tariff rates and,
more importantly, how the new price levels would impact the demand for imports in the
region under the scheme. The MRIO model used in this analysis just encompasses a
partial equilibrium of the global economy. Prices are not included and, consequently,
the market-clearance condition (i.e. the point where global supply equals global
demand through a change in prices) required to achieve a general equilibrium cannot
be modelled. This constitutes a limitation in this research, which will be discussed in
Chapter 8. However, it is possible to determine the amount of value added and wages
to skilled and unskilled labour that are associated with an assumed decline in final
demand for imports caused by the implementation of BCAs in the priced sectors.
6.4. Potential impacts to the developing world
As has been said, some of the tariff rates presented in the previous section can
potentially cause disruptions in trade flows due to their magnitude. Without the
adoption of the BAT principle, regions like the middle-development group would face
tariffs as high as 12.3% on average. These rates can imply a negative effect on
economic growth and employment creation in the developing world, particularly in the
exporting sectors. As has been said, this study is unable to precisely estimate how
consumer demand in the region of consumption would respond to the higher prices of
imports. However, the same procedure as the one used in the previous chapter (see
section 5.7) can be used to explore the impacts in different developing-country groups,
in terms of losses in value added and wages to skilled and unskilled labour, due to a
certain decline in final demand. In this sense, this examination assumes that BCAs
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cause a fall in final demand for imports associated with the sectors covered in the
scheme. It is also assumed that imports from each developing region drop
proportionally to their share of the total. Results are estimated for a fall representing an
overall decrease of 1% of total final demand in the consuming region. The amount of
consumption-based emissions compatible with this new level of final demand is then
estimated. After that, it is calculated how much value added and wages to skilled and
unskilled labour would decrease in the different developing-country groups owing to
those reductions in final demand.
The results from this analysis are presented in Table 26. When total final demand in
the region under the scheme (i.e. carbon-priced) declines by 1%, due to a lower
demand for imports corresponding to carbon-priced sectors, consumption emissions
are cut by 2.7%. This leads, however, to decreases in total value added and total
wages to skilled and unskilled labour in the producing regions. Medium-development
economies would be the most affected with a reduction in value added or GDP of
2.8%. In a similar fashion, their wages to skilled and unskilled workers would suffer
cuts of 1.6% and 2.8%, respectively. The high- and low-development groups would
face similar cutbacks. In the case in which only the trade-exposed sectors are included
in the BCA scheme, a decline of 1% in total final demand leads to a reduction of 5.5%
in consumption emissions. CO2 falls more in this scenario, as the entire reductions in
final demand occur in a smaller number of carbon-intensive sectors. In terms of value
added, the high- and medium development groups are the most affected, with similar
reductions of 2.4% and 2.3%, respectively. In relation to wages, medium-development
economies observe the largest falls with 1.2% for skilled labour and 1.9% for unskilled
labour. Overall, the least impacted region corresponds to the low-development group
due, ironically, to its limited industrialisation levels.
Table 26 - Impacts on value added and wages to skilled and unskilled
labour caused by BCA-induced reductions in final demand
Sectors which
register a
decline in final
demand for
imports
Reductions in
consumption CO2
compatible with
the new level of
final demand
Impacts on
total Value
Added
Impacts on
total wages to
skilled labour
Impacts on
total wages to
unskilled
labour
Priced sectors -2.71%
High: -1.55%
Medium: -2.81%
Low: -1.15%
High: -0.73%
Medium: 1.68%
Low: -0.81%
High: -1.35%
Medium: -2.86%
Low: -1.23%
Only trade-
exposed sectors -5.53%
High: -2.43%
Medium: -2.30%
Low: -1.11%
High: -0.92%
Medium: -1.29%
Low: -0.65%
High: -1.57%
Medium: -1.90
Low: -0.74%
Note: The reduction in final demand for imports takes place in the region under the BCA scheme.
The assumed reduction corresponds to imports from the sectors mentioned in the first column and
amounts to 1% of total final demand. The impacts refer to decreases in total value added and total
wages to skilled and unskilled labour registered in the developing world. High-, medium- and low-
human-development countries correspond to the UNDP’s 2013 classification.
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It must be noted that the objective of a BCA scheme is not to abate emissions, but to
address competitiveness issues and avoid carbon leakage, issues that were not
analysed here. Nonetheless, BCAs can indirectly achieve emissions reductions by
influencing producer and consumer behaviour. The cuts in CO2 correspond in this
analysis entirely to BCA-induced decreases in final demand for imports (i.e. demand-
side mitigation).
The results show that the regions which would face the largest tariff rates would also
experience the largest impacts in terms of losses in value added and wages. This
would translate into lower rates of economic growth and employment and, ultimately,
into an associated decline in well-being. The precise impacts, however, are uncertain,
as the model used does not consider general-equilibrium effects. The changes in
prices could actually lead to a substitution for other types of imported products or for
imports from less carbon-intensive regions. Yet, the present analysis provides a useful
insight about the potential consequences in the developing world of a BCA scheme
from a partial-equilibrium perspective.
If the BAT principle was applied, the impacts are found to be much smaller, as the
import prices would increase slightly more than 1%. However, once again, it is not
possible here to determine their precise effects on consumer prices. On the other hand,
if the revenue obtained by the BCA scheme was returned to the producing regions in
the form of development aid or technology transfers, then the impacts on the
developing world could be mitigated. This issue, however, was also not modelled.
6.5. Summary and further remarks
This chapter offered empirical answers to the third research question proposed in this
thesis. In basic terms, it focused on the case of BCAs and showed how they can
potentially distort trade flows and exert a negative impact on welfare in the developing
world. As has been said, understanding these effects is relevant, as discussions are
happening in several Annex B nations about their possible implementation.
The results presented in this chapter in section 6.2 show that the potential scope for
BCAs is influenced by a number of factors. Hypothetically, 7.8% of total production
emissions that are embodied in exports, and 18.3% of total consumption emissions that
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are embedded in imports could be captured by such a scheme. However, this range is
potentially reduced by complying with GATT’s provision of non-discrimination. Around
17% of the emissions embodied in remitted exports and 28.8% of the emissions
embedded in imports would not be included, as they are related to non-priced
economic sectors in the consuming region. Moreover, when applying the BAT principle,
the scheme would capture nearly 75% less emissions from Non-Annex B nations. This
could potentially diminish the effectiveness of BCAs. On the other hand, the capacity to
precisely quantify the emissions embedded in intermediate and final goods was shown
to be challenging. The results reveal that more than two thirds of emissions are
associated with intermediate demand. Finally, exempting economic sectors according
to their contribution to final imports in the consuming region can potentially reduce the
amount of emissions captured by about 35%.
In section 6.4, it was explained that by adopting a carbon price of $50 dollars per
tonne, medium-development economies could face average tariff rates of 12.3% when
only priced sectors are taken into account. These rates, however, vary according to the
same issues mentioned in the previous paragraph. When only the emissions
associated with intermediate demand are considered, for example, the rates go down
by almost half when compared to the benchmark. It was also found that excluding
emissions from electricity embodied in imports, favours particularly the medium-
development group. More importantly, when BATs are applied, the rates drop
significantly. The medium-development group, for instance, registers a rate ten times
lower. In individual terms and without BATs, medium- and low-human-development
nations would face the largest import tariffs. Specifically, South Africa and China would
carry the heavier burdens with rates of 13.8% and 10.2%, respectively, when the priced
sectors are considered.
The results presented in section 6.4 also reveal that the regions which face the largest
tariff rates would also experience the largest impacts in terms of losses in value added
and wages. In the analysis, it was assumed that if BCAs were to cause a 1% decline in
final demand in the consuming region, medium-development economies could lose
around 2.8% of their GDP. In a similar fashion, their total wages to skilled and unskilled
workers would suffer cuts of 1.6% and 2.8%, respectively. Similar effects would register
in the rest of the country groups. However, it was shown that low-development nations
would tend to be the least affected, due to their limited capacity to produce those goods
covered in the scheme.
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Finally, the chapter argued that although the results reflect a partial equilibrium
perspective, it provides valuable insights regarding the potential consequences that the
unilateral implementation of BCAs in Annex B nations could bring to the developing
world. All these matters will be discussed further in Chapter 8.
The next chapter will focus on providing answers to the fourth research question
proposed in this thesis.
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Carbon and development spaces: Developing within limits
The aim of this chapter is to offer the empirical findings related to the fourth and last
research question proposed in this thesis (see section 1.2): To what extent can human
development be improved in the developing world within the limits of the available
carbon space as defined by the RCP pathways given the continuity of the status quo?
As has been expressed in the introductory chapter, humanity’s greatest challenge is to
improve development levels around the world within the limits of the available carbon
space. However, this space is dwindling at a fast rate. The results offered in Chapter 4
show that CO2 emissions have tended to rise monotonically with higher levels of
affluence, and this increase has been even more pronounced from a consumption-
based perspective. As countries become wealthier, their populations consume more
goods and services produced domestically and in foreign regions. In this sense, they
become accountable for a higher amount of emissions associated with their
consumption. Industrialised economies have thus turned into net importers of
emissions via international trade, as their consumption-based emissions have
expanded at a faster rate than their territorial ones over the years. Emerging
economies have also significantly increased their annual territorial and consumption
emissions, while they transit from the agricultural to the industrial phases of their
economic development process. The rates of technological change and deployment
until now, however, have not outpaced the influence of affluence and population as
drivers of emissions. Technological-induced mitigation measures must therefore be
complemented with demand-side actions in order to achieve a 2°C target and avoid
dangerous climate change. As illustrated in Chapter 5, reductions in demand in wealthy
nations can contribute to free carbon space, much needed in the global South.
Nonetheless, globalisation has intensified the interdependencies between nations.
Consequently, as is explained in that same chapter, a lower demand for imports can
distort trade flows and affect economic growth rates in developing nations. This would
put at risk their development process and the well-being of their societies. For this
reason, demand-side actions and measures that can influence demand, like BCAs,
must be analysed and implemented adequately to avoid negative consequences in the
South, as was explained in Chapter 6. This is relevant, as there is a pressing need for
developed economies to achieve deeper reductions through technological and
demand-side measures and thus make more carbon space available to less developed
nations. The longer it takes industrialised countries to take significant and sustained
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actions, the less carbon space will be left for the poorest regions. As was mentioned in
the literature review chapter, a solution to climate change should not be attained at the
expense of reducing the development opportunities of the global South (see section
2.1.3). An equitable use and fair sharing of the carbon space is vital to overcome the
challenge. It is uncertain, however, to what extent human development could be
improved with the remaining carbon budget in different regions of the planet. Among
the scenarios that are to be used in the Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2013), the so-
called RCP3-PD, also known as RCP2.6, describes an emissions concentration
pathway that is likely to maintain global warming below the 2°C threshold in the long-
run (van Vuuren et al., 2007). By using this pathway as a quantification of the available
carbon space, the present chapter thus seeks to investigate to what extent human
development levels in different country groups can be improved within its limits given
the continuity of the status quo; that is, according to the current model of economic
development. This analysis, however, does not attempt to produce an accurate
prediction of future human development levels, explore alternative pathways or
rearrange the sharing of the carbon space between nations in order to achieve this
goal. Rather, the analysis offers an insight about the magnitude of the challenge. The
findings, moreover, can help to build more equitable and comprehensive future
emission pathways that focus on enhancing development within biophysical limits, as
well as to inform global and regional climate negotiations. The chapter starts in section
7.1 by providing an overview of the variables and data used to carry out the analysis,
which is based on cross-country panel-data regressions. The carbon space is
quantified in section 7.2, describing the individual budgets assigned to different country
groups. The historical human-development trends for each of these groups are then
presented in section 7.3, highlighting the potential improvements that can be attained in
the future. The carbon elasticity of human development corresponding to the period
under study is calculated for each country group in section 7.4. These elasticities are
then used in section 7.5 to extrapolate the HDI into the future according to the
emissions pathways described by the different RCPs. Finally, a brief summary of the
main findings is offered in section 7.6.
7.1. Overview of the variables and data
The present analysis makes use of the 2013 UNDP’s human development index, which
comprises 187 individual countries. As a reminder to the reader, the purpose of this
indicator is to measure and monitor the progress of the development process across
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nations (see section 2.1.2). It is basically constituted by sub-indices corresponding to
income per capita, life expectancy, and the observed and expected years of
schooling24. The index ranges from 0 to 1, and countries are ranked according to their
index scores and are then divided into four tiers or quartiles. This classification has
been used in the previous two chapters of this thesis. HDI data is only available for
eight years, which are: 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005, 2007, 2010, 2011 and 2012. The gaps
between these years were filled in by projecting the HDI scores at a country-level
according to average annual growth rates. This allowed having sufficient annual
observations to apply the panel data regression methods described in section 3.2.1.
Not having done so would have prevented running some statistical tests and obtaining
robust results (see: Mátyás and Lovrics, 1991).
Along with the HDI data, two separate databases for CO2 were employed to estimate
the carbon elasticity of human development for different country groups. The first one
corresponds to that used in Chapter 4, which is formed by territorial and consumption-
based emissions from fossil fuels and cement production, as provided by Peters et al.
(2011b). Per capita values were then calculated using population figures obtained from
UNSD (2013a). This dataset ranges from 1990 to 2010 and involves 129 countries and
regions according to the GTAP 8 classification. This information is useful, since it
allows comparing how both types of emissions relate to human development. The
second dataset was built only with territorial CO2 emissions also from fossil fuels and
cement production in absolute levels and in per capita terms. It covers a longer time
period, from 1980 to 2010, and includes all the 187 HDI countries. This particular
dataset was used to complement the analysis and, more specifically, to verify if a
longer time series and a larger number of observable units (i.e. countries) produced
results that are consistent with those obtained with the first dataset.
As has been said, the RCP3-PD pathway is used as a representation of the available
carbon space compatible with a 2°C target, measured from a territorial perspective. Its
corresponding data was taken from van Vuuren et al. (2007). Moreover, emissions
projections from RCP8.5, developed by Riahi et al. (2007), were utilised to assess the
business as usual (BAU) scenario. Emissions from RCP4.5 (Smith and Wigley, 2006;
Clarke et al., 2007; Wise et al., 2009) and RCP6 (Fujino et al., 2006) were employed to
explore two additional intermediate pathways. Data for the period 2010-2050 was taken
24 See Appendix B.1.2 for a more detailed explanation about the methodology to calculate
the HDI.
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from all scenarios, which is offered in the form of midyear atmospheric CO2
concentrations and annual emissions (Gt per year). The data comprises 5 regions (see
Figure 4) which, in turn, cover 184 individual countries. Future per capita emissions
associated with the RCP3-PD were calculated with population estimates for each
country up to 2050 extracted from the SSP1 pathway, the most sustainable scenario to
be used in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (see Table 2 for a description of the
SSPs). In the case of RCP8.5, its associated per capita emissions were determined
using population figures related to SSP3, the less sustainable pathway. In turn,
population projections from SSP5, which correspond to a conventional development
scenario, were used to calculate per capita emissions for RCP4.5 and RCP6.
Population figures for these SSPs are published by IIASA (2012).
The first part of the analysis consists in estimating the historical carbon elasticity of
human development for different country groups with the use of panel-data-regression
methods. These estimates are then used in the second part of the examination to
extrapolate HDI into the future according to the emissions pathways indicated by the
different RCPs. A detailed list of descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the
analysis for each country group can be found in Appendix B.1.2. Table 27, presented
below, offers a summary of the most relevant variables for the whole set of countries.
Table 27 - Descriptive statistics for HDI and territorial
and consumption emissions (absolute and per capita)
Statistic HDI TerritorialCO2
Consumption
CO2
Territorial
CO2 per
capita
Consumption
CO2 per
capita
Mean 0.61 136.45 200.02 4.54 6.06
Median 0.64 9.70 36.25 1.72 3.56
St. Dev. 0.19 550.33 646.66 6.74 7.01
Minimum 0.18 0.03 -1.24 0.01 -0.36
Maximum 0.95 8,286.14 6,976.28 68.62 56.51
No. Obs 4,210 4,889 2,625 4,889 2,625
Period 1980-2010 1980-2010 1990-2010 1980-2010 1990-2010
Note: HDI corresponds to the UNDP’s Human Development Index (2013). Territorial and
consumption emissions are expressed in megatonnes of CO2 per year. Per capita emissions
are expressed in metric tonnes of CO2 per year. Source: Own table based on data by
CDIAC (2013), Peters et al. (2011b), UNDP (2013) and UNSD (2013a)
As was the case in Chapter 4, several nations had to be excluded from the analysis,
due to an insufficient number of observations for HDI or CO2. Hence, four regions were
removed from the consumption-emissions dataset and 17 countries from the longer set
of territorial emissions25. Notwithstanding these exclusions, the final cross-country
panels are unbalanced, because some countries in both datasets still present missing
observations. However, these are sparse and represent a small fraction of the total.
25 See list of excluded countries in Appendix B.1.2.
Chapter 7: Carbon and development spaces: Developing within limits 185
Hence, they are not deemed to affect the robustness of the results, as was shown in
the carbon EKC analysis (see section 4.2).
7.2. The carbon space
The available carbon space is defined in this thesis as the total amount of future
cumulative emissions that is likely to achieve a 2°C target and thus avoid dangerous
climate change in the long-run. As has been said, the RCP3-PD (or RCP2.6)
represents a pathway that is potentially compatible with such a goal. This scenario was
described in section 2.1.1 of the literature review chapter, and it can be appreciated
graphically in Figure 2 (page 19). It corresponds to a level of radiative forcing of
between 2.6 and 3 Wm-2. The acronym PD stands for peak and decline, as it considers
that yearly emissions will peak in 2020 and then will show a sustained decline until
becoming negative from the 2070s onwards. The atmospheric CO2 concentration, in
turn, will peak around 2050 at a level of about 450 ppm, which corresponds to a total of
approximately 630 Gt of carbon emitted since the beginning of the industrial era. In
2012, the atmospheric concentration was around 394 ppm. Consequently, in line with
the RCP3-PD, the available carbon space from 2013 to 2050 amounts to roughly 249
Gt of carbon26, as can be seen in Figure 32a. Beyond 2050, the carbon space does not
expand much, reaching 260 Gt in 2100, since it is assumed that emissions will start to
be absorbed rather than emitted into the atmosphere from the mid-2070s. The present
analysis, however, just focuses on the period up to 2050.
26 This figure just considers emissions from fossil fuels and cement production. The carbon
space would amount to 275 Gt if CO2 derived from land-use change was also accounted
for.
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Figure 32 - The available carbon space: Atmospheric CO2 concentration (a)
and cumulative emissions according to country group (b)
(a) (b)
Note: VHHD: Very-high-human development; MHD: Medium-human development. Source: Own graphs
based on van Vuuren et al. (2007)
The RCP3-PD pathway entails the achievement of significant abatement efforts across
different regions. It allows global emissions to continue increasing until 2020 at an
average annual growth rate of 0.5%; a figure that is much lower than the current trend
of 2.5% (from 2005 to 2010). Nonetheless, it requires Annex I nations (i.e.
industrialised OECD countries and most economies in transition) to attain early
reductions of around 0.8% on an annual basis on average before 2020. From that year
on, Annex I nations need to undertake steep cuts of nearly 80% in 2050 with respect to
2000. Asian countries, on average, would require accomplishing a reduction target of
about 20% for the same period, followed by Latin American economies with a 10% cut.
Middle East and African nations, in turn, would be required to stabilise their emissions
in relation to their existing levels in 2000. In per capita terms, this implies achieving
significant mitigation rates across all country groups, as can be seen in Figure 4 (page
23). Taking into account optimistic growth population rates, such as the ones specified
by SSP1, which considers that the global population will peak at around 8.5 billion
people in 2050, the developing world (i.e. Non-Annex B nations) would need to cut its
per capita emissions by more than half during the period. This consequently entails
carrying out considerable mitigation efforts worldwide.
Given the aforementioned emissions cuts, regional and country-specific carbon
budgets can be identified. Very-high-human-development countries would hold more
than a third (36.6%) of the entire carbon space, as is shown in Figure 32b. This group
includes the US, the nation with the second largest budget, which amounts to 11.6% of
the total. The EU 27 would possess 15.8% of the carbon space, while the rest of the
countries in the group would use the remaining 9.3%. The high-human-development
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cluster, in turn, would be entitled to 18.0%. Medium-human-development nations, in
contrast, would seize 43.5%, but this is largely due to China. This country would hold
by itself the largest portion of the carbon space in the world; that is, almost another
third (29.2%). This group also includes India, the world’s most populated country by
mid-century with around 1.5 billion people, and which would possess the third biggest
share (7.5%). In fact, the emerging economies of the G20 (i.e. Argentina, Brazil, India,
Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey), plus China, would
use almost half of the whole carbon space. The least developed countries, on the other
hand, would be constrained to utilising the remaining 1.8%. As can be appreciated, the
RCP3-PD pathway allocates the larger carbon budgets to the current major polluters,
rather than to those who possess the lowest development levels. This allocation can
thus be expected to limit development opportunities.
The carbon space clearly increases if it is measured using emissions pathways that
lead to higher levels of radiative forcing, such as RCP4.5, RCP6 and RCP8.5. The
available space from 2013 to 2050 is almost equal in the case of the first two pathways,
since they share almost the same trajectory up to 2050, as can be seen in Figure 2
(page 19). Their cumulative yearly emissions are equivalent to slightly more than 400
Gt of carbon, with a corresponding atmospheric CO2 concentration that reaches
approximately 500 ppm. In relation to RCP8.5, the carbon space amounts to around
550 Gt for the same period, with an atmospheric concentration that would reach almost
600 ppm in 2050. This last pathway could likely (i.e. >66% probability) lead to average
rises in global temperature as high as 3.8°C to 5.7°C by 2100 (see Figure 2, page 19).
7.3. The development space
The development space is defined in this thesis as the extent to which human
development opportunities can be enhanced across the world. Figure 5 in section 2.1.2
(page 31) shows the historical trends that HDI has followed since 1980 in different
regions of the planet. Asian countries have seen the largest advances in human
development from 1980 to 2012, as their HDI registered an increase of 33.5%. Latin
American nations experienced a rise of about 26.0%, followed by Middle Eastern and
African countries with a similar expansion of 24.1%. The growth in developed nations
was lower, reaching 17.7%. Transition economies, on the other hand, recorded the
lowest increase of 7.3%. The UNDP (2013) has highlighted these improvements across
the developing world, labelling the phenomenon as a rise of the South (see section
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2.1.2). Nonetheless, there is still a considerable space to improve development levels,
as can be seen in Figure 33. Very-high-human-development economies, which house
approximately 15% of the global population, attained an average HDI score of 0.90 in
2012. This score is twice as high as that of the least developed group, which advanced
nearly 48% since 1980. Medium-development countries showed a record growth of
52.6% during the last three decades, but they still need to expand their current HDI
levels by another 40% to attain the scores enjoyed by the topmost group. As is
discussed in section 2.1.2, the pace of improvement has been accelerating in recent
years, but this progress has been uneven. Almost 70% of the people in the planet live
in the medium- and low-human development nations. Some of these countries are
lagging significantly behind and still need to meet many of their Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs).
Figure 33 - The development space: HDI
average scores per country group, 1980-
2012
Source: Own figure based on data by UNDP (2013)
Figure 33 shows a graphical representation of the development space, as expressed
by the HDI. The dark blue areas represent the improvements attained from 1980 to
2012 by the different country groups. The red area, in turn, symbolises the potential
improvements in human development that can be achieved in the future.
7.4. The carbon elasticity of human development
Energy use has been essential to accomplish higher levels of economic expansion,
which have translated into greater levels of human development. As shown in Table 4,
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section 2.2.1 (page 43), developed countries consume around 205 gigajoules on
average per person per year, compared to 33 in least developed nations. Energy
consumption has, nonetheless, entailed billions of tonnes of carbon being emitted into
the atmosphere, as a considerable amount of energy is obtained from fossil fuels. In
addition, carbon has also been freed as a consequence of land use change in
response to the need to acquire more land for agricultural activities. Human
development and CO2 emissions, in this sense, have shown to be correlated over time
(see section 2.1.3).
The relationship between these two variables, however, is not linear. It rather follows
an asymptotic curve. At low levels of HDI, an increase in CO2 emissions delivers more
than proportional increments in human development. As countries become more
developed, the relationship starts showing diminishing marginal returns. This means
that at higher HDI levels more emissions are required to accomplish smaller
improvements in human development. This pattern can be seen in Figure 34, in which
data for all years and all countries were pooled together using territorial emissions. As
has been said, the first part of the analysis consists in estimating the carbon elasticity
of human development for different country groups. This elasticity, in other words,
expresses how much CO2 emissions have been required to achieve improvements in
human-development levels during the period in the regions under study.
Figure 34 - Relationship between the human
development index and territorial CO2
emissions per capita (1980-2010)
Source: Own figure based on data by CDIAC (2013) and
UNDP (2013)
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7.4.1. Functional forms
Existing studies have used different functional forms to express the relationship
between HDI and CO2 emissions. It is common to describe the relationship in terms of
a logistic curve, following the approach proposed by Preston (1975), who examined the
links between life expectancy and economic development. This particular form, for
example, was adopted by Costa et al. (2011) to analyse the correlation between HDI
and CO2 per capita. Other authors have utilised semi-logarithmic forms (e.g. Pasternak,
2000) or have included a quadratic term as is usually done to assess the EKC (e.g.
Dietz and Rosa, 1997; Rosa et al., 2004). In this analysis, two functional forms are
tested, as is explained in section 3.2.1.6. The first one corresponds to a hyperbolic
saturation curve, which was used by Steinberger and Roberts (2010) and Steinberger
et al. (2012), according to which HDI for country i at time t is expressed as:
ܪܦܫ௜௧= ܪܦܫ௦௔௧− exp (ܣ) × ܥܱଶ௜௧ఉ (30)
where the HDIsat term represents the asymptote or saturation value, A is a constant and
β is expected to be negative, while CO2 represents carbon emissions per capita per
year for country i at time t. As stated by Steinberger and Roberts (2010), this form
offers some advantages, since it produces a slightly better fit than other functional
forms, is invertible and allows data weighting. However, the asymptote value has to be
determined a priori from the data. In line with the aforementioned authors, it is
estimated here as HDIsat=1.1*max(HDI). In addition to this functional form, a simplified
log-log version is also tested, in which the only difference is that the saturation term is
excluded. The curvature of the function is, in this manner, not bounded, producing a
slightly steeper slope at high levels of HDI.
ܪܦܫ௜௧= exp (ܣ) × ܥܱଶ௜௧ఉ (31)
Both functional forms can be easily linearised by applying logs to both the left- and
right-hand side terms of the equations, which results in: ln(HDIsat – HDIit)=A+β*ln(CO2it)
and ln(HDIit)= A+β*ln(CO2it). Panel data regression methods can then be applied using
these linear forms in order to estimate the parameters A and β. In the latter function, β
is expected to be positive and represents the carbon elasticity of human development.
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It must be kept in mind that these functional forms do not imply a direct causality
between the variables. Apart from energy consumption, human development is
determined by a number of economic, social and institutional factors (see: Binder and
Georgiadis, 2010). The present analysis does not seek to delve any deeper into the
causal relationship between human development and per capita emissions, but rather
to assess its degree of association over time in relation to countries with different HDI
levels.
7.4.2. Statistical tests
In line with the procedure followed in Chapter 4, a series of statistical tests were carried
out to assess the viability of using pooled OLS regressions, as well as to identify the
presence of heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional independence in
the saturated and unbounded specifications for territorial and consumption CO2 data.
Table 28 - Statistical tests for the HDI-CO2 per capita relationship according to
functional specification and type of emissions used in the analysis
Test Specification Territorial Consumption Result
F-test: All fixed effects
are null
Saturated F(30,3951)=339.02*** F(20,2296)=326.32*** OLS not valid
Unbounded F(30,3951)=291.36*** F(20,2296)=170.54*** OLS not valid
Breusch-Pagan LM test
for pooled vs random
effects
Saturated chi2(1)=30778.63*** chi2(1)=12852.26*** OLS not valid
Unbounded chi2(1)=30612.48*** chi2(1)=13136.17*** OLS not valid
Modified Wald test for
groupwise
heteroskedasticity
Saturated chi2(170)=1.6e+07*** chi2(125)=1.6e+05*** Heteroskedasticity
Unbounded chi2(170)=9.9e+06*** chi2(125)=1.5e+05*** Heteroskedasticity
Likelihood-ratio test for
group heteroskedasticity
Saturated chi2(169)=2784.75*** chi2(124)=1790.99*** Heteroskedasticity
Unbounded chi2(169)=3275.25*** chi2(124)=2364.07*** Heteroskedasticity
Wooldridge test for
autocorrelation in panel
data
Saturated F(1,169)=76341.92*** F(1,122)=13979.59*** Autocorrelation
Unbounded F(1,169)=33277.31*** F(1,122)=17215.17*** Autocorrelation
Pesaran's test of cross-
sectional independence
Saturated 379.04*** 282.44*** Cross-sectionaldependence
Unbounded 375.60*** 279.31*** Cross-sectionaldependence
*** Significant at 0.01 level
As can be seen in Table 28, the results derived from the F (fixed effects) and the
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier tests indicate that a pooled OLS regression is not a
suitable method, since country-specific effects are present. Their null hypotheses are
rejected in both cases at a level of significance of 1% for all specifications (i.e.
saturated and unbounded) and types of emissions (i.e. territorial and consumption).
Moreover, the two heteroskedasticity tests reveal that the residual variance is not
constant over time. In both the modified Wald test and the likelihood-ratio test, the null
hypotheses are rejected in all cases. On the other hand, the Wooldridge test points out
that the errors are serially correlated and bound to produce biases in the estimated
coefficients. Its null hypothesis is rejected at a significance level of 1% for all
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specifications and types of emissions. The same can be said about the Pesaran test for
cross-sectional independence, which shows that country-specific errors are correlated
between panels.
Unit root tests were also applied to determine the order of integration of the variables.
As has been explained in section 3.2.1.3, two variables can be cointegrated if they
share the same order of integration. Table 29 presents the results from these tests.
According to the Im-Pesaran-Shin test, territorial and consumption emissions are
stationary in levels (i.e. not differenced variables) in the case of some panels. However,
the Pesaran (2007) test, which accounts for heterogeneous panels with cross-sectional
dependence, indicates that both variables are I(1); that is, they possess an order of
integration of 1. The alternative hypothesis, which states that some panels are
stationary in first differences, is accepted at a 1% level of significance. These results
are consistent with those obtained in Chapter 4 in relation to the same variables. In the
case of HDI, both tests point out that its order of integration is 2. In other words, the
variable must be differenced twice before becoming stationary across the whole set of
panels. The results thus suggest that HDI and CO2 emissions are not cointegrated,
since they do not share the same order of integration. In order to verify this assertion,
the Westerlund (2007) test was applied. It reveals that the variables are in fact not
cointegrated in both functional specifications when using both types of emissions. The
null hypotheses of no cointegration among all the panels are accepted. The complete
results can be checked in Table 33, which appears in Appendix B.1.2.
Table 29 - Unit root tests for variables used in the analysis
Variable Lags Im-Pesaran-Shin PesaranStatistic (t-bar) Statistic (t-bar)
Territorial 1.38 -3.05*** -1.86
Δ Territorial 1.31 -52.36*** -31.58***
Consumption 1.22 -1.88** 2.06
Δ Consumption 1.10 -37.71*** -6.25***
HDI 2.39 4.24 7.62
Δ HDI 1.17 6.21 5.55
ΔΔ HDI 1.12 -43.43*** -2.08***
Note: Number of panels=170 and 125 for consumption emissions;
***, ** Null significantly rejected at 0.01 and 0.05 levels,
respectively. Number of average lags obtained according to AIC
provided by the Im-Pesaran-Shin test.
Δ: Number of differences. All variables tested with constant. 
7.4.3. Results
Although the existence of cointegration has been ruled out in the relationship, the
presence of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence
precludes the use of fixed and random effects models. Consequently, as was done in
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the case of the carbon EKC analysis, the GLS Prais-Winsten regression method is
used to correct these problems and produce robust standard errors. Moreover, a panel-
specific first order autoregressive term is included in the specifications to address serial
correlation.
Table 30 shows the estimated coefficients derived from the regressions. The βs are
significant in all cases and display the expected signs. These are negative for the
specification that considers a saturation term and positive for the unbounded function.
In the latter case, the βs represent the carbon elasticity of human development.
At a global level, consumption-based emissions display slightly higher elasticities
(0.172) than territorial emissions (0.159), and this difference is statistically significant.
Moreover, consumption emissions are more closely correlated with HDI, as evidenced
by their higher goodness of fit (i.e. R2). The HDI-emissions relationship at a global level
is, in this manner, better described when emissions related to consumption are used.
Overall, these have tended to deliver slightly more benefits in terms of human
development than territorial emissions, although this does not always apply for
individual regions, as will be explained. These findings, in general, are consistent with
those obtained by Steinberger et al. (2012).
When using the longer territorial emissions dataset for the period 1980-2010, the
estimated coefficients are statistically significant and similar than those reported here
for both specifications. These results can be checked in Table 34 in Appendix B.1.2.
The fitted curves produced by the specification that includes the saturation term and
that pertaining to the unbounded function are similar in shape for the global dataset, as
can be seen in Figure 35a (page 195). However, the former presents a steeper slope at
low levels of CO2 per capita, while the latter shows a slightly steeper slope at high
levels. The same pattern was identified when using both types of emissions. It was
found, nonetheless, that the differences in the slopes are minimal when the curves are
estimated at a regional scale, although these are not shown here in graphic form.
Hence, the βs calculated with the unbounded specification can be deemed as
acceptable approximations of the carbon elasticity of human development for each of
the country groups.
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Table 30 - Prais-Winsten regression results according
to specification and types of emissions for all countries (1990-2010)
Region Coefficient Territorial ConsumptionSaturated Unbounded Saturated Unbounded
Global
β 
-0.246***
(-23.88)
0.159***
(134.93)
-0.272***
(-21.44)
0.172***
(301.67)
A -1.178***(-35.67)
-0.372***
(-26.92)
-1.138***
(-41.17)
-0.399***
(-34.02)
R2 0.668 0.741 0.729 0.773
Very high
human
development
β 
-0.172***
(-31.32)
0.046***
(24.14)
-0.206***
(-31.89)
0.058***
(33.69)
A -1.443(-38.08)
-0.220***
(-20.89)
-1.363***
(-40.89)
-0.244***
(-24.1)
R2 0.863 0.778 0.851 0.779
High human
development
β 
-0.072***
(-19.19)
0.035***
(13.51)
-0.091***
(-17.4)
0.044***
(13.71)
A -1.060***(-32.76)
-0.363***
(-23.42)
-1.059***
(-34.02)
-0.364***
(-24.37)
R2 0.925 0.886 0.939 0.885
Medium human
development
β 
-0.062***
(-33.34)
0.057***
(48.41)
-0.075***
(-21.48)
0.068***
(29.2)
A -0.819***(-55.34)
-0.503***
(-46.17)
-0.822***
(-56.81)
-0.503***
(-46.76)
R2 0.869 0.899 0.939 0.943
Low human
development
β 
-0.049***
(-10.87)
0.092***
(10.14)
-0.052***
(-6.71)
0.093***
(7.02)
A -0.577***(-59.45)
-0.674***
(-44.23)
-0.565***
(-33.08)
-0.705***
(-25.85)
R2 0.803 0.904 0.790 0.899
Note: t-stats are shown in parentheses. *** Significant at a 0.01 level. The estimated βs are
statistically different between territorial and consumption specifications. The null that
β(saturated)=β(unbounded) is rejected at a 0.01 level in all cases, except for the low-human-
development group in relation to both specifications.
As can be appreciated in Table 30, the elasticities have been larger on average in
those regions that possess lower levels of human development. Least developed
countries, for example, registered an elasticity of 0.092 for territorial emissions, while
very-high-development nations observed a value of 0.046. These values reflect the
position that these economies have occupied along the curve during the period; and
this, in turn, exposes their level of economic development. The less developed nations
are situated in the steeper segments of the curve, where small increments of CO2
provide higher improvements in human development, which explains their larger
elasticities. However, while countries become more industrialised during their economic
development process and their levels of consumption and income per capita rise, they
tend to generate more emissions. These rising emissions, in turn, gradually deliver
lower marginal improvements in standards of living over time. Very-high-development
nations, in this sense, have been positioned along the higher and flatter segments of
the curve that correspond to low elasticity values. This situation is illustrated graphically
in Figure 35b, which shows the estimated (i.e. fitted) unbounded curves for each
country group. As can be seen, each group has occupied a distinct and clear position
along the curve. It can thus be implied that as long as the current model of economic
development is followed, based on resource- and carbon-intensive economic growth,
nations will continue moving along the curve according to this pattern. In other words,
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improvements in HDI will continue being associated with rising emissions, unless this
relationship can be decoupled. In fact, relative decoupling has occurred, but this will be
further discussed in the following section.
Figure 35 - Estimated curves for HDI against CO2 territorial emissions per
capita (1990-2010) at a global level (a) and according to country groups (b)
(a) (b)
Source: Own graphs
The carbon elasticity of human development is slightly higher at a regional level when it
is estimated with consumption emissions. Least developed nations, however, constitute
the exception. Their territorial and consumption elasticities are equal from a statistical
point of view, reporting a value of 0.09. The same applies to the βs estimated using the
saturated specification. This suggests that both types of emissions have contributed in
a similar way to enhancing their HDI levels. Nevertheless, their consumption curve lies
slightly below their territorial one. This small gap, which is not presented here in
graphic form, is due to a lower estimated value for A (i.e. constant) in the consumption
specification, which is significantly different in statistical terms from the territorial one.
This gap was previously found by Steinberger et al. (2012) and complements the
results obtained in chapters 4 and 5. As was explained there, many of these nations
are not self-sufficient, particularly in the industrial and services sectors (see sections
4.3.3 and 5.3.1), and require importing a range of goods from other regions to satisfy
their needs. The gap between the curves, in this sense, shows that still more emissions
are required in these countries to enhance their standards of living when international
trade is taken into account. The rest of the regions, on the other hand, display larger
elasticities with consumption emissions, and the differences with respect to the
territorial elasticities are statistically significant. In the case of the very-high- and high-
human-development groups, the consumption elasticities are almost 20% larger, while
their consumption curves lie above their territorial ones. These countries, consequently,
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obtain more human development benefits via international trade. Regarding middle-
development economies, which include China, the estimated As (i.e. constants) are
equal from a statistical point of view when using both types of emissions, but the slope
of the consumption specification is slightly higher. This indicates that, on average,
these nations have also started to gain benefits from trade, although in a lesser extent
than their more developed counterparts.
At a regional scale, the saturated specification yielded, in general, a better goodness of
fit across the country groups. On the other hand, the R2s are very similar when using
territorial and consumption emissions. The medium-development group constitutes the
exception. In this case, consumption emissions produced a better fit.
In summary, the main findings presented in this section show that the carbon
elasticities of human development reflect the stages of economic development that
each country group has gone through during the period under study. Furthermore,
international trade has tended to deliver on average more development benefits to the
more developed economies. This is evidenced by the higher elasticities obtained for
these countries with the use of consumption-based emissions. This type of emissions,
moreover, correlates better with HDI on a global scale, although the differences are
minimal at the regional level.
7.5. Extrapolating HDI according to the RCPs
The second part of the analysis, as has been explained, consists in extrapolating HDI
into the future by using the already estimated carbon elasticities of human development
and the annual emissions described by the different concentration pathways. As has
been said, RCP3-PD is of special interest, since it specifies the amount of cumulative
emissions that are potentially compatible with the 2°C threshold in the long run.
RCP8.5, on the other hand, illustrates the business- or development-as-usual pathway.
The two remaining RCPs, 4.5 and 6, in turn, represent intermediate scenarios.
The results presented in the previous section evidence the positive and monotonic
relationship that exists between the HDI and CO2 emissions, as described by the
functional forms introduced in section 7.4.1. In other words, HDI has generally
expanded over time with rising emissions, and the extent to which this expansion has
occurred in different regions is given by the carbon elasticity of human development.
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However, these specific forms also imply an opposite outcome; that is to say, HDI can
fall with decreasing emissions. This possibility is patent under the RCP3-PD, which
entails a significant decline in CO2. If HDI levels depended entirely on an emissions-
intensive model of economic development that is unable to achieve any decoupling
with the use of technological, economic or social measures, then, ceteris paribus,
attaining the 2°C target could constrain or undermine the opportunities to improve living
standards among the global society. These reductions in HDI were calculated here so
as to illustrate this outcome. It must be kept in mind that these figures were obtained by
applying the historical carbon elasticities of human development and using the RCP3-
PD yearly emissions without introducing any measure of decoupling. As can be
appreciated in Table 31 (page 199), least developed nations would be the most
affected group, observing a decline of 11.59% in their HDI levels, which would drop on
average from 0.466 in 2012 to 0.412 in 2050; attaining a level similar to the one that
existed in the early 2000s. Very-high-human-development economies, in turn, would
constitute the second most affected region, due to the scale of their required cuts,
registering an average fall of 7.92%, going down from 0.905 to 0.833. Medium-
development countries, which possess a significant share of the carbon space, would
exhibit a plunge of 5.70%, with HDI levels dropping from 0.640 to 0.603. Meanwhile,
high-development nations would represent the least affected group with a fall of 3.43%
(from 0.758 to 0.731). These crude estimates reveal, on the one hand, the vulnerability
of least developed nations to changes in emissions due to their level of economic
development, depicted by their position along the curve. On the other hand, these
numbers illustrate the importance of achieving considerable decoupling rates in order
to significantly improve living standards across the world within the limits imposed by a
2°C target.
Steinberger and Roberts (2010) have revealed the existence of an ongoing process of
decoupling between HDI and CO2 emissions. This process is illustrated in Figure 36,
which shows that the fitted correlation curves have been shifting upwards over time.
This shift is analogous to a certain extent to the one described by Preston (1975) in
relation to income per capita and life expectancy. This process of decoupling indicates
that countries not only move along the curve during the different stages of economic
development, but they also tend to move continuously upwards, obtaining more
development benefits with the same amount of emissions. Following Preston’s line of
reasoning, it can be said that this behaviour is due to technological improvements, as
well as national, regional and global development policies, such as the MDGs.
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Figure 36 - Estimated correlations between
HDI and territorial CO2 emissions from 1980
to 2010
Source: Own figure
In order to take this decoupling process into account, the regression parameters (i.e. βs
and As) were estimated again, but this time including a dynamic saturation value
instead of a fixed one, like was done in the previous section. In this case, the
asymptote was determined a priori as HDIsat,gt=1.1*max(HDIgt); that is, it is given by the
maximum HDI value achieved in country group g at time t, multiplied by the 1.1 factor.
The saturation value was then projected for each country group up to 2050 according
to its historical average annual growth rate, limiting the maximum HDI value so it does
not exceed the unity. This procedure allows the estimated parameters to reflect the
upward shift of the HDI-emissions relationship that takes place over time. As can be
seen in Table 31, the saturation value (i.e. maximum HDI) grew on average 0.58%
annually in high-development nations, followed by very-high- (0.40%), medium-
(0.26%) and low-development countries (0.23%). This suggests that the process of
decoupling has been more emphasised in those economies that possess higher levels
of human development.
The parameters utilised to carry out the projections were estimated with territorial
emissions, since the RCPs do not include consumption-based figures. The results
derived from the regressions that involve the dynamic saturation term can be consulted
in Table 35, which is included in Appendix B.1.2. Yearly per capita emissions related to
each RCP were then used along with the projected saturation values in order to obtain
future HDI scores up to 2050. The results are presented in Table 31.
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
H
um
an
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ti
nd
ex
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
CO2 territorial emissions (tonnes of C per capita)
1980 1990
2000 2010
Chapter 7: Carbon and development spaces: Developing within limits 199
It can be appreciated that HDI manages to grow across all country groups under the
RCP3-PD when considering the historical rates of decoupling. Very-high- and high-
development economies register improvements on average of 10.08% and 26.43%,
respectively, in 2050 with regards to 2012. Their mean HDI levels thus achieve a value
that is close to 1, while utilising slightly more than half of the available carbon space
(see Figure 32 in section 7.2). However, the HDI in medium-development countries
shows a more modest progress, rising 8.43%, as can be seen in Figure 37a. It
advances from 0.640 in 2012 to 0.694 in 2050 by using 43.5% of the carbon space.
Least developed nations, on the other hand, remain stagnant throughout the whole
period, barely observing an expansion of 1.55%. This is illustrated in Figure 37b. Their
HDI scarcely grows from 0.466 to 0.474 with the use of 1.8% of the carbon space. The
lower expansions experienced by these two latter groups reflect their larger carbon
elasticities and lower rates of decoupling. It must be kept in mind that these projections
imply the continuity of the status quo; that is, the persistence of the existing economic,
social, institutional and technological conditions, which is entrenched in the allocation
of remaining carbon space by the RCP3-PD.
Table 31 - Percentage change in HDI according to different RCPs
Region RCP3-PD (nodecoupling)* RCP3-PD* RCP4.5* RCP6* RCP8.5*
Dynamic
saturation
value
(growth)**
Very high human
development -7.92% 10.08% 10.19% 10.30% 10.41% 0.40%
High human
development -3.43% 26.43% 29.30% 30.73% 31.44% 0.58%
Medium human
development -5.70% 8.43% 14.79% 17.49% 23.64% 0.26%
Low human
development -11.59% 1.55% 12.77% 17.74% 50.92% 0.23%
Cumulative
emissions (Gt,
2012-2050
249.22 249.22 404.75 399.63 552.46 ---
Temperature
increase (year
2100)***
1.3°C to 1.9°C 1.3°C to1.9°C
2.0°C to
2.9°C
2.5°C to
3.6°C
3.8°C to
5.7°C ---
Notes: * Refers to percentage change in 2050 with respect to 2012. ** Average annual growth rates. ***
Temperature ranges refer to likely average increase by the end of the century with respect to pre-industrial levels
(see: Rogelj et al., 2012; IPCC, 2013). Projections were estimated using a dynamic saturation term except for
RCP3-PD (no decoupling).
According to RCP8.5, which is more closely in track with the current emissions
trajectory (see: Peters et al., 2013), very-high and high-human development countries
achieve elevated levels of HDI that are close to 1. They register average improvements
of 10.41% and 31.44%, respectively. The rest of country groups also experiences a
significant expansion under this pathway. Medium-development economies attain an
HDI level of 0.791 in 2050, which is a score similar to the one currently held by the best
ranking high-development nations (see Figure 37a). This represents an enhancement
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of 23.64% with respect to 2012. Nonetheless, they utilise almost twice the emissions
(259 Gt) specified in the RCP3-PD to attain this level. Low development countries, in
turn, observe a considerable advancement of 50.92%. Their average HDI score rises to
0.704 in 2050, which is almost the current level enjoyed by some high-development
economies (see Figure 37b). This expansion requires almost three times the amount of
cumulative emissions (12.21 Gt) than those stipulated in the RCP3-PD. This figure is
relatively small when compared to the cumulative emissions used by the rest of the
country groups, and can thus be regarded as a positive sign. This suggests that the
standards of living can be significantly improved with a moderate amount of emissions
in least developed nations, although this fact has to be taken with caution. These
countries currently possess very low levels of emissions per capita (i.e. 0.11 tonnes on
average in 2010), and the projections assume that their historical carbon elasticity of
human development will maintain the same level in the future. However, under the
current patterns of economic development, it is expected that the elasticity will
decrease as they become more industrialised and income rises, implying a faster rise
in emissions and lower improvements in HDI.
The improvements achieved under RCP4.5 and RCP6 in each of the country groups
are very similar, since both pathways share almost the same annual emissions
trajectories up to 2050 (see Figure 2, page 19). Once again, the two most developed
groups attain HDI levels that are close to the unity, as can be seen in Table 31. Growth
rates of 10.19% and 10.30% on average are registered in very-high-development
economies for RCP4.5 and RCP6, respectively. In turn, high-development countries
observe average rises of 29.30% and 30.73%. In medium-development nations, both
pathways lead to mean HDI levels of around 0.740, which is equivalent to the current
level of the high-development group. Least developed nations, on the other hand,
register lower expansion rates of 14.79% and 17.49%. Their HDI, in this sense,
reaches scores of about 0.540 in 2050. Nonetheless, human development would
continue improving beyond 2050 under the RCP6 pathway, as emissions would
continue growing until peaking in 2080 (see Figure 2, page 19).
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Figure 37 - Projected HDI values according to different RCPs for Medium-
Human-Development (a) and Low-Human-Development countries (b)
(a) (b)
Source: Own graphs
On the whole, the results reveal some optimistic aspects. Very-high and high-
development countries can improve their human development levels even with a
significant decline in emissions, as long as they maintain their historical rates of
decoupling. This is particularly true in the case of the latter group, which manages to
obtain the highest relative improvements in HDI, as a result of having achieved the
highest levels of decoupling. It is, however, not certain if these nations can sustain
these same improvements with even greater emissions cuts; that is, with a smaller
carbon budget. This aspect was not considered in the study. Nonetheless, the results
suggest that they could still maintain average high development levels between 0.9 and
1 with a lower share of carbon space and, especially, if their rates of decoupling were
to be augmented even more over time. In relation to least developed countries, the
results suggest that they can considerably expand their HDI scores with a relatively
small amount of cumulative emissions. However, they are most sensitive to changes in
emissions, as a consequence of their current stage of economic development. Their
progress can thus be seriously constrained if they are just allowed to use 1.8% of the
available carbon space. Medium-development economies, on the other hand, require a
significant amount of emissions to deliver enhancements in human development. This
applies particularly to countries like China, which has relied on a highly carbon-
intensive model of development. It is in these nations were greater rates of decoupling
are required in order to improve the living standards of their populations within the
limits of the available carbon space.
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7.6. Summary and further remarks
This chapter explained to what extent human development can be improved in the
developing world within the limits of the available carbon space as defined by the
different RCPs. In this manner, it provided empirical answers to the fourth and last
research question proposed in this thesis. As was explained, the objective of the
analysis is not to develop an exact prediction or forecast of future human development
trends across different regions. Moreover, it does not seek to probe alternative
pathways or examine different approaches to allocate the available carbon space in a
more equitable manner between nations. Rather, this examination attempts to analyse
the consequences of maintaining the status quo; that is, the continuity of the existing
economic, social, institutional and technological conditions embodied in the current
model of economic development. The results from this analysis provide insights about
the magnitude of the problem and, more importantly, contribute to identifying and
highlighting the aspects and regions where action must be taken. The findings can also
help to develop alternative emission pathways that place a stronger emphasis on the
enhancement of human development within the confines of a carbon space compatible
with a 2°C target. Moreover, the evidence included in this chapter can as well inform
future climate negotiations at the global, regional and national levels.
The available carbon space was quantified in section 7.2 according the RCP3-PD
pathway, also known as RCP2.6, which describes a future emissions concentration
trajectory that is likely to avoid dangerous climate change in the long-run (van Vuuren
et al., 2007). The available space or total cumulative emissions, in this sense, amounts
to roughly 249 Gt of carbon when it is measured from 2013 to 2050. The space clearly
increases if it is estimated using alternative emissions scenarios, such as those
described by RCP4.5, RCP6 and RCP8.5. It is thus equivalent to slightly more than
400 Gt of carbon according to the first two pathways, and reaches approximately 550
Gt in the case of the latter. However, these trajectories are associated with mean
global temperatures that would likely exceed the 2°C threshold by the end of the
century.
Given the regional shares incorporated in the RCP3-PD pathway, it was determined
that very-high-human-development economies would hold more than a third (36.6%).
The high-human-development group would utilise 18.0%, while medium-development
nations would make use of 43.5%. Least developed countries, on the other hand,
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would be entitled to the remaining 1.8%. This allocation clearly contrasts with the
development needs of the different country groups. As was explained in section 7.3,
low-development nations currently possess an average HDI score that is almost half of
the one enjoyed by the highest ranking nations. Medium-development countries, in
turn, require expanding their scores by about 40% to attain those same levels. This is
worrying, as almost 70% of the global population live in these last two regions.
The carbon elasticities of human development were estimated in section 7.4 with the
use of Prais-Winsten panel data regressions in order to correct the presence of
heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence. The elasticities
were larger on average in those regions that possess lower levels of human
development, and they reflect the stages of economic development that the different
country groups have gone through during the period under study. The less developed
nations are situated in the steeper segments of the fitted curve, where small
increments of CO2 provide higher improvements in human development. In contrast,
very-high-development nations have been positioned along the higher and flatter
segments of the curve that correspond to low elasticity values. As long as this
development pattern persists, it can be implied that improvements in HDI will continue
being associated with rising emissions.
It was also found that international trade has generally provided more development
benefits to the very-high- and high-development economies. These nations show
higher average elasticities associated with their consumption-based emissions.
Moreover, the results reveal that this type of emissions correlates better with HDI on a
global scale, although the differences are minimal at the regional level.
The estimated elasticities and the annual emissions described by the different RCPs
were then used to extrapolate HDI into the future. The projections reveal some positive
aspects. Very-high- and high-development economies manage to obtain elevated
levels of human development under the RCP3-PD pathway, when historical rates of
decoupling are considered. This suggests that it is possible for them to transfer more
carbon space to the countries that need it the most without sacrificing a high-
development status. The extent to which this can be done was not modelled here, but
this stresses the importance of undertaking deeper abatement (or decoupling) efforts in
industrialised nations so as to free more carbon space. These emissions could then be
used particularly by least developed countries, which are sensitive to changes in CO2.
The findings indicate that they can significantly enhance their living standards with a
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relatively small amount of cumulative emissions. However, this requires an
enhancement of their historical rates of decoupling and modifying their patterns of
economic development. It is crucial for them not to follow the same development paths
pursued by the rest of the country groups. Medium-development countries, like China
and other big emerging economies, have done so, basing their economies on a highly
carbon-intensive model of development. As a consequence, they will keep requiring a
significant share of carbon space in the future, unless they start taking immediate
actions.
The following chapter focuses on discussing the results presented in this thesis.
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Discussion
This chapter offers a discussion of the main results presented in the last four chapters.
These findings provide an evidence base to answer each of the research questions
proposed in this thesis. Chapter 4 focused on testing the carbon EKC from a
consumption-based approach. The evidence conclusively rejects the validity of the
hypothesis for CO2 emissions. Chapter 5 analysed the extent to which developing
countries can be affected in terms of losses in value added and wages to skilled and
unskilled labour due to mitigation-induced reductions in imports in industrialised
economies. The findings revealed that while these actions can free carbon space, they
can also lead to negative developmental consequences in the developing world via
international trade. Chapter 6 quantified the amount of emissions that could be
captured by a BCA scheme and examined which regions could be potentially affected
by its implementation. The results show that the breadth of the scheme can be
significantly limited by the existing trade agreements, although it can cause distortions
in trade flows and curtail the developing process in the South. Finally, Chapter 7
concentrated on examining how much improvement in human development can be
achieved across different regions within the limits of the available carbon space. The
examination revealed that given the continuity of the status quo, an emissions pathway
compatible with a 2°C target can prove to be too stringent to allow developing nations
to significantly improve their standards of living. These findings are discussed here in
the light of the existing literature, while focusing on their academic and policy
implications. Section 8.1 discusses the income-emissions relationship from a
consumption-based approach. Section 8.2 then focuses on the North-South divide and
the patterns of unequal exchange. Section 8.3 talks about the trade-off that exists
between demand-side mitigation actions and the attainment of global development.
The issue of taxing imports at the border is then examined in section 8.4. The dilemma
of developing within limits is finally discussed in section 8.5. The conclusions drawn
from this discussion will be reserved for the following and final chapter.
8.1. The income-emissions relationship from a consumption-
based approach
As has been stated by authors like Ekins (1997) and Rothman (1998), analysing the
EKC hypothesis from a consumption-based approach provides valuable insights into
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the long standing discussion about the sources of human impact on the environment.
By shifting the attention from production activities as the origin of environmental
impacts, as has traditionally been done in EKC studies, consumption is revealed to
have an important role in shaping the relationship between affluence and
environmental degradation. Conducting a robust and comprehensive analysis from this
perspective in the case of carbon had been difficult due to data availability. However,
by using the set of global time series developed by Peters et al. (2011b), this study
contributes by shedding light upon the academic debate regarding the validity of the
carbon EKC. In this manner, conclusive evidence was produced to reject the existence
of the hypothesised inverted-U curve. Income and carbon emissions have not shown
signs of having decoupled over time. The findings indicate that while nations become
wealthier, their emissions tend to rise monotonically, associated with the consumption
of a higher amount of goods produced in foreign regions.
In methodological terms, one of the messages conveyed in Chapter 4 is the possibility
of obtaining a variety of different fits. As was shown throughout the exposition, several
curves can be fitted with the use of different panel-data methods. The selection of a
particular fit, therefore, has to be decided with caution. The utilisation of a particular
model or method cannot be solely based, for example, on producing the best R2 value,
but rather on a series of other considerations. As was explained in the literature review
chapter, numerous authors have warned about the various econometric shortcomings
and inconsistencies that commonly affect EKC analyses (e.g. Stern et al., 1996;
Millimet et al., 2003; Perman and Stern, 2003; Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh, 2005; Müller-
Fürstenberger and Wagner, 2007; Romero-Ávila, 2008; Wagner, 2008; Vollebergh et
al., 2009; Stern, 2010). In line with some of the recommendations proposed by the
aforementioned authors, the present study followed a rigorous approach, explained
step by step, in order to choose an adequate model and technique based on the nature
of the data. A series of statistical tests were conducted to find the most appropriate
methods to avoid producing biased or spurious results.
When correcting for heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-country correlation,
the estimated coefficients revealed one of the most noticeable findings. The
consumption-based curve exhibits a steeper slope than the territorial one at higher
levels of income, thus possessing a higher turning point. This goes in line with the
evidence presented previously by Aldy (2005), Peters and Hertwich (2008a) and, more
specifically, by Wagner (2010). The latter used a similar GLS method but applied to
energy use. These authors also found higher peaks for consumption emissions, some
Chapter 8: Discussion 207
of them situated out of the sample range, but these are lower than those estimated in
this thesis. The coefficients estimated here suggest that both types of emissions have
increased monotonically with income, evidenced by their out-of-sample peaks (see
section 4.3.3). This is consistent with the conclusions offered by Bagliani et al. (2008a)
and Bagliani et al. (2008b), who found that the ecological footprint and income per
capita follow a monotonically increasing trend. As can be appreciated in Figure 8 (page
46), the behaviour of this indicator can be explained to a large extent by the carbon
footprint.
The results were further substantiated when the estimated parameters were freed from
the assumption of slope homogeneity and when the long-term relationship between
income and emissions was calculated (see: Perman and Stern, 2003; Dijkgraaf and
Vollebergh, 2005). Similarly to Bagliani et al. (2008b) and Wagner (2010), it was found
that the variables in a number of panels share the same order of integration and thus
share a common long-term trend. Cointegrating regressions were subsequently run for
each individual country according to the procedures proposed by Pesaran and Smith
(1995) and Westerlund (2007). A significant quadratic term was not found in the
majority of nations, implying that income and both types of emissions have followed, in
general, a linear trend in the long-run. Once again, consumption-based CO2 presented
a steeper slope. In fact, the long-term income elasticity of carbon shows that when
income per capita grew by 1% during 1990-2010, consumption emissions per capita
increased on average by 0.75%; a rise mainly led by net importing countries. This
figure is higher than the estimate obtained for territorial emissions of 0.53%, which is
very close to the one found by York (2012) for the period 1960-2008, although he did
not use income data based on PPP (also see: Steinberger and Krausmann, 2011).
The cointegrating regressions also showed that consumption-based emissions tend to
adjust around 20% faster to their long-term trend after short-term disturbances in GDP,
as expressed by the error correction terms. The speed of adjustment estimated here
for territorial emissions is consistent with the one found by Martı́nez-Zarzoso and
Bengochea-Morancho (2004). However, this is the first time that this figure has been
estimated for consumption emissions. This finding reflects the textbook argument that
consumption is sensitive to anticipated changes in personal income (see: Flavin, 1981).
In the face of adverse economic conditions, consumption tends to slow down, followed
by production. During the 2008/2009 crisis, for example, private consumption in
industrialised countries suffered a strong contraction, and their demand for imported
goods fell significantly. As explained by Peters et al. (2012), this pushed consumption
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emissions down in Annex B nations (-8.4%), more than territorial CO2 (-7.0%).
Moreover, consumption is an important driver to stimulate economic growth.
Governments try to boost private and public consumption as soon as possible during a
recession with fiscal and monetary policies to avert a crisis. Production (i.e. territorial)
emissions, on the other hand, as suggested by York (2012), are more constrained by
inertia and lock-in effects in the face of changes in GDP. These facts may explain why
consumption-based emissions tend to be more reactive to variations in income per
capita and, hence, return more quickly to their long-term equilibrium than production
emissions.
Chapter 4 also highlighted that the poorest countries were net importers of emissions
during the period. This fact was later reinforced with the findings presented in Chapter
5, which showed that least developed nations import emissions related to agriculture
and industry. This is a fact that has been seldom highlighted in the literature, since it
has mainly focused on the industrialised world. Only a few existing studies have
revealed additional evidence in this respect. Steinberger et al. (2012), as explained in
Chapter 7, obtained statistical proof along these lines. However, more analyses are
hard to find. This is a topic that requires further consideration due to its policy
implications. More attention should be paid, specifically, to the economics literature, as
it has shown that least developed economies are not self-sufficient in certain economic
activities and, consequently, are obliged to import goods from other regions (see: Ng
and Aksoy, 2008). UNCTAD (2012), for instance, has found that poor African nations
are net importers of renewable resources (i.e. biomass). More about the situation of
least developed countries will be discussed later in this chapter.
The findings also show that only 35 nations out of 129, mostly middle-income (e.g.
China, India, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa), were net exporters of emissions during
the whole period 1990-2010 (see section 4.3.3). Apart from least developed and
industrialised nations, many other countries have become or are on track to become
net importers of emissions, as evidenced by the estimated long-term trends. As has
been explained by Peters et al. (2012), developing nations registered in 2009 higher
consumption-based emissions in absolute terms than industrialised countries for the
first time (see Figure 9, page 49). In fact, consumption emissions rose considerably
from 1990 to 2010 in the South. These grew, for example, more than 120% in China
and more than 70% in India. This reflects the significant six-fold increase that Southern
nations registered in final consumption expenditure from 1970 to 2011 (see Figure 7a,
page 44). More and more people in the developing world are demanding the same type
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of goods than in wealthy countries, such as cars, clothing, mobile phones, etc., and this
is having a significant impact in the environment (Hubacek et al., 2007). Their annual
consumption expenditure, as stated in section 2.2.1, is still expected to triple in 2025
with respect to 2010, an expansion mainly fuelled by the big emerging economies
(Dobbs et al., 2012; UNDP, 2013). This means that their import requirements will also
grow and, as a consequence, their consumption emissions are expected to continue
along the same trend over the forthcoming years.
8.2. The North-South divide and unequal exchange
Chapter 5 described a clear picture of the divide that exists between Northern and
Southern countries in terms of their production structures and their stages of economic
and human development. As discussed in the previous section, industrialised nations
have the highest levels of income per capita and consumption, which have supported
their very high standards of living. However, they have attained this status at the
expense of exerting a significant stress on the environment. As stated in section 2.2.1
(see Table 4, page 43), these economies consume 3.2 times more energy and 2.3
times more materials per capita than the rest of the world (Fischer-Kowalski and
Haberl, 2007; Haberl et al., 2011). Accordingly, they also generate 3.4 times more
emissions per person (see section 4.1). These consumption patterns are manifested in
the global production structure. Very-high-human-development economies produce
annually around 75% of the total value added in the world, measured in conventional
economic terms, and this reflects a profound disparity. High- and medium-development
economies create almost the remaining fourth, while least developed countries are
responsible for barely 1%.
Analysing the content of value added that is embodied in trade allowed acquiring a
better understanding of the global production structure than by using traditional trade
indicators. It also permitted a better calculation of the magnitude of trade flows and
determining the role that different regions play along the intricate networks of the global
supply chain. The escalating process of production fragmentation that has been taking
place across different geographical regions has reshaped the global division of labour
(see: Athukorala, 2005; Jones and Kierzkowski, 2005; Lanz et al., 2011). As explained
in section 2.4.2, this has made necessary to determine how much value each
economic sector in each country contributes during the production process.
Conventional trade indicators are limited in this respect, since they assume that a
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product is entirely manufactured in the country of origin. By assessing the trade in
value added, the findings indicate, for example, that the US trade deficit with China is
reduced by around 45% when using this method than when employing traditional trade
statistics. This illustrates China’s real participation in the global value chain. Not all the
exports from that country are entirely manufactured within its territory, but it has rather
specialised in certain tasks. The US shortfall against the EU27, in turn, increases by
around 12%, since many intermediate goods and factors of production of European
origin are contained in final products assembled elsewhere. These findings are in line
with those obtained by IDE-JETRO and WTO (2011) and Stehrer (2012), although they
vary slightly due to methodological and temporal differences.
The trade patterns identified in the analysis show that almost 40% of the total value
added in agriculture is embedded in trade, while in industry this figure reaches 30%.
This estimate is similar to the 27% obtained by Daudin et al. (2011), who used GTAP
data for 1997, 2001 and 2004. Moreover, the examination revealed that very-high-
human-development economies are in general net importers of value added. By
consuming large amounts of foreign resources and a wide range of products, they thus
tend to consume wealth from other regions via international trade. The rest of the
world, in contrast, is a net exporter of value added. However, a closer inspection of the
sectoral composition of trade exposed important characteristics of the global production
structure and, more specifically, of the trade relationships between different regions. As
expressed by Daudin et al. (2011), this procedure is useful to determine “who produces
what and for whom”. The picture that emerged from the analysis resembles to a certain
extent the patterns of unequal exchange described by the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis
(Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950). In accordance with these authors, the findings
presented in Chapter 5 show that the North or core (i.e. very-high-human-development
nations) specialises in capital- and skilled-labour-intensive goods. These economies
are net exporters of value added in heavy industry and services. Moreover, they are
net exporters of skilled labour in almost every economic activity (see section 5.3). The
South or periphery (i.e. developing countries), on the other hand, focuses on low-
capital- and unskilled-labour-intensive products. As has been explained, these
countries are on average net exporters of value added in the agricultural, mining and
light-industry sectors. In addition, they hold positive trade balances in relation to
unskilled labour in the same activities, especially in the case of medium-development
nations. These North-South trade flows suggest that a pattern of unequal exchange still
persists. However, understanding if these flows have translated into a worsening of the
terms of trade over the years in the developing world is uncertain (see section 2.4.1).
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The validity of the hypothesis has been contended in the literature (Hadass and
Williamson, 2003), but it is out of the scope of this thesis to test it. Nonetheless, these
findings are consistent with what other authors have observed, such as Stehrer (2012).
He obtained similar evidence in relation to employment, although his analysis was not
done at a sectoral level. In relation to material flows, other researchers have reached
similar conclusions about the trade asymmetries between the North and the South (e.g.
Muradian and Martinez-Alier, 2001; Bringezu et al., 2004; Giljum, 2004; Giljum and
Eisenmenger, 2004; Muñoz et al., 2011).
The existence of an unequal exchange between Northern and Southern nations evokes
the long-standing discussion about the benefits of free trade. Upon this situation, a
possible action would be to impose trade barriers, as prescribed by the structuralists, in
order to protect domestic industries from foreign competition. However, implementing
this model seems almost unthinkable in an era of increasing globalisation, and
especially under the framework of the WTO. Nonetheless, many industrialised nations
currently make use of antidumping duties and subsidies to shield some economic
activities, like agriculture (see: Kee et al., 2011). Furthermore, the import-substitution
schemes implemented in the 1970s proved to be ineffective in promoting
industrialisation, since they led to low levels of productivity and competitiveness (Baer,
1972; Bruton, 1998). On the other hand, a more extreme measure, like autarky, would
have a negative impact on social welfare (Samuelson, 1962; Irwin, 2005).
Although the North-South asymmetries described above are of concern, there are
signs of improvement. By gradually integrating their economies to the global markets,
developing countries have increased their share in world trade from 25% to 47%
between 1980 and 2010 and their share of total output from 33% to 45% (UNDP,
2013). This has been associated with a significant expansion of consumption and with
improvements in human development. Studies, like the ones conducted by Davies and
Quinlivan (2006) and UNDP (2013), indicate that increases in trade are positively
correlated with enhancements in well-being. However, developing nations, and
especially the big emerging economies, need to avoid falling into the middle-income
trap (see: Paus, 2012). In other words, they require being able to surpass the middle-
income threshold and achieve higher levels of human development. Acquiring this
ability involves shifting their current comparative advantages, based on resource
extraction and cheap labour, towards the attainment of higher levels of productivity and
innovation. This would allow them to break the North-South imbalance, reduce their
dependency and secure more benefits from trade. As was explained in section 5.5,
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developing nations, and specifically the least developed, currently capture a lower
share of value and wages domestically for every dollar of exported goods than their
developed counterparts. These efforts, however, imply undergoing a deep process of
structural transformation. More importantly, they require doing it in a sustainable
manner (see: UNCTAD, 2012). The results presented in section 5.5 show that high-
and medium-development nations are highly carbon-intensive (i.e. 0.94 and 1.32 kg of
CO2 per dollar of final demand, respectively), an element that has contributed to
enhancing their comparative advantages. Such an industrialisation pathway, based on
resource extraction, unskilled labour and carbon-intensive activities, can only reinforce
the existing asymmetries and lead to economic stagnation and more pollution in the
long-run. In this sense, these countries require higher investments on productivity
growth, education, health, technological capabilities, among others, in order to advance
to higher echelons of economic and human development within the limits of the
available carbon space.
8.3. Demand-side mitigation and global development: the trade-
off
The available carbon space, defined as the amount of cumulative emissions
compatible with the achievement of a 2°C target, is decreasing at a fast rate. As has
been argued in section 8.1, emissions and particularly those associated with
consumption have tended to rise monotonically while countries transit through the
different stages of economic development. Higher levels of income per capita are
coupled with a higher utilisation of resources and energy. As illustrated by the IPAT
identity in section 2.3.1 and implicitly reflected in the results obtained from the carbon
EKC analysis, the pace of technological change has not been enough to offset the
emissions associated with the rise in population and affluence (see: Beder, 1994;
Schor, 2005; Flavin and Engelman, 2009; Jackson, 2009). As expressed by authors
like Huesemann (2006, p. 539), technology will be able to deliver the required cuts
“only if population and economic growth are halted without delay”. This statement is
aligned with the ideas of steady-state economics (Daly, 1974) and the degrowth
movement (Latouche, 2006), which believe that the scale of many economies,
particularly the industrialised, has become unsustainable and consumption must thus
be kept constant or downscaled. In this sense, demand-side measures aimed at
changing/reducing consumption are deemed as essential to complement technology-
led actions in order to lessen the environmental pressures and prevent dangerous
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climate change in the long-run. The findings presented in Chapter 5 reveal, however,
that curbing final demand for imports involves an important trade-off. While demand-
side actions implemented in the North can contribute to reduce emissions and free
carbon space, they can also curtail the development opportunities available to the
global South. Developing countries, who have adopted free-market policies and export-
led models of growth, depend on the revenue and employment generated by their
exporting sectors. Consequently, their development processes can be affected by a
lower volume of trade under the current model of economic development.
Estimating the labour productivity of carbon (see section 5.5) is useful to understand
the underlying mechanism that explains the impacts on value added and skilled and
unskilled wages in the global South derived from changes in final demand registered in
the North. Moreover, this indicator reveals the sensitivity of different regions and
economic sectors to demand-driven mitigation actions, since it expresses the amount
of wages to skilled and unskilled labour that are associated with every unit of
emissions. To the best of the author’s knowledge, no other studies in the literature
have estimated this indicator using this particular method, although multiplier analysis
is a common technique used within the input-output framework (e.g. Lenzen et al.,
2004; Lin et al., 2012). The analysis on the labour productivity of carbon showed that
low-human-development nations are on average the most sensitive group to Northern
demand-side mitigation actions. More specifically, they are vulnerable in relation to
agriculture. For instance, mitigating one kilogram of CO2 by reducing the demand of
agricultural imports from these countries could yield losses of 1.4 dollars in wages to
unskilled labour and 6 cents to skilled labour. These figures, however, have to be
considered with caution, as non-CO2 emissions (e.g. N2O, CH4 and fluorinated gases)
were not included in the analysis. These represent around 25% of total GHGs (see
section 2.1.1). The results produced in this chapter would therefore vary if these gases
had been taken into account, particularly in the case of agriculture.
The study also showed the magnitude of the impacts in different developing-country
groups derived from cuts in final demand for imports in the North, so as to reduce the
latter’s consumption-based emissions (see section 5.7). As has been said, least
developed nations are specifically sensitive to changes in their exports of agricultural
products, but also of those related to mining. In turn, the medium-development group,
to which China belongs, is more sensitive in the case of industrial activities. For
instance, reductions of 1.5% in total final demand for imports of light industrial products
manufactured in these countries are required in industrialised nations to bring their total
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consumption emissions by 1%. As a consequence, total value added, which is
analogous to GDP, would fall by 5.9% in medium-development nations, while their total
wages to skilled and unskilled labour would drop by 3.7% and 7.7%, respectively.
These figures cannot be compared to other examples in the literature, as they are
virtually nonexistent. Mattoo et al. (2011a) conducted one of the very few related
studies, which analysed how changes in the price for carbon could affect
industrialisation in the developing world by using a general equilibrium model. With all
the caveats involved, it could be said that the findings presented in this thesis are in
line with theirs. The authors equally found that carbon-intensive countries, like China
and India, would be mainly affected. They determined that drops of 9% to 11% in
manufacturing exports due to higher carbon prices were associated with falls of 6% to
7% in output. Moreover, they estimated that aggregate welfare in low- and middle-
income nations would fall by around 2%. Changes in total utility or well-being were not
estimated in this thesis, due to methodological reasons. Nonetheless, it can be implied
that a drop in GDP of about 6% with associated declines in total payments to unskilled
labour would bring a rise in unemployment rates, lower levels of consumption and
investment, and ultimately a deterioration of social welfare.
As was explained in Chapter 5, value added and wages to skilled and unskilled
workers were used in this thesis as proxies for development indicators, as they are
relevant for promoting economic growth and improving welfare. Assessing wider
potential impacts on human development, however, would have required utilising a
range of other indicators for life expectancy, education attainment, etc. As explained in
section 3.2.2, this would have demanded data at a sector-level consistent with an
MRIO framework, but unfortunately information at this degree of disaggregation is not
available. While the proxy variables used here provide a partial view of the effects
caused by Northern demand-side mitigation actions on the global development
process, they offer valuable insights regarding the magnitude and direction of the
potential impacts. On the whole, the findings indicate that mitigation-driven reductions
in final demand can effectively put at risk the developmental processes taking place in
the South.
The evidence presented in Chapter 5, however, should not be interpreted as a
justification to preserve the current levels of consumption, particularly in industrialised
nations, given the threats that developing countries would face otherwise. A case has
been robustly made in the literature regarding the pressing necessity to make
consumption more sustainable (e.g. UN, 1992; Lintott, 1998; Jackson, 2005; Mont and
Chapter 8: Discussion 215
Plepys, 2008). Developed countries, in this sense, should make efforts to modify their
consumption patterns and even reduce their overall consumption. For this reason,
recognising the potential impacts and the vulnerability of different country groups to
lower levels of Northern demand is important, as it can help to better inform policy
decisions. This examination represents an initial approach to the problem and
evidences the risks that are involved if these actions were to be taken unilaterally
without a deeper understanding about their potential consequences. More research is
thus needed to determine how the impacts identified here can be hampered. For
example, it would be useful to identify carbon-intensive imports that can be safely
substituted or whose consumption can be discouraged. Some lessons could also be
learned about existing programmes, such as Fair Trade, which seek to ensure better
trading conditions and promote sustainability in the South (Le Mare, 2008). In spite of
the criticisms received by these programmes (see: Renard, 2005; Getz and Shreck,
2006), labelling and certification schemes could be designed to assist local producers
to manufacture products in a less carbon intensive manner and inform consumers
about both the carbon content of those goods and their importance to the livelihoods of
those who produce them.
Ameliorating the impacts on developing countries also imply strengthening their
domestic markets. As was argued in section 8.1, this has been gradually taking place,
especially in high- and medium-human-development nations. Consumption expenditure
per capita has grown significantly along with an enlargement of the middle classes. For
example, according to Kharas (2010), the middle classes in developing Asian
economies are expected to double by 2020. The UNDP (2013) estimates that the
South will account for three-fifths of the one billion households earning more than
$20,000 dollars per year in 2025. Special attention, however, has to be given to least
developed nations. As has been said, they are generally not self-sufficient in certain
economic activities and are consequently dependent on trade and aid from the
industrialised world. Moreover, as stated in section 2.1.1, future climate variability will
aggravate their ongoing social and economic situations, thus increasing their
vulnerability and exacerbating their already limited economic and technological
capacities to adapt (Yohe and Tol, 2002; Adger et al., 2003; Reid et al., 2010). A case
can thus be made, based on the results presented in this thesis, to exempt them from
the application of demand-side mitigation actions taken in the North.
South-South trade can also contribute to reduce the dependency of the developing
world. As explained in section 2.4.4, this has become the fastest growing segment of
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world trade, more than tripling between 1980 and 2011. In addition, intra-South FDI
grew on average 20% per annum from 1996 to 2009 (UNCTAD, 2011). More efforts,
however, are still required to integrate more countries. Furthermore, it is vital to ensure
that the exploitation patterns followed in the past by industrialised nations are not
repeated (Mol, 2011).
More importantly, developing nations require undertaking more efforts to make their
production processes cleaner, more productive and more resource-efficient, particularly
in the case of high- and medium-human-development economies. As was explained in
the previous section, these countries cannot continue supporting their development
strategies on cheap labour- and carbon-intensive production if they wish to move
beyond the middle-income threshold while staying below the limits of the available
carbon space. Achieving this goal, however, is not easy. As stated by Khor (2011), the
broad, one-size-fits-all development prescriptions traditionally formulated by
international organisations in the past have proved to be ineffective. Development
strategies therefore need to be designed according to the needs and characteristics of
specific countries. Nonetheless, this would in general require much higher investments
in capacity building and innovation, poverty reduction, technology transfer, international
support, fair trading rules, and a strong developmental state, among others. In a few
words, as stated by Ocampo (2002) and Chang (2011) it is necessary to start
rethinking development.
8.4. Taxing imports at the border
Chapter 6 focused on the specific case of BCAs. This specific policy instrument was
chosen to be analysed in this thesis since discussions are happening in some Annex I
countries about their potential implementation. The US, in particular, has been
considering this option in more serious terms. Its congress has expressed that it will not
approve an emissions trading scheme without a provision for BCAs. Proponents argue
that this policy instrument ensures the competitiveness of domestic industries and thus
levels the playing field with respect to nations that are not bound to legal emissions-
reduction commitments. Many developing countries, however, have opposed their
implementation, asserting that they contravene not only the spirit of free trade, but also
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (Holmes et al., 2011;
Kaufmann and Weber, 2011). In other words, they shift climate change mitigation costs
onto the developing world, who should carry less onerous abatement obligations
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(Davidson Ladly, 2012). Moreover, it has raised concerns in some developing regions,
as it is believed that they can distort trade flows and thus affect the well-being of their
societies (Schneider and Samaniego, 2010).
Much of the existing literature on BCAs has focused on discussing their legal aspects
and their compatibility with the WTO framework (e.g. Holmes et al., 2011; Monjon and
Quirion, 2011; Sheldon, 2011). Moreover, considerable work has been done to assess
their ability to address competitiveness issues and avoid carbon leakage (e.g. Kuik and
Hofkes, 2010; Dissou and Eyland, 2011; Bednar-Friedl et al., 2012; Böhringer et al.,
2012). However, there has been insufficient research to determine which and to what
extent particular developing regions could be mostly affected. Moreover, to the best of
the author’s knowledge, no studies have been conducted to calculate the potential
scope of this policy instrument; that is, the amount of emissions that could be covered
by such as a scheme (see section 2.3.3). This particular study, in this sense,
contributes to the literature by analysing these two last issues.
The results reveal that the potential amount of CO2 emissions that could be taxed
under a BCA scheme that involved all Annex B countries (i.e. carbon-priced
economies) using data for 2007 corresponds to approximately 18.3% of their total
consumption-based emissions (see Figure 28, page 168). This figure represents
almost 55% of the CO2 embodied in their imports. Almost two thirds of these emissions
are from medium-human-development nations, and to be precise, mostly from China.
However, the analysis showed that this scope can be significantly limited by the
existing trade agreements embodied in the WTO framework. As was explained, a
number of issues influence the potential breadth of the scheme, such as GATT’s
provision of non-discrimination, the inclusion of elaborate finished goods, and sectoral
and country exemptions.
In order to ensure a fair and similar treatment than domestic products, a fraction of
emissions cannot be taxed since they are not covered under the operating carbon-
pricing schemes (i.e. Kyoto, EU ETS). In this sense, only 45% of the total imported
emissions could be legally included. Around half of this proportion corresponds to
economic sectors that are considered to be as particularly at risk from foreign
competition and carbon leakage (i.e. lime and cement, basic iron and steel, refined
petroleum, aluminium, basic chemicals, and pulp and paper). These are the emissions
that could more likely be considered in future schemes to address concerns raised by
those particular industries (Stephenson and Upton, 2009). However, as can be seen,
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this would involve just a small portion of the CO2 contained in imports. Almost the rest
of the remaining emissions are associated with the generation of electricity. Its
inclusion is problematic, since it would require calculating the amount of indirect
electricity emissions generated along the production process. According to Ismer and
Neuhoff (2007), this is complicated in technical terms particularly when integrated
electricity systems are involved, as the origin of specific electricity inputs are difficult to
track. However, as noted by Monjon and Quirion (2010), the effectiveness of a BCA
scheme would be undermined if electricity was not taken into account, especially for
electricity-intensive sectors that are exposed to international competition, such as
aluminium. A similar problem applies to the case of intermediate goods, which
comprise about two thirds of all these emissions. Estimating the direct and indirect
carbon content of basic commodities like the ones described above is already complex,
but calculating it for more elaborate products or finished products of different origin,
such as cars or heavy equipment, can be even more challenging. A robust
administrative system and a comprehensive and transparent carbon accounting
procedure would be required. This, nonetheless, would elevate the costs and the
complexity of managing the scheme. Winchester (2012), for example, has highlighted
that a system of this nature would need to produce regular updates of the carbon
content of different products. Asking exporters to provide certified information on the
carbon embodied in their goods can imply a heavy burden, specifically for small
producers. Applying a rigid rate, on the other hand, could be considered as a fixed
import or anti-dumping tariff, irresponsive to improvements in carbon intensity. This
could, on the one hand, reduce the effectiveness of the tax in encouraging producers to
modify their practices and, on the other, could be contested by the exporting countries,
generating trade disputes within the WTO.
The scheme, however, is even more constrained when the BAT principle is accounted
for in compliance with the provision of non-discrimination. By assuming that imports are
manufactured with at least the best technology available in the region of destination,
the scope of the scheme is reduced significantly. The results from this analysis indicate
that at most 10% of total emissions embedded in imports could be covered if this was
the case, without taking into account the issues related to electricity and intermediates.
Currently, the EU computes product-specific benchmarks to allocate free allowances
based on the average of the 10% European plants with the lowest emissions. These
have been proposed as potential BATs. Nevertheless, they do not account for indirect
emissions due to electricity and, as has been said, this factor could compromise the
breadth of the BCA scheme. Monjon and Quirion (2010, p. 5204) recognise the
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limitations imposed by BATs and acknowledge that BCAs would have minimal effects
in they were considered. They state that in many cases BATs entail very low carbon
intensities and offer two examples: “steel made with sustainable charcoal in Brazil or of
aluminium made with hydropower in Canada”. In the face of these possibilities,
products would have to be benchmarked against a technology that is similar to the one
used to produce them. This, again, would increase the intricacy of the scheme. The
other option proposed by these authors would be to exclude some technologies from
the BATs. More research, in this sense, is needed to analyse how different product
benchmarks affect the effectiveness of BCAs.
Based on the aforementioned results, different tariffs rates were estimated for the
regions included in the study using an illustrative carbon price of $50 dollars per tonne
of CO2 (see section 6.3). Although this price would need to increase in the future in
order to encourage deeper emissions reductions, Atkinson et al. (2011, p. 572) believe
that it is compatible with “a fairly ambitious” reduction target for highly-developed
economies in the short-run. For the purpose of this research, this price is useful to
show the scale that BCAs could reach in different regions. The rates calculated here
are very similar to the ones produced by these authors. The tariffs could reach around
8.9% for medium- and 2.8% for low-human-development countries when all sectors are
included. Atkinson and his colleagues, for instance, estimated a rate of 9.2% for
Chinese exports to the EU. Additional rates were calculated in this thesis according to
the criteria that has been discussed (i.e. including electricity, intermediates, BATs,
etc.), which has not been done in other studies. The tariffs could reach up to 12.3%
and 2.9% for the same groups of countries if only trade exposed sectors were covered.
These tax burdens can potentially distort trade flows and affect the demand for imports,
as they would translate into higher prices paid by consumers (see: Grubb, 2011). The
consumer price of exports from medium-development countries, and particularly China,
would go up proportionally by 12%. When applying BATs, however, the rates are much
lower. They become 1.2% and 0.6% for medium- and low-development nations,
respectively. As can be implied, the effectiveness of the BCA scheme would be
reduced, as well as its impact on the exporting countries.
These tariff rates can potentially affect the welfare of the developing world. The results
show that the most carbon-intensive nations, such as China and South Africa, could
receive the largest impacts in terms of losses in GDP and wages to skilled and
unskilled labour. If BCAs induced a contraction in final demand for imports of around
1%, consumption-based emissions in the priced region would decline by 2.7%. This
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would lead to a drop in GDP of about 2.8% in medium-development countries, with
associated reductions of 1.6% and 2.8% in wages to skilled and unskilled labour. It
must be noted, nonetheless, that these figures are valid from a partial equilibrium
approach, but could change if prices had been considered. Changes in prices could
potentially lead to a substitution for other types of imported products or for imports from
less carbon-intensive regions, although this is difficult to tell. Despite this caveat, the
findings presented here are consistent with the arguments provided by Dong and
Whalley (2009) and Lin and Li (2011), who believe that China’s imports would register
a fall and this could ultimately affect the country’s regional development policy.
Moreover, if the carbon price increased beyond 50$ dollars per tonne, the tariffs would
rise proportionally, aggravating the impacts on different regions. The repercussions,
however, could be subdued if the revenues obtained from the BCA scheme were
remitted back to the exporting countries in the form of aid, technology transfer or
assistance for adaptation efforts. This would be particularly relevant for low-
development nations.
Regarding least developed nations, these findings strengthen the case to exempt them
from Northern demand-side mitigation actions. Although their emissions just represent
a very small fraction of the BCA scope (i.e. around 1.4% of total imported emissions),
the scheme could lead to a decline of 1.1% in their GDP, with related decreases of
0.8% and 1.2% in wages to skilled and unskilled labour. These nations are sensitive to
variations in trade flows (see Figure 12, page 83) and are in need of more development
opportunities.
8.5. Carbon and development spaces: The dilemma of
developing within limits
In spite of the efforts that have been undertaken by Annex B countries to curb carbon
emissions, these have continued growing monotonically as their societies have
become more affluent. A similar behaviour has been observed in the developing world,
whose emissions have increased at historical rates during the last decades, even
surpassing those of their wealthier counterparts (see Figure 9, page 49). The
possibilities of avoiding dangerous climate change in the long-run, in this sense, are
quickly diminishing unless immediate and sustained actions are taken. This is of
special concern for the poorest nations in the world, who are the ones that require most
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urgently greater opportunities to satisfy their basic needs and acquire more capacities
to adapt to a changing climate.
The results presented in Chapter 7 reveal the magnitude of the challenge. The carbon
space available from 2013 to 2050 amounts to roughly 249 Gt of carbon according to
the RCP3-PD, or RCP2.6, pathway (van Vuuren et al., 2007). As was explained in
section 2.1.1, this constitutes a novel scenario included in the IPCC (2013) Fifth
Assessment Report which is compatible with a 2°C target. Illustrative emissions
pathways for different regions are offered along with the scenario, and these were used
to determine region-specific budgets. As explained in section 7.2, the largest shares
are allocated to the current major polluters, rather than to those who possess the
lowest development levels. Very-high-human-development nations would hold slightly
more than a third of the carbon space, while China on its own would use almost
another third. Least developed nations would be entitled to utilising just 1.8%. This
clearly does not represent an equitable allocation of the carbon budget and diverges
with what authors like Khor (2010) have put forward. He has manifested that the
historical carbon debt owed by industrialised nations should be taken into
consideration, since this would significantly enhance the share of the developing world.
Moreover, it conflicts with the Greenhouse Development Rights Framework and related
ideas proposed by Baer et al. (2009), Chakravarty et al. (2009) and Kartha et al.
(2009), who have suggested that those who earn less than $16 to $20 dollars per day
or are responsible for less than one tonne of CO2 per year should be exempted from
taking up mitigation costs (see section 2.1.3). Their proposals conform to the UNFCCC
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and provide a significant portion
of the carbon space to the 70% of the world’s population who reside in medium- and
low-development nations. The bulk of the mitigation burden would thus fall on the
shoulders of the richest countries.
The regional emissions pathways associated with the RCP3-PD, however, imply
significant emissions cuts across all regions in per capita terms, even for least
developed nations. As a consequence, the longer it takes industrialised countries to
take significant and sustained actions, the less carbon space will be left for the poorest
regions. Medium-development countries still need to expand their current levels of
human development by another 40% on average in terms of their HDI scores in order
to attain the levels currently enjoyed by the topmost group. Meanwhile, least developed
nations have to double them. Given the current development trends already discussed
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in this chapter, based on an intensive use of fossil fuels, the less developed economies
are in need of more carbon space in order to achieve these improvements.
Wealthy nations have attained very high levels of human development, but have been
responsible for a significant portion of the GHG emissions that have been emitted into
the atmosphere (Goldemberg, 1995; Raupach et al., 2007; Wei et al., 2012). This can
be clearly observed by focusing on the last three decades. Their HDI scores increased
16.6% on average from 1980 to 2010 with an amount of cumulative emissions of
around 98.7 Gt of carbon. On the other hand, medium- and low-development nations
registered important improvements in HDI of 50.5% and 46.2% on average during the
same period, while generating 49.7 and 2.5 Gt of carbon, respectively (see Figure 33,
page 188). As can be observed, at high levels of HDI more emissions are required to
accomplish smaller enhancements in human development. In contrast, at low levels of
HDI, a rise in CO2 emissions delivers more than proportional increments (see Figure
34, page 189). In this sense, the marginal gains in human development that
industrialised nations could obtain in the future by generating more emissions are
minimal when compared to least developed countries, who could still achieve
significant advancements.
The relationship between HDI and CO2 per capita is represented by the carbon
elasticity of human development, which was estimated for the different regions. In line
with what has been said, the elasticities were revealed to be larger in those countries
with lower levels of human development and smaller in the more developed (see Table
30, page 194). This pattern reflects the different stages of economic development that
countries go through. While economies transit from the agricultural to the industrial
phases of economic development, rising emissions gradually deliver lower marginal
improvements in living standards. The results also showed that the elasticities
associated with consumption emissions tended to be slightly higher than those
obtained with territorial CO2, except for least developed countries. In the case of the
very-high- and high-human-development groups, the consumption elasticities were
almost 20% larger, and their consumption curves were situated above their territorial
ones. These countries, consequently, obtain more human development benefits via
international trade. In the case of the low-development group, the results evidence their
dependency on trade, an issue that has already been discussed in this chapter. These
findings, on the whole, are consistent with the ones obtained by Steinberger et al.
(2012).
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As long as the patterns of economic development are followed, based on resource-
and carbon-intensive economic growth, improvements in HDI will continue being
associated with rising emissions. It is important to have in mind, nonetheless, that
countries present a high level of heterogeneity in terms of their development
trajectories. Important lessons could be learned by examining certain outliers; that is,
nations that have not adhered to the global trend and have thus been attaining more
development benefits with lower emissions. This, however, is a matter for further
research. Another aspect that is worth highlighting is that, in general, it has become
possible to attain a given level of human development over time with lower emissions
(Steinberger and Roberts, 2010). In other words, a gradual decoupling between human
development and CO2 emissions has been taking place, illustrated by an upward shift
of the estimated curves. This phenomenon is analogous to the one described by
Preston (1975), who analysed the relationship between income per capita and life
expectancy. He found that life expectancies of between 40 and 60 could be achieved
with lower incomes in the 1960s than thirty years earlier. In line with his arguments, it
can be said that the disassociation between HDI and emissions is due to technological
improvements, a better provision of public education and health services, as well as
other national, regional and global development policies, such as the MDGs. It must be
noted that income per capita, which constitutes an important component of HDI, has
not contributed to the decoupling. As has been explained, the results from the carbon
EKC analysis found no signs that emissions have delinked from income per capita. The
decoupling process is thus being manifested via the education and health components
of the HDI, although these sub-indices were not analysed individually in this thesis to
determine their specific contributions. Steinberger and Roberts (2010) focused on this
task. They found, for example, that high literacy rates stand out as being attainable at
very low levels. More research, however, is required to analyse this decoupling
process, identify its underlying causes and distinguish in which regions it is taking place
more rapidly. The present examination suggests that it has been more emphasised in
high-human-development nations than in less developed areas. Preston (1975) also
hinted that in relative terms this process occurs more slowly at low income levels and
somewhat faster at higher levels. Jack and Lewis (2009) have criticised this assertion,
stating that health levels have improved in poor countries at a faster rate than in rich
countries, although from a lower starting point. However, it is also true that emissions
have grown at a faster pace in poor regions. More work is therefore needed to produce
firm and definite conclusions in this regard.
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With the use of the estimated elasticities and by allowing the estimated curves to shift
upwards over time to simulate prospective efficiency gains, regional HDI scores were
extrapolated into the future according to the yearly emissions described by each of the
RCPs. A relevant finding is that high-development nations, which possessed an
average score of 0.758 in 2012, managed to attain very high human development
levels of nearly 0.95 on average in 2050 by using 18% of the available carbon space.
This amount of cumulative emissions entails curbing their annual per capita emissions
by around 50% with respect to their current levels as described by the RCP3-PD. This
indicates that many of these nations, which include some big emerging economies, are
in a position to adopt legally binding emissions reduction targets. In fact, some
countries like Brazil and Mexico have already proposed to reduce their GHG emissions
by up to 36% and 30%, respectively, by 2020 with respect to their BAU trajectories
(UNFCCC, 2011a). In contrast, more modest improvements were estimated for
medium- and low-development economies under the RCP3-PD, which amounted to
8.43% and 1.55%, respectively (see Figure 37, page 201). These figures reflect their
larger carbon elasticities and, hence, their stages of economic development. In the
case of the former group, to which China belongs, making use of nearly half of the
available carbon space (i.e. 43.5%) allowed it to improve its average HDI score from
0.640 in 2012 to 0.694 in 2050. As has been argued in this chapter, these countries
cannot continue supporting their development strategies on carbon-intensive activities,
and urgently require achieving significant efficiency gains. China, for example, has
announced a national strategy to reduce its carbon intensity by 55% to 60% by 2020
with respect to its 2005 levels. This could be achieved, as has been proposed by Liu et
al. (2013), by following an approach based on recycling, using more renewable energy
sources and reinvigorating its domestic energy market. Regarding least developed
countries, using the 1.8% of the available carbon space under the RCP3-PD is clearly
not enough to deliver improvements in their living standards. Unless they adopt an
alternative model of economic development, they will require a larger carbon budget,
which is to be freed by the developed world. In order to accomplish this, the North
would require reducing its per capita emissions by more than 80% by 2050 with respect
to its current levels. This would entail enormous abatement efforts. On the other hand,
if Northern economies curb their emissions by using demand-side measures as a
complement to technology-led mitigation actions, caution has to be taken to avoid
affecting the South via international trade. As has been explained in the previous
sections, potential development gains in the developing world could be offset by a
lower demand of imports from the North.
Chapter 8: Discussion 225
Under a development-as-usual scenario, depicted by the RCP8.5, the analysis showed
that medium-development nations could achieve an HDI level of 0.791 in 2050, which
is a score similar to the one currently held by the best ranking high-development
nations (see Figure 37a, page 201). Nonetheless, this requires almost twice the
emissions (259 Gt) specified in the RCP3-PD. Low development countries, in turn,
would attain an average HDI score of 0.704 (see Figure 37b), involving almost three
times the amount of cumulative emissions (12.21 Gt) than those stipulated in the
RCP3-PD. Following this pathway, however, implies that the average global
temperature will exceed the 2°C threshold by the end of the century, likely ranging
between 3.8°C and 5.7°C in relation to pre-industrial levels (Rogelj et al., 2012; IPCC,
2013). The effects of a changing climate would increase the vulnerability of the poorest,
underdeveloped and most climate-exposed societies. This would impose negative
impacts on their human development levels, potentially curtailing their progress and
elevating the adaptation costs (see section 2.1.1).
The projections produced here differ from those produced by Costa et al. (2011).
According to their reduction framework, the authors estimated that 85% of the world’s
population could live in countries with an HDI score above 0.8 by mid-century by
following their current development trajectories. They argue that this expansion is
possible within an available carbon space of 272 Gt of cumulative emissions of carbon.
However, their framework considers that nations that have surpassed the 0.8 threshold
should undertake very steep and abrupt reductions. Moreover, they allocate less
carbon space to the already developed world than the RCP3-PD. They acknowledge,
nonetheless, that without these reductions, cumulative emissions could reach 600 Gt
by 2050, a figure higher than the one considered by the RCP8.5. Steinberger and
Roberts (2010), on the other hand, found that thresholds of around 0.25 and 0.7 tonnes
of carbon by 2030 can ensure global high human development standards in relation to
life expectancy and HDI, respectively. In this analysis, however, the shares for each
country group were used as they are offered by each of the RCPs and new
configurations were not explored. As has been explained, the objective of this study is
not to probe different allocation frameworks or novel pathways, but to examine the
human development implications of prominent emissions scenarios.
In relation to least developed countries, the results reveal that they are not only
sensitive to changes in trade, as was argued in section 8.3, but also to changes in
emissions, as a consequence of their current stage of economic development. Their
progress can thus be seriously constrained if they are just allowed to use 1.8% of the
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available carbon space. However, the results show that significant enhancements in
human development can be achieved by tripling their share. This amount of cumulative
emissions is still small, compared with the rest of the country groups, and this fact can
be considered as a positive sign. The caveat is that under the current patterns of
economic development, it is expected that their emissions will increase beyond this
amount when they start becoming more industrialised and start consuming more
resources and energy. Nonetheless, these nations are currently facing an important
historical conjuncture. In contrast to their more developed counterparts, least
developed countries are still not locked-in or stuck on a particular development path.
As late-comers to the global development process, they face an historic opportunity.
Given their low starting point in terms of emissions and resource use, they can avoid
adopting the traditional development pathways followed by the rest of the world and
start developing in a low carbon and resource efficient manner. This would allow them
to leapfrog or tunnel through from their current stages of economic development to
higher echelons, skipping the dirty stages of development experienced by industrialised
nations and currently by high- and medium-development economies. This
transformation will require substantial efforts at the national scale and assistance from
the developed world.
Formulating alternative development pathways not only for least developed nations, but
also for the rest of the countries is essential under the stringent limits imposed by the
available carbon space. A number of ideas have been explored, such as the climate
compatible development strategies (Mitchell and Maxwell, 2010; Bruggink, 2012;
Linnér et al., 2012; Román et al., 2012), the Circular Economy scheme (Yuan et al.,
2006; Mathews and Tan, 2011), the notions of Green Economy and Green Growth
(OECD, 2011; UNEP, 2011) or the concept of sustainable structural transformation
(UNCTAD, 2012). These constitute some examples of ongoing work, but more
research at macro and micro scales is still required to find ways of facilitating a
transition towards a low-carbon, high-developed, and sustainable global economy.
As has been said in the introductory chapter of this thesis, humanity’s greatest
challenge is not only to maintain the average global temperature below the 2°C
threshold by the end of the century and thus avoid dangerous climate change. It is also
being able to improve the living standards of billions of people across the world. These
two objectives are embodied in the concepts of the carbon and development spaces.
The author of this thesis believes that they represent a useful way to frame this dual
challenge and integrate the discourses from the climate change and development
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communities. As explained in section 2.1.3, the nexus between climate and
development has not been fully acknowledged in research and policy circles. In
particular, they can be useful to stress the importance of developing future emission
pathways that place a stronger emphasis on the enhancement of human development
within the confines of a 2°C target. The notion of carbon space, specifically, highlights
the relevance of using cumulative emissions as an appropriate approach for creating
climate-economy models and examining policy options (Anderson and Bows, 2008;
Allen et al., 2009; Meinshausen et al., 2009; Zickfeld et al., 2009; Bows and Barrett,
2010). In terms of policymaking, both concepts are useful to emphasise the fact that
policies should not be regarded from a unilateral perspective, but rather from an
inclusive viewpoint that takes into account the needs of both developed and developing
nations.
***
This chapter provided a discussion about the main findings presented in this thesis. In
this manner, it offered valuable insights about the compatibility between climate change
mitigation and global development from a demand-side perspective. The next chapter
offers the main conclusions derived from this research.
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Conclusions
After discussing the main results derived from this study in the previous chapter,
valuable insights were obtained from which conclusions can be drawn. The present
chapter starts by providing a brief summary of the findings and presenting the main
conclusions related to each of the research questions outlined in the introduction of this
thesis. This is done in section 9.1. The main contributions to the knowledge base are
then presented in section 9.2. The limitations involved in this research project are
acknowledged in section 9.3. Future research paths are then suggested in section 9.4.
Some final remarks are offered at the end in section 9.5.
9.1. Brief summary of findings and main conclusions
As was explained in the previous chapter, answers were successfully provided in this
thesis to each of the related research questions outlined in the introductory chapter
(see section 1.2, page 9). These answers contributed to fulfilling the overarching aim.
In this section, the main conclusions related to each research query are highlighted,
offering a short summary of the findings.
Emissions tend to grow monotonically with income.
Is the Environmental Kuznets Curve for carbon valid from a consumption-based
approach? Exploring this first question served as a starting point for this study. As was
explained in section 2.2.3 (page 49), accepting the validity of the EKC hypothesis for
carbon would imply that no trade-offs exist between achieving emissions cuts and
enhancing global development through an expansion of income per capita. Under this
view, an appealing option for policy makers to combat climate change would be to
encourage increases in income per capita around the world. However, the results
presented in Chapter 4 indicate that emissions tend to grow monotonically with income,
showing no discernible signs of having decoupled over time. This evidence thus leads
to definitively reject the existence of the hypothesised inverted-U curve in the case of
CO2 from a consumption-based perspective. It can be concluded that it is not possible
to grow out of the problem. In the process of becoming wealthier, nations tend to be
responsible for a higher volume of emissions associated with the consumption of a
larger amount of foreign goods. They also become locked-in with existing
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infrastructures. This fact is of concern, as the evidence indicates that income and
consumption per capita are increasing in the developing world, and this is exerting a
considerable pressure on the environment (Hubacek et al., 2007).
Northern mitigation-induced reductions in demand can curtail the development
opportunities available to the South.
How much value added and wages paid to skilled and unskilled labour in developing
countries are associated with every unit of CO2 that is mitigated in different sectors
through reductions in consumption in industrialised nations? This second research
question addresses the trade-offs between implementing mitigation-induced reductions
in demand in the North and attaining development benefits in developing economies
through international trade. The findings presented in Chapter 5 lead to the conclusion
that while curbing final demand for imports in the developed world can contribute to
reduce its consumption-based emissions and free carbon space, they can also curtail
the development opportunities available to the global South. Least developed countries
are dependent on trade, and are specifically sensitive to changes in their exports of
agricultural and mining products. In turn, medium-human-development economies, to
which China belongs, are more sensitive in the case of industrial activities. For
instance, a reduction of 1% in consumption-based emissions driven by a fall of demand
for light-industry imports in the North would cause a decline of 5.9% in GDP in the
former nations, while their total wages to skilled and unskilled labour would drop by
3.7% and 7.7%, respectively. This evidence, however, should not be considered as a
justification to preserve the current levels of consumption, particularly in industrialised
nations. The literature acknowledges the pressing necessity to make global
consumption more sustainable. This study represents an initial approach to the
problem and evidences the risks that are involved if these actions were to be taken
unilaterally without a deeper understanding about their potential consequences.
Moreover, it allows the identification of countries and sectors that are more vulnerable
to changes in the flow of traded goods in order to find ways to hamper these negative
impacts.
BCAs can potentially distort trade flows and jeopardise development in the
South.
How much value added and wages paid to skilled and unskilled labour in developing
countries are associated with CO2 emissions that would be captured in different sectors
230 Chapter 9: Conclusions
through the implementation of border carbon adjustments in industrialised nations?
This third research question addresses a similar trade-off, this time involving the
implementation of BCA schemes in economies subject to legally-binding emissions
reduction commitments and improving welfare levels in the South through international
trade. As explained in section 2.3.3 (page 64), some developing nations have opposed
their implementation, asserting that they represent trade barriers and shift the
mitigation costs onto the developing world. However, their proponents argue that they
are vital to avoid carbon leakage and level the playing field. The results lead to the
conclusion that BCAs can potentially distort trade flows and cause a reduction in
exports and slower economic growth in the South, along with a decline in wages paid
to skilled and unskilled workers. This, however, depends on the breadth and depth of
the scheme, which could be significantly limited by the existing trade agreements and
the intended sectoral and country coverage. The amount of CO2 that could be captured
varies between 45% to less than 10% of total consumption-based emissions in the
importing region. This challenges the effectiveness and viability of a BCA scheme,
which would be complex and costly to operate. The most carbon-intensive nations,
such as China, could face the largest tariff burdens. For example, if BCAs induced a
contraction in final demand for imports of around 1% in the priced region, this would
cause a drop in GDP of about 2.8% in medium-human-development countries, with
associated reductions of 1.6% and 2.8% in wages to skilled and unskilled labour. The
repercussions, however, could be subdued if the revenues obtained from the BCA
scheme were remitted back to the exporting countries in the form of aid, technology
transfer or assistance for adaptation efforts.
The available carbon space compatible with a 2°C target is insufficient to deliver
significant improvements in living standards in medium- and low-human-
development countries given the continuity of the status quo.
To what extent can human development be improved in the developing world within the
limits of the available carbon space as defined by the RCP pathways given the
continuity of the status quo? This fourth question addresses the challenge of the
equitable sharing of the development and carbon spaces. According to the RCP3-PD,
or RCP2.6, the total amount of future cumulative emissions that is unlikely (i.e. <33%
probability) to exceed the 2°C target is equal to about 249 Gt of carbon (IPCC, 2013).
Given the illustrative regional emissions pathways included in this scenario, the largest
shares are allocated to the current major polluters, rather than to those who possess
the lowest development levels. The results show that high-human-development nations
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can attain very high HDI scores in 2050, even by curbing their annual per capita
emissions by around 50% with respect to their current levels. In contrast, medium- and
low-development economies could be seriously constrained, given their prevailing
development patterns. They could experience modest improvements in their HDI
scores of about 8.43% and 1.55%, respectively. In this sense, the longer it takes
industrialised countries to undertake significant and sustained emissions reductions,
the less development opportunities will be available for the poorest regions. Under a
development-as-usual approach, depicted by the RCP8.5, both medium- and low-
development countries could achieve similar scores to the ones currently held by high-
development economies. Nonetheless, this would require them around 271 Gt of
carbon, slightly more than the entire RCP3-PD budget. Following this pathway,
however, implies that the average global temperature could likely (i.e. >66%
probability) range between 3.8°C and 5.7°C by the end of the century with respect to
pre-industrial levels (Rogelj et al., 2012; IPCC, 2013). Intermediate improvements, on
the other hand, can be achieved with the stabilisation pathways (i.e. RCP4.5 and
RCP6), but these would likely lead to average temperature rises beyond the 2°C
threshold (see section 2.1.1, page 13). It can thus be concluded that achieving this
target can seriously put at risk the development opportunities in the developing world
under the current patterns of economic development supported by carbon- and
resource-intensive economic growth. Hence, future climate negotiations must centre on
providing a larger share of the carbon space to those nations that need it the most to
enhance their development levels. Moreover, formulating alternative development
pathways not only for developing, but also for developed nations is vital to ensure a
transition towards an equitable, low-carbon, high-development, and sustainable global
economy.
The current patterns of economic development entail important trade-offs
between realising the necessary development space within the available carbon
space from a demand-side perspective.
Providing answers to each of the proposed research questions allowed fulfilling the
overarching aim, which is to assess the compatibility between climate change
mitigation actions in industrialised nations and improving development prospects in the
developing world from a demand-side approach. From what has been presented, it can
be concluded that there are important trade-offs involved if the world continues with the
current patterns of economic development. This does not imply, however, that these
trade-offs should persist. As has been said, a solution to climate change should not be
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accomplished at the expense of reducing the development opportunities of developing
countries. Achieving sustainable development involves enhancing the living standards
of the world’s population without transgressing the planetary boundaries.
9.2. Main contributions to the knowledge base
Each of the proposed research questions addresses a specific gap in the existing
knowledge base, which were identified in the literature review chapter. In this sense,
this thesis makes several contributions to different bodies of the academic literature.
Conclusive evidence to reject the validity of the carbon EKC from a
consumption-based approach
As was explained in section 2.2.3 (page 49), the findings related to the EKC for carbon
had been inconclusive regarding its validity. Authors, such as Ekins (1997) and
Rothman (1998), had suggested that a consumption-based approach is a more
appropriate way to analyse the hypothesis, than by employing the standard territorial or
production-based method. Conducting a robust and comprehensive analysis from this
perspective, however, had been difficult due to data availability. This study contributes
to the EKC literature, as well as to the bodies related to consumption-based
approaches by producing evidence to reject the existence of the EKC. This was
accomplished by using a set of global time series for CO2 developed by Peters et al.
(2011b) and by following a rigorous and robust methodological approach. Moreover,
this study makes a contribution by having estimated the speed of adjustment and the
long-term income elasticity of consumption-based CO2 emissions (see sections 4.3.5
and 4.3.6).
Quantification of the factor content of Southern exports associated with every
unit of Northern consumption-based carbon emissions
Various bodies of the academic literature have recognised the need to address
overconsumption, particularly in the developed world. However, the economic and
development consequences in developing countries caused by reductions/changes in
consumption levels via international trade have been scarcely explored. This thesis
makes a contribution to the climate change mitigation literature, as well as those bodies
related to development, sustainable consumption and steady-state and degrowth
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economics, by having quantified the magnitude of these effects. This thesis presents
for the first time the labour productivity of carbon for different country groups (see
section 5.5), based on an examination of trade in value added and the carbon
embedded in trade flows. This indicator reveals the sensitivity of different regions and
economic sectors to demand-driven mitigation actions, since it expresses the amount
of wages to skilled and unskilled labour that are associated with every unit of
emissions. Moreover, this study estimated the impacts on different country groups
caused by Northern mitigation-induced reductions in final demand for imports in terms
of losses in value added and payments to skilled and unskilled labour (see section 5.7,
page 157).
Quantification of the emissions captured by a BCA scheme and its potential
effects in the developing world
Much of the existing literature on BCAs has focused on examining the legal features
related to BCAs and their compatibility with the existing trade agreements.
Considerable work has also been undertaken to assess their ability to address
competitiveness issues and avoid carbon leakage. Nonetheless, there has been
insufficient research to calculate the potential amount of emissions that could be
captured by such as a scheme, as well as to determine which and to what extent
particular developing regions could be mostly affected. This study contributes to the
BCA, development and climate change mitigation literatures by analysing these two
last aspects. Moreover, it makes a further contribution for having estimated the different
tariff rates that developing countries would face according to a set of different factors
(e.g. trade provisions, sectoral and country coverage, etc.) (see section 6.3).
Estimation of improvements in human development in the South according to
the RCP pathways given the continuity of the status quo
A considerable amount of studies have been undertaken by climate and development
modellers in order to develop probable depictions of the future, and in the majority of
cases they have tended to work independently from each other (see section 2.1.3,
page 33). Most of the emissions scenarios have represented a central process of the
IPCC, and have been mainly based on assessing the technical advances and their
influence on the carbon intensity of GDP. Human development scenarios, on the other
hand, have tended to devote less attention to climate-related matters. In contrast, a
modest number of researchers have explored the relationship between human
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development and emissions. The literature is uncertain, however, about the extent to
which living standards could be improved across the South with the remaining carbon
space given the continuity of the status quo. This thesis contributes to the climate
change mitigation and development literatures by offering estimations of the potential
improvements in human development, as measured by the HDI, according to the
different RCPs included in the IPCC (2013) Fifth Assessment Report given the
continuity of the status quo. This was accomplished by calculating the historical carbon
elasticity of human development and the scale of the decoupling process for individual
regions. These estimations had not been presented before in the literature (see
sections 7.4 and 7.5).
9.3. Limitations of the study
In the light of the contributions that this thesis makes to the existent knowledge base, it
is important to acknowledge the limitations that are involved. Some of these limitations
have already been mentioned throughout the different chapters and are summarised in
this section.
As is the case with macroeconomic studies that use highly aggregated data, the level
of detail at the micro level is faded or lost. One aspect that must be acknowledged is
the heterogeneity between countries. Although this study identified global trends, many
nations have followed emissions and development pathways that diverge from these
general tendencies. Each nation possesses distinctive features, which are difficult to
distinguish in a study of this nature. The degree of the impacts that were estimated, for
example, derived from mitigation-induced changes in demand or from the
implementation of BCAs, could vary significantly from one country to another. A similar
situation applies to economic sectors. This study found, for instance, that these show a
variety of carbon intensities not only within nations, but also among them. Important
lessons could have been learned by identifying and examining relevant cases that have
not adhered to the global trends.
Another aspect that should be recognised is that non-CO2 GHGs (e.g. N2O, CH4 and
fluorinated gases) were not taken into account in the different analyses that were
conducted. These represent around 25% of total GHGs. As was explained in section
3.4, this data was not available at the level of disaggregation required by the MRIO
framework and was excluded from the panel data analyses to maintain consistence.
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Some estimations produced in this thesis, particularly in relation to research questions
2 and 3, would have showed slight variations if these gases had been taken into
account. This is particularly true for the results related to the agricultural sectors.
However, it is deemed that their inclusion would not have significantly altered the
magnitude and direction of the results and, consequently, the conclusions produced in
this thesis.
It must also be noted that the findings presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 related to
impacts on the developing world due to changes in final demand for imports in the
North reflect partial equilibrium effects. Prices were not included. Consequently, the
market-clearance condition (i.e. the point where global supply equals global demand
through a change in prices) required to achieve a general equilibrium in the economy
was not modelled. Changes in prices could potentially lead to a substitution for other
types of imported products or for imports from less carbon-intensive regions. It is
uncertain, however, to what extent the results could have varied. Nonetheless, once
again, the author believes that their inclusion would not have changed the direction of
the impacts nor modified the main conclusions.
Finally, in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, value added and wages to skilled and unskilled
workers were used as proxies for development indicators. Due to the methodological
nature of MRIO analysis, more appropriate indicators of human development (e.g. life
expectancy, observed and expected years of schooling, etc.) could not be included.
Data at this level of sectoral disaggregation was not available. However, the results
provided valuable insights regarding the scale and direction of the potential impacts.
9.4. Future research suggestions
The findings produced in this study, along with the limitations that have been
presented, suggest a number of potential avenues for future research that should be
explored in order to obtain a more complete understanding of the issues presented
here.
One of the main conclusions drawn in this thesis points out that Northern mitigation-
induced reductions in demand for imports can lower the development opportunities
available to the South. As has been said, this should not be interpreted as a
justification to avoid implementing demand-side mitigation measures and preserving
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the current levels of consumption, particularly in industrialised nations. On the contrary,
there is an urgent need to address overconsumption as a source of many of the
existing environmental pressures. This study represents an initial approach to the
problem, and it exposes the necessity to deepen our understanding of the processes
that are involved. In this sense, it generates new questions, opening the door to
multiple research paths. Specifically, the results presented in this thesis stress the
importance of determining ways to avoid exerting negative effects in least developed
nations via international trade. More research is required to identify, for example,
products that can be safely substituted or whose consumption can be discouraged.
Valuable insights could be obtained by examining existing programmes, such as Fair
Trade and other labelling and certification schemes, as was argued in section 8.3
(page 212). Similarly, further studies are required to assess the specific vulnerability of
different countries and regions to changes in the trade flows of particular products.
Due to the heterogeneity that exists between and within countries, a useful approach
would be to conduct case studies at different scales (e.g. local communities, cities,
regions, etc.) to understand how the livelihoods of the people who labour in particular
economic activities could be affected by Northern mitigation-induced reductions in
demand. One interesting and relevant case, for instance, would be to analyse how a
lower demand for commercial flights could affect the welfare of small nations or small-
island states that depend significantly on tourism, and how any negative effects could
be averted (see: UNWTO, 2012).
Another possible avenue for future research involves examining the mechanisms to
strengthen South-South trade relations and integrate more countries in order to reduce
their dependency on the North. Moreover, it is important to determine how the new big
emerging players, like China, can avoid adopting the same exploitation patterns
followed in the past by industrialised nations (see: Mol, 2011).
In methodological terms, computable general equilibrium models could be used to
assess the influence of prices on the demand for imports and the generation of CO2
emissions derived from the implementation of demand-side mitigation measures or
BCAs.
Furthermore, this thesis highlights the need to undertake further efforts to develop
more consumption-based indicators for a range of variables, from raw materials and
energy to a host of different pollutants. These indicators should complement the
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traditional territorial or production-based ones so as to attain a broader view of the
influence of consumption and thus support informed decision-making. Not doing so
could undermine the effectiveness of global climate efforts focused on attaining a
sustainable global economy.
9.5. Final remarks
As was expressed in the introductory chapter, this research represents an effort to
understand the trade-offs between undertaking climate change mitigation actions in
industrialised nations and improving development prospects across developing
countries from a demand-side approach. The various results presented in this thesis
allow drawing an overarching conclusion. Important trade-offs are involved if the world
continues with the current patterns of economic development. However, this assertion
does not imply that the implementation of mitigation-induced reductions in demand by
Northern economies should be avoided. Like was discussed, it is important to
determine how impacts to the developing world derived from these actions can be
hampered. On the other hand, it is essential to complement demand-side measures
with technology-led mitigation options. A large proportion of emissions are still territorial
in nature; that is, these are not embedded in international trade. Hence, efforts should
be redoubled to tackle these emissions, particularly those arising from energy demand.
This would allow lessening the impacts on Southern countries caused by lower trade
flows. One other message contained in thesis is the impossibility of continuing with the
current models of economic development. The non-declining levels of consumption in
industrialised nations are unsustainable and the developing world cannot follow this
same track. It is urgent to develop alternative development pathways that ensure a fair
and equal apportionment of the carbon and development spaces. Doing so within the
available timeframe would signify overcoming successfully humanity’s biggest
challenge.
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Appendix A
A.1. Country classification
A.1.1. Least Developed Countries
Africa (34)
Angola
Benin
Burkina Faso #
Burundi #
Central African Republic #
Chad #
Comoros *
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia #
Gambia
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau *
Lesotho #
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi #
Mali #
Mauritania
Mozambique
Niger #
Rwanda #
São Tomé and Príncipe *
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Sudan
Sudan
Togo
Uganda #
United Republic of Tanzania
Zambia #
Asia (14)
Afghanistan #
Bangladesh
Bhutan #
Cambodia
Kiribati *
Lao People’s Democratic Republic #
Myanmar
Nepal #
Samoa *
Solomon Islands *
Timor-Leste *
Tuvalu *
Vanuatu *
Yemen
America (1)
Haiti *
* Also a Small Island Developing State
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# Also a Landlocked Developing Country
A.1.2. Classification by level of development (UNDP)
Ordered according to 2013 HDI rankings:
Very high human development
1 Norway
2 Australia
3 United States
4 Netherlands
5 Germany
6 New Zealand
7 Ireland
7 Sweden
9 Switzerland
10 Japan
11 Canada
12 Korea (Republic of)
13 Hong Kong, China (SAR)
13 Iceland
15 Denmark
16 Israel
17 Belgium
18 Austria
18 Singapore
20 France
21 Finland
21 Slovenia
23 Spain
24 Liechtenstein
25 Italy
26 Luxembourg
26 United Kingdom
28 Czech Republic
29 Greece
30 Brunei Darussalam
31 Cyprus
32 Malta
33 Andorra
33 Estonia
35 Slovakia
36 Qatar
37 Hungary
38 Barbados
39 Poland
40 Chile
41 Lithuania
41 United Arab Emirates
43 Portugal
44 Latvia
45 Argentina
46 Seychelles
47 Croatia
High human development
48 Bahrain
49 Bahamas
50 Belarus
51 Uruguay
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52 Montenegro
52 Palau
54 Kuwait
55 Russian Federation
56 Romania
57 Bulgaria
57 Saudi Arabia
59 Cuba
59 Panama
61 Mexico
62 Costa Rica
63 Grenada
64 Libya
64 Malaysia
64 Serbia
67 Antigua and Barbuda
67 Trinidad and Tobago
69 Kazakhstan
70 Albania
71 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic
of)
72 Dominica
72 Georgia
72 Lebanon
72 Saint Kitts and Nevis
76 Iran (Islamic Republic of)
77 Peru
78 The former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia
78 Ukraine
80 Mauritius
81 Bosnia and Herzegovina
82 Azerbaijan
83 Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
84 Oman
85 Brazil
85 Jamaica
87 Armenia
88 Saint Lucia
89 Ecuador
90 Turkey
91 Colombia
92 Sri Lanka
93 Algeria
94 Tunisia
Medium human development
95 Tonga
96 Belize
96 Dominican Republic
96 Fiji
96 Samoa
100 Jordan
101 China
102 Turkmenistan
103 Thailand
104 Maldives
105 Suriname
106 Gabon
107 El Salvador
108 Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
108 Mongolia
110 Occupied Palestinian Territory
111 Paraguay
112 Egypt
113 Moldova (Republic of)
114 Philippines
114 Uzbekistan
116 Syrian Arab Republic
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117 Micronesia (Federated States
of)
118 Guyana
119 Botswana
120 Honduras
121 Indonesia
121 Kiribati
121 South Africa
124 Vanuatu
125 Kyrgyzstan
125 Tajikistan
127 Viet Nam
128 Namibia
129 Nicaragua
130 Morocco
131 Iraq
132 Cape Verde
133 Guatemala
134 Timor-Leste
135 Ghana
136 Equatorial Guinea
136 India
138 Cambodia
138 Lao People's Democratic
Republic
140 Bhutan
141 Swaziland
Low human development
142 Congo
143 Solomon Islands
144 São Tomé and Príncipe
145 Kenya
146 Bangladesh
146 Pakistan
148 Angola
149 Myanmar
150 Cameroon
151 Madagascar
152 Tanzania (United Republic of)
153 Nigeria
154 Senegal
155 Mauritania
156 Papua New Guinea
157 Nepal
158 Lesotho
159 Togo
160 Yemen
161 Haiti
161 Uganda
163 Zambia
164 Djibouti
165 Gambia
166 Benin
167 Rwanda
168 Côte d'Ivoire
169 Comoros
170 Malawi
171 Sudan
172 Zimbabwe
173 Ethiopia
174 Liberia
175 Afghanistan
176 Guinea-Bissau
177 Sierra Leone
178 Burundi
178 Guinea
180 Central African Republic
181 Eritrea
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182 Mali
183 Burkina Faso
184 Chad
185 Mozambique
186 Congo (Democratic Republic of
the)
186 Niger
A.1.3. Classification by level of income (World Bank)
Low-income economies ($1,025 or less)
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Benin
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gambia, The
Guinea
Guinea-Bisau
Haiti
Kenya
Korea, Dem Rep.
Kyrgyz Republic
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Myanmar
Nepal
Niger
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zimbabwe
Lower-middle-income economies ($1,026 to $4,035)
Albania
Armenia
Belize
Bhutan
Bolivia
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Congo, Rep.
Côte d'Ivoire
Djibouti
Egypt, Arab Rep.
El Salvador
Fiji
Georgia
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Ghana
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Iraq
Kiribati
Kosovo
Lao PDR
Lesotho
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Philippines
Samoa
São Tomé and Principe
Senegal
Solomon Islands
South Sudan
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Swaziland
Syrian Arab Republic
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Vietnam
West Bank and Gaza
Yemen, Rep.
Zambia
Upper-middle-income economies ($4,036 to $12,475)
Algeria
American Samoa
Angola
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Gabon
Grenada
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Jamaica
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Latvia
Lebanon
Libya
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Lithuania
Macedonia, FYR
Malaysia
Maldives
Mauritius
Mexico
Montenegro
Namibia
Palau
Panama
Peru
Romania
Russian Federation
Serbia
Seychelles
South Africa
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Suriname
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Tuvalu
Uruguay
Venezuela, RB
High-income economies ($12,476 or more)
Andorra
Aruba
Australia
Austria
Bahamas
Bahrain
Barbados
Belgium
Bermuda
Brunei Darussalam
Canada
Cayman Islands
Channel Islands
Croatia
Curaçao
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Equatorial Guinea
Estonia
Faeroe Islands
Finland
France
French Polynesia
Germany
Greece
Greenland
Guam
Hong Kong SAR, China
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Isle of Man
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea, Republic of
Kuwait
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Macao SAR, China
Malta
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Monaco
Netherlands
New Caledonia
New Zealand
Northern Mariana Islands
Norway
Oman
Poland
Portugal
Puerto Rico
Qatar
San Marino
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Saint Maarten
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Martin
Sweden
Switzerland
Trinidad and Tobago
Turks and Caicos Islands
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Virgin Islands (U.S.)
A.1.4. Annex I Countries
Australia
Austria
Belarus *
Belgium
Bulgaria *
Canada **
Croatia *
Cyprus
Czech Republic *
Denmark
Estonia *
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary *
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan **
Latvia *
Liechtenstein
Lithuania *
Luxembourg
Malta
Monaco
Netherlands
New Zealand **
Norway
Poland *
Portugal
Romania *
Russian Federation *, **
Slovakia *
Slovenia *
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey ***
Ukraine *
Appendices 287
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland
United States of America ***
(*) Economies in transition
(**) Countries that will no longer be
listed as Annex B for the period 2013-
2020, as they will not adopt binding
targets
(***) Countries not listed as Annex B
Kazakhstan is an Annex B country not
listed as Annex I.
A.2. GTAP 8 classification
A.2.1. GTAP regions
1. Australia
2. New Zealand
3. Rest of Oceania: American Samoa,
Cook Islands, Fiji, Federated States of
Micronesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall
Islands, Northern Mariana Islands, New
Caledonia, Niue, Nauru, Palau, Papua
New Guinea, French Polynesia,
Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga,
Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna,
Samoa, Pitcairn, United States Minor
Outlying Islands.
4. China
5. Hong Kong
6. Japan
7. Korea Republic of
8. Mongolia
9. Taiwan
10. Rest of East Asia: Macao,
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
11. Cambodia
12. Indonesia
13. Lao People's Democratic Republic
14. Malaysia
15. Philippines
16. Singapore
17. Thailand
18. Viet Nam
19. Rest of Southeast Asia: Brunei
Darussalam, Myanmar, Timor Leste
20. Bangladesh
21. India
22. Nepal
23. Pakistan
24. Sri Lanka
25. Rest of South Asia: Afghanistan,
Bhutan, Maldives
26. Canada
27. United States of America
28. México
29. Rest of North America: Bermuda,
Greenland, Saint Pierre and Miquelon
30. Argentina
31. Plurinational Republic of Bolivia
32. Brazil
33. Chile
34. Colombia
35. Ecuador
36. Paraguay
37. Peru
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38. Uruguay
39. Venezuela
40. Rest of South America: Falkland
Islands (Malvinas), French Guiana,
Guyana, Suriname, South Georgia and
the South Sandwich Islands
41. Costa Rica
42. Guatemala
43. Honduras
44. Nicaragua
45. Panamá
46. El Salvador
47. Rest of Central America: Belize
48. Caribbean: Aruba, Anguilla,
Netherlands Antilles, Antigua &
Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba,
Cayman Islands, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica,
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia,
Montserrat, Puerto Rico, Turks and
Caicos Islands, Trinidad and Tobago,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Virgin Islands British, Virgin Islands US
49. Austria
50. Belgium
51. Cyprus
52. Czech Republic
53. Denmark
54. Estonia
55. Finland, Aland Islands
56. France, Guadeloupe, Martinique,
Reunion
57. Germany
58. Greece
59. Hungary
60. Ireland
61. Italy
62. Latvia
63. Lithuania
64. Luxembourg
65. Malta
66. Netherlands
67. Poland
68. Portugal
69. Slovakia
70. Slovenia
71. Spain
72. Sweden
73. United Kingdom
74. Switzerland
75. Norway, Svalbard and Jan Mayen
76. Rest of EFTA: Iceland,
Liechtenstein
77. Albania
78. Bulgaria
79. Belarus
80. Croatia
81. Romania
82. Russian Federation
83. Ukraine
84. Rest of Eastern Europe: Republic of
Moldova
85. Rest of Europe: Andorra, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Faroe Islands,
Gibraltar, Monaco, the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, San
Marino, Serbia, Guernsey, Isle of Man,
Jersey, Montenegro, Holy See (Vatican
City State)
86. Kazakhstan
87. Kyrgyzstan
88. Rest of Former Soviet Union:
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
89. Armenia
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90. Azerbaijan
91. Georgia
92. Bahrain
93. Islamic Republic of Iran
94. Israel
95. Kuwait
96. Oman
97. Qatar
98. Saudi Arabia
99. Turkey
100. United Arab Emirates
101. Rest of Western Asia: Iraq,
Jordan, Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen
102. Egypt
103. Morocco
104. Tunisia
105. Rest of North Africa: Algeria,
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Western
Sahara
106. Cameroon
107. Cote d'Ivoire
108. Ghana
109. Nigeria
110. Senegal
111. Rest of Western Africa: Benin,
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Guinea,
Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Saint Helena,
Ascension and Tristan Da Cunha,
Sierra Leone, Togo
112. Central Africa: Central African
Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial
Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Chad
113. South Central Africa: Angola, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
114. Ethiopia
115. Kenya
116. Madagascar
117. Malawi
118. Mauritius
119. Mozambique
120. United Republic of Tanzania
121. Uganda
122. Zambia
123. Zimbabwe
124. Rest of Eastern Africa: Burundi,
Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Mayotte,
Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, Seychelles
125. Botswana
126. Namibia
127. South Africa
128. Rest of South African Customs
Union: Lesotho, Swaziland
129. Rest of the World: Antarctica
French Southern Territories, Bouvet
Island, British Indian Ocean Territory
A.2.2. GTAP sectoral classification
1. Paddy rice
2. Wheat
3. Cereal grains NEC
4. Vegetables, fruit, nuts
5. Oil seeds
6. Sugar cane, sugar beet
7. Plant-based fibres
8. Crops NEC
9. Cattle, sheep, goats, horses
10. Animal products NEC
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11. Raw milk
12. Wool, silk-worm cocoons
13. Forestry
14. Fishing
15. Coal
16. Oil
17. Gas
18. Minerals NEC
19. Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse
20. Meat products NEC
21. Vegetable oils and fats
22. Dairy products
23. Processed rice
24. Sugar
25. Food products NEC
26. Beverages and tobacco products
27. Textiles
28. Wearing apparel
29. Leather products
30. Wood products
31. Paper products, publishing
32. Petroleum, coal products
33. Chemical, rubber, plastic products
34. Mineral products NEC
35. Ferrous metals
36. Metals NEC
37. Metal products
38. Motor vehicles and parts
39. Transport equipment NEC
40. Electronic equipment
41. Machinery and equipment NEC
42. Manufactures NEC
43. Electricity
44. Gas manufacture, distribution
45. Water
46. Construction
47. Trade
48. Transport NEC
49. Sea transport
50. Air transport
51. Communication
52. Financial services NEC
53. Insurance
54. Business services NEC
55. Recreation and other services
56. Public Administration and Defence,
Health, Education
57. Dwellings
NEC: Not elsewhere classified
A.2.3. Sectoral classification used in chapter 5
1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing: paddy rice, wheat, cereal grains NEC,
vegetables, fruit, nuts, oil seeds, sugar cane, sugar beet, plant-based fibres, crops
NEC, cattle, sheep, goats, horses, animal products NEC, raw milk, wool, silk-worm
cocoons, forestry, fishing.
2. Mining and quarrying: coal, oil, gas, minerals NEC.
3. Light industry: meat (cattle, sheep, goats, horse), meat products NEC, vegetable oils
and fats, dairy products, processed rice, sugar, food products NEC, beverages and
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tobacco products, textiles, wearing apparel, leather products, wood products, paper
products, publishing.
4. Heavy industry: petroleum, coal products, chemical, rubber, plastic products, mineral
products NEC, ferrous metals, metals NEC, metal products, motor vehicles and parts,
transport equipment NEC, electronic equipment, machinery and equipment NEC,
manufactures NEC.
5. Electricity, gas and water supply: electricity, gas manufacture, distribution, water
6. Construction
7. Trade
8. Transport and communications: transport NEC, sea transport, air transport,
communication
9. Services: financial services NEC, insurance, business services NEC, recreation and
other services, public administration and defence, health, education, dwellings.
A.2.4. Country and sectoral classification used in chapter 6
Countries under the BCA scheme (shown according to GTAP number):
(1) Australia
(2) New Zealand
(6) Japan
(26) Canada
(27) United States of America
(49) Austria
(50) Belgium
(51) Cyprus
(52) Czech Republic
(53) Denmark
(54) Estonia
(55) Finland
(56) France
(57) Germany
(58) Greece
(59) Hungary
(60) Ireland
(61) Italy
(62) Latvia
(63) Lithuania
(64) Luxembourg
(65) Malta
(66) Netherlands
(67) Poland
(68) Portugal
(69) Slovakia
(70) Slovenia
(71) Spain
(72) Sweden
(73) United Kingdom
(74) Switzerland
(75) Norway
(76) Rest of EFTA
(78) Bulgaria
(79) Belarus
(80) Croatia
(81) Romania
(82) Russian Federation
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(83) Ukraine Cyprus and Malta are EU ETS member
countries, but are not listed as Annex B
parties.
Sectors covered by the scheme (shown according to GTAP number):
(12) Wool, silk-worm cocoons
(13) Forestry
(15) Coal
(16) Oil
(17) Gas
(18) Minerals NEC
(21) Vegetable oils and fats
(22) Dairy products
(24) Sugar
(26) Beverages and tobacco products
(27) Textiles
(28) Wearing apparel
(29) Leather products
(30) Wood products
(31) Paper products, publishing
(32) Petroleum, coal products
(33) Chemical, rubber, plastic products
(34) Mineral products NEC
(35) Ferrous metals
(36) Metals NEC
(37) Metal products
(38) Motor vehicles and parts
(39) Transport equipment NEC
(40) Electronic equipment
(41) Machinery and equipment NEC
(42) Manufactures NEC
(43)Electricity
Sectors 31 to 36 are considered as
trade-exposed sectors.
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Appendix B
B.1. Supplementary information
B.1.1. Additional information for Chapter 4
List of countries excluded from the carbon EKC analysis:
Namibia (126)
Rest of Central Africa (112)
Rest of Eastern Africa (124)
Rest of North America (29)
Rest of South Asia (25)
Rest of Southeast Asia (19)
Rest of the World (129)
Taiwan (9)
Zimbabwe (123)
GTAP region ID number is noted in parenthesis.
B.1.2. Additional information for Chapter 7
The Human Development Index
The HDI is a composite indicator that envelops three basic dimensions of human
development: life expectancy, education attainment and income per capita. These
dimensions are measured by the following variables:
 Life expectancy at birth (years)
 Mean years of schooling
 Expected years of schooling
 Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (PPP $)
Each of these sub-indices is normalised according to a min-max procedure:
I୧= actual value −minimum valuemaximum value−minimum value (32)
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Since two indicators are used for education, a combined education index is
constructed. The HDI is then calculated as the geometric mean of normalised indices
from each of these three dimensions.
ܪܦܫ= ඥܫ௛௘௔௟௧௛ ∗ ܫ௘ௗ௨௖௔௧௜௢௡ ∗ ܫ௜௡௖௢௠ ௘య (33)
For a full explanation of the method, see: Klugman et al. (2011).
Tables
The table below presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in HDI
analysis:
Table 32 - Descriptive statistics for the analysis undertaken in Chapter 7.
Statistic HDI T CO2 C CO2 T CO2 pc
C CO2
pc Population RCP3-PD
RCP3-PD
pc SSP1
World
Mean 0.61 136,448 200,023 4.54 6.06 33.09 139,961 3.11 46.16
Median 0.64 9,702 36,249 1.72 3.56 7.21 10,621 1.57 10.55
St. Dev. 0.19 550,327 646,664 6.74 7.01 120.55 640,280 4.29 155.32
Minimum 0.18 33 -1,241 0.01 -0.36 0.01 13 0.01 0.15
Maximum 0.95 8,286,139 6,976,284 68.62 56.51 1,318.17 9,124,263 38.03 1,550.00
No. Obs 4,210 4,889 2,625 4,889 2,625 5,240 6,800 6,800 6,800
VHD
Mean 0.81 276,098 331,030 10.39 12.59 22.64 198,570 6.09 28.17
Median 0.81 53,863 84,509 8.07 10.97 6.47 45,394 4.76 9.29
St. Dev. 0.06 799,392 879,394 8.44 7.33 44.84 611,596 4.77 57.86
Minimum 0.64 84 2,147 1.31 2.09 0.06 426 0.84 0.26
Maximum 0.95 5,828,167 6,282,316 68.62 56.51 310.38 5,692,772 38.03 411.10
No. Obs 1,240 1,311 882 1,311 882 1,395 1,760 1,760 1,760
HID
Mean 0.68 108,650 135,959 5.78 5.11 22.31 112,926 4.74 29.11
Median 0.69 27,405 51,503 3.33 3.68 8.20 31,471 3.11 9.37
St. Dev. 0.07 240,051 239,804 6.54 4.99 36.56 209,020 5.22 44.80
Minimum 0.44 37 -1,241 0.20 -0.36 0.01 843 0.28 0.35
Maximum 0.80 2,139,526 1,974,069 37.78 30.25 194.95 1,712,050 36.43 218.00
No. Obs 904 1,049 672 1,049 672 1,209 1,520 1,520 1,520
MED
Mean 0.57 153,032 220,471 1.79 1.97 69.63 240,182 1.65 88.30
Median 0.57 4,633 10,962 1.10 1.41 5.21 4,930 1.07 6.96
St. Dev. 0.08 669,651 751,401 1.89 1.55 232.79 1,080,461 1.68 291.04
Minimum 0.34 33 7 0.04 0.01 0.09 16 0.04 0.15
Maximum 0.71 8,286,139 6,976,284 10.52 7.50 1,318.17 9,124,263 10.00 1,550.00
No. Obs 985 1,190 609 1,190 609 1,260 1,720 1,720 1,720
LOD
Mean 0.36 6,755 16,152 0.29 0.36 19.71 9,716 0.20 37.88
Median 0.36 1,346 6,450 0.18 0.28 9.21 1,843 0.12 19.06
St. Dev. 0.08 18,326 27,463 0.29 0.30 30.42 26,519 0.22 54.25
Minimum 0.18 40 132 0.01 0.05 0.09 13 0.01 0.55
Maximum 0.53 161,381 175,558 1.78 2.38 173.59 215,580 1.54 328.60
No. Obs 1,081 1,339 462 1,339 462 1,376 1,800 1,800 1,800
Period 1980-2010
1980-
2010
1990-
2010
1980-
2010
1990-
2010 1980-2010
2011-
2050
2011-
2050
2011-
2050
Note: HDI corresponds to the 2013 UNDP’s Human Development Index. T CO2 and C CO2 correspond to territorial and
consumption emissions, respectively, expressed in thousand tonnes of CO2 per year. The acronym “pc” refers to per capita.
Population is expressed in millions. RCP3-PD corresponds to projections for yearly CO2 emissions from 2011 to 2050 (thousand
tonnes) compatible with a 2°C target. SSP1 corresponds to the projected population figures under the IPCC sustainable scenario
(2011-2050).
Source: Own table based on data by CDIAC (2013), IIASA (2012), Peters et al. (2011b), UNDP (2013) and UNSD (2013a)
Table 33, presented below, shows the results from the Westerlund’s cointegration tests
for the saturated and unbounded specifications in relation to territorial and consumption
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emissions. As can be appreciated, the results indicate that the variables used in the
analysis are not cointegrated.
Table 33 - Westerlund’s cointegration tests according to
functional specification and type of emissions
Statistic Territorial ConsumptionSaturated Unbounded Saturated Unbounded
Pt 9.58*** 9.06*** 5.55*** 5.88***
Pa 6.78*** 7.25*** 5.15*** 4.45***
Note: Reported Z-values. Tested with an average of 2 lags, based on AIC with a
constant. *** Null hypothesis of no cointegration accepted at a 0.01 level
The results from the regressions based on a dataset that encompasses territorial and
consumption emissions are presented in Chapter 7. Table 34, situated below, contains
the estimated parameters using the longer dataset of territorial emissions. Table 35, on
the other hand, shows the results from the regressions that include a dynamic
saturation term.
Table 34 - Prais-Winsten regression between HDI and territoral per
capita emissions (1980-2010) according to functional specification
Region Coefficient TerritorialSaturated Unbounded
Global
β 
-0.23***
(-30.72)
0.18***
(56.30)
A -1.11***(-34.23)
-0.41***
(-30.15)
R2 0.71 0.77
Very high
human
development
β 
-0.17***
(-26.30)
0.05***
(20.15)
A -1.35***(-29.57)
-0.25***
(-18.72)
R2 0.78 0.77
High human
development
β 
-0.07***
(-16.91)
0.04***
(12.55)
A -1.01***(-34.20)
-0.39***
(-25.17)
R2 0.89 0.82
Medium human
development
β 
-0.08***
(-32.05)
0.07***
(27.90)
A -0.83***(-42.61)
-0.49***
(-35.96)
R2 0.94 0.92
Low human
development
β 
-0.06***
(-44.88)
0.13***
(23.72)
A -0.56***(-37.55)
-0.66***
(-41.37)
R2 0.82 0.91
Note: Dependent variable: log of HDI. T-stats are shown in
parentheses. *** Significant at a 0.01 level.
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Table 35 - Prais-Winsten regression between HDI and territoral per
capita emissions (1980-2010) using a dynamic saturation term
Region Coefficient TerritorialSaturated
Global
β 
-0.07***
(-10.93)
A -1.81***(-85.12)
R2 0.92
Very high
human
development
β 
-0.21***
(-29.58)
A -1.57***(-169.75)
R2 0.97
High human
development
β 
-0.16***
(-45.20)
A -1.92***(-110.32)
R2 0.95
Medium human
development
β 
-0.18***
(-24.65)
A -1.87***(-42.18)
R2 0.95
Low human
development
β 
-0.25***
(-40.64)
A -2.47***(-60.32)
R2 0.88
Note: Dependent variable: log of HDI. T-stats are
shown in parentheses. *** Significant at a 0.01
level.
A number of countries had to be excluded from the analysis due to insufficient
observations for CO2 emissions or HDI values. In relation to the dataset that includes
consumption-based emissions, the excluded countries and regions are:
 Taiwan
 Rest of East Asia
 Rest of North America
 Rest of the World
With regards to the longer dataset of territorial emissions, the following nations were
excluded:
 Andorra
 Antigua and Barbuda
 Azerbaijan
 Bahamas
 Bhutan
 Eritrea
 Grenada
 Kiribati
 Liechtenstein
 Micronesia (Federated States
of)
 Occupied Palestinian Territory
 Oman
 Saint Kitts and Nevis
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 Saint Lucia
 Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
 Turkmenistan
 Vanuatu
